


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The Catholic University Bulletin

Vol. XVIII.

January, 1912.

No. 1.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL STUDIES
10 ELMSLEY PLACE
TORONTO 5, CANADA,

OCT 19 1931

J. M. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

AUG 30 1960

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ST. AUGUSTINE.

It is difficult to write about St. Augustine without appearing to exaggerate. Even to cite the encomiums of critics and historians, to put together the sentences in which great men have expressed their estimate of his greatness would leave one open to the charge of indulging in panegyric where critical examination would be more appropriate. On the other hand, one cannot open up the subject "St. Augustine" without some reference to the extraordinary greatness of his genius. He was great as a philosopher; he was still greater as a theologian. He was great in the personal sanctity which he attained, great in his zeal and prudence as a Churchman, great in his faults as well as in his virtues, and greatest of all, perhaps, in the simplicity of heart which enables us to see him as he really was. He combined, says one admirer, "the powerful and penetrating logic of Plato, the deep scientific conceptions of Aristotle, the knowledge and intellectual suppleness of Origen, the grace and eloquence of Basil and Chrysostom." We may add that if he is second to the other great Christian teachers in any one respect, if he is lacking in the subtleness of metaphysical skill which characterized Athanasius, if he is inferior to Ambrose in practical institutional genius, if he is excelled by Aquinas in technical skill and in the gift of systematisation, he stands above them all in tenderness of heart and the supreme power of reaching the soul of his reader. Catholics have called him

"The greatest doctor of the Catholic World." But Protestants have claimed him too. Harnack has said "No man since Paul is comparable to him," and less thoughtful Protestant writers have maintained that "Augustine is the father of evangelical protestantism as Pelagius is of Catholicism." Evidently it is not easy to praise St. Augustine and at the same time keep within the bounds of reasonableness and of logical consistency. It is safer, therefore, to refrain from the attempt to estimate his genius, and to give mostly from his own writings, an account of the life and character of the man and a sketch of his system of thought in its broad outlines and its main tendencies.

One phase of his genius, however, is a matter of unanimity among historians. His influence has been unique and perennial. He was the great, indeed, the only teacher, of Latin Christianity in its higher problems for eight hundred years. And even after the influence of other great teachers was established, after Thomas of Aquin had come to be the acknowledged master in the schools, after Aristotelianism had supplanted Platonism in the seats of learning, outside the schools, in the non-academic world, Augustine still taught and still teaches in simple, untechnical language, in the fervid eloquence that flows from heart to heart, the lessons of Christian piety. We go to other teachers for our theology and our technical philosophy, although to him those other teachers owe much of what they have to give; but to him directly we go for inspiration, consolation and spiritual enlightenment. If scholastic theology leaves the heart cold and the philosophy of the schools fails to solve the problems of life, there is in St. Augustine a source of spiritual warmth and a wealth of ethical inspiration on which the world will always draw as long as it appreciates the Christian view of life and the Christian way of living.

Our materials for the biography of St. Augustine are, fortunately, both abundant and varied. We have, first of all, his own "Confessions," that inimitable autobiography, so full of human interest. It is a superlative work in its own class. Others may equal it in sincerity and candor: they may show

an author great enough to reveal without mercy, but not without shame, his own imperfections, his own defects, his own sins. But no other "Confessions" are so serenely set in the key of the sublime. No other work of the kind is so elevated in tone and style as to avoid the commonplace, the sordid and even the vulgar. For Augustine had the courage to put his narrative in the form of a prayer and to lay bare his soul to His maker, so simply, so directly, with such complete absence of self-consciousness that as we read we sometimes feel that so clean a confession was indeed meant for no human ear, but for the ear and heart of Infinite Mercy Itself. There we have the story of Augustine's soul. Elsewhere, he left us the history of his mind. He was great enough to be able to acknowledge that he sometimes made mistakes. This is sometimes said to be an unmistakable sign of greatness. It is, at least, one of the signs. During his long career as a writer and a teacher Augustine was often obliged to change his opinions and to revise his earlier convictions. All these corrections he collected in a work called "Retractions," which is, therefore, a record of his opinions as the "Confessions" is a narrative of his inner spiritual experiences. We have a third source, the "Life of Augustine," written by his friend Possidius, which is an account of his public career, especially of his work as bishop and defender of the faith. With these three documents before us we have but to choose in order to get a complete and integral picture of the man, the scholar and the Churchman.

Augustine was born at Tagaste in Numidia about the year 354. His father, Patricius, was a pagan; but, owing to the example of Monica, that ideal Christian wife and mother, he was received into the Christian Church before his death in 371. The boy Augustine was brought up a Christian, although, in conformity with the custom then prevalent, he was not baptized. How carefully his pious mother watched over his early training, we can infer from what we know of her character. That she had a determining influence on her son's spiritual life is a fact so well known that it need not detain us here. In his "Confessions" he makes open and touching allusion to the

perseverance with which she prayed for his conversion to Catholic Christianity. When, in spite of her vigilant care, at Tagaste and, afterwards, during his school days, at Carthage, he gave himself up to a life of pleasure; when, as the renowned teacher of rhetoric, he was attracted by the Manichaean heresy and openly joined that sect, she followed him in spirit into all his waywardness of heart and intellect, besieging heaven with her prayers and her tears. "She mourned for me," he writes, "more than mothers weep the bodily deaths of their children." This, as has been said, is a fact so well known as to be almost a commonplace in literary biography. Behind the figure of Augustine, the convert and saint, is the gentle, patient, figure of his saintly mother. And that night at Ostia, on the eve of her death, when, looking out on the sea and the stars, they discoursed of heavenly things! Who has not read the noble passage in which the philosopher, now a Christian philosopher, showed the way "from Nature up to Nature's God" and the still nobler passage in which speaks the heart of the woman and the mother, now happy in her son's conversion? "Son, for mine own part, I have no further delight in anything in this life, I know not what I do here any longer, or to what end I am here, now that my hopes in this world are accomplished. One thing there was for which I desired to tarry longer in this life, that I might see thee a Catholic Christian ere I died. My God hath done this for me more abundantly, since I now see thee despising all earthly happiness in order to become his servant." Never was hope crowned by gladness, or sorrow long patient finally rewarded, more eloquently expressed than in this sublime *Nunc dimittis*. But what is not so generally known is the extraordinary mental power of St. Monica and her unusual aptitude for philosophy. For the thousands who read the scene at Ostia there is hardly one who knows of the conversations which took place at Cassiciacum immediately after Augustine's conversion. There with a few friends whose tastes agreed with his own, the converted rhetorician conducted philosophical debates amid scenes of idyllic simplicity and pastoral peace. In the cool shade of the gardens,

or in the portico of the villa, these friends discussed such themes as Happiness, Order, The Errors of the Platonists; and in all their learned discourse Monica took her part as one who was quite at home in the subtleties of the philosophers. Hear what St. Augustine writes: "Our mother was with us: we had long known her mind and her heart all on fire for the things of God. This we knew by close observation and continual companionship. But in the disputation which I held with my companions on my birthday about a very important matter, it struck me that her mind was so great as to be well adapted to the study of philosophy as any one's ever was."¹ It was evidently a revelation to him; perhaps the joy at his conversion awakened new powers in her mind. "Day by day," he says, "I saw her mind in a new light."² He cannot suppress his astonishment "Truly, mother," he writes, "you have stormed the castle of philosophy. You need only the words and you would express yourself like Cicero himself." Perhaps St. Augustine may seem to some to emphasize too much the exceptional nature of his mother's talent. "She had uttered these words so surprisingly that we forgot her sex and thought that some great man had taken his place among us."³ From the point of view of human interest, it is hard to say which is more enjoyable, the half-concealed surprise on the part of the philosopher, or the genial, sometimes witty disclaimer of the mother, whose modest opinion of herself is put to a severe test.

I have lingered in these details because I consider that without this knowledge of St. Monica in what we must call, I suppose, the stronger side of her character, it would be difficult to understand St. Augustine himself. In all that he wrote there was a certain *femininity*, as his critics call it. In his letters, especially, this is easily remarked. It is not so much a quality of his thought as of the manner in which he expressed his thought. Among the philosophers of Greece there was one who was nicknamed the Mothertaught. Perhaps St. Augustine would be the last to admit that he owed his philosophy to his

¹ *De Ord.* II, 1.² *Op. cit.*, II, 45.³ *De Vita Beata*, 10.

mother. His conversion, indeed, he freely attributed to her prayers; but we have just seen that his sense of loyalty to his own sex struggled hard in the admission that his mother had a talent for philosophy that was by no means common. Nevertheless, unconsciously, perhaps even by the mysterious ways of heredity, he must have owed some of his own talent to her, and the peculiarity of his genius to which I have just called attention would indicate some such derivation.

To return to his career. The dissolute student at Carthage became the brilliant professor of rhetoric, first at Carthage, later at Rome, and finally at Milan. For nine years he had remained an adherent of the Manichaean sect, which holds as its central doctrine the inherent evil of all material things and ascribes all evil, physical and moral, to the agency of the devil. This was a facile solution of a most perplexing problem. But, it was crude, and its crudeness, its vulgar coarseness, in fact, finally broke the spell that bound Augustine to it. Next, he turned to the Platonist philosophers and while still disturbed by the Platonic view, though not quite convinced, he came under the influence of St. Ambrose. These were two minds cast in entirely different moulds. St. Augustine, though an African of Latin descent and race, was a Greek in mind and heart. Ambrose was a Latin, trained in Roman Law and in Roman administration. The Greek mind with its love of artistic excellence and its appreciation of clear-cut ideas, drawn towards Platonism at last as a refuge from the confusion and discord of the sensuous, met the Latin mind with its sense of legal right and its appreciation of the value of institutions, its love of order and dignity and practical adjustment. The soul of Augustine craved for just such food as Ambrose had to offer, and the sermons in the basilica at Milan ended in a ceremony by which the waters of baptism flowed at last on a soul that was weary of its burden of sin and weary too of the war which it had carried on against doubt and error. Unfortunately, historians will not allow us any longer to believe that on this great occasion the *Te Deum*, in which the official Church voices her gratitude to God, sprang spontaneously from

the lips of both the bishop and his convert. We give up the legend with regret, for we think that grand hymn of praise could not have had a more fitting origin, nor has it ever been sung on an occasion more worthy of its majestic cadence.

Once converted to Christianity, Augustine became zealous, according to his nature, in such activities as suited his gifts and seemed to atone for his past offences. He took up the cause of truth against its sceptical opponents in philosophy. He championed the cause of orthodoxy against every form of heresy that had arisen. He became, too, a model shepherd of souls. Called to the See of Hippo in his native Africa, he administered the office of bishop with zeal and self-sacrificing devotion. Both as a pastor and as a writer, he combatted error. But, not content with a negative role, he taught, expounded and explained the truth. Disdaining no part of the duties of a pastor of souls, he preached to the people with the same success with which he wrote against the leaders of great heresies, and condescended even to instruct little children in the rudiments of the Christian faith. His death at Hippo in 430 brought his busy career to an end. It ended also the epoch to which he belonged. For his last days were disturbed by news that the barbarian invaders were before the walls of his episcopal city. Elsewhere these invaders had begun the work of destruction. In the decades that were to follow they were to continue that work, to wipe out the last vestige of Greek and Roman culture, to put an end to the decadent Latin civilization and prepare for the reconstructive activity out of which medieval Europe sprang.

Before passing on to the description of St. Augustine's system of thought, let us take up here a work of his on a topic suggested by this last remark, namely his *City of God*, in which he develops his philosophy of history. When in 410 Rome was captured and despoiled by the Goths under Alaric, the pagans attributed the city's downfall to the impiety of the Christians, and among the Christians themselves there was a good deal of consternation. For both pagans and Christians believed in the sacredness of the eternal city. The pagans had

placed it under the protection of their own deities and the overthrow of those deities by the Christians was, to the pagan mind, the cause of Alaric's success. The Christians, on their side, inherited an unexplained reverence for *Roma Immortalis*. They felt in some vague way that the destinies of the city somehow involved the destinies of the Church, and the destruction of the one seemed to threaten the indefectibility of the other. Indeed, the whole Christian world was shocked at the news of Rome's downfall, and was inclined to consider it a presage to the end of all things. It was the purpose of St. Augustine to show in this treatise that the true City of God is not Rome nor any other city however great, but the whole world, that City of God, of which "glorious things are said." The whole human race constitutes one commonwealth, of which the ruler is Divine Providence, a commonwealth which has for its constitution the Divine law, and for its citizens the children of God in every land and in every clime. Thus, for the first time, a point of view was established for the study of universal history, and a philosophy of history was made possible. In pre-Christian times there was no philosophy of history, because no historian could break through the national or racial prejudice that bound him to a partial and prejudiced view. "Proud Greece all nations else *barbarians* held" and the Roman included even the Greeks in his supercilious contempt of all that was not Roman. The belief that Christ died for all human beings, whether savage or civilized, whether Gentile or Jew, bond or free, ignorant or cultured, was a hard doctrine for the first pagan converts. But it prevailed, and established for the philosophical historian the possibility of viewing all the events of human history from the point of view of "the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man," a phrase now no longer empty and hollow, as it was in the contention of the Stoic philosophers, but full of practical meaning and put to many a severe test in the actual working out of the Christian system. All nations, then, and all races, are under the divine plan of government; and history, for St. Augustine is the slow, stern, reluctant rule of God's will, which human passion may

resist and human obstinacy may resent, but which works out its purposes in the end, in ways that are mysterious and in results that make demands on our patience and our faith. St. Augustine did not say the last word on the subject. He was followed by others who in some respects succeeded better than he in justifying the ways of God to man. But, he was a pioneer, and his success is to be judged not by detailed applications of his great idea, but by that great idea itself. Others who came after him emphasized other factors in human history: some laid stress on the material factors, others on the influence of great men, others on education and similar human institutions. One does not need to disregard any of these in order to give due credit to him who first viewed all history as the spiritual City of God, and placed above all other forces in history the power of Him who created material forces, sent great men into the world, and gave to the mind of man the power to educate and develop itself. The theological explanation of history is not exclusively theological. It is theological in the sense that it establishes a perspective of historical factors in which all but God are seen in their respective proportions and His power and His will are not denied their overshadowing pre-eminence.

The philosophy of St. Augustine in general is Platonic. That is to say it is a Christian adaptation of Platonism. How far he was read in the genuine works of Plato, and how far he was dependent rather on Neo-Platonic sources is a question which need not be discussed here. It is probable that, like many another since his time, Dante, for example, he was led to the Platonic way of thinking, not by much reading nor by diligent study but by a certain kinship of spirit which drew him to the Platonic philosophy as naturally as the light and heat of the sun draw the leaf and the blossom of the growing plant. He was born a Platonist; he found himself in an atmosphere of Platonism and the appeal which Christianity made to his mind was facilitated by his Platonic habits of thought. So that when he entered finally into the Christian world of thought he saw it all in the light of Platonism.

But, what is Platonism? There are in last analysis but two ways of thinking on the highest problems, the Aristotelian way and the Platonic way. The Aristotelian way is the way of science; its method is accurate observation, clear definition and sound syllogistic reasoning. It begins with facts and proceeds to laws. The Platonic way is the way of metaphysical poetry: its method is intuitive perception, spiritual comprehension and aesthetic realization. It cares not so much for the facts of the external world as for those of our own internal experience. It is interested less in nature than in human nature, and concerns itself less with human nature than with the world of intelligences that is above us. If there is an upward way, from the world of minerals, plants, animals and men, to the higher truths of a world above us, that is the Aristotelian way of knowledge. If there is a downward way, from the world of intelligences above us to our own world of human nature and thence descending through the realms of animal life, plant life and the mineral kingdom, that is the Platonic way. If the sceptic denies the validity of these ways, Aristotle tries to convince him, Plato is content with trying to persuade him. Aristotle supposes nothing: he calls our attention to facts of experience, and then goes on to reason on those facts. Plato supposes much, takes much for granted. He takes for granted the existence above us of a world of Ideas, in which there is no change, no imperfection, no decay, where everything around us exists in a higher, in a more perfect, in an absolutely perfect form. He cannot prove this, he can only ask us to believe in it because it is beautiful, because our heart longs for it, because, if we did not believe in it, then our plight would be a very sad one indeed. Do you perceive here the blending of the emotional and the esthetic with the purely intellectual? Do you catch the appeal to the love of beauty as well as to the truth-hunger in us? That is Platonism. The Platonist is enamoured of the beauty of Truth, the Aristotelian is concerned about the truth of Beauty.

St. Augustine was a Platonist. He shows this in his method, and he shows it in the contents of his philosophy. There are

two subjects in which his interest as a philosopher centers, and they are God and the human soul. The phenomena of nature, the events of history, the experience which is commonly supposed to make up our "lives," in a word, the "fleeting show" that passes in part before the eyes of each of us, and is in part recorded for us as the experience of others—the world of nature, the world of history, the world of my experiences and of yours—all this is the object indeed, of knowledge. It is not mere illusion. But it is not the object of Wisdom (*Sapientia*) or the highest knowledge. The highest knowledge has for its object spiritual truth, God and the soul. And which of these comes first? St. Augustine acknowledges that there is a *trace* of divinity in the material world and in history. It is possible, by searching, to find in the study of nature and of historical events intimations of a divine origin. But the *image* of God is in our own souls. In a pure heart and an untroubled soul God is mirrored; as in the clear, unruffled surface of the lake one may see reflected the green hills and rugged rocks that surround it, or rather, let us say, the calm, unhurrying courses of the stars that are shining in their immense distances above it. *Noverim me, noverim Te.* "To know God one must first know oneself." This, however, is only part of the truth. To know ourselves, we must know God. And thus, like a true Platonist, he holds that the lower is known by the higher; the way of knowledge is the downward way. "I believe in order that I may understand." *Credo ut intelligam.* Faith is not merely intended to baffle the understanding, to bring reason to its senses, to teach us how to become humble intellectually. It aids reason. It throws a flood of light on the problems which reason unaided cannot solve. And of no class of truths is this so strikingly true as of those which relate to ourselves. We are full of unexplained mysteries. There is in us a longing for happiness even before we know what happiness is. There is in us a hunger for truth even before we know what truth is. We cannot understand this enigma until we look above and beyond us and see Infinite Happiness and Infinite Truth. Then, we begin to know that it is a longing for God and a

hunger for God that make heart and mind restless until they rest in Him.

Let us try and understand this attitude. There have been other great thinkers who called our attention to man's desire for happiness and knowledge. What is peculiar to St. Augustine is the way that he explains this desire, and the use that he makes of it in his philosophy. Others, be they philosophers or poets or great moral teachers, or men of science or philanthropists, have stood in awe of man's capacity for happiness and knowledge. They have treated that fundamental need of our nature with respect and even with reverence. They have shown us how passion thwarts us in our search for happiness, how self-interest blinds us and false pleasure leads us astray. They have set up the guiding lights to show us the true way, and urged all the virtues which are necessary if we are to succeed. St. Augustine cuts across all their carefully planned directions. "Go not outside thyself," he writes; "in the inner man, in thine own soul, dwell happiness and truth." It is not by the study of nature, then, nor by the careful consideration of how others succeeded or failed; it is not by science nor by the study of history or biography nor by the observation of life around us that we are to find the path to happiness and to knowledge, but by studying ourselves and going up to God as the source of our own half articulate longings, that we are to learn true wisdom. Introspection thus takes precedence over observation. But introspection itself is only the preliminary to contemplation. The heart must be pure, the soul must be clear and untroubled, so that when we look into it we see the reflection of the Happiness which is infinite and the Truth which is eternal.

Occasion required that St. Augustine should formulate proofs for the existence of God, and there are many such proofs throughout his voluminous writings. But, let me emphasize here a remarkable fact. These proofs are for the doubter or the unbeliever, for him who hesitates or who has had the temerity to deny the existence of a Supreme Being. For St. Augustine himself, the existence of God is not a conclusion. It is rather a premise. It is a presupposition of all knowledge.

Thus, he argues "In order to know anything as good or beautiful or true, and to distinguish it from what is not good or beautiful or true, we must possess a standard of judgment and comparison. The standard, in order to be trustworthy, must be immutable and, in order to be always available, must be always present to our minds. Such a standard, immutable, omnipresent truth and goodness and beauty can be God and God alone. Therefore God exists." Here an Aristotelian would have much to say by way of criticism. But we are not criticising. We are describing a state of soul, and the state of soul is Platonic. St. Augustine is not reasoning himself into belief in God; he is revealing the fact that for him God is a presupposition of all thought. With the thought of God we start, and by means of it we justify our judgments and account for all our thoughts.

It is the same with the problem of happiness. Every man desires to be happy. Some seek happiness in those things which do not really embody it, but present a phantom semblance of it. They spend their lives chasing shadows and are lured by false appearance away from those things in which happiness truly consists. But even they desire happiness. Now, they could not desire what is entirely unknown to them. Therefore, there must be in their souls an intimation, a vague impression of true happiness. God must have touched them with the divine fire. And is it not a curiously pathetic thought, that the criminal and the libertine must unconsciously have caught fire from the Infinite Happiness of God, to set ablaze in their souls the conflagration that leads to the tragedy of their own lives and the wreck of the lives of others? God is, then, a presupposition of action as well as of thought. He planted in every human heart that insatiable thirst for Truth which leads to thought and the equally unquenchable desire for happiness which leads to action. These are the two mighty arms which He stretches out to His creatures, and there is no true rest or satisfaction until they fold over the returned prodigal or clasp the pure soul of the saint that has never faltered in his life-journey towards them.

There is emotionalism here as well as philosophy. But,

where there is Platonism emotionalism cannot be absent. That is why Platonism has been nearer the hearts of the people than any other philosophy. It speaks the language of sentiment, which all understand. It is not technical in its phraseology, it requires no preliminary training in dialectic on the part of those who would make progress in its method. It demands a pure heart and a clean conscience, and commits its case to these in preference to the rules of syllogistic reasoning or a profound study of natural science. That is why Platonism appealed to the mystic and to the successful popular preacher. And that is why all during the later Middle Ages, when Aristotelianism was dominant, there were many pious souls who found in the Platonism of Augustine a solace and an inspiration which they sought in vain in the philosophy of the schools. The author of the *Imitation of Christ* was one of these. His contemptuous allusions to accurate definition and formal proof are to be understood as a protest against the Aristotelian way of philosophising.

Besides emotionalism there is in the central doctrine of St. Augustine very much of the personal element. We know how troubled and intellectually how checkered his own life was. He may, indeed, be said to have "tried all things." It took him long to realize that in his waywardness he was doing violence to his own better nature. But when he did realize it, his response was generous, wholesouled, unreserved. He could not help making his own case that of human nature in general, and exalting into a universal principle the way of salvation which he found happiness in following. This is Platonic too. The Aristotelian subjects every conception of science to the discipline of logic; the Platonist tries every sentiment in the crucible of spiritual experience. In the literature of the Aristotelian school it is mind speaking to mind. In the writings of the Platonist heart speaks to heart. This too contributes to the popularity of St. Augustine, not only among those who agree with him, but also among those who, while failing to share his beliefs, cannot resist the fascination of a genius that takes us, as it were, into the sacred intimacies of personal

friendship and addresses us with the directness and even familiarity that give to friendly intercourse its chief charm.

I have tried to give an idea of how St. Augustine puts God at the beginning and at the end of all human action and human thought. "From God to God" is the soul's history. But, what is the soul? Here, once more, we may see the Platonist approach a problem of philosophy in a manner peculiar to his school. One of St. Augustine's greatest gifts was his power of observing and portraying states of mind. He knew his own soul and he had the ability to describe what he saw in the souls of others. Yet, he does not appear as a Humanist, so to speak, in psychology. The soul, for him, is of supreme interest because it came from God, because God is its life and its light, and because it goes to God when this earthly career is over. He does not agree with the Platonists who taught the pre-existence of all human souls in an intelligible world above us before they were united with the body. The soul was created, but when it came into the world it brought with it "clouds of glory," not, indeed, ideas acquired in a former existence, but the germs, as it were, of ideas which it develops here below into a knowledge of God and of spiritual truth. Plato, as is well known, taught that all knowledge is recollection; that to learn is to recall what we knew before in a previous existence. St. Augustine will not go so far as that. Yet, he says the soul when it first learns of God seems to recall ("reminisci") a knowledge of God, for it lives in Him and lived in Him from the first moment of its existence.⁴ Hence the exceptional importance which he attaches to Memory. Memory, he teaches, is a faculty of the soul coördinate in dignity with intelligence and will. Recent psychology has come to regard memory as a faculty somehow inferior in dignity to the other powers of the mind. And the popular estimate agrees with recent psychology. If you praise a man's judgment, or his reason, or his power of observation, he is, usually, pleased, and takes it as a compliment. If you say that he has a good memory you hardly please him at all; you seem, indeed, to damn him with faint praise. And we all

⁴ *De Trin.*, Lib. xii and xiv.

know how readily one admits that he has a "poor memory," while the admission "My judgment, or my reason, or my power of observation is at fault," is very rare indeed. St. Augustine does not share this popular depreciation of memory. For him, memory is a most important power of the soul. In it are stored up, so to speak, our unthought ideas. "When a man begins to reflect," he says, "he will find in his own soul thoughts which he already knew, but on which he has not hitherto reflected."⁵ When, in search of truth, we wander out into the world of nature, or of history, we should know that truth is not there, outside us, but in our own souls, and all that we can get from the outside world is a hint that sends us back upon our own thoughts and causes us to reflect on them. We are, if a trivial comparison may be allowed here, like the absent-minded man who looks all over his room for the pen that is behind his ear or the spectacles that he is wearing all the time. Truth is in us, and all we have to do is to reflect on it, in order to make it our own. Thus, Memory assumes a rôle of very great dignity and very great importance in our mental life. It is the storehouse out of which the thinking man brings "new things and old."

This coördination of Memory with Intelligence and Will makes it possible for St. Augustine to maintain that the human soul is an image of the Trinity. "Three in one" is a description of the faculties of the soul and the substance of the soul, with which they are really identical. Here, again, the point of view is Platonic. The fruit of the study of the soul is not merely a deeper and a clearer knowledge of ourselves. Psychology does not merely tell us what we are in our own nature and what our place is in the world of nature around us. Its fruit is a knowledge of higher spiritual truths, and its effect is to teach us how we stand related to the spirit world above us. The knowledge of our own souls is a Jacob's ladder leading up into the regions of light inaccessible, on which lessons of spiritual import are continually ascending and descending. This doctrine more than any other gave life and con-

⁵ *De Trin.*, xiv, Cap. v.

tinued influence to St. Augustine's philosophy in medieval times. Even in the darkest ages, when very little attention was given to psychology, and there was no original effort to think out the problems of mind, this notion persisted that the soul of man is an image of the Trinity, and that by studying the threefold mental life in ourselves we may attain to some imperfect realization of the greatest of Christian mysteries.

There is, it need hardly be said, much more in the philosophy of St. Augustine than his attitude towards the problem of God and the problem of the soul. And besides, his philosophy, is his great, imposing, complex, system of theology, with its discussion of Free Will and Predestination, Grace and Sanctification, the question of Divine Providence, the problem of Evil, the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity and the nature of the Church's Sacramental system. All those have to be passed over, and many questions of philosophy, which it would take too long to discuss. Enough has, I hope, been said to show what manner of thinker St. Augustine was. He was the Plato of Christianity. The Platonic view, as has been said, came naturally to him. It suited his mental temperament, and it satisfied the age in which he lived. One may not dare to say that as a philosopher he improved on Plato, but it may be said, without belittling Plato, that St. Augustine, as a Christian thinker, added much to Platonism by which Platonism was richer, more vital, and better adapted to the needs of humanity. He was a popularizer in the best sense. And this accounts for his influence which was, and is, great even among those who have no special interest in philosophy and theology. He had the genuine humility that goes with true greatness. His great gifts of intellect command our admiration and respect, but, it is the greatness of his heart that binds us to him in love and, if one may say so, in friendship. We admire him in his great effort to systematise Christian truth as he understood it, but we like best to picture the mighty mind, whose struggle was with the giant spirits of heresy and error, condescending to the level of the minds of little children and smoothing over the difficulties that lie in their path of knowl-

edge. His manual on how to teach Catechism to the unlettered does him more credit, we think, than all his learned works on philosophy and theology. It was inspired by the same motive that inspired all his efforts. Perhaps the keynote to his complicated character is given us in the sublime words with which St. Monica concludes one of the dialogues on philosophy: "Yes, that is, beyond all doubt, the happy life which we must strive to attain in unshakable faith, enthusiastic hope and glowing love." ⁶

WILLIAM TURNER.

⁶ *De Vita Beata*, 35.

A DEMOCRATIC KING OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

At first blush that phrase of Dr. Walsh "the thirteenth, the greatest of centuries" seems very bold indeed. To the superficial reader of history, to the legions who are duped by the vulgar clap-trap anent the "Dark Ages," to those who consider our modern era as superior to the middle age as is the strong man in the prime of life to the infant in swaddling clothes, the title of the Doctor's work must have seemed only an expression of exaggerated enthusiasm, or an attempt to prove the unprovable. No doubt they received it with a smile of amused contempt—with a feeling somewhat akin to that of the Jews of old when they put their famous question: "Can any thing good come out of Nazareth?" But their amusement and contempt must have simmered down considerably on reading the Doctor's able defence of his thesis; for he has shown, to the complete satisfaction of all unbiased readers, that his favorite cycle was at least very wide awake, not alone in the field of speculation, but in the practical sciences and the useful arts as well.

The present writer has as yet seen no reference to the fact that this same thirteenth century furnishes us with the most striking example in all history of a genuinely democratic régime. Not indeed a democracy in the strict modern sense of the term—with its widely extended suffrage and its (at least theoretical) supremacy of the people—but a democracy nevertheless in a very true sense of the word: in all that makes a democracy worth while: in an administration of the most impartial justice, in the equality of all before the law, and in a ruler who was one of the most thoroughly democratic men of all times.

The assertion will doubtless be deemed as bold as Dr. Walsh's—perhaps even bolder—and far less credible. All well-informed men know, of course, that there were republics in ancient Greece and Rome. They know too that the Swiss

Republic struck its roots in this very century that we are writing about. They may even know that the little republic of Andorra can trace its origin back to the days of Charlemagne, and that there has been a tiny republic—San Marino—in the Papal States for nearly three centuries. Yet, in spite of their knowledge, it is no slander to say that most Americans believe in their heart of hearts that there never was a real republic, or real democratic rule, until our own glorious commonwealth sprang into existence. With their notions of the much-decried, and oftentimes much-misunderstood, theory of the divine right of kings, they would never think of looking for a type of the best democracy in a European monarch—least, of all, perhaps, in a French monarch, and a monarch of the Middle Ages at that! And yet, paradoxical as it may seem, it is none the less true that one of the most genuinely democratic administrations in the world's history was that of a mediæval French king.

No thoughtful reader can lay down the *Memoirs* of that honest and lovable old chronicler, the *Sieur de Joinville*, without being firmly convinced that Louis the Ninth was one of the most democratic, as well as one of the wisest and best, of rulers. The picture the average man forms to himself of a mediæval monarch is that of an extraordinarily high and mighty personage, proud and aloof, difficult of approach, hedged about with a sort of divinity, standing upon a lofty pedestal to receive the homage, and almost the adoration, of his subjects; of a man who acted as though he were a being apart from, and by his very nature superior to, those whom he governed; acting often, in fact, as if he considered himself a being of another and much higher species. To such, no doubt, the caption of this article will look like veriest nonsense. "A democratic king" is a contradiction in terms. "A democratic French king" is worse; and as for "a democratic French king of the thirteenth century," the idea is simply ridiculous. Notwithstanding all this, we venture to assert that there never existed a more truly democratic ruler than Louis the Ninth of Mediæval France; never a ruler more easy of access, never a

kinder or a more sympathetic. Nor was his democracy a thing of fits and starts. It was absolutely consistent and unvarying. It was not the offspring of a worldly-wise policy, but the result of a genuine affection for his people. It was not founded on expediency or utility, but deeply and firmly rooted in the eternal principle of charity towards God and his fellow men.

When Louis came to the throne he found a rather slipshod method of dealing out justice prevailing throughout his dominions. The great feudal chieftains, or "lords of the manor," were, to all practical intents and purposes, absolute masters in their domains; not only landlords and executives, but also, to a large extent, lawmakers, judges and juries. In the patriarchal state this might do very well; but it was certainly not very satisfactory in the feudal state. No doubt there were many just and upright nobles who would scorn to take a mean advantage of their tremendous power, but the system, or lack of system, left entirely too much authority in the hands of grasping or revengeful petty sovereigns who would not hesitate to abuse it whenever it was to their interest to do so. Louis set himself to remedy this defect by giving his people that wise code of laws known as "*Les Établissements de St. Louis*," and created a new judicial organization—setting up in the various provinces royal courts of justice, or parliaments, to supersede the jurisdiction of the oftentimes arbitrary and unjust "lords of the manor."

I am not citing this great and good work of the saintly king as the strongest proof of his democracy: for Justinian and Napoleon too gave some very wise and just laws, and certainly they were not very excellent types of the democrat. But, taken in connection with the long and solid array of indisputable proofs that follow, it is well worth noticing. Louis not only framed wise laws, but saw too that they were well and wisely executed. He personally superintended the administration of justice whenever he had an opportunity and—what is most commendable and most characteristic of the man—his methods of dealing out justice were genuinely democratic. Never was there a juster, and seldom a wiser, judge.

De Joinville gives us an excellent portrait of Louis in his judicial capacity—so excellent that the imagination can readily picture the great monarch as he appeared on these occasions—rather plainly clad, sitting at the foot of his bed, or leaning against an old oak tree in the Wood of Vincennes, or again, seated on a carpet in the Jardin de Paris, with his people round about him—the father in the midst of his family—listening patiently, weighing the evidence impartially and passing sentence in strictest justice and equity, indifferent as to whether it affected friend or foe.

A loyal and devoted son of the Church and a staunch friend of the churchmen, he never allowed his friendship for them to make him swerve one iota from the narrow path of justice or square-dealing. On one very notable occasion, as De Joinville informs us, he preferred to array against him the whole French episcopate rather than betray his conscience in a matter of the kind. In the words of the old chronicler: "I saw him yet another time in Paris, when all the prelates of France had asked to speak with him, and the king went to the palace to give them audience. And there was present Guy of Auxerre . . . and he spoke to the king on behalf of all the prelates, after this manner: 'Sire, the lords who are present, archbishops and bishops, have directed me to tell you that Christendom, which ought to be guarded and preserved by you, is perishing in your hands.' The king crossed himself when he heard that word, and said: 'Tell me how may that be.' 'Sire,' said Guy of Auxerre, 'it is because excommunications are at the present day so lightly thought of that people suffer themselves to die before seeking absolution, and will not give satisfaction to the Church. These Lords require you therefore, for the sake of God, and because it is your duty, to command your provosts and bailiffs to seek out all such as suffer themselves to remain excommunicated for a year and a day, and constrain them, by seizure of their goods, to have themselves absolved.' And the king replied that he would issue such commands willingly whensoever it could be shown to him that the excommunicate persons were in the wrong. The bishops said they would

accept this condition at no price whatever, as they contested his jurisdiction in their causes. Then the king told them he would do no other; for it would be against God and reason if he constrained people to seek absolution when the clergy were doing them wrong. 'And of this,' said the king, 'I will give you an example, *viz.*, that of the Count of Brittany who, for seven long years, being excommunicated, pleaded against the prelates of Brittany, and carried his cause so far that the Apostle [the Pope] condemned them all. Wherefore, if I had constrained the Count of Brittany, at the end of the first year to get himself absolved, I should have sinned against God and against him.' " And happily, the lords archbishops and bishops had sense enough to see and admit the reasonableness of the king's contention, for De Joinville tells us that " the prelates then resigned themselves; nor did I ever hear tell that any further steps were taken in the aforesaid matter."

Nor did he ever fail to render a just verdict even when the verdict was against himself and his own interests. He was not the man to take an advantage of his high position or the technicalities of the law. He did not even give himself the benefit of a doubt; but, with all his power to over-rule and over-ride an adverse claimant, and with a host of obliging minions ever ready to advise a self-interested course and to back him up in it, he chose invariably to judge the case in strictest justice as between man and man treating himself and his rights with precisely the same consideration he gave to the meanest of his subjects. The following incident, related by the genial old Seigneur, will serve as an excellent illustration: "My lord Renaud of Trie brought to the saintly man a charter stating that the king had given to the heirs of the Countess of Boulogne, lately deceased, the county of Dammartin in Gouelle. The seal on the charter was broken, so that nought remained save half the legs of the image on the king's seal, and the stool on which the king set his feet. And the king showed the seal to all those who were of his council, and asked us to help him to come to a decision. We all said, without a dissentient, that he was not bound to give effect to the charter. Then he told John

Sarrasin, his chamberlain, to give him a charter which he had asked him to obtain. When he held this charter in his hands, he said: 'Lords, this is the seal I used before I went overseas, and you can see clearly from this seal that the impression on the broken seal is like unto that of the seal that is whole; wherefore I should not dare, in good conscience, to keep the said county.' So he called the lord Renaud of Trie and said: 'I give you back the county.' "

If justice and equity—a genuine regard for the rights of all, of the lowest as well as the highest; if plain and absolutely square dealing between man and man, irrespective of rank or condition, are at the bottom of all true democracy—its strongest foundations and its truest tests (as they certainly are), then most assuredly there never was a better or a more consistent democrat than King Louis the Ninth of France. Here is at least one mediæval monarch who did not consider himself the irresponsible owner of his kingdom; one at least who did not regard himself as a sort of divine personage or a being above all human law. Not for him the motto of the Britisher: "The king can do no wrong," nor that of one of his successors—the Grand Monarque—"L'État, c'est moi." Though wielding his great power at a time when "the divine right of kings" was at its zenith, when a constitutional monarchy was a something practically unknown, he was, by his own choice, a constitutional monarch or, better still, a thorough democrat. And he ruled his kingdom, and conducted himself in his private life, in a democratic spirit that is rarely to be found even in this professedly democratic age of ours.

Another, and a most striking instance of the man's inherent democracy was the freedom and familiarity of speech which he permitted, and encouraged, in those round about him. Not the reluctant yielding that springs from fear or weakness, for he knew no fear; and he was, by all odds, the biggest and strongest man in his kingdom. Nor let it be thought for an instant that he suffered such familiarity as was tolerated by the royal buffoon King James I of England. That is not necessarily an evidence of the democratic spirit; for thoroughgoing

democracy is perfectly compatible with a due sense of dignity and decorum. We cannot imagine King Louis listening to impudence or impertinence, or to anything inconsistent with what he owed to his position. But his democracy of spirit, his strong common sense; most of all, his Christian humility, made him ever lend a willing ear not only to those who had sound advice to give, but also to those who pointed out his faults or gently chided him for his blunders. No doubt this was one of the chief reasons for his attachment to the honest and blunt old Seigneur de Joinville. Plainness of speech, within the bounds of sense and reason, far from being a bar, was rather a passport, to the royal favor. Louis realized that, though a great king, he was after all only a man, with all a man's limitations, and that other men's brains and judgments might be better than his. We have many democrats in authority nowadays, but I wonder how many of them would compare favorably with the mediæval French king in this respect. Imagine the surprise and resentment of a modern republican executive at the bold language which De Joinville never hesitated to adopt in advising his king. When Louis, on one occasion, inquired of him what he expected for his services, the doughty knight answered boldly that he didn't want his money, but would prefer to make another kind of bargain with him; and when the amused monarch asked him what it was, he replied: "You wax wroth when one asks you for anything; so I wish you to make a covenant with me, that if I ask you for anything during the whole of the year, you will not be wroth, and if you refuse it, I on my side will not be wroth either." "When the king had heard this," continues the narrator, "he began to laugh aloud, and said he would keep me in his service on this covenant; and he took me by the hand and led me to the legate and his councillors and told them of the bargain we had made."

While Louis was in Egypt, during his first crusade, the Sultan of Babylon (Cairo) was murdered by his emirs; and it was commonly reported that the conspirators, assembled in council, were thinking seriously of placing the French king on

the dead soldan's throne. Louis asked De Joinville what he thought of the proposition, and the Seigneur bluntly replied: "I told him that had he so taken it, he would have acted like a fool, seeing they had killed their lord; but he told me that in sooth he would not have refused it." Another time when a crusader of rank had forfeited his horse for some misdemeanor, De Joinville tried to get the animal for one of his poor dependants; and on the king's refusal to grant his request, the sturdy seneschal reproached his majesty for failing to live up to their bargain: "And the king answered me that this request was not reasonable, seeing that the horse was still worth eighty livres. And I replied: 'Now have you broken our covenant, for you are wroth with me for my request.' And he said to me, laughing merrily: 'Say what you will, I am not wroth with you.'" And the old chronicler adds with a touch of dry humor, "Nevertheless I did not get the horse for the poor gentleman."

During the king's sojourn at Acre, a host of Armenians going on a pilgrimage to the Holy City, sought to see the saintly monarch of whom they had heard so much; and De Joinville was asked to be their spokesman and get them an interview. "I went to the king," writes the seneschal, "there where he sat in a pavilion, leaning against the pole of the pavilion; and he sat upon the sand, without a carpet, and without anything else under him. I said to him 'Sire, there is here outside a great troop of people from Great Armenia going to Jerusalem; and they pray me, sire, to cause the sainted king to be shown to them; but I have no desire as yet to kiss your bones.' He laughed aloud and told me to go and fetch them, etc."

"While the king was waiting at Hyères," writes De Joinville, "in order to obtain horses to come into France, the Abbot of Cluny presented him with two palfreys, which would to-day be well worth five hundred livres—one for the king himself, and the other for the queen. When the abbot had presented them, he said to the king: 'Sire, I will come again tomorrow to speak to you about my affairs.' When the morrow came, the abbot returned. The king heard him with great

diligence and at great length. When the abbot had departed, I came to the king, and said: 'I should like to ask, if it so pleases you, whether you have given ear to the Abbot of Cluny with the more favor because of those two palfreys that he gave you yesterday?' The king thought a long time, and then said: 'Truly, yes.' 'Sire,' I continued, 'do you know why I have asked you this question?' 'Why,' said he. 'Because, Sire,' I replied, 'I advise and counsel that, when you return to France, you forbid all your sworn councillors to accept aught from those who have matters to bring before you; for you may rest assured that, if they accept aught, they will listen more willingly, and with greater diligence, to those who have bestowed somewhat upon them; like as you have done to the Abbot of Cluny.' The king called all his council together and incontinently told them what I had said."

The account of a sermon to which the king listened, during this same short sojourn at Hyères, does immense credit to the characters of both the preacher and his royal auditor. It proves conclusively that the king was not unwilling to hear the truth, however unpalatable, and the preacher not afraid to utter it. The preacher in question was a learned and godly Franciscan named Brother Hugh, and this is the way the good brother began his sermon: "Lords, I see too many religious in the king's court and in his company. And, in the first place, I myself am one too many here; and this I say, because the religious here are in no condition to be saved—unless the Holy Scriptures lie to us, which cannot be. For the Holy Scripture tells us that a monk cannot live out of his cloister without mortal sin, any more than a fish can live out of water. And if the religious who are with the king say that his court is a cloister, then I say unto them that it is the very largest cloister that I ever saw. And if they say that in that cloister they can lead a hard life for the salvation of their souls, then I do not believe them; for I tell you that I have eaten with them here of divers meats in great foison, and drunk good wines both strong and clear, etc." He also told the monarch very pointedly how he should rule his realm and wound

up with this fearless advice: "Now let the king have a care, since he is going into his kingdom, that he execute right and justice among his people and remain thereby in the love of God so that God do not take from him both his kingdom and his life." And far from resenting this plainness of speech, the king was so pleased with it that he sought—though without avail—to keep the good brother in his company. Taking De Joinville by the hand, he said to him: "Let us go and beseech him to stay with us." So they went and asked, but the sturdy old monk replied: "Of a truth, sir, I will not do so. I shall go where God will love me better than in the king's company."

It may be objected that these instances of plain bold speech are rather to the credit of the speakers than to that of the king. Creditable to the speakers they certainly are, but certainly still more creditable to the royal heart and head. Men like De Joinville and Brother Hugh were bold with the boldness of conscious, unswerving truth and honesty. But, bold and straightforward, thoroughly honest and truthful though they were, it is not likely that they would have dared to address the king as they did, had they not known for a certainty how he would receive it. They knew well their man; knew him to be, like themselves, a lover of plain speech and plain dealing, a man who preferred the naked truth, how ungainly soever its appearance, to the most highly embellished flattery and sycophancy of the polished courtier. The knight and the monk were both men after his own heart—closely akin to him in character and conduct.

That the great king hearkened to such, and honored them, speaks volumes for both his head and his heart. It proves unmistakably the real greatness of the man. A man with a mean little head or a mean little heart, and at the same time invested with the dignity and authority of a king would not, and could not tolerate such bold enunciations of the truth. It was no undue lack of self-reliance, no sense of timidity or fear for his position, no weakness engendered by an impractical piety, that prompted Louis to favor such councillors. For there is not the slightest exaggeration in saying that there never

existed a stronger or a more fearless man. He was perfectly well-balanced, level-headed and practical. His sanctity did not interfere in the least with his practicalness as a ruler. He was at the same time a great saint and a great king; for, strange as it may seem to some, the two are perfectly compatible. If any man ever lived up to the motto "*fiat justitia, ruat coelum*," that man was Louis the Ninth of France. Justice—duty—was the guiding star of his life. Nor expediency, nor utility, nor self-interest, nor all the powers of earth and hell, could make him swerve one iota from the path of justice or duty. These assertions are fully borne out by the facts of his life.

When the emirs had murdered the Soldan of Babylon, "one of the (Saracen) knights whose name was Faress-Edin Octay, cut him open with his sword, and took the heart out of his body; and then he came to the king, his hand all reeking with blood, and said: 'What wilt thou give me? for I have slain thine enemy who, had he lived, would have slain thee.' And the king (looking upon him as did David upon the man who boasted of having murdered Saul) answered him never a word." With his army reduced to a comparative handful by war, privation and sickness, Louis was at last forced to make a treaty with the enemy; and though the latter proved treacherous and utterly failed to live up to the agreement, the king was determined to carry out to the very letter his own end of the bargain. One of its main provisions was an indemnity of 200,000 livres to the Saracens for the losses they had sustained, and when Louis discovered that his paymaster had purposely miscounted the money to the enemy's disadvantage, he was very angry. "I command you," said he to the paymaster—the Lord Philip of Nemourz—"by the fealty that you owe to me as being my liegeman, which you are, that if these ten thousand livres have not been paid, you will cause them to be paid without fail."

For his kingly position as such, he had but little regard. He accepted and maintained it only as a matter of duty and an instrument of doing good. As far as he was personally concerned, its loss, I daresay, would not have disturbed in the least

his peace of mind. With all the pleasures and luxuries of life at hand, he would have none of them, but rather elected, for God's sake, to suffer and toil and struggle against the enemies of the Cross till death released him, somewhat prematurely on the inhospitable sands of the African coast.

As regards physical torture and death he was absolutely fearless. In his first expedition he met with reverses and illnesses enough to discourage the bravest heart. At the time of his capture he was suffering terribly from a sort of plague (which De Joinville terms "the sickness of the host") and a violent dysentery which caused him to faint again and again. Still he kept up and on and, when he could easily have escaped, preferred to be taken captive rather than desert his people. And yet, with all this bitter experience before him, knowing full well what he was about to face, he hesitated not to take the Cross a second time, though on setting out he was so sick and weak that he could neither ride horse-back nor be drawn in a chariot, but had to be carried like a helpless infant, in the arms of the faithful De Joinville,—and reached Tunis only to breathe his last a few weeks later.

The Saracens themselves had the greatest admiration for the King's rare qualities of mind and heart—for his courage, his loyalty and steadfastness. They could not bring themselves to understand the secret of his endurance. I have already mentioned the report that, after killing their Sultan, the rebel emirs thought seriously of putting Louis in his place. It seems that the report was well founded, and that Louis would have actually been elected Soldan of Cairo, had it not been for that identical loyalty and steadfastness which his enemies so greatly admired, but feared still more. "The matter proceeded no further," says the chronicler, "because the Saracens said the king was the most steadfast Christian that could be found . . . And they said that if Mohammed had suffered them to be so maltreated as the king had been, they would never have retained their belief in him."

The following incident is well worth giving in its entirety as a striking instance of the point I am trying to make: "The

counsellors of the soldan had tried the king in order to see if he would promise to deliver over to them any of the castles of the Temple, or the Hospital, or any of the castles belonging to the barons of the land . . . and they threatened him and told him that, if he would not do as they wished, they would cause him to be put in the bernicles. Now the bernicles are the most cruel torture that any one can suffer. They are made of two pieces of wood pliable, and notched at the ends with teeth that enter the one into the other; and the pieces of wood are bound together at the end with strong straps of ox-hide; and when they want to set people therein, they lay them on their side, and put their legs between the teeth; and then they cause a man to sit on the pieces of wood. Hence it happens that not half a foot of bone remains uncrushed. And to do the worst they can, at the end of three days, when the legs are swollen, they replace the swollen legs in the bernicles and crush them all once more. To these threats the king replied that he was their prisoner, and that they could do with him according to their will."

Another instance in point is the conduct of Louis on the occasion of the above-mentioned treaty. "The last point in the oath was to this effect; that if the king did not observe his covenants with the emirs, he should be as dishonored as a Christian who denies God and His law and who, in despite of God, spits upon the Cross and tramples upon it. When the king had heard this (deeming it blasphemous) he said that, please God, he would never take that oath. The emirs sent Master Nicholas who knew the Saracen tongue, to the king, and he spake to the king these words: 'Sire, the emirs are greatly incensed, forasmuch as they have sworn what you required of them, whereas you will not swear what they require of you; and be assured that if you do not swear this oath, they will cause your head to be cut off, as well as the heads of your people.' The king replied that they could act in this matter as seemed best to them; but that he liked better to die as a good Christian rather than to live under the wrath of God and His Mother."

We have already given quite a number of incidents to illustrate the king's democratic spirit, his strikingly democratic policy of inviting plain speech, of accepting counsel and even criticism. We have shown conclusively that this characteristic of Louis was not the result of fear or weakness, for every act of his life proves him a man of unusual firmness of character and purpose—a man who knew no fear. But there are other instances still more to the point. In fact we have purposely kept for the last, the strongest and best proofs of his sense of oneness with the people—the common people—his genuine and deep love for them—a love resembling that of Christ, his Master, manifesting itself by a willingness to make great personal sacrifices for them, even to the extent of risking his own life: “We found that the king in person,” says De Joinville, “had caused the bodies of the Christians whom the Saracens had killed (at Sayette) to be duly buried; and he himself, in person, bore the decayed and evil-smelling corpses to the trenches in which they were to be buried; and he did this without ever holding his nostrils as others did.” I have already stated that Louis might easily have escaped the Saracens had he so willed, but that he preferred captivity with his people. Here is the fact as given by our old chronicler: “While we were going down the stream, the king who had upon him the sickness of the host and a very evil dysentery, could easily have gotten away on the galleys if he had been so minded; but he said that, please God, he would never abandon his people. That night he fainted several times; and because of the sore dysentery from which he suffered, etc.” When the king was returning from the Holy Land, his ship struck a sandbank on the island of Cyprus. After a careful examination, it was found that the sand had knocked off a considerable portion of the keel, dislocating the ship's timbers and rendering it unseaworthy; and the mariners advised Louis to leave it and go into another ship. The knights joined their entreaties to those of the seamen, and this was the king's reply: “Then the king said to the mariners: ‘I ask you, on your fealty, whether if the ship were yours, and freighted with your own merchandise,

you would leave her? And they all replied together, 'No,' for they liked better to put their bodies in peril of drowning rather than to buy a new ship at a cost of 4,000 livres and more. 'And why do you then advise me to leave the ship?' 'Because,' said they, 'the stakes are not equal. For neither gold nor silver can be set against your person and the persons of your wife and children who are here; therefore we advise you not to put yourself or them in jeopardy.' Then the king said to them: 'Lords, I have heard your opinion and that of my people, and now I will tell you mine, which is this: If I leave the ship, there are in her five hundred people, and more, who will land in this isle of Cyprus, for fear of peril to their bodies—since there is none that does not love his life as much as I love mine—and these, peradventure, will never return to their own land. Therefore I like better to place my own person, and my wife and my children, in God's hands than to do this harm to the many people who are here.' "

The thought ever uppermost in his mind was not of conquest, gain or glory, but the welfare of his beloved people: "The great love that he bore to his people," says the seneschal, in the opening chapters of his memoirs, "appeared in what he said during a very sore sickness that he had at Fontainebleau, unto my Lord Louis, his eldest son: 'Fair son,' he said, 'I pray thee to make thyself beloved of the people of thy kingdom; for, truly I would rather that a Scot should come out of Scotland and govern the people well and equitably than that thou shouldst govern them ill in the sight of all men.' "

It was the king's wont to wash the feet of a number of poor people on Holy Thursday, in imitation of Christ washing the feet of His Apostles, and on one occasion he inquired whether De Joinville did the like. The honest knight very bluntly replied that he did not, for he considered the practice rather unseemly. Louis closed the incident by remarking very aptly and drily that he would scarcely expect a creature to consider beneath him what the Almighty God Himself did not disdain to do. His love for his people did not stop at merely wishing them well, or washing their feet. He showed it in a truly

practical manner, by heaping benefits upon them to the full extent of his power. Anent this matter, De Joinville writes thus: "From the time of his childhood, the king had pity on the poor and suffering; and the custom was that wherever the king went, six score poor persons were fed every day in his house with bread and wine, and meat or fish. In Lent and Advent the number of the poor was increased; and oftentimes it happened that the king served them, and set their food before them, and carved the meat before them, and gave them money with his own hand at their departing. Particularly at the great vigils, before the solemn festivals, he served the poor in all matters as aforesaid, before he himself either ate or drank. Besides all this, he had every day to dine or sup near him old and broken men, and caused them to be fed with the same meats of which he himself partook; and when they had eaten, they took away a certain sum of money.

"Besides all this, the king gave day by day, large alms to the poor religious, to the poor in hospitals, to the poor sick and to poor communities; also to poor gentlemen and ladies and girls, and to fallen women, and to poor widows, and to women who were lying in, and to poor workmen who, through age or sickness, could no longer work at their crafts; so that it would hardly be possible to number his alms. Therefore may it well be said that he was more fortunate than Titus, the Emperor of Rome, of whom old writings tell us that he was sad and discomforted for any day on which he had not been able to confer a benefit."

Civil Service Reform, or the merit system, is one of the crying demands of our age and country; and to listen to the glib talk of our modern political reformers, one might almost be tempted to consider it, like most other good things that have come to us, as an altogether new discovery. But happily in this, as in so many other respects, the democratic French king of the Middle Ages was a pioneer, and may well serve as a model for our present day advocates of the merit system. What appealed to Louis was not the man's rank or station in life but his character and personal worth, and he invariably selected

for positions of trust the men who were noted, not for mere nobility of birth, but rather for their uprightness and efficiency. Thus, when the constableness of France became vacant he went outside his own realm to secure the services of Giles Le Brun, solely because he considered him the man best fitted for that office. One of his closest companions and most trusted counsellors was the commoner, Robert of Sorbon, whom Louis highly esteemed for his judgment, learning and character. When he ascended the throne, he found corruption rampant in the city of Paris. The provostship of the capital, like the imperial dignity in the days of Rome's decadence, was sold to the highest bidder, and the successful candidate generally reimbursed himself by accepting bribes and hush-money. As a result, there was little or no justice to be had from the municipal administration without a liberal use of gold. The friends and relatives and supporters of the provost were protected and upheld in wrong-doing; the provost's enemies, and all who failed to supply the cash, ignored. As the chronicler remarks: "The poor were greatly downtrodden; nor could they obtain justice against the rich because of the great presents and gifts that the latter made to the provosts."

As soon as Louis became acquainted with this state of affairs, he set about to remedy it by forbidding the sale of the office, increasing the provost's salary so that he might have no reasonable excuse for accepting largesses, and then causing an enquiry to be made throughout the whole kingdom "to find men who would execute good and strict justice, and not spare the rich any more than the poor." His search was rewarded by the discovery of Stephen Boileau, a man of stern, unbending principle, of exceptional ability and firmness, absolutely just and fearless—a man "who so maintained and upheld the office of provost that no malefactor, nor thief, nor murderer, dared remain in Paris, seeing that if he did, he was soon hung or exterminated; neither parentage, nor lineage, nor gold, nor silver, could save him."

Were more needed, we could give other instances in abundance to support our claim; but we feel that more than

enough has already been said to prove the point in question. The facts speak for themselves: they are most eloquent witnesses to the justice of our contention that a man may be a king and yet a genuine democrat. They show conclusively enough that, just as in a democracy we may find some, both governors and governed, who are anything but democratic at heart, so it is possible to find, now and then, as in the case of Louis the Ninth, a thorough-going democrat seated even upon a kingly throne.

JOHN E. GRAHAM.

ADDISON AND THE MODERN ESSAY.¹

I.

If, lifted on the wings of imagination, we should transport ourselves in space some 3,000 miles and in time some 200 years, and go back to the London of the days of Good Queen Anne, we should find it, not perhaps in essentials, but certainly in many outward aspects, very different from the London of to-day. Accustomed as we are to the bignesses of the twentieth century, we should doubtless consider it, from the point of view both of area and of population, somewhat insignificant in comparison with the immense city with which we are now acquainted, and which is by no means flattered when it is called the Modern Babylon. At the same time, however, we should find the London of the early eighteenth century seething with activity, busy and bustling with varied forms of life, full of its own importance, and, with its three-quarters of a million of inhabitants, well on its way to be the metropolis of the greatest empire that the world has ever seen.

We should, indeed, be made painfully aware of many drawbacks. The streets were narrow, ill-paved, and ill-lighted, and were infested by gangs of desperadoes and bullies, who made personal violence a practice and not infrequently plied highway robbery as a trade. Sanitation, in the modern sense, was not understood, and great heaps of filth lay about in exposed situations. To avoid surroundings so noisome the citizens did their travelling as much as possible on the River Thames, which, with its fleet of tilt-boats and barges, still remained the great thoroughfare for transportation of passengers and

¹ This article and its continuation, which will appear in the next number of the *Bulletin*, consist, in substance, of a lecture delivered October 19, 1911, in the series of public lectures organized by the administration of the Catholic University of America.

goods. Smarting from the recent application of Jeremy Collier's lash,² the stage wore a semblance of decency; but in society an aftermath of the scandalously profligate period of the Restoration and of the license of the court of Charles II. was clearly discernible in manners that were decidedly coarse and in morals that were somewhat lax. Superstition was widespread. Drunkenness, boxing, and duelling were common. Cock-fighting and the baiting of badger, bull, and bear were pursued with zest. Card-playing and lotteries and rash speculation had votaries in every walk of life. Relying on the never-failing asset of human credulity, the beauty-doctor and the quack vendor of nostrums and cure-alls flourished in the land. Not much fault on the score of aesthetics could be found with the dress in vogue among gentlemen: whether the same could be said of the attire of the ladies is at least open to question. In those distant days Englishmen of position wore—among other things—knee-breeches and full-bottomed wigs, and Englishwomen of quality went about arrayed in monstrously hooped petticoats and tricked out with party patches dotted here and there on their foreheads and on their painted and powdered cheeks. A busy, fussy, and, especially among the upper classes, a somewhat frivolous life was led.

There were, naturally, many topics of interest to engage the attention of those dwellers in London town; but the one outstanding subject that never seemed to pall was the war. In the spring of the year of grace 1709—the date to which our attention is to be first particularly directed—the War of the Spanish Succession had for seven years been waged with varying fortune on sea and land—in Spain, in Portugal, in France, in the Netherlands, in Bavaria, in Sardinia, in Minorca, in Italy, in Savoy. The student of the various phases of that memorable struggle has his attention held at every turn by famous historical characters—Prince Eugene and the Earl of Peterborough; Sir George Rooke, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, and

² Jeremy Collier's *Short View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the English Stage* was published in 1698, and his *Dissuasive from the Play-house, in a Letter to a Person of Quality*, in 1703.



the Count de Toulouse; Marshal Berwick and Marshal Boufflers; Villars and Jean Cavalier; Stanhope and Staremberg; Tallard and Vauban and Vendôme. The great captain, who never fought a battle that he did not win and never laid siege to a walled city that he did not take, who paralyzed the marshals and set at nought the engineers of the grand monarch, was in 1709 still lord of the ascendant. Handsome, courteous, debonair, diplomatic, ambitious of power, greedy of pelf, sordid indeed, if not corrupt, in money matters, John Churchill, first Duke of Marlborough, Prince of Mindelheim in the Holy Roman Empire, captain-general of the English troops at home and abroad, and master-general of the ordnance, was still actively engaged in that series of military manoeuvres which made all Europe thrill, which saved Vienna, which impoverished France, which forced Louis XIV. to sue in vain for peace, and caused French mothers to hush their wailing infants to sleep by invoking the dread name of Malbrook. This nonpareil commander had already won undying fame by his great victories of Blenheim,³ Ramillies,⁴ and Oudenarde,⁵ and in the September of this year his glory was still further to be increased, although at a terrible cost of lives, on the murderous field of Maplaquet.⁶ A Tory politician, who from many mixed motives, dominant among which was Self, had adopted a Whig policy, Marlborough was maintained in the proud and profitable position of commander-in-chief of the armies of the Grand Alliance by the intrigues of his clever, scheming, beautiful, shrewish wife, and by the Whig faction which then ruled, and for a year or so longer was to continue to rule, the roast in England.

With this war and with this commander, and with the Whig party which supported both, are inextricably intertwined the names of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele. Addison had obtained his first start in life from the Whigs, and he got his second chance by celebrating the victory of Blenheim in a poem, made to order, called *The Campaign* (December, 1704),

³ August 13, 1704.

⁴ May 23, 1706.

⁵ July 11, 1708.

⁶ September 11, 1709.

in which, in a simile that has been famous for two centuries, he likened Marlborough to an angel that rides in the whirlwind and directs the storm. As soon as he had penned that image his fortune was made, for in England this was the age of gold for literary men. He was in turn appointed a Commissioner of Appeal in Excise (1704), Under-Secretary of State (1706), Secretary to Lord Halifax on a mission to the Elector of Hanover (1707), member of Parliament (1708), Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and keeper of the records in Dublin Castle (1709), Secretary to the lords justices (1714), Chief Secretary for Ireland a second time (1714), a Commissioner of Trade and Plantations (1716), and finally a principal Secretary of State (1717), retiring from the last-mentioned office with a pension of £1,500 a year (1718). Some of his prose writings, too, are directly concerned with the war and with the policy that dictated its continuance. Such are his pamphlet, *The Present State of the War, and the Necessity of an Augmentation* (1707), his paper the *Whig Examiner* (1710), and his pamphlet *The Trial and Conviction of Count Tariff* (1713). In his opera of *Rosamond* (1707) he paid compliments to Marlborough in some rather indifferent lyrical verse. Nor must it be forgotten that his first contribution to the *Tatler* is linked up with the war in that quietly and quaintly humorous style which was to be the distinctive feature of so many of his future essays.

Steele was almost a life-long friend of Addison's. They were of the same age, they were boys together at the Charterhouse School, they were at Oxford together, and their names are indissolubly and forever associated together with the *Tatler*, the *Spectator*, and the *Guardian*. A more pronounced and ardent and belligerent Whig even than Addison, Steele owed practically all the success that he attained in public life to his Whig connection. He disappeared from the University in 1694 without taking a degree, and entered the army as a private soldier in the Life Guards. Luckily he dedicated his poem, *The Procession*, written on the death of Queen Mary, to Lord Cutts, Colonel of the Coldstream Guards, and through

the influence of that intrepid soldier he rose from the ranks to a commission, and was finally gazetted captain in Lord Lucas's regiment of fusiliers. It is doubtful if he saw any active service: somehow, despite the duel in which he participated as principal, we do not seem naturally to associate Steele with the idea of a fighting man. Recommended by Addison to the patronage of Lords Halifax and Sunderland, leaders of the Whigs, Steele was appointed in 1706 Gentleman Waiter to his royal highness, Prince George of Denmark, consort of Queen Anne; in the following year he received the then important post of Gazetteer or editor of the *London Gazette*; and in 1710 he was made commissioner of stamps. In common with Addison he suffered for his principles during the ascendancy of the Tories from 1710 to 1714; but when George I. came to the throne Steele was made a justice of the peace, deputy-lieutenant of Middlesex, and surveyor of the royal stables; he received the lucrative post of patentee of Drury Lane theatre and Governor of the Royal Company of Comedians; he was made a knight; and, on the suppression of the Jacobite rebellion of 1715, he was appointed a commissioner of forfeited Scotch estates. Many of his writings are fiercely partisan. When Marlborough was dismissed on December 31, 1711, Steele wrote *An Englishman's Thanks to the Duke of Marlborough*; even in the pages of the professedly non-political *Guardian* he could not entirely refrain from political controversy; and two of his publications, *The Englishman* and *The Crisis*, were, in the heyday of his political opponents, officially declared to be "scandalous and seditious libels highly reflecting upon her Majesty, upon the nobility, clergy, gentry, and universities of this kingdom," and by formal vote of 245 to 152 their author was, on March 12, 1714, expelled from membership of the House of Commons.

From active politicians and busy men of affairs of the type of Addison and Steele one would not ordinarily be inclined to expect any startling new departure in literature; and yet it was precisely with these two men that there originated a class of publication—the Periodical Essay—which both had in itself

the charm of novelty and was destined profoundly to influence literary form and output from their own day to ours not only in all English-speaking countries but also in nearly every nation of Europe.

Under the later Stuarts the newspaper press in England was practically in its infancy. If a man wished to work up public opinion on any question of the day, he wrote a pamphlet. This was read and discussed in coffee-houses, and generally provoked one or more pamphlets in reply. During the period of the Civil War (1642-1651) there had been various ephemeral newspapers, generally called *Mercuries*, which gave their readers some items of news combined with attacks on the opposite party; but, on the whole, political controversy was carried on by means of pamphlets, published separately and for a specific purpose. After the Restoration (1660) the newspaper grew gradually in importance. Sir Roger L'Estrange, himself a noted pamphleteer, started in 1663 two weekly papers, the *News* and the *Public Intelligencer*, which he "published for the satisfaction and information of the people." These were followed in 1665 by the *Oxford Gazette*, which became in the following year the *London Gazette*, and under the latter title has had a continuous existence ever since. The *Gazette*, then as now, contained little but paragraphs of news and official notices; and when men's minds were violently agitated, as, for example, during the wild excitement caused by the so-called Popish Plot of 1679-80, the pamphlet remained the favorite form of controversy. The pamphlet, in fact, was then to a large extent what a leading article or editorial in an influential newspaper, or what a letter from a public man to the *London Times*, is to-day. With the disappearance of the system of press licensing in 1695 more and more newspapers were established, and finally, in 1702, three days after the accession of Queen Anne, the first daily newspaper, the *Daily Courant*, appeared. This journal had distinct limitations, for the editor expressed his intention of relating only matters of fact and of avoiding comment or conjecture, so that the domain of the pamphlet was as yet by no means usurped. Some few years later, for ex-

ample, Swift published, in *The Conduct of the Allies* (1711), *The Barrier Treaty* (1712), and *The Public Spirit of the Whigs* (1714), three of the finest and most convincing pamphlets of which we have record; he used the pamphlet in 1724 with deadly effect in his celebrated *Drapier Letters* written against the acceptance of Wood's halfpence by the people of Ireland; and far on into the century the pamphlet continued to be a weapon ever ready to hand for politicians of all parties.

A great advance, however, towards a different order of things, politically and otherwise, that is, towards periodicity as against uncertainty in publication, was made in 1704 when Daniel Defoe, then in prison for the political offence of publishing his own pamphlet, *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters*, started his *Review*. It was entitled *A Review of the Affairs of France and of all Europe as influenced by that Nation*. Its principal topics were politics, news, and trade, but there was a lighter section intended to "bring people to read with delight." The title of this appendix was *Mercure Scandale: or Advice from the Scandalous Club*. Its purpose was thus stated by the editor: "After our serious matters we shall, at the end of every paper, present you with a little diversion, as anything occurs to make the world merry; and whether friend or foe, one party or another, if anything happens so scandalous as to require an open reproof, the world will meet with it there." The topics of the Scandal Club were questions in divinity, morals, war, language, poetry, love, marriage, and so forth, and it is obvious that the introduction of this Club and of the subjects it discussed approximates very closely to the model subsequently adopted in the *Tatler*, the *Spectator*, and the *Guardian*. We may, I think, justly go farther and say that it furnished very useful hints. Defoe's *Review*, begun on February 19, 1704, lasted for over nine years, until June 11, 1713, and thus it was not only the predecessor but was also the contemporary of the three more famous publications. It came out at first once, then twice, and finally thrice a week, reverting to a bi-weekly publication for the last ten months of its existence on account of the imposition of the halfpenny tax on newspapers and periodicals in August, 1712. Containing as it did political criticism as well as news,

it may be taken to be the direct ancestor of all the political magazines and reviews that have since appeared.

Among other predecessors of the Steele-Addison papers were John Dunton's *Athenian Mercury*, established in 1690, which contained questions to the editor on every variety of subject, with suitable answers—a modest forerunner in fact of the modern *Notes and Queries*; and the *British Apollo* (1708-11), which was of the same order as the *Athenian Mercury*, but devoted considerable space to verse and other occasional contributions and to the decision of wagers on cards and other bets.

It has been already stated that Steele was made official gazetteer in 1707. He was well off in the matter of income; which from all sources was at that date £1,025 a year; but he was notoriously extravagant and fond of display, and in consequence he was often deep in debt, and knew only too well the touch of the bailiff's hand and the inside of the sponging-house. Accordingly, he felt the necessity of strengthening his resources, and, being gifted in a marked degree with the journalistic instinct, he bethought himself of starting a paper to come out three times a week, and to be sold at one penny per number. There can scarcely be a doubt that his position as gazetteer and the fact that in that capacity he had early official knowledge of happenings abroad and especially in connection with the war, which was then in all men's minds and on all men's tongues, was one of the determining causes of this decision; another, I feel certain, was the comparative success of Defoe's *Review*; but the great factor was the man's innate tendency to publish, spurred as it was by the sharp and pressing need of making more money. Thus, on Tuesday, April 12, 1709, the *Tatler* came into being. The first four numbers were given away free, but after that the price was enforced. It is amusing to read in the first issue the earnest appeals of Steele for the payment of the penny. He bluffed, too, in the most approved modern journalistic style, about the great charges for his materials and about the staff of correspondents he had arranged to maintain in all parts of the world. The form of

the new paper was a single folio sheet of two pages. It purported to be conducted by Isaac Bickerstaff, Esq., a name which had quite recently been made famous by Swift in his exquisite fooling with Partridge, the astrologer and almanac maker. The motto from Juvenal,⁷

Quicquid agunt Homines nostri Farrago Libelli,

Whate'er men do, or say, or think, or dream,
Our motley Paper seizes for its Theme,

sufficiently indicates the miscellaneous nature of the contents.

The introduction is quite specific as to the scope and intentions of the *Tatler*. The editor says:—

“Tho’ the other Papers which are printed for the Use of the good People of England have certainly very wholesom Effects, and are laudable in their particular Kinds, they do not seem to come up to the main Design of such Narrations, which, I humbly presume, should be principally intended for the Use of Politick Persons, who are so publick-spirited as to neglect their own Affairs to look into Transactions of State. Now these Gentlemen, for the most Part, being Persons of strong Zeal and weak Intellects, It is both a Charitable and Necessary work to offer something, whereby such worthy and well-affected Members of the Commonwealth may be instructed, after their Reading, WHAT TO THINK: Which shall be the End and Purpose of this my Paper.”

This idea was never forgotten or lost sight of throughout the *Tatler* and its successors.

Steele came to his task equipped with some literary reputation based on a treatise called *The Christian Hero*, and on three comedies of fair merit; with an education which had been by no means finished, but which nevertheless counted for something; and with a varied and extensive knowledge of taverns, clubs, and coffee-houses, of men and women, and of life

⁷Sat. I., 85, 86. The lines in full run thus:—

Quicquid agunt homines, votum, timor, ira, voluptas,
Gaudia, discursus, nostri farrago libelli est.

about town. His original idea was to give news in addition to his jocose or serious lucubrations, but as time went on the news became of less and less importance and more and more emphasis was laid on the Essay.

The merit of the conception and starting of the *Tatler* is entirely Steele's. Addison was then in Ireland, and it was only when he saw a criticism which he had himself communicated to Steele reproduced in the sixth number of the paper that he concluded that Isaac Bickerstaff was no other than his old friend. The idea of the paper appealed to Addison, and he at once offered his services. His first acknowledged contribution appeared in No. 18 of the *Tatler* on Saturday, May 21, 1709, and runs, in part, as follows. He is dealing with manufacturers of news:—

“The Case of these Gentlemen is, I think, more hard than that of the Soldiers, considering that they have taken more Towns, and fought more Battles. They have been upon Parlies and Skirmishes, when our Armies have been still; and given the General Assault to many a Place, when the Besiegers were quiet in their Trenches. They have made us Masters of several strong Towns many weeks before our Generals could do it; and compleated Victories, when our greatest Captains have been glad to come off with a drawn Battle. Where Prince *Eugene* has slain his Thousands, *Boyer*⁸ has slain his Ten Thousands. This Gentleman can indeed be never enough commended for his Courage and Intrepidity during this whole War: He has laid about him with an inexpressible Fury, and, like the offended *Marius* of ancient *Rome*, made such Havock among his Countrymen, as must be the Work of two or three Ages to repair. It must be confessed the Redoubted Mr. *Buckley*⁹ has shed as much Blood as the former; but I cannot forbear saying, (and I hope it will not look like Envy) that we regard our Brother *Buckley* as a kind of *Drawcansir*, who spares neither Friend or Foe, but generally kills as many of his own Side as the Enemy's. It is impossible for this ingenious sort of Men to subsist after a Peace: every one re-

⁸ Of the *Post-Boy*.

⁹ Of the *Daily Courant*.

members the Shifts they were driven to in the Reign of King Charles the Second, when they could not furnish out a single Paper of News, without lighting up a Comet in Germany, or a Fire in Moscow. There scarce appeared a Letter without a Paragraph on an Earthquake. Prodigies were grown so familiar, that they had lost their Name, as a great Poet of that Age has it. I remember Mr. *Dyer*,¹⁰ who is justly looked upon by all the Fox-Hunters in the Nation as the greatest Statesman our Country has produced, was particularly famous for dealing in Whales; insomuch that in five Months Time (for I had the Curiosity to examine his Letters on that Occasion) he brought three into the mouth of the River Thames, besides two Porpusses and a Sturgeon. The judicious and wary Mr. Ichabod *Dawks*¹¹ hath all along been the Rival of this great Writer, and got himself a Reputation from Plagues and Famines: by which, in those Days, he destroyed as great Multitudes as he has lately done by the Sword. In every Dearth of News, Grand Cairo was sure to be unpeopled."

Thereafter Addison's contributions were fairly frequent. Of 271 *Tatlers* Steele wrote about 188, Addison 42, and they were jointly responsible for 36. Other contributors were Swift, Congreve, Harrison, and Ambrose Philips.

Addison brought to the new undertaking a mind stored with knowledge, which was in turn the fruit of long study, of much reading, of travel, and of keen observation; he was also, as appeared from the outset, gifted with a sly, pervasive, and captivating humour, which in its own kind has never been equalled, not to say surpassed; he had a certain dignity and poise; he was master of a fluent and easy style; and, above all, he was sincerely animated with a love of the beautiful, the good, and the true. What Addison's accession to the *Tatler* meant to literature and morals it has been the delight of successive generations of critics to dwell upon. He had as yet done nothing that was really great, but, in the words of Macaulay, "the time had come when he was to prove himself a man

¹⁰ Of *Dyer's Letter*.

¹¹ Of *Dawks's Letter*.

of genius, and to enrich our literature with compositions which will live as long as the English language."¹²

Steele, ever generous, bore eloquent testimony to the value of the help of his friend. "I fared," he said, "like a distressed prince who calls in a powerful neighbour to his aid: I was undone by my Auxiliary; when I had once called him in I could not subsist without dependence on him." Elsewhere he says: "The paper was advanced indeed. It was raised to a greater thing than I intended it." Steele, it is true, herein belittled himself in order to magnify his friend, and although we love and admire him for doing it, and would like to regard his expressions as the hyperbole of devotion and esteem, it must be confessed that there is a solid foundation of fact for his statement. Despite many personal faults and lapses from the straight path, Steele was essentially a moralist, if not a preacher, and he had a strong moral purpose in the *Tatler*; but it is probable that his scheme of reform was not on such a high plane as that to which, by his association with Addison, he was ultimately led. To publish items of foreign and domestic news, to give accounts of plays and players, to draw attention to the pulpit performances of noted preachers, to descant on the gossip of clubdom regarding the classics of old and the latest literary ventures, to pay compliments to women on their beauty or dress, to poke gentle fun at fashionable foibles, to condemn duelling, to pillory sharpers and ridicule bores, was about the ambit of Steele's aim, and in attaining that aim there was still ample opportunity for him, in his own telling phrase, to teach his readers what to think. But the loftier tone of Addison and his more subtle humour gradually infected his editor, and the result was that, like one actor responding to another more powerful actor on the stage, Steele played up to the pitch and standard set by his colleague. By the finished and careful papers sent in by Addison, Steele was stimulated to a higher ambition, and, as he himself tells us, to an elegance, a purity, and a correctness to which he had not at first aspired.

Thus between these two minds there was produced a new spe-

¹² Essay on *The Life and Writings of Addison* (July, 1843).

cies of writing in the Periodical Essay. As Mr. Austin Dobson says: "It was when the scholarly secretary to Lord Wharton commenced to print . . . the delightful La Bruyère-like studies of Tom Folio and Ned Softly and the Political Upholsterer, the *Adventures of a Shilling*, and the Rabelaisian *Frozen Voices*, that a new thing began to be born which was the Essay of Addison and Steele."¹³ Under this benign influence Steele produced those affecting domestic scenes in which he was so expert, and thus in one direction anticipated the function of the Novel that was in due course to come. If Steele did much for Addison by affording him the opportunity of showing the latent powers that he possessed, Addison repaid the obligation by bringing out from Steele the best that was in him, and by giving to his inventive genius a bent in the direction of higher and nobler things than he had hitherto dreamt of. This was plainly seen in the next venture in which the friends joined.

(To be continued.)

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¹³ Article "The Eighteenth Century," in *Chambers's Cyclopaedia of English Literature*," Vol. II., p. 3.

JOHN XXII AND THE BEATIFIC VISION

A CONTRIBUTION TO DOMINICAN THEOLOGICAL HISTORY.

During all his long and eventful life John XXII had been a warm and admiring friend of the Order of St. Dominic. From its friars he had received his early education in his native town of Cahors, Gascony. Though raised in after years to the bishopric of Fréjus (1300), later transferred to the See of Avignon (1310), and finally elevated to the Pontifical Throne, August 7, 1316, he did not forget his old-time friendship, or lose the memory of the many favors he had received at their hands. Possibly, too, his election to the chair of Peter in the Dominican Monastery of Lyons may have given an additional strength to the already strong chain of friendship that bound him to the order. Like his predecessor, Clement V, who during his pontificate lived as a guest in the Dominican Monastery of that city, John chose Avignon as his place of permanent residence. It was he who raised the great Thomas Aquinas to the honor of the Altar; and so ardent was his admiration for the learned and saintly Dominican, that he preached three sermons during the ceremonies of the canonization, extending from the 14th to the 18th of July, 1323, (in one of which he declared that Thomas had performed as many miracles as he had written articles¹), and celebrated, at the end, the first Mass ever offered in honor of the saint.

At the time of John's accession to the Papal Throne the Order of Preachers was in the zenith of its power and glory; strong in the vast numbers of its subjects, stronger still in their zeal, learning and eloquence. From the beginning it had been placed under the immediate jurisdiction and protection of the Sovereign Pontiff; and consecrated to the defence of the faith

¹ Percin, *Monumenta Conventus Tolosani*, p. 229; Frigerio, *Vita di San Tomaso*, Lib. I, C. VII, p. 44.

and the Church it constituted in the hands of the Successors of Peter a power to be reckoned with. For one hundred years successive Popes had not hesitated to call on its friars to undertake the most difficult and perilous missions. This Gascon Pontiff, a learned man himself, a keen judge of men, an astute statesman, fully abreast of his times,² was quick to see that he, too, might find a tower of strength in these same friars. History told him of their courage and faithfulness in the execution of the charges confided to them by his predecessors; and he was not slow in exacting the same tribute for himself, employing them in every capacity and in every country to spread the faith, to uphold the cause of religion, to stem the turmoil of the troublous times in which his pontificate was thrown.

They were his arm of strength in putting down the turbulent Fraticelli, then disturbing the peace of the world; they were sent as papal envoys to restore harmony between warring potentates; they were employed to bring the excommunicated Visconti of Milan into subjection to the Church and to calm anarchical uprisings in different parts of the Italian peninsula; they fulminated John's anathemas against the powerful Louis of Bavaria. Though because of their faithfulness in executing the papal commands laid upon them they had often to undergo bitter persecution, to suffer the loss of their houses, exile or even imprisonment, few were found wanting in their duty; and if at times some hesitated in the face of perils, their Masters General were there to enforce literal obedience to the orders of the Head of the Church.

The stress of putting down revolt against the Holy See and upholding the politico-ecclesiastical interests of the Papacy did not consume all the energies of John's active mind. One of the most apostolical of the Popes who have ruled over the destinies of the Church, he kept a watchful eye on the advancement of the spiritual interests of the faithful and did much for

² John's voluminous correspondence shows how closely he followed the political and religious events of the world in his day; how he sought in every way to further the interests both spiritual and temporal of the Church.

the conversion of heathen nations. No Pontiff ever had more at heart the missions of the far East. From the earliest days of their existence the Friars Preachers had penetrated all along the Barbary coasts of Africa, into Egypt, India, Greece, Palestine, Persia, Syria, Armenia, China, the Steppes of Russia, erecting monasteries or setting up missionary outposts of their order in many of the countries under the sway of the Tartar and the Mussulman.³ One of the chief glories of the Avignon Papacy is its untiring efforts to bring the unbelievers of the Orient into the one fold of the true faith. John XXII took these missionaries and their missions under his especial protection, giving them his heartiest support. In 1318, we find him establishing at one time a whole ecclesiastical province with an archbishop and six bishops, and appointing Dominicans to all the seven new dioceses.⁴ On another occasion, 1328, he writes the Fathers assembled in the General Chapter in Toulouse, France, calling for fifty or more religious to be sent to labor on the missions in the Orient. "Ardently desirous," he says, "of seeing the divine ministry, already flourishing among many infidel nations, become more and more efficient in the propagation of the true faith, and seeking, as a means of furthering this noble purpose, to increase the number of evangelical laborers among those peoples, we have, after mature deliberation, resolved to appeal to you assembled in chapter. For the Order of Preachers, through the blessing of God, is as a firmament bristling with stars; it abounds in religious men of conspicuous virtue. Our will and wish are, therefore, that you designate at least fifty of your brethren for that field of labor. We wish further that all those so chosen should be priests, that only those who voluntarily offer themselves for those missions should be selected and that that they should be neither too young nor too old, men of grave character, truly religious men, as only this kind are suited for such apostolic work. Those selected will be sent to the Orient and dispersed among the

³ For the history of these missions see Mortier, *Histoire des Maîtres Généraux de L'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs*, Vols. 2 and 3, *passim*.

⁴ *Bull. Ord. Praed.*, Vol. 2, p. 137; Mortier, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 509 et seq.

different monasteries of your order in those parts, as the needs of the missions may demand." ⁵

When, after the Chapter of Toulouse, Barnabas of Vercelli, the Master General of the Order, in search of recruits for the missions of the East, sent notice of the Holy Father's letter broadcast through the various provinces of the order, the numbers of Friars Preachers applying for, nay begging, the privilege of laboring for the conversion of the infidel were so great, that it became necessary to restrain their ardor. Had not their zeal been repressed within due bounds, whole provinces had been made desolate. The news of this unwonted outpouring of devotion for the salvation of souls, when it reached the ears of John, caused him to exclaim: "Verily, these friars were made to shine and to light up the Church of God." ⁶

No less keen and beneficent was the interest of the second of the Avignon Popes in the historic Dominican mission in Armenia which resulted in nearly the entire conversion of the schismatic Basilian monks of that country, and their eventual affiliation with the Order of St. Dominic. ⁷ Indeed, if the space of this article permitted, much interesting and edifying matter might be written on this and other missions under the charge of the Fathers in the far East during the years of John's pontificate. He aided them in every possible way, and left no stone unturned in order to further the cause of religion in those parts.

But this long-standing friendship was destined to receive a rude shock; and the years from 1330 or 1331 until the death of John XXII, December 4, 1334, form a period of uncommon interest in the history of the Dominican Order. About the year 1330, disturbing reports began to be circulated abroad through the intellectual centers of Europe that the Pope was teaching or favoring a strange and erroneous doctrine concerning the state of the souls of the just after death. It was said he

⁵ *Bull. Ord. Praed.*, vol. 2, p. 178; Reichert, *Acta Capit.*, vol. 2, 178; Mortier, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 27 et seq.

⁶ Fontana, *Monumenta Domin.*, p. 186.

⁷ Mortier, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 31 et seq.

held that souls departing this life and needing not to pass through the cleansing fires of purgatory, and those that had already been so purified, would not be permitted to cross the threshold of heaven, or admitted to the beatific vision, before the day of the final judgment; that before then they would enjoy, it is true, some foretaste of the heavenly bliss, some fruit of their merits, but not until after the resurrection and the re-union of body and soul would they receive the full measure of the supernatural reward which consists in what the apostle calls the full and direct vision of God. At first there were only vague, disquieting rumors, but by the end of 1331 the theological world was rent by the certainty that the Head of the Church was really preaching against a Catholic teaching which had long been considered as practically of faith divine, the denial of which was tantamount to heresy. On November 1, of that year, John preached before the assembled cardinals, prelates and theologians resident at the Papal Court, and numbers of the faithful, taking as his text: "*Mementote operum patrum vestrorum quae fecerunt in generationibus suis.*" During the course of his sermon, touching upon his favorite topic of the beatific vision, he gave a thinly veiled expression of his personal opinion by declaring that the souls of the just, before the general judgment, are under the altar of God, that is to say, under the protection of the glorified humanity of Christ, and enjoying the happiness of its presence. After the day of judgment, they will be placed on the altar of God, or will be admitted to the presence of His divinity, and that of the Blessed Trinity in whose direct vision man's full and complete happiness consists.

Growing bolder, it would seem, and determined plainly to speak out his mind on the subject, he preached again two weeks later, November 15, before the same distinguished audience. This time he took as his text: "*Gaudete in Domino semper*"; and laying aside all cover of metaphor and veil of mysticism, he declared himself openly in favor of the delay of the beatific vision. His words are: "I say that the souls of the faithful departed do not enjoy that perfect or face to face vision of God,

in which, according to St. Augustine (in *Psalm xc*, sermo II, No. 13), consists their full reward of justice; nor will they have that happiness until after the general judgment. When, and only when, the soul will be re-united to the body, will this perfect bliss come to man, coming to the whole man composed of body and soul, and perfecting his entire being." And, following out his opinion to its logical conclusion, in a discourse delivered, the eve of the Epiphany, January 5, 1332, on the words: "*Tolle puerum et matrem ejus*," John declared further, by way of corollary of his previous sermon, that souls departing this life in mortal sin are not forthwith sent to hell; that, just as the blessed will not be admitted to the intuitive presence of God until after the resurrection of the body, so also not until then will the condemned be consigned to the depths of their punishment. These three were the Pontiff's principal sermons on the beatific vision; yet in others, preached at a later date, he touches on the subject *obiter*, always manifesting a continuance of his belief in the doctrine he had taught in them. And, in 1333, he wrote a treatise in its defence: "*Queritur utrum anime sanctorum ab omnibus peccatis purgate videant divinam essentiam*." ⁸

The news of such a doctrinal lapse on the part of the Church's Supreme Head, beginning at Avignon, rapidly spread over Christendom, everywhere causing consternation and arousing great indignation. The Catholic world was profoundly stirred.⁹ Controversies waxed strong and vehement. Quite naturally, in Avignon, where the Papal Court resided, these were of a much less pronounced character. There, indeed, the new doctrine, possibly because of hopes of preferment, found a number of ardent supporters. On the other hand, fear of incurring papal disfavor caused its opponents to be less em-

⁸ See Denifle and Chatelain on the sermons of John XXII, *Chartularium Univer. Par.*, vol. 2, p. 414, no. 970; Mortier, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 63-70; Baluze-Mansi, *Miscellanea*, 3, 349 et seq.

⁹ Denifle, *op. cit.*, p. 414-15, no. 970; Mortier, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 69; *Contin. Guill. de Nangis*, Ed. Geraud, vol. 2, p. 127; Verlaque, *Jean XXII*, p. 198 et seq. (Paris, 1883). The first excitement gradually cooled down, but only to arise with redoubled bitterness in 1333 (Denifle, pp. 414-15).

phatic in their denunciations. Yet, even at the very foot of the pontifical throne, there was not wanting the strong voice of protest; for there also the old traditional doctrine, sanctified by the acceptance of ages, found able and courageous defenders. Among these the theologians of the Order of St. Dominic took decidedly a leading part.

It was not long before vigorous protests and rumors of angry excitement began to pour in upon the Pope from the four quarters of the globe. Alarmed at the storm he had stirred up, John XXII sought refuge behind the Scriptures and the Fathers, particularly St. Augustine. He maintained that he had not advanced the teaching advocated in his sermons as of his own making, but had taken it from the great Doctors of the Church, and from the Sacred Text itself; that he had preached simply as a private theologian, not as Head of the Church, defining a doctrine to be accepted as of faith; that, consequently, his opinion, being given as that of a private doctor, was subject to the judgment and decision of the Church to be approved or condemned, as it may be found true or false; that, furthermore, the question was open to discussion, and every theologian was free to accept and to advocate whichever side of the controversy he should judge to be the true one.¹⁰ He did not, therefore, give any *ex cathedra* decision binding the consciences of the faithful. Theologians, as history shows, by no means accepted John's private tenets.

The Pontiff, however, was far from being as unbiased in his judgment and impartial in his actions as he fancied. Despite these declarations, as is shown by the difference of treatment accorded its supporters and adversaries, he continued to entertain a strong predilection for the opinion he had advanced. On the one hand, as a contemporary informs us, to support it was a sure passport to honors and preferment; while, on the other, to oppose it, whether by word of mouth or in writing, meant papal disfavor, or even punishment. For one it meant imprisonment.¹¹ Despite, too, the vehement protests

¹⁰ Cfr. John's letters in Denifle, *op. cit.*, p. 415 et seq.; Mortier, *op. cit.* p. 169 et seq.

¹¹ Villani, *Istorie Fiorentine*, vol. 10, p. 392, ed. Milan, 1834.

that poured into Avignon, and the general dissatisfaction excited by his sermons, particularly those of November 15, 1331, and Jan. 5, 1332, he sought, for a time at least, to defend and to disseminate the doctrine they contained. At his command numerous copies of his second sermon were made, and a copy given to whosoever desired to see the Pope's side of the controversy. He also sent a copy of his treatise (*libellus*) to Queen Johanna of France, or rather to the Franciscan, Walter de Divione, to explain to her.¹²

The reports of the strong opposition to the new doctrine on the part of Phillip VI of France, the Christian ruler most favorably disposed to John XXII, and the faculty of the University of Paris seem to have been the cause of no little uneasiness to the Pontiff. Letters still in existence show a considerable correspondence on the subject between Avignon and the King.¹³ In the latter part of 1333, Gerard Odonis or Eudes, minister general of the Minorites, and Arnold of Saint-Michael, a papal penitentiary and one of the few Dominicans who stood with John in this matter—possibly influenced by the many favors he had received at the hands of that Pope,—left Avignon on a mission of restoring harmony between England and Scotland, and on their way stopped in Paris to consult with Philip. While there the Franciscan general, availing himself of the opportunity, made an attempt to gain over the French monarch to the Pope's cause and to win adherents among the professors of the University. The attempt proved a complete failure. The Dominican, frightened by the tumult and scandal caused by Eudes' sermon, sought to appease the anger aroused by it and to excuse the Pontiff by showing the scriptural and patristic authorities on which he had based his opinion. So intense, however, was the feeling against the Minorite general, largely due, it would seem, to an impression that he and his companion had been sent to Paris for the express purpose of making propagandism for John XXII, and that the mission to England was only a pretence to justify

¹² Denifle, *op. cit.* p. 414, no. 970; 418, no. 974; 427, no. 979.

¹³ Cfr. Letters of John XXII in Denifle *ut supra*.

their coming to Paris, that Philip declared he considered him a heretic, and that, unless he retracted his scandalous assertions, he would have him burned at the stake. He is also said to have made threats against John himself.¹⁴ Feeling keenly the action of Philip and the University, John wrote the former, November 18, 1333, censuring him for his inordinate zeal before the question as to whether the beatific vision is granted to worthy souls immediately on their death, or is delayed until after the final judgment, should be decided by the Church. He also declared he had only advanced the opinion attributed to him as probable and supported by authorities both scriptural and patristic; admonished the King that the question is still, and must be, open to free discussion; informed him that Peter Roger, Archbishop of Rouen, had been commissioned, subject to the royal approval, to present his (John's) case and authorities before the theological faculty of the University; and requested that they be allowed full liberty of discussion.¹⁵

So few, indeed, were the exceptions, that it may be said the theologians of the Order of St. Dominic rose up as a body in favor of the time-honored, traditional Catholic teaching, boldly withstanding John's propositions. Neither fear of feeling the weight of papal displeasure, nor hope of reward, had any influence on the Friar Preacher, when there was question of an error against Catholic faith. He was the Pontiff's most pronounced and outspoken antagonist. The spectacle of an order, whose sons had braved every danger and with unflinching courage borne untold sufferings in defending the Holy See against Louis of Bavaria, now resisting with the same unyielding fortitude and fearless spirit the Roman Pontiff himself in his apparent efforts to propagate a doctrine they adjudged contrary to faith, elicited from that German monarch this splendid encomium: "Verily, the Order of Preachers is an order of truth."¹⁶ And it was certainly inspiring to see an order,

¹⁴ Denifle, 425, no. 976; 437, no. 984; Mortier, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74; Natalis Alexander, *Hist. Eccles.*, vol. 7, p. 521; Villani, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

¹⁵ Denifle, *op. cit.*, p. 426, no. 978; 427, no. 979.

¹⁶ Taegio, *Chron. Ampliss.*, II, p. 118.

equally indifferent to favor and dishonor, to loss and gain, withstanding with all its might, in the interest of Catholic truth, a Pontiff who had been one of the best friends it had know in the more than a hundred years of its existence, who had shown it every favor and every mark of affection, for whom it entertained the deepest love and esteem, and to defend whom its brethren had hesitated in the face of no peril.

Among those of the order who were made to feel the anger of John XXII, we shall single out three:—1. Barnabas of Vercelli, then its Master General, as head and leader of a great host of opponents to the theory of the delay of the full and direct vision of God, had incurred the Pontiff's ill will. Barnabas, after having made a canonical visitation of his order in Spain, and presided over a General Chapter assembled in Vic-toria, had returned to Avignon, intending to go thence into Italy, possibly for the purpose of continuing his visitation in the provinces of the Italian peninsula. But he received positive orders from the Pope not to enter his native land. Apparently because impeded in the government of his order from Avignon and feeling deeply the fact that he was *persona non grata* at the Papal Court, he later sought and obtained from John permission to retire to Paris, where he died soon after, January 10, 1332. Though the meekest and most fatherly of men, he was fearless and unbending in his defence of the traditional doctrine.¹⁷

2. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, at the time Bishop of Meaux, was one of the first to challenge John's propositions. Scarcely had the news of the Avignon sermons reached him, when he hotly entered the arena of controversy, writing a treatise on the state of the just souls after death, in which he vigorously attacked the doctrine they advanced. He widely disseminated his work, and sent a copy of it to the French king. Its author was soon in disfavor. Unfortunately for Durandus himself, in the heat of controversy some ill sounding

¹⁷ *Chron. mag. Ord.*, p. 56, *Constitut. Ord. Praed.*, Romae, 1690; Fontana, *Monumenta Dom.*, p. 183; Mortier, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-72.

propositions found their way into an otherwise well-reasoned treatise. The reputation of the writer as an independent thinker, it would seem, suggested to the Pontiff the idea of subjecting the book to a searching examination, with a view of finding errors that might discredit it. So it happened. A commission of thirteen masters in theology, all, or most, of whom were favorably disposed to the new view, and among whom were the Franciscan and Dominican whom we have seen pleading the cause of the Pope at Paris, after much acrimonious discussion censured eleven of its propositions as savoring of heresy.¹⁸

3. Thomas Walleys, or Walleis, was an Englishman by birth, and a master of the Oxford University, of whose faculty he had long been an honored and illustrious member. He was a man of deep piety, a profound theologian, and possessed of a courage that amounted to heroism. Having come to Avignon, he became the leader there of the Friars Preachers in their heroic defence of the doctrine that the beatific vision is given to departed souls immediately that they are found worthy. He became the victim of expiation for his order.

January 3, 1333, Master Thomas preached in the Dominican church of Avignon to an audience composed of cardinals, bishops, priests, religious of every order, and the faithful. Despite the contrary opinion of some few writers, John XXII, it seems certain, was not present at the preaching of this discourse. Walleys vigorously attacked the Pontiff's opinion, and, in answer to those who had pretended the great Thomas Aquinas favored that doctrine, he took occasion to show that that saint, canonized by John himself, characterizes it as heretical. That men's souls were wrought to a high pitch on the subject is evident from the aggressive tone running all through the Englishman's discourse. However, if we are correctly to appreciate Thomas' method of speech, we must remember that shortly before other sermons, in which the rancor of heated controversy

¹⁸ Denifle, p. 415, no. 970; 418, no. 975; 425, no. 976; Benedict XII, *Quaestiones de Visione beatifica*, Vat. Ms. 4006, fol. 225; Mortier, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

found a conspicuous part, had been preached in favor of the opposite view. It was a period, too, of direst confusion in affairs both political and religious. The atmosphere was literally palpitant with the scandal and unrest that had been caused by the Avignon sermons. The minds of theologians were stirred and their hearts aflame. The people were as a unit on the side of the defenders of the universal belief of the Church. It was, further, an age of outspoken, blunt language; an age when the faith was defended with all the energetic sincerity of a deep, living *credo*. A child of his time Thomas Walleys simply defended the teaching of the Church with the plain-spoken, brusque language of the period.

Walleys' sermon was preached on the third day of January; on the ninth of the same month seven of its propositions were censured by William of Monterotundo, a Minorite Inquisitor, as savoring of heresy; by the fourteenth of February he was confined in a prison of the Inquisition; and in September the same commission of thirteen who examined Durandus's work, condemned seven propositions of Walleys taken from his sermon and a vindication he had hurriedly written while in prison. The English Dominican's name is still to be seen on the inquisitorial account book. He has himself left us an idea of the treatment accorded him as a prisoner. Neither confinement nor harsh treatment could break his spirit, or cause him to relax one iota in the doctrine he had preached.¹⁹

John XXII had shown a far better spirit and much more of the wisdom of the skilled diplomat, had he been more moderate and conceded his opponents the full liberty of discussion he professed to allow to all. His repressive measures were productive of no good; nor was the imprudence of his actions slow in becoming manifest. The imprisonment of Walleys created an impression that was far from being favorable to the Pope. Indignation ran particularly high at the University of

¹⁹ For information on Walleys see Denifle, p. 415, No. 970; 415-416, no. 971, and notes 3 and 4; pp. 416-418, nos. 972-75; Mortier, *op. cit.*, pp. 76 et seq.; Echard, *Scriptores Ord. Praed.*, vol. I, p. 599 gives copious extracts from Walleys' sermon.

Paris and at the Court of Philip VI. In vain did John, writing to the French monarch or his Queen consort try to create the impression that the English Dominican had been imprisoned, not because of his antagonism to the views advocated in the Avignon sermons, but on account of the heresies contained in his own sermons.²⁰ In order to appease the displeasure aroused by the incarceration of Master Thomas, the Pontiff finally acceded to public opinion so far as to transfer the prisoner to the Papal Palace during the month of October, 1333.²¹ There, it is true, Walleys' position was bettered; yet, as he continued to be denied his liberty, the minds of men refused to be calmed.

Determined to bring matters to an issue, Philip VI called a meeting of the theological faculty of the University of Paris for the purpose of having them express their opinion on the subject in debate. Accordingly, on December 19, 1333, a commission of twenty-three masters in theology assembled in the royal palace under the presidency of Peter de la Palud, the Dominican patriarch of Jerusalem; and there in the presence of the Kings of France and Navarre, many bishops, priests, secular and regular, princes, and faithful, they unanimously declared their firm belief in the Catholic teaching, that the souls departed and freed from all stain of sin and debt due to sin enjoy the beatific or full and direct vision of God before the day of judgment. And on the second day of January, 1334, they and six other Masters who did not attend the first meeting, affixed their names to a profession of their faith wherein they declared that: "After the death of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ, the souls of the faithful who have departed this life exempt from all purgatorial purification, or have been liberated therefrom, enjoy a perfect, beatifying, intuitive and immediate vision of the divine essence and the Most Holy Trinity, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost."²²

Six of these Masters, all leading men in the university world,

²⁰ Denifle, p. 415, and pp. 416, 17, 25, 27, 28, nos. 970, 71, 72, 73, 76, 79, 80.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 415, no. 971, note 3; 440, no. 986.

²² *Ibid.*, 429, no. 981; 432, no. 982.

belonged to the Order of St. Dominic. They were: Peter de la Palud, Patriarch of Jerusalem; Peter of Baumes-les-Dames, then Provincial of France, and later Master General of his order; William of Chateaurenaud; William Catalot; Garin of Gy-l'Eveque, later General of the order; and Durandus of Aurillac.²³

The same day, January 2, 1334, these nine and twenty master theologians forwarded John XXII a letter, expressing in polite and respectful, but clear and firm language the result of their deliberations. While affirming their filial devotion and submission to the Vicar of Christ, they recalled his express declaration that he had spoken, not as Head of the Church, defining a doctrine, but as an individual theologian, exposing a personal view; and that all theologians were permitted to give their minds on the subject. They proclaimed their firm belief in the doctrine to which they affixed their names, declared that, after the example of the apostle, they were ready to give singly a reason of the faith that was in them, and expressed a strong desire that the Pope would deign to give his apostolic sanction to their decision.²⁴

In the light of the events that immediately followed, this joint letter, we think, clearly exerted a salutary influence on the Pontiff; for may we not refer to it John's subsequent steps as here related? On January 3, the very next day after it was forwarded to him, John held a consistory in which he showed himself more than ordinarily tolerant towards those who had opposed him, and declared anew that he had never intended dogmatically to settle the question, but had only sought, as he was still seeking, to have all possible light thrown on it, with a view to having it set at rest for all time.²⁵ Seven days later, January 10, he wrote Philip VI, declaring absolutely false the report that he had sent the Minorite, Gerard Eudes, and the Dominican, Arnold of Saint-Michael, to Paris for the purpose of winning favor or making proselytes to the doctrine

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 429, no. 981.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 432, no. 982.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 434, no. 983.

he had preached; he positively asserted that such an idea had never entered his head.²⁶ Again, on March 12, he wrote and admonished Peter Roger, Archbishop of Paris, of the order given at the late consistory, requiring cardinals, bishops and others to make a careful study of the question of the beatific vision and then to make known to the Pope the conclusion to which they should come relatively to the merits of the two debated theories on the subject.²⁷ And finally, on March 20, he informed Philip VI by letter that Father Thomas Walleys had been transferred from the prison of the Inquisition to a room in his own Papal Palace, and gave assurance that there he would be well treated.²⁸ Here the English Dominican remained a prisoner until after the election of Benedict XII, John's successor.

Feeling that he was at death's door, John XXII called to his bedside the cardinals and bishops resident at Avignon, together with the notaries public, and in their presence made a retraction of whatever he had himself preached or said, or caused others to preach or teach, on the beatific vision that was not in perfect conformity with Catholic belief. He also declared that he held with the Catholic Church that the just souls departed enjoy the vision of God immediately that they are free from all stain and debt of sin. This was on the third day of December, 1334;²⁹ and on the day following he died with sentiments of the deepest piety.

While the sermons of John XXII, his harsh measures towards his antagonists and his perpetual recurrence to the subject would seem to indicate a real and firm belief in the delay of the beatific vision, and while his adversaries, in the heat of controversy, certainly attributed that doctrine to him, still, in the light of his protests to the contrary, found at the end of his second Avignon sermon, in his letters to the Sovereign of France, and in his public profession of faith on the eve of his death, it is impossible to say that he did more than

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 437, no. 984.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 440, no. 986.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 438, no. 985.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 440, no. 987.

to advocate such an opinion tentatively, or showed more than a strong inclination to accept it, had it met with wide favor among theologians. It had but comparatively few supporters, however. It is absolutely certain that he never gave, or had any intention of giving, an *ex cathedra* definition. And were it undeniable that, in his capacity of private theologian, John firmly believed and taught such an erroneous doctrine, it would in no way militate against the Catholic dogma of papal infallibility. For while we like to consider the public acts of the Head of the Church as providential—and history often proves them to have been such,—no well-instructed Catholic holds that the Sovereign Pontiff is infallible in his private views, though made public, or that they must be accepted on faith divine. The influx of the Holy Ghost, which alone renders his judgment unerring in matters of faith and morals, is vouchsafed him only, when, acting precisely in his capacity as Vicar of Christ and teacher of the faithful, he speaks *ex cathedra*, proclaiming a truth to be believed under pain of anathema.

It is a matter of faith, of course, for Catholics that, when the Successor of Peter speaks thus officially on points of doctrine and morals—but on these only,—his pronouncements are infallible: a logical and necessary conclusion from the words of Christ: “Thou art Peter (a rock), and upon this rock I will build my Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” From the beginning such has been the traditional belief and teaching of the Church, though it was not formally defined until the solemn promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility by the Vatican Council, July 18, 1870. Yet, though the records of ecclesiastical history are soiled by no such blot—a fact which, we think, is due to a special care of Divine Providence,—it has never been thought an impossibility that the Head of the Church as an individual, or a private theologian, should fall into formal heresy. No such an accusation can be laid at the door of John XXII. In no sense of the term can he be said to have been a formal heretic; for the doctrine of the immediate bestowal of the beatific vision upon the departed just soul, once it is free from all trace and

stain of sin, though generally believed, had not then been made a dogma of Catholic faith. A good lawyer and learned canonist, a fair theologian,³⁰ and possessed of splendid executive abilities, John was by nature contentious, fond of his opinions and loth to relinquish them. These traits, as often happens, became more firmly fastened on him in advanced age. Here, we believe, lies the cause of all the acrimonious discussion on the question of the beatific vision during the closing years of his life. A sincere and deeply religious man, an apostolic Pope, he never had any thought of going against what he really believed to be certainly the doctrinal teaching of the Church. As he did not authoritatively condemn the doctrine of the immediate beatific vision by his temporary opposition, so neither did he define it by his public retractation and profession of faith on the eve of his death. The honor of making the traditional belief of the Church an article of faith belongs to his successor, Benedict XII, the Carthusian, who, January 29, 1336, published his Constitution, "*Benedictus Deus*," settling the question for all Catholics.

V. F. O'DANIEL, O. P.

THE DOMINICAN COLLEGE,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

³⁰ John XXII was not a Master in theology (Denifle, *op. cit.*, p. 427, note 4). In his letter to the French monarch, November 18, 1333, he says: "They (his antagonists) will likely have told you that we are not a Master in theology. But we may here aptly recall the saying of the wise man 'Consider, not who speaks, but what he says.'" *Ibid.*, p. 426, no. 978).

BOOK REVIEWS.

Konversations-Lexikon Ergänzungsband. Herder, 1911. \$4.00 net.

The eight splendid volumes of Herder's *Lexikon* which appeared in quick succession since 1902 were reviewed briefly in the *Catholic University Bulletin* at the time of their appearance. The notices were without exception enthusiastic in their commendation of the work. A supplementary volume has just been published by Herder bringing the *Lexikon* up to 1910. The contents of this new volume range over the whole field of human interest, including events, discoveries, inventions and persons which have engaged the attention of the world since the appearance of the eighth volume. Binding, illustrations and treatment of subjects are as careful in this supplementary volume as they are throughout the work. The nine volumes sell for \$32.00 net.

It is extremely difficult nowadays for the teacher, the public leader or men and women of culture to keep abreast of the times without just such aid as that offered by this admirable *Lexikon*. Everyday life, reading and action force us into touch with all lines of human progress. Today's laboratory experiment becomes tomorrow's topic in the scientific world. Today's interests in the scientific world become tomorrow's topics in magazine, newspaper, class room, and cultured conversation. Technical terms are entering rapidly into everyday speech. Progress in the arts and sciences, in industry and in social legislation, the rise and direction of social movements, decisions of courts and plans of legislators are becoming matters of everyday vital interest to the average citizen. We must in fact in these days write and speak as Ferdinand La Salle said so boastfully of himself "armed with all the learning of the centuries." *Konversations-Lexikon* makes it possible for us to do so in a qualified way. Turning to the volume at hand we find, as an illustration, very clear and satisfactory information, accompanied by excellent illustrations, concerning the aeroplane and the dirigible balloon, phases and tendencies of recent social and

labor legislation, progress in medicine and philanthropy and in education: in a particular way in the history and action of the Church: in diet and home gymnastics. It is particularly gratifying to find in this great work the leaders and achievements, history and social aims of the Church represented in their true place in the life of the world—a service systematically neglected outside of the Church and not always done well within it. The wealth of German scholarship displayed is sufficient guarantee of the character of the contributions. The great reputation of Herders in their unique service to Catholic literature is of itself sufficient to commend the *Konversations-Lexikon* unreservedly to those familiar with the German language.

WM. J. KERBY.

Fratris Rogeri Bacon Compendium Studii Theologiae. Edidit H. Rashdall una cum appendice de Operibus Rogeri Bacon Edita per A. G. Little. Aberdoniæ: Typis Academicis, MCMXI, 16mo., pp. vi + 118.

The British Society of Franciscan Studies has conferred a signal service on all students of Bacon by the publication of this volume. For, although the opusculum here printed represents a fragment only of an uncompleted work by Bacon, it possesses, nevertheless, considerable interest and importance. In the first place, apart from the preliminary matter on the causes of error (which find a close parallel in the Introduction to the *Opus Majus* and in the *Metaphysica*), very little of the substance of the present treatise is to be found in Roger Bacon's hitherto published writings. Again, a perusal of this work goes far to confirm the view of M. Charles and others that on the whole Bacon's originality and importance as a man of science and an "Anticipator" of modern discoveries has been exaggerated, whereas his importance as a schoolman has been too much overlooked. And further, the germ of later Franciscan philosophy—that of Duns Scotus and that of William of Occam—are here to be found in Bacon's criticisms upon the dominant Thomist philosophy. But for many students, perhaps, the chief interest of the *Tractate* before us will lie largely in the historical notices which it contains about the history of philosophy in Bacon's time, the dates at which various Aristotelian treatises became known and the like.

The assertion that "almost nothing is known of the Philosophy of Aristotle" must surely be suspected of exaggeration in view of what we know from other sources of the books read in Paris prior to the year 1292, when the present book was written. Moreover, Bacon alludes to St. Thomas Aquinas as "one of the pretended authors (or authorities) famous though he be" and dwells at length upon the influence of the Franciscan Richard of Cornwall—who seems to have escaped the notice of the historians of philosophy—more especially at Oxford, where, as Dr. Rashdall remarks, the Franciscan friary "was the original home of all that was most important in the later mediæval Scholasticism."

As regards the subject matter of the compendium, it is divided into two parts. The first of these deals with the chief causes of human error. According to Bacon the principal stumbling-blocks in the way of truth (*veritatis offendicula*) are (1) The excessive influence of authority, (2) custom (*consuetudinis diuturnitas*) and (3) Vulgar opinion (*sensus multitudinis imperite*) and there is a certain irony in the fact that the writer's chief argument in favor of independent thinking as against "authority," consists mainly of a series of citations from Scripture, Cicero, Pliny and Seneca. In Book or Part II Bacon proceeds to establish the truths themselves and to "Evacuate" errors in detail.

Here we find that Bacon was more the child of his age than he imagined himself to be; for, while he admits that the proper subjects of theology should be the study of the sacred text, yet seeing that "for the last fifty years the theologians have been principally occupied with questions, as is evident to all through the treatises and *Summe* and horse-loads which have been composed by many," Roger therefore, yields to the prevailing taste and deals with the speculative philosophical questions commonly treated of by theologians.

This edition of Bacon's *Compendium* is edited from a thirteenth century MS. in the British Museum and is all the more valuable for being brought in by a critical Introduction from the pen of Dr. Hastings Rashdall of New College, Oxford, the historian of the universities of Europe in the middle ages, which covers some seventy-four pages, and which is supplemented by a series of useful notes illustrating the text.

The value of the volume is further enhanced by an appendix containing a bibliography of Roger Bacon compiled by Professor

A. G. Little, author of "The Grey Friars in Oxford" not the least attractive part of the present work. The compilation of a list of Bacon's works is a very difficult task, owing partly to Bacon's habit of rewriting his treatises again and again, so that the same works recur with different titles and different *incipits* and different works with the same title—and partly to the fact that many spurious writings are attributed to Bacon while some genuine ones are hidden under other names.

Taken as a whole, this, the latest publication of the British Society of Franciscan Studies, reflects the greatest credit upon all those concerned in its preparation.

FR. PASCHAL ROBINSON, O. F. M.

La réforme de la prononciation latine, by Camille Couillault:
Préface du R. Dom Pothier, O. S. B. Published by Bloud
and Co., Paris. xvii + 171.

This meritorious work written specifically for liturgical purposes, that is to bring uniformity into the rendition of Gregorian chant, possesses nevertheless a vital importance as touching the perennial question of the proper pronounciation of the Latin language. The author in the four chapters into which he has resolved his work treats successively the following topics: The pronounciation of Latin in Antiquity; here he restates the various arguments for the restored pronounciation, drawn from ancient monuments, ancient authors and from the Keil recension of the Roman grammarians, then follows the second chapter in which the necessity of a unified reform in the matter of pronounciation is discussed. The third chapter deals with the opportunity of reform offered by present conditions. The fourth and last chapter then proposes the Italian pronounciation as a compromise among the various pronounciations now in use. His reasons for this compromise is that the Italian pronounciation is not the best but the most attainable. It stands midway between the extremes and therefore can be adopted with less effort than any other system. No fault can be found with the author's conclusion except that he makes it a compromise. It is true the Italian pronounciation would be easy of adoption, it is

equally true that it rests on firmer grounds than this ease of adoption. The Roman pronunciation, called also the phonetic and the restored pronunciation, is predicated on the assumption that somewhere in the past ages the Latin language died, that it is a dead language and that therefore the pronunciation of the Classic Period must be recovered and restored.

The Latin language however has had a continuous and unbroken existence in the Catholic Church down to the present day, hence the pronunciation in use in the Capital City of the Church rests on reasons much more valid than those of compromise. It is an ascertained law of language that pronunciation does change and so it would seem that the pronunciation in use now by the Church is the logical pronunciation to adopt. No logic whatever attaches to the argument for the restored pronunciation. Indeed it would be quite as logical for us who use English to restore the pronunciation in vogue in the time of Shakespeare as it is for Latin scholars to attempt to restore to use the pronunciation of the time of Cicero. The work otherwise is scholarly and doubtless will do much to settle this vexed question. It is also accompanied by a letter of approval from His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State.

JOHN D. MAGUIRE.

La venerable Louise de Marillac, Mademoiselle Le Gras. Par le prince Emmanuel de Broglie, 1 vol. in 12 de la collection "Les Saints." Paris, Victor Lecoffre. J. Gabalda et Cie, 1911. Pp. viii + 219.

Though there are many biographies of the venerable woman, who so efficiently collaborated with St. Vincent de Paul in his great works for the relief of human suffering, it is eminently fitting that another should be written to form part of the Lecoffre series. The author, who is well known for his life of St. Vincent de Paul, makes no attempt at a minute or elaborate narrative in this work of the life and works of the first Sister of Charity. He has succeeded, however, in bringing out the qualities of mind and heart, which joined to the most fervent love for Jesus Christ, enabled this truly wonderful woman to lay the foundation for the great works of charity towards the sick and the poor, which are evidenced

by the manifold activities of the Sisters of Charity in all lands at the present. Her simple career is told in language free from exaggeration, and her life is revealed from her birth until her death when she had the satisfaction of seeing the great work which she had undertaken grow and multiply in many places outside the scenes of her first activities. Louise de Marillac was declared Venerable by Pope Leo XIII on June 10th, 1895, and though the prudent tardiness of Rome has delayed her canonization, the author expresses the hope that before long she may be invoked together with her spiritual father and guide St. Vincent. Her work remains. The congregation which at her death numbered 250 members living in sixty houses, today reaches the total of more than 24,000 members carrying on the work of the founders in more than 3,000 institutions in all quarters of the globe.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Saint Patrick. Par M. l'Abbé Riguet, curé de Saint-Denis de l'Hotel (Loiret). 1 vol. in 12mo de la collection "Les Saints." Victor Lecoffre, J. Gabalda et Cie, Paris, 1911. Pp. ix + 203.

The life of the patron saint of Ireland is a subject which year by year attracts attention from an ever-widening circle of scholars and historians. In the preparation of this work the author took advantage of the excellent monograph on St. Patrick by Professor Bury, and was not compelled to devote himself to criticisms of the theories, many of which Professor Bury had so effectually disposed of. Several chapters are devoted by M. Riguet to the religious conditions in pre-Christian Ireland and to the early life and fortunes of St. Patrick; but, as might be expected, because of the narrow limits imposed on him by the general plan and scope of this series of lives, it was not possible to do more than to state what may be regarded as well-established conclusions. The life of St. Patrick is narrated without any attempt at detail, and with little reference to the controversies which attach to each step of his career. His birth-place, his captivity, his education, his mission, and his apostolic journeys are all gone over with a complete absence of the polemical spirit. Considering the difficulties of the task and the larger mass of work that still remains to be done regarding the sources for the life of St. Patrick and the early history of

Christianity in Celtic lands, it is better perhaps that the purely technical side of the work was not accentuated in a volume mainly intended for popular reading. A good example of the author's method can be found in chapter VIII on the organisation of the Church in Ireland where every step bristles with difficulties.

There are some appendices containing a short account of the sources and literature for the life of St. Patrick and some notes on some features of Zimmer's theory of the introduction of Christianity to Ireland and its apostle.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Le Cardinal Vaughan. Par Paul Thureau-Dangin, de l'Académie française. Bloud et Cie. Paris, 1911. Pp. 127.

This little work is merely a summary of the extended biography of Cardinal Vaughan by Snead-Coxe. Though it contains nothing that cannot be found in the earlier work it is valuable if for no other reason than that it contains the views of the author of *La renaissance catholique en Angleterre au XIX^e Siècle*. Those who are interested in the great Catholic awakening in England during the last century have seen the principal figures of that movement gradually take the places to which time and the wider insight into action and its results have been consigning them. As the years go on the figure of Cardinal Vaughan will be brought more and more into contrast with Newman, Wiseman and Manning, their labors for the cause which they upheld so bravely will be judged more impartially, and their stature as leaders and teachers will come into clearer view. This process is already evident in the work before us, and though inchoate it indicates how the unrelenting hand of the historian falls on those who become the subjects of his pen.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Story of the Bridgettines. By Francesca M. Steele (Darley Dale). Benziger Bros. New York, 1910. Pp. 292.

This work contains a very satisfactory though brief life of St. Bridget the Swedish saint whose mystic life found concrete expression in the foundation of the order of Bridgettines. Many

sources have been laid under contribution in bringing together much well-digested information regarding St. Bridget and her daughter St. Catherine. In addition there is a brief description of the peculiar rule of the Bridgettines, providing as it did, a method for regulating in the most minute particulars the daily life of the members of the community. Though the number of nuns in each convent was limited to sixty, the peculiar organisation of the separate communities and the rigor of the rule did not prevent the order from being widely extended. The author gives an account of the various foundations in England, Russia, Denmark, Poland, Holland, Belgium and Bavaria and shows what sad havoc the Reformation played with the convents in most of these countries. The interest of the narrative is still further enhanced by the fact to which the author adverts as one of her reasons for writing the history of the Bridgettines, that they "enjoy the unique privilege of being the only pre-Reformation order of women in England of which the English branch has survived the storm that cut off all the unhappy countries over which it swept from the Catholic Church; after nearly three hundred years of exile the Bridgettine community originally so famous at Lyon House, Islesworth, is now established at Chudleigh in Devonshire.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Les Récits de la Chambrée, par l'abbé Georges Ambler. Paris, G. Beauchesne et Cie., 1911. 80., pp. xxviii + 300.

This book pays a high tribute to the army chaplain who, brave and faithful in war and in peace, has always been the friend and confidant of the soldier. Since the official suppression of this post in the French Army in 1880, the chaplain *Volontaire* has left nothing undone to protect the soldier's faith against the dangers of barrack life.

We have no doubt that in these days of antimilitarism and *sans-patrie*, in France, the stories of l'abbé Ambler will be a great incentive to the young generation to imitate the religious faith and military virtues of their predecessors, and should the occasion arise they will prove that even war can be a cause of civilization, and that the "Vae Victis" of antiquity has made room for "Pro Deo" and "Pro Patria," words of eternal religion and civic duty.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Protestant Magazine published at Washington, D. C., reproduces in its second quarter issue of 1911, pp. 104-109, a few pages from a work of Dr. Chr. Wordsworth. The citation includes in part the original and English translation of a pretended Catholic confession of faith, said to have been imposed on Hungarian converts from Protestantism. It is generally known as the "Hungarian Flucht formular" or formula of malediction. Among other articles the newly-made converts were, before being admitted into the Catholic Church, asked to confess "that the most holy Pope ought to be honored by all with divine honor, with the greater genuflection, due to Christ himself; that the reading of Holy Scripture is the origin of heresy, and schism, and the source of blasphemy; that to receive the Eucharist under one kind is good and salutary; and to receive it under both is heretical and damnable; that Mary, the Blessed Virgin, is worthy of greater honor from men and angels, than Christ himself, the Son of God." The same converts, moreover, were made to accurse the parents who had educated them "in that heretical (Protestant) faith."

This surely is "a remarkable document" as the *Protestant Magazine* entitles its article. It is evidently only with the very best of reasons that we ought to attribute such horrible teachings as the above citation contains to any denomination whether Catholic or non-Catholic. But the *Protestant Magazine* does not heed such an elementary consideration. It relies on the "Letters to M. Goudon" by Chr. Wordsworth, D. D., although the mere title of the book if it were completely quoted would reveal the character of the work: "Letters to M. Goudon on the Destructive Character of the Church of Rome both in Religion and Polity." It does not tell its readers that when Chr. Wordsworth published his *Letters* containing the alleged confession the latter document was repudiated by the *Dublin*

Review as a forgery. It is a pardonable offense of course, for the *Protestant Magazine* not to be acquainted with the *Dublin Review*. A careful perusal, however, of the later editions of Chr. Wordsworth's *Letters* would necessarily have forced the standpoint of the *Dublin Review* (Vol. xxii (1847), pp. 455-56; Vol. xxiv, 290-92) on its attention. With its authority, Chr. Wordsworth, the *Protestant Magazine* seems to believe that the confession must be genuine because it was edited by Streitwolf "who appears to have been a Roman Catholic" (*Prot. Mag.*, p. 104, note). Now, Streitwolf was not a Catholic, but a Protestant minister of Bodenfeld in Hanover. Moreover, he did not edit the confession. He died in 1836 and the second volume of his publication, the one in which this confession is found was published only in 1838. It was published by Kleuer, who was, like Streitwolf, a Protestant.

The *Confession* is no Roman Catholic document, but a wretched hoax first published in 1676 by the Calvinistic preacher George Lani. It was probably forged by Lani himself who brought it out, after sentence of death had been pronounced against him for treasonable machinations and after he had been fortunate enough to effect his escape. Standard works written by Protestants on creeds and confessions, such as Schaff's *Creeds of Christendom* maintain an ominous silence concerning its existence. A lengthy and thorough article on "Confessions" by W. A. Curtis in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (Vol. iii, pp. 831-901) knows nothing of its existence. It has been conclusively proved to be a forgery by Gordanski (1822), Giefers (Paderborn, 1866) and more recently by Duhr in his *Jesuitenfabeln* (fifth edition). This stupid forgery bears on its face its own condemnation, yet it continues to be circulated by Protestant writers, perhaps on the principle that nothing is too vile or abominable to be uttered concerning the religion of Catholics, thus making the end justify the means.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Advent Course. During the season of Advent, Reverend Doctor E. T. Shanahan delivered a course of Sunday sermons at St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York. The titles of the sermons were:

- I.—The Dissembling of Truth.
- II.—The Spirit of the Church and the Temper of the Times.
- III.—Progress and Guidance.
- IV.—The Christian Doctrine of Life and its Critics.
- V.—Bethlehem and the Social Future of Man.

Lectures by Dr. Turner. Reverend Doctor William Turner will deliver a course of six lectures on Medieval Philosophy at the Academy of Music, Brooklyn, N. Y., during the months of January and February. The following are the dates and the titles:

- January 5.—St. Augustine, the Plato of Latin Christianity.
- January 12.—John the Scot, and the ninth century.
- January 19.—Gerbert (Pope Sylvester II) and the tenth century.
- January 26. St. Anselm and the eleventh century.
- February 2.—Abelard and the twelfth century.
- February 9.—St. Thomas and the thirteenth century.

Annual Collection for 1910. From the Rector's *Report* it is seen that the Annual Collection for 1910 amounted to \$95,464.27; the amount for 1909 was \$97,181.21.

Financial Condition of the University. The Annual Report of the Treasurer shows that the University has no debts and that its investments have reached the figure of \$1,178,825.43.

Visit of Reverend Doctor Hyvernât. During the Christmas holidays Reverend Doctor Hyvernât paid a visit to the

University for the purpose of supervising the work of the graduate students, which he has been conducting by correspondence during his year's leave of absence.

Publications by Professors. The Appendix to the Rector's Report contains more than a hundred titles of publications by professors of the University during the year 1910-1911. These include text-books, monograph studies, magazine articles, articles in encyclopedias, and lectures.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII.

February, 1912.

No. 2.

"Let there be progress, therefore ; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTEES,
BALTIMORE.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII.

February, 1912.

No. 2.

LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X TO CARDINAL GIBBONS.

[Translation.]

Dilecto Filio Nostro Jacobo
Tit. Sanctae Mariae Trans
Tiberim S. R. E. Presb. Card.
Gibbons, Archiepiscopo Balti-
morensi, Catholicae studio-
rum Universitatis Washing-
toniensis Cancellario.

To Our Beloved Son James
Gibbons, Cardinal Priest of
Santa Maria in Trastevere,
Archbishop of Baltimore,
Chancellor of the Catholic
University of America.

PIUS PP X.

Dilecte Fili Noster, Salu-
tem et Apostolicam Benedicti-
onem.

Plane nec praeter opinio-
nem nec praeter spem acci-
derunt majora in dies incre-
menta istius Catholicae studio-
rum universitatis, quae Wash-
ingtoniae, in urbe Foedera-
tarum Americae Civitatum
principe, Catholicorum exci-
tata stipe, et ab Apostolica
Sede omni aucta jure legiti-

PIUS X POPE

Beloved Son, Health and
Apostolic Benediction.

By no means surprising or
unexpected is the steady and
vigorous growth of the Catho-
lic University which, located
at Washington the capital city
of the American Republic,
built up by the offerings of
the Catholic people and in-
vested by the Apostolic See
with full academic authority,

mo, ibidem doctrinae in omni scientiarum divinarum et humanarum genere magna parens assidet. Perspecta enim fide et munificentia Catholicorum ex America nulla Nobis inerat dubitatio quin, iisdem adnitentibus, illud recens conditum christianae sapientiae domicilium brevi eam assequeretur nominis gloriam ut inter clariora istius gentis gymnasia haberi posset. Pergratae tamen litterae fuerunt quas nuper Nobis misisti huius rei nuntias non solum quia jucundius fuit ex te ipso rem cognoscere, sed etiam quia id confirmasti quo nihil optabilius Nobis erat; id est in illa alma studiorum sede elegantiam doctrinae optime conjungi cum fidei integritate, ita ut ad bonas artes non minus quam ad religionem adolescentes et clerici et laici informantur. Est igitur cur ex animo gratulemur, tibi quidem in primis, Dilecte Fili Noster, cujus sollertiae providentiaeque hanc ducimus tribuendam laetabilem rerum conditionem, tum etiam ceteris Foederatarum Americae Civitatum Episcopis, qui tibi in Lyceo moderando egregiam navant operam, tum denique

is now become the fruitful parent of knowledge in all the sciences both human and divine. Knowing as We do the faith and generosity of the Catholics of America, We had not the slightest doubt but that through their efforts this newly established home of Christian wisdom would quickly win for itself an honorable name and a place among the foremost institutions in your country. None the less gratifying, however, was the information on this subject which you lately sent Us by letter, not only because it was highly pleasing to have the statement from you personally but also because you gave Us assurance in regard to a matter We have so deeply at heart, to-wit, that in this noble seat of learning the finest culture is thoroughly united with purity of faith, in such wise that the students both clerical and lay are trained in the truths and practice of religion and in the various branches of science as well. We have therefore good reason to congratulate, first of all you, Beloved Son, to whose solicitous and provident care We ascribe the

ejusdem Rectori ac Doctoribus Collegiatis quorum doctrina ac diligentia tam praeclaros efferunt fructus.

At vero quominus Washingtoniensis Academia prosperis omni ex parte rebus utatur officiant adhuc atque obstant, ut ipse fateris, rei familiaris angustiae. Hinc necessitas adeundi piam fide-
lium liberalitatem; quam cum experti jam sitis, per alios decem annos advocare iterum cogitatis in saluberrimi operis subsidium. Collaudamus, ut alias jam fecimus, providentem voluntatem vestram, eamque frugiferam Instituto futuram portendit prompta ac facilis ad largiendum Catholicorum ex America indoles: quin etiam confidimus vel eos ipsos quorum largitatem tenuitas contrahit, symbolam tamen suam ultro collaturos; eo vel magis quod ex hoc lyceo tanta christianae humanitatis emolumenta sperare licet, quanta Catholicorum consueverunt offerre scholae, quibus

prosperous condition of the University, then also the other Bishops of the United States who so ably assist you in the administration of the University, and finally the Rector and the Professors whose teaching and devotion to their work have produced such splendid results.

But, as you yourself acknowledge, the University is still hampered and its full development retarded through lack of resources. Hence the necessity of appealing to the loyal generosity of the faithful of which you have already received striking proof and which you would again call to the aid of this highly useful institution during a further period of ten years. We praise, as on a former occasion We praised, your foresighted design whose success and beneficial result for the University is guaranteed by the prompt, responsive liberality of your American Catholics; nay, We are confident that even those whose readiness to give is limited by the slenderness of their means, will nevertheless gladly contribute their share—the more so because from the Univer-

lex est mentem doctrinae studiis excolere, animos virtute confirmare.

Occasione utimur ut idem vos hortemur quod jam decessor Noster f. r. Leo XIII qui die XIII junii MCM I ad te rescribens, Americae Septentrionalis Episcopis suadebat ut e suis quisque delectos aliquos clericos, quorum ingenii vis discendique ardor plus quidam facerent spei, Washingtoniae Academiae instituendos traderent. Nos autem pro certo habemus, Dilecte Fili Noster, episcopus eosdem studiose Nobis obsecuturos in re quaecum singularum dioecesium exploratissima utilitas est conjuncta. Iidem enim clerici sacerdotio initiati et ad sua reversi quodcumque libeat episcopis sacerdotale munus illis conferre, ea perficient diligentia quam excellentiorem in ipsis praestabunt doctrinae opes quas uberiores Washingtoniae acquisierint.

sity as the source may rightly be expected all those advantages for Christian education which flow out through our Catholic schools to enrich the intelligence with knowledge and to strengthen the heart in the practice of virtue.

We take this occasion to renew the exhortation given by Our Predecessor of happy memory Leo XIII who, in writing to you on June 13, 1901, urged the Bishops of North America to send to the University from each diocese some specially chosen clerical students whose ability and eagerness for learning would give more than ordinary promise of success in their studies. We are quite certain, Beloved Son, that the Bishops will readily comply with Our express wish in this matter from which each diocese will derive beyond doubt the greatest benefit. For these clerics elevated to the priesthood and returning to their respective dioceses will, in any position which the Bishops may assign them, discharge their duties with an earnestness all the greater because of the deeper and wider knowledge they will have acquired at Washington.

Suam quoque laudem hic a Nobis habeant Religiosarum Familiarum Moderatores, qui suorum Collegia tironum circum Washingtoniensem Universitatem considerunt, quasi quamdam filiorum coronam qui Almam Matrem complectuntur. Hujus enim propinquitatis ea sunt commoda quod ex una parte Collegiorum conspectus Academiam egregie exornat eidemque opinionem auget; ex altera religiosiis alumni, qui domi studia doctrinarum colunt, Academia et praestantiorum magistrorum copiam praebet et cultum exquisitiorem si qui Athenaeum celebrare velint. Quae probe considerantes Nos, quibus maximae est curae ut qui in sortem Domini vocati sunt sanctitatis et doctrinae cultu evadant *operarii inconfusibiles, recte tractantes verbum veritatis*, Collegia ejusmodi singulari benevolentia complectimur, ceterosque Religiosos Antistites hortamur ut idipsum, omni nempe remoto regularis disciplinae detrimento, efficiendum curent.

Illud quoque jucundum fuit abs te accipere Episcopos Uni-

In this connection also We bestow deserved praise upon the superiors of the Religious Orders whose houses of study are established at the University, forming as it were a circle of devoted children around their cherished mother. This grouping indeed is of mutual advantage: the Colleges add to the adornment of the University and enhance its prestige, while on its part the University affords the religious who, along with their own studies, may follow its courses, opportunity to profit by the teaching of the ablest professors and to attain more thorough knowledge. Carefully considering these relations and concerned above all that those who are called to the service of the Lord should by growth in holiness and knowledge become *workmen that need not to be ashamed, rightly handling the word of truth*, We regard these Colleges with special favor and We exhort the Superiors of other religious orders, while preserving intact their regular discipline, to establish similar institutes.

It was furthermore a pleasure to learn from you that

versitatis moderatores rationem, provido consilio, iniisse qua, incolumi sane religiosa disciplina, vel ipsis Religiosis Foeminis faciliora redderent altioris doctrinae beneficia quibus utilius versentur in puellis instituendis.

Quae hucusque scribendo persequuti sumus in aperto ponunt Nos laudatae Catholicae Academiae incrementis summa quadam voluntate studere. Plane enim intelligimus quantum ad Catholicam doctrinam vulgandam, defendendam, ad provehendam gentium humanitatem possit Catholica studiorum universitas quae quidem celebritate atque auctoritate floreat. Tueri igitur ipsam et provehere idem prorsus esse videmus ac perutilem dare operam cum religioni tum civitati.

Auspex divinorum munerum Nostraeque testis benevolentiae Apostolica sit Benedictio quam tibi, Dilecte Fili Noster, Rectori, Doctoribus alumni Washingtonianae Universitatis amantissime in Domino impertimus.

the Bishops who are directors of the University had, with prudent foresight, devised a plan whereby the teaching Sisters also, without in any way slackening the observance of their religious rules, might more easily enjoy the advantages of university study and thus attain greater efficiency in their work of educating girls.

What we have thus far set forth makes it plain that We are fully determined on developing the Catholic University. For We clearly understand how much a Catholic university of high repute and influence can do towards spreading and upholding Catholic doctrine and furthering the cause of civilization. To protect it therefore and to quicken its growth is in Our judgment, equivalent to rendering the most valuable service to religion and to country alike.

As an omen of God's favor and a token of Our own goodwill accept the Apostolic Benedictio which We most lovingly in the Lord bestow upon you, beloved son, as also upon the Rector, the professors and the students of the Catholic University.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum in praeludio diei sacrae Infanti Deo a tribus Sapientibus adorato, anno MCMXII. Pontificatus Nostri nono.

Given at St. Peter's, Rome, the eve of the Epiphany, 1912, the ninth year of Our Pontificate.

PIUS PP X.

PIUS X, POPE.

THE DIVINE INFANT.¹

And the angel said to them: fear not; for, indeed, I bring you tidings of great joy, that shall be to all the people: for this day is born to you a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord, in the city of David. And this shall be a sign unto you. You shall find the infant wrapped in swaddling clothes and laid in a manger. *Luke II, 10-12.*

This night, the world over, every true Christian heart rejoices, for in these momentous hours was solved at Bethlehem the mystery of human life that from time immemorial mankind had been wearily trying to understand. In one way or another mankind for untold centuries had been seeking on earth or in itself the key of the dread enigma, in power or pleasure, in philosophy, knowledge, or wealth, but in vain. Neither Cæsar nor Pan, neither Plato nor Aristotle nor Mammon, had been able to lift the heavy veil that shrouded from the anxious gaze of man the hard secret of pain and sorrow, of poverty and injustice, of universal evil and endemic wrong, above all the grim secret of death that humbled equally all men and remained for all the one inscrutable thing.

But this night, twenty centuries ago, the long-silent heavens opened and in a poor village of a despised and hated land, amid the most wretched surroundings, the Word of God, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, came down to earth in the form of a little infant, miraculously born of an humble virgin; began again the religious life of man; took up, as it were, to Himself the whole social order in its lowest and simplest elements and breathed into it unexpected spiritual long-

¹This discourse was preached by Monsignor Shahan, on Christmas night at High Mass in the Church of San Silvestro in Capite, Rome.

ings and energies, a new spiritual insight, new faith and hope, above all a new and irresistible love that was to be the solvent of the hardened hearts of mankind, the mighty force that was to lift to higher levels our broken and helpless race, semi-conscious indeed of its spiritual ruin, but too weak to raise itself, too blind to recognize in the vast labyrinth of idolatry and immorality the one true outlet of penance and conversion. This night, therefore, says one of the Fathers of the Church, all sorrow should be banished, for it is truly the birthday of human happiness. Filled with this glad knowledge, we confess that the tender infant in his cold manger is truly God Himself, who has taken up our helpless nature, save its sins and its sinful tendencies, has begun with the great enemy of mankind a supreme conflict in the very flesh that he hitherto dominated, and has made it certain for all time that not in matter, *i. e.*, not in the body with its passions nor the world with its attractions, not in an evil or indifferent God, not in a totally corrupt nature, nor in our incapacity to know and serve a higher power, lies the true source of all human misery, past or present, but in our own sinfulness, inherited and actual, in our own immemorial violation of the eternal law, in the growing volume of our iniquities that challenge and deserve the wrath of God, offended in His goodness and His justice, in His holiness, His power and His patience.

This night, dearly beloved brethren, was broken forever the power of sin, *i. e.*, the moral death which had overrun the earth and established its perverse order in all places. The gross naturalism of the Gentile world that ranged from the vile idolatry of the multitude to the fierce pessimism of a Tacitus and the refined atheism of a Lucretius, was this night vanquished. This night the glorious spiritual promises delivered to Israel, and emptied of their true life by a narrow Jewish nationalism, were given back to humankind, and religion enabled to begin its splendid career of universal beneficence that is far from ended, despite the ingratitude and injustice that it encounters too often at the hands of those to whom it has been most helpful.

Could we roll back the ages and stand before the Crib of Jesus and in its divine radiance look out upon the world He came to save, our hearts would be stricken with an anguish that no lips could express. We should only stand in mute amazement and confess how truly Christ could say later that He had convinced the world of sin and iniquity.

It is impossible to even outline the moral horrors of the world into which Jesus Christ was born. We know it only through pitiful fragments of its arts, its letters and its monuments, through faint echoes of the earliest Christian teaching and preaching, and through the ponderous learning of modern scholars. But the cruel pressure of universal sinfulness, without relief and without protest; the awful impact of popular philosophies of presumption or despair; the unrestrained course of social wrong that bore down woman, the child, the slave, the stranger, the poor, the conquered; the whole moral atmosphere oppressive beyond belief—all that is gone beyond our ken or memory, gone in the great tide of Christian triumph, religious, social, moral, that rose this night at Bethlehem and still rolls its glorious course through the world.

This night, indeed, the hour of divine mercy for mankind was at hand, and from the heavens poured forth the cry of God's revealing angels:—Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace to men of good will! That is, for the deadly worship of demons the clear knowledge and universal praise of the one true God and for the old order of mutual hatred a new law of love, infinite, universal, omnipotent. The angels may indeed be the joyful heralds of the good news, the glorious evangel of peace and love, but God Himself will be our Saviour, and the little infant now scarcely breathing will overthrow the ancient enemy of mankind so thoroughly that soon the Apostle of the Gentiles can taunt Him before the world and forever:—

O Death, where is thy victory?
O Grave, where is thy sting?

Yes, the arch-enemy of the one true God and of his pure and holy moral law, the exterminating Apollyon, king and angel of the bottomless pit (*Apoc.* ix, 2), was this night shorn of the ascendancy that for so many unhappy ages he exercised over the minds and hearts of mankind. Faith, hope and love came down from above, the heavens long besought rained down the Just Man, and the glorious visions of the prophets, cast against the forbidding background of Gentile corruption and Jewish perversity, were at last realized.

Bethlehem was, indeed, the birthplace of the new Gospel, and to nearby Jerusalem, the holy city, the city of the promises, the seat of divine revelation, the throne of David, the altar of the Most High, was it first offered, but in vain! A proud, obstinate, ungrateful, malicious people, His own race and kin, rejected the new-born Master of Heaven and Earth, the King of all the Ages, and He turned to another race, chose another kin and destined them to a spiritual authority that should one day immeasurably surpass their actual empire, splendid as it was, seated solidly around the great Middle Sea, majestic queen at whose feet the peoples and nations of the world cast daily their tribute of subjection and admiration. Legend, both ancient and eloquent, has it that here at Rome on the day of Christ's birth broke forth two wells of oil that ran unchecked to the Tiber, symbolic of the sweet and ever-spreading mercy of the new law of Christ that was to heal and purify forever bruised hearts, corrupted and corrupting lives, nay, all human society, and cause a new order and a new civilization, even the order and the civilization of the Catholic Church yet vigorous and promising despite the assaults of a thousand enemies and the machinations of the Evil One whose long mastery was this day checked at Bethlehem.

Another speaking legend, as lovely as it is ancient, makes the Emperor Augustus behold this night in a vision the Blessed Virgin with the Infant Jesus in her arms, standing in a resplendent sun, the Sun of Justice that would never again set, but would shine forever, and forever prevent the universal recurrence of the spiritual torpor of antiquity, its reign of

sinfulness and law of selfishness, its accepted order of injustice, the sum-total of all evil that had hitherto been the rule of human existence. Moral lapses and decay were inevitable, even in the Christian order, nor are its course and operations free from human imperfections. But it has within itself, as no other order of human life, before or since, a divine power of self-judgment, of self-restoration, of return to the higher and better things of the Gospel, of self-renewal in Christ Jesus, whose abundant healing graces are never lacking, but are everywhere and at all times ready in His Holy Church for those who turn meekly and penitently toward Bethlehem, *i. e.*, toward divine mercy now incarnate in the Infant of Bethlehem and finally triumphant on the altar of the Cross whose shadow, even now, far deeper than those of any Judæan night, falls athwart the manger where Mary and Joseph adore among the crowding angels and the symphonies of heaven.

While the divine Gloria is ringing in our ears and the heavens are alive with its infinite sublimities, let us too go over to Bethlehem with the shepherds, "and let us see this word that is come to pass, which the Lord hath showed us." (*Luke*, 11, 15.) Gazing on the sublime mysteries of the Incarnation and the birth of Jesus, let us try to fathom, as far as divine grace enables us, the depth and the strength of the love of Jesus that made Him quit His place at the eternal council-table of heaven, and in the ancient language of the Church empty Himself, as it were, for the love of man, take up our frail and suffering nature, take up also His abode with us amid the lowliest circumstances, and begin on earth His miraculous career from Bethlehem to Calvary. And as we gaze in loving admiration upon the Holy Family let us pray the Heavenly Father to renovate on that blessed model the hearts of men and to make it the foundation of that new social order whose solid pillars shall be justice and mercy, peace and love, an order that the Catholic Church established and in part made perfect, that has left indelible traces on human society, and must be again restored and perfected if we would understand fully, and understanding exhaust the vast capaci-

ties for good that God has laid up in our human nature, raised this blessed night to such a dizzy height of grandeur, united ineffably with the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity and in that union purified, sanctified, deified.

And while in our poor human way we try to fathom the incomparable honor so gratuitously paid this blessed night to His creature man by the Word of God, let us meditate deeply the words of St. Leo the Great in the noble Christmas sermon that nearly fifteen hundred years ago he addressed to the Christians of Rome on the very site where his successor, the tenth Pius, now gloriously reigns and preaches to all mankind the same saving doctrine, as though no unspeakable cataclysms of history separated the Vatican of the fifth from the Vatican of the twentieth century.

“Know thy dignity, O Christian man, and since thou shar’st henceforth the divine nature, let not a degenerate life lead thee back to thy former wretched estate. Call to mind of what head and of what body thou art a member, and forget not that thou hast been snatched from the power of darkness and brought into the light of God and into His kingdom.”

It is our great privilege, dearly beloved brethren, to celebrate this night the birth of Jesus in the city that He chose to be the seat of His religion, the living hearth from which should be forever borrowed the sacred fire of divine truth; in the very shadow of the glorious Crib that first sheltered our Emmanuel; in closest proximity to the venerable head of St. John the Baptist, the last of the prophets of Christ, among the first of His martyrs, and the first of His apostles; in one of the most ancient churches of Christendom that shows yet the scars of the long conflict of the Sun of Justice with the idolatrous worship of the orb of day, and in itself a continuous monument of the one true God over the legions of false gods, of the unbroken line of the papacy that was old when this church was first dedicated to God in honor of St. Sylvester and is yet young in the courage and vigor and endurance that come to it incessantly from the Holy Spirit. May the blessings of the holy time be yours in abundance, above all may your faith

be kindled here afresh in the divine character of the Infant of Bethlehem, in His mission of universal regeneration, in His power to solicit irresistibly the hearts of men, and in the future triumph of His Holy Church that still teaches here with no less charm and authority than when Peter and Paul laid down, in this city, their lives for the religion of Jesus Christ.

INTELLECTUALISM AND PRAGMATISM: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE.*

II. THE INTELLECTUALISTIC THEORY.

The intellectualistic theory of knowledge—that is, the theory of moderate intellectualism as exemplified in Scholastic Realism—may be expressed in the following brief sentence: Knowledge consists originally in the mental apprehension of an object. Knowledge is a vital action indeed, but a complex and vital action of a special kind, both receptive and apprehensive in character, common to both object and subject. The direct and ultimate result is not one of production but one of apprehension by communication and union between object and subject. In the act of knowledge the object manifests itself as present to the subject on one side; and the subject, on the other, apprehends the object itself as present. Knowledge therefore, from the intellectualistic viewpoint, implies that “transcendence” which the empiric pragmatist dreads so much. It consists in the very leaping from the subject to the object, the “salto mortale” of the radical empiricist. It is the mental union of the subject with the object, which union results in the conscious and real apprehension of the object by the subject. When I say that *I perceive* this book on my desk, I do not express merely a feeling of various sensations which succeed each other or continue each other in my consciousness, but I express the very fact of the existence of a well determined object outside of my consciousness although in relation with it. In the same way, when I say that I have the *idea* or *concept* of man or of tree, I do not simply describe a subjective state of mind or express a mere name, but I intend primarily to mean an object, the object *man* or the object *tree* apprehended through its concept and expressed by a name.

* See *Catholic University Bulletin*, March, 1911.

Such is indeed the common sense notion of knowledge. It is also that of the Intellectualist who does not take alarm at being in accordance with common sense.

The intellectualistic notion of knowledge therefore is essentially transcendent, realistic and objective.

FACTS VERSUS THEORY: OBSERVATION VERSUS EXPLANATION.

Let us first lay down the elementary principles of method in the treatment of the problem. Here, as in every investigation, the question of method is of primary importance. Very often, it is because it has been ignored in the various scientific inquiries, especially in philosophy, that many pseudo-problems have been raised; that many mere difficulties have been converted into direct objections, when they should have preserved their true character of difficulties; that even evident facts have been denied or doubted, when their existence should have been sincerely accepted, even at the cost of a frank acknowledgment of ignorance on our part concerning their explanation. We may add that there is not perhaps one problem, in the whole field of philosophy, where this question of method has been more neglected, and where this neglect has caused more errors, than in the problem of knowledge.

The true method demands that we observe the facts before we begin to explain their existence or their nature. Again, explanation must be subordinated to observation, theory to facts, and the value of a theory must be judged by its respect for and accordance with the facts observed. Finally, inability to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the existence or nature of a fact, must never become a pretext for denying the reality of its existence or the genuineness of its manifestation. To act otherwise is not to act according to reason but to give way to arbitrary caprice.

The application of these principles to the problem of knowledge suggests clearly the way and order to be followed in the study of that problem. At the same time, it brings out very

pointedly the initial and fundamental error of both the idealistic and pragmatic theories of knowledge. Both of them, Pragmatism as well as Idealism, are first and last *a priori* theories. Both deliberately sacrifice observation to explanation, facts to theory. It is evident that we have not to decide at first and by an *a priori* conception what the content of our knowledge *must be* in order to be true knowledge, as is being done by the Idealist; nor to investigate first *how* our knowledge takes place and to study the nature of its process of production to determine afterward the reality and nature of its object, as is being done by the Pragmatist. We must, from the start, observe knowledge as a fact, that is, as it manifests itself to our mind in its entirety and in its primary and spontaneous presentation, independently of any theory concerning the nature of its object or the conditions of its process: and this is precisely the position taken by Realistic Intellectualism.

THE DATA OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE.


Our first step therefore, in the study of this problem, is to observe knowledge as a fact, what we call the *data of experience*. Up to this point there is, theoretically at least, unanimous accord of all philosophers, of idealists like Bradley and pragmatists like Professor James and Dr. Schiller, of intuitionists like Bergson and of realists like Aristotle and S. Thomas. As soon as, however, it comes to the point of determining what we call the data of experience, the agreement ceases. Are the data of experience, from which we are bound to start, the data of "our" experience or the data of "pure experience"? If, on the one side, we answer that we must start with the data of "our" experience, are we not confronted with the danger of confusing what is really given with our interpretation of it, added to and mixed with it, by consequence of our individual education or of our inherited habits of race? Our experience in the adult age is not the same as in childhood. How then are we to distinguish what

is natural from what is acquired? On the other hand, if we answer that we must begin with the data of "pure experience," there arises the question: Where are we to find these data? Only newly born babes, Professor James tells us, or men under the influence of semi-comatic sleep, drugs, etc. . . . can be considered as having a pure experience in the literal sense of a feeling of a *that* which is not yet a *what*.¹ Such a description shows what the partisans of "pure experience" understand by the "purity" of experience. Does it not seem strange that, in order to study the fundamental and essential data of human knowledge, we should be bound to begin our investigation with the undeveloped, abnormal and morbid states of human life? Does it not seem strange that we could find, only there, the primary facts and elements of human knowledge? It appears evident that it is impossible to start with the so-called "pure experience." And even if it were possible or reasonable, it would remain, on the very principle of this theory, that we would not yet have reached the primary sources of experience, since even in the case of the newly born babe or the other particular cases mentioned, experience is already filled with the inherited habits acquired by the race.

Let us apply our principle: facts before theory. The data of "our" experience, whatever may be their origin or antecedents, whatever may be their degree of originality and purity or the number of acquired elements included among them, are the only experimental data which are really present to us and which may be object of observation for us. The so-called data of pure experience, on the contrary, far from being facts subject to direct observation, are elements hypothetical in their existence as well as in their nature. They are a theory not a fact; a theory the value of which can be judged only in function of and by inference from our actual and normal experience.

There is then no room for doubt or hesitation. If we wish to study human knowledge scientifically, the data of "our"

¹"The Thing and Its Relations" in *A Pluralistic Universe*, app. A.



experience alone can furnish us with a positive starting point. Such is also Dr. Schiller's opinion, although we may, at times, notice some vague hesitation, on his part, concerning this question.² It is likewise the very method firmly maintained by Professor Bergson. Let us therefore study the fact of knowledge, as it presents itself to our observation in its present and normal state.

KNOWLEDGE AS SENSE PERCEPTION.

Our first act of knowledge is an act of perception or empirical intuition, an act of simple apprehension, as it is called by the Schoolmen. Now, what does this act of perception present to our mind and to our direct apprehension? Let us take an example. I am sitting at my desk, my eyes closed: I open my eyes and I perceive. What do I perceive? At the very first instant I perceive only a continuous, confused and heterogeneous whole. Desk, books, papers, etc. . . . form an indistinct continuity of objects, a mass of colors and forms occupying various places in space, where nothing is particularly remarked, determined or recognized. There is, no doubt, a confused perception of various objects, of similarities and differences between objects, which it is easy with the least attention to distinguish from or relate to each other. But, at this instant, variety, differences and similarities form an undivided and indistinct whole. There is not as yet any clear distinction between object and subject, substances and qualities; there is no clear perception of the relations between the objects perceived.³ One thing however is very clear: the presence of an object. In every act of perception, what I perceive directly and immediately is not the act itself of perception or sensation, but an object. When sitting at my desk I open my eyes, it is not the consciousness of seeing which manifests itself immediately to my mind, but the indistinct mass of objects present before my eyes; it is that mass of objects which

² *Studies on Humanism*, p. 184; see also p. 187.

³ St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, p. 9, LXXXV, a. 3, 8.

I perceive. The consciousness of seeing exists indeed; but it occupies only the second place in my act of perception and is subordinated to the presence of the object. Such is the psychological fact, primary and irreducible, in my perception, as was well remarked by S. Thomas.⁴

This point cannot be too much emphasized, for it is of the highest consequence. The essentially "transcendental" and "objective" character of knowledge reveals itself as a fact. Hence the theory advanced concerning the process of the act of knowledge or the nature of the object perceived, whatever it may be, must take account of this fact and subordinate itself to it. Nobody can reasonably pretend to reject the element of "transcendence" under the pretext that it is mysterious or contradictory, any more than he can reasonably deny the existence of motion or of life under the pretext that he cannot explain it. This element manifests itself directly as an essential and integral element of our act of knowledge.

RADICAL AND IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM EXAMINED

And so, at the very first step, we part company with Professor James' Radical Empiricism and Professor Dewey's Immediate Empiricism; and this we do in the name of experience itself. Moreover, if we examine Professor James' and Professor Dewey's theories, we may clearly see how their fear of transcendence leads them to a dead-lock and how transcendence imposes itself upon them in all its horror, if their theory is to be in any way at all a theory of knowledge.

According to Professor James, it is possible for our thought to have reference to things outside the field of our actual experience. He tells us that "the known may be a possible experience, either of that subject or another, to which the said conjunctive transitions would lead if sufficiently prolonged."⁵ According to Professor Dewey, an experience is

⁴ St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, 9, LXXXV, a. 2.

⁵ "A World of Pure Experience," *Journal of Phil.*, vol. I, pp. 538 ff.

truly cognitional only on the condition of being "contemporaneously aware of meaning something beyond itself."⁶ Is not this transcendence pure and simple? Since the correspondence between my experience, as for instance the image of a fire and the event represented is admitted; since it is admitted that, under certain conditions, this correspondence might have been or may be actually experienced, is not the fact of transcendence granted as the very essential element of knowledge? Or if an odor is truly cognitional only on the condition that it means and tends to something beyond itself, a rose for instance, as maintained by Professor Dewey, does not this again necessarily imply the reality of transcendence? Does it not follow that our experimental knowledge does not consist in the mere subjective experiences or sensations which realize the "plan of action," but rather that it precedes, determines and directs them? that this "plan of action" is itself already a transcendental knowledge, since, whether I realize it or not, whether or not I follow the indications meant by that odor, it remains that it possesses the specific character of meaning and tending to something determined and beyond itself? The fulfilling experiences, had they taken place, might and would have then furnished an actual verification of my antecedent knowledge; they do not constitute it.

But Professor James would not accept these conclusions; transcendence must not be admitted. Our knowledge, he maintains, is "ambulatory" not "saltatory"; it does not consist in a transcendental relation of image to object, but in a continuous series of felt transitions. Let us recall his typical illustration.⁷ I am thinking of Memorial Hall. At the outset, Professor James says, nothing is in my mind but "a flat piece of substantive experience like any other, with no self-transcendence about it." "If I can lead you to the hall . . . ; if in its presence I now feel my idea to be continued; if the associates of the image and of the felt hall run parallel,

⁶ "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," *Mind*, pp. 301 ff.

⁷ Cf. *The Catholic University Bulletin*, March 1911, p. 209.

so that each term of the one context corresponds serially, as I walk, with an answering term of the other . . . my idea must be called cognizant of reality. That percept was what it meant, for into it my idea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness and fulfilled intention. . . . Whenever such transitions are felt, the first experience knows the last one." I then know the Hall. My knowledge of it consists in the continuous succession of experiences unrolling themselves in time and corresponding serially to continuous feelings of satisfaction and fulfilled intention. My initial image then becomes a knower and the terminus an object meant or known.

In reality this description, which looks very much like an attempt to explain away transcendence, takes all the meaning it may have from the unconscious implication of that element, and it loses it all, as soon as this element is truly put aside. For, how could this initial image be a term of "experiences of conjunction," unless it contains already in itself an element of adaptation to the other term, a term outside itself, of the said conjunction? And if it means something beyond itself, it is self-transcendent, it is already an act of knowledge. I cannot help thinking that Professor James, unconsciously, evades this conclusion by a mere verbal delusion. There is, he will say, between my image and the Hall, a *continuity*, a *felt-transition*. I maintain that the simplest observation manifests the consciousness of a *correspondence* and of an *objective and transcendental relation* between the image and the Hall. Again, why is it that in presence of the Hall, the image is accompanied by the consciousness of satisfaction and fulfilled intention, if not because it contained already a certain relation with the said Hall, because it was already a representation, in memory or by anticipation, of Memorial Hall, now clearly recognized and clearly verified by its actual correspondence with the Hall presently perceived? If, from the beginning, it was not already a determined knowledge, although perhaps vague, but merely a "flat piece of substantive experience like any other, with no self-transcendence about it," how was it in any way the image of Memorial

Hall rather than the image of any other object? Where is the foundation of the so-called continuity between the initial image and the subsequent experience? and where is the source of that consciousness of *fulfilled intention* I have in presence of the Hall? This final consciousness of fulfillment, if it means anything at all, means at least that there was in my image something that could be fulfilled and has been as a matter of fact satisfactorily fulfilled by the actual perception of the hall; that is, that there was a correspondence, a relation between the representation contained in the image and the object actually perceived—a correspondence now actually apprehended.

Moreover, we might ask, without being open to the reproach of overcritical curiosity where knowledge truly comes in? It is not at the starting point, for the image is not yet a knower. It is not at the end, for there is then no knower, since the initial image has disappeared. It is not in the intermediary experiences, since there is not yet a knower, nor is there yet any fulfillment.⁸ Would Professor James say that the initial image, although not representative of anything, had at this point however a meaning and an intention, meaning and intention now consciously apprehended? He should then confess that the initial image was more than a "flat piece of substantive experience;" that it contained a meaning and intention of *something determined beyond itself*. And what is this but an admission of the transcendental character of that image?

Thus, according to Pragmatic Empiricism, there is, in our act of knowledge, no transcendental leap from subject to object, —although objective reality, we are told, exists independently of our ideas, and we know with what indignation Professor James protests against the accusation of subjectivism,—but merely a process of continuous transition between images and "the most authentic substitutes and representatives" of objective reality.⁹ Hence, the entire act of knowledge unrolls

⁸ See James B. Pratt, "What is Pragmatism," pp. 160 ff., (New York, 1909), where this point is well developed.

⁹ *Journ. of Philos.*, vol. IV, p. 398.

itself wholly between the limits of individual experience of the subject, by a transition from image to image, until we happen to experience that element of the process which is the "most authentic substitute and representative" of external or objective reality. Truly one who reads these words begins to hesitate, and seriously to suspect that he has misunderstood the theory, when he reflects that it is supposed to do away with transcendence. For does not all this explanation clearly imply and postulate the existence and reality of transcendence? The images are substitutes and representatives. Substitutes and representatives of what? And if they are substitutes and representatives of external reality, how are they so, but by a relation of transcendence of the representative to the object of which it is the representative? We are told that knowledge exists when we experience the *most authentic* representatives of reality. Would we be deemed too exacting, if we were to ask for the marks of this authenticity? And would it be too rash to assert that they cannot be anything else than the transcendental relation, consciously and objectively apprehended, between the representative and the object represented.

But transcendence must not be admitted, under any consideration. Knowledge, it is asserted by the Empiricist, ultimately resolves itself into the adaptation of my successive impressions to their satisfaction. What then shall we say of the case when I am fully satisfied with a certain opinion, although I am in reality mistaken. Suppose, for instance, that I am fully satisfied with the idea that some sentence has been pronounced by such a man, while it has been in fact pronounced by another. And let us suppose moreover that one of my friends, without my knowing it, is as fully satisfied with the idea that it has been pronounced by another, that is, the right person. Will the Pragmatist say that in my case there is *no* knowledge? or that it is a case of *false* knowledge? I am yet as fully satisfied as my friend whose knowledge is true. It remains therefore that mere subjective satisfaction cannot constitute or authenticate knowledge; that genuine knowledge must necessarily include an objective reference, as well as the

consciousness of it, to a reality beyond subjective experience, objective reference which is the true criterion between true and false knowledge.

Truly, when one speaks of knowledge, transcendence is implied; it is the very essence of knowledge; knowledge and transcendence stand or fall together. Without that element, in spite of all protestations to the contrary, nothing remains but a vague and subjective impressionism.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE DATA OF INTELLECTUAL APPREHENSION.

Not only have we immediate perceptions through sense experience, but we have also immediate apprehensions of an intellectual order. In our first act of knowledge, the object does not only present itself to our senses as a confused mass of colors, an indistinct and continuous extension, etc. . . ., but it is, moreover, immediately apprehended by our intelligence as a "something" concretely realized and subsisting in these divers qualities perceived by our senses. This intellectual apprehension or abstractive intuition of "being," as immediately given, is as spontaneous and natural in its order, as the very perception of color, sound or extension in sense-perception. It is confused at first, yet very rich and pregnant with reality. It presents to our mind a content which our intelligence, with its ability and desire to understand, cannot fail to explore. And thus, by applying its power of abstraction, penetration and reflection to the data of sense experience apprehended in connection with the fundamental element of "being," and concentrating it successively upon their various aspects, our intelligence discovers the divers characters, determinations and relations of this element of being, of which the concrete reality present to us is the actual and individual realization. We discover the elements of existence, of potency and act, of substance and qualities, of unity and multiplicity, of distinction and continuity, etc. . . . which are as many determinations of that "something," so vaguely perceived at first. These various

elements form the content of our primitive concepts or ideas. We discover also their fundamental conditions of existence and necessary relations which form the matter of our primitive judgments or principles, such as the principles of identity and contradiction. By reflecting upon its own act of apprehension in relation to the thing apprehended, our intelligence perceives the distinction as well as the relation between being as known and being as knowing, that is, between object and subject. And so, by successive acts of abstraction, comparison and reflection, our mind apprehends the elements and relations which constitute the very essence of reality, independently of, although actually realized in, concrete and individual circumstances and conditions.¹⁰

If we now examine, without any *a priori* theory concerning its nature or its process of formation, the fact of intellectual apprehension or conception, as it presents itself immediately to our mind, we may observe in it the following data.

My first act of intellectual knowledge is not an act of explicit judgment, but an act of immediate apprehension of something existing, in which unity and multiplicity, permanence and change, etc. . . . are, as yet, confusedly mixed together.

As, through empirical intuition, the individual and concrete object presents itself naturally and spontaneously to my senses as "transcendent," so the elements apprehended through my concepts present themselves to my intelligence as objective and real. My intelligence does not produce or shape them according to some arbitrary or artificial device; it discovers them in and expresses them out of the individual determinations in which they are implicated. In the building up and formation of its concepts, it does not accept any element or relation which has not its foundation in the actual data of experience; and, under the constant guidance and control of these data, it attempts to apprehend as exactly as possible, in its essential

¹⁰ St. Thomas, *Contra Gentes*, I. II, c. 83; 99 *disp.*, *de Veritate*, q. I; *Summa Theologica*, I, p. 9, XII, a. 4; 9, LXXXV, a. 5 etc. . . ; Cajetan, *Comment. de Ente et Essentia*, subinitio; see our article in the *Catholic University Bulletin*, March 1910, pp. 215-217.

elements and fundamental relations, that very reality which our senses, through their empirical intuitions, perceive in its outside surface.

Again, there is a clear distinction between a concept and an image or a word. While an image is the mere representation, more or less confused, of a concrete and particular object, a concept implies essentially a meaning, that is, contains the *raison d'être* of the object apprehended or conceived. As to the word, far from constituting the concept, it is merely its expression, expression which is modified and determined according to the very modifications and determinations of the concept itself. Such is the law of formation in every language.¹¹

Finally, it is true, in a certain sense and measure, that a concept may be influenced in its formation, by needs, interests, emotions, etc. . . ., that it may be purposive. But this influence does not affect the *matter of the content* of the concept. Needs, interests, emotions, etc. . . . may stimulate the intelligence to form a concept, determine its direction or its degree of precision; but the matter itself of the content whatever its character or degree of precision may be, is always determined by the object.¹²

THE PRAGMATIST NOTION OF CONCEPT EXAMINED.

As we have already said¹³ Pragmatism denies that our concepts are truly representative and apprehensive of reality. And the Pragmatist takes delight in emphasizing what he considers an irreducible opposition between concept and reality. Reality, he says, is essentially concrete and individual, while our concepts are by nature abstract and general. Reality is dynamic and evolutive, while our concepts are static and immutable. Reality is continuous and synthetic, while our concepts

¹¹ Cf. Whitney, *Life and Growth of Language*.

¹² Cf. *The Catholic University Bulletin*, November 1909, pp. 609 ff.

¹³ Cf. *The Catholic University Bulletin*, March 1911, pp. 206-207.

are fragmentary and analytic. How then could our concepts be representations of reality?

Yet the Pragmatist admits the utility and necessity of concepts in human knowledge. They cannot indeed represent reality, but, he insists, they are useful and necessary instruments, imposed upon our mind by the conditions of human life, by which we prepare ourselves to enter into contact with reality and to keep in touch with it. They are efficacious means by which we are enabled to handle and communicate it.

Hence the Pragmatist conclusion that our concepts are "practical substitutes for pure experience" or "words with a steering function" in our attempt to express reality;—"plans of action" devised to direct our knowledge;—"tools" invented and fashioned by the human mind for a successful mastery of experience;—"dynamic schemas" or a kind of intellectual scaffolding built by man in order to allow him to experience and live reality. In a word, in the Pragmatic system, concepts are not representations produced in our mind by reality and corresponding to it; they are mere artificial means and instruments devised and built by our mind to use and master reality.

Let us say at once that we have no intention of denying the great importance and value of experience or intuition, nor do we feel any hesitation in confessing the essential inadequacy of the concept in human knowledge. We find in nature, as actually realized, only concrete and individual beings; man or tree, as such, does not exist in reality, but only such and such an individual man or such and such a tree with its peculiar determinations. And the very first operation by which we apprehend these concrete beings is an act of sense-perception or experimental intuition.¹⁴ Again, intuition alone is able to apprehend reality in its original and individual determinations, with all the riches of its details, in that particular space and in that unique and never-to-be-repeated moment of time in which it exists and which constitute its original individuality.

¹⁴ St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, p., q. XII, a. 12; q. LXXXIV, a. 3; q. LXXXV, a. 1, 2 ad 2; *De Verit.*, q. X, a. 6; *De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 4; *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 4, etc. . . .

Finally, a real being, concrete and individual as given in nature, is essentially a synthetic union of elements which are organically and integrally connected with and adapted to each other, and intuition alone is able to apprehend it in this organic unity.

On the other hand, our concepts are essentially abstract. They exist only by deliberately neglecting, in the individual reality, certain elements or aspects of elements, namely, those very elements or aspects which constitute its concreteness and individuality. Again, they proceed through analysis; they consider separately the essential elements of reality, and destroy the very synthetic unity which constitutes the organic wholeness and the peculiar originality of every concrete being. Hence our concepts, whatever may be their number or degree of precision, remain always inadequate in their representation of any individual reality. There is always more in reality than in any of our concepts.

In all this there is nothing that is not accepted by the best Intellectualists. St. Thomas states that a true and complete knowledge is one which apprehends an object in its concrete individuality: that our knowledge of things, through abstract concepts, always remains incomplete and imperfect.¹⁵ He emphasizes the distinction between *intellectus* which apprehends its object by a direct insight or intellectual intuition, and *ratio* which proceeds by analysis and discourse, that is, by concepts, judgments and reasoning.¹⁶ Intellectual knowledge is perfect in the measure in which it is the fruit of *intellectus*. In God intelligence is pure and perfect *intellectus*; He knows all things in their most concrete determinations and in all their comprehensiveness by one simple act of intuition. Even in the angels there is no *ratio*, although their intellectual intuition, being finite, is always inadequate.¹⁷ Man, whose nature is

¹⁵ *Sum. Theol.*, 1. p. q. LV, a. 3 ad 2; LXXXIV, 7; *Opera*, 14, c. 14; *Quodlib.* 7 a. 3 ad 1, etc. . . .

¹⁶ 2a 2d q. XLIX, a. 5 ad 3; LXXXIII, a. 10 ad 2; *De Verit.*, 15, 1; *In Trinit.*, 6, 1, etc. . . .

¹⁷ *Id.*, XXV, q. I, a. 1 ad 4; *Sum. Theol.*, 1. p. q. XIV, a. 11; I c. *Gentes.*, 65; II c. *Gent.*, 100, etc. . . .

made of spirit and matter and whose operations, in the present life, are dependent upon the conditions of matter, of space and time, must necessarily know through concepts and discourse. *Ratio* is his natural faculty of knowledge. And although to be *rational* is relatively to human nature a perfection, it is however, from the point of view of knowledge, an essential imperfection which has its source in the very essence of man.¹⁸ Thus, our human concepts, although true as representations, remain always inadequate to concrete reality. They can never comprehend it in its entirety and originality. Concrete and individual reality remains always indefinable: "*Omne individuum ineffabile.*"¹⁹

But when this has been said, all has not been said. The necessity and advantages of intuition in human knowledge have been emphasized, not its insufficiency and shortcomings. The insufficiency and shortcomings of the concept have been pointed out, not its necessity and value. And while the Pragmatist, without further hearing, pronounces the concept unable to provide us with true knowledge, the Intellectualist more equitable, wants to inquire more deeply into the meaning, function and value of the concept and demands in its favor a fair trial.

Let us first examine the Pragmatic attitude toward the notion of concept. As we have said, Pragmatism, although denying any value of representation to the concept, maintains nevertheless that it is useful for knowledge. It is, at least, a "practical substitute," a "word with a steering function," a "plan of action," a "dynamic schema" by which we are directed toward, and are enabled to enter into, contact with reality; it is also a useful instrument for the communication of knowledge.

But we may well ask how the concept can fulfill these functions, how it can be a "plan of action" or a "dynamic schema," a "word with a steering function," unless it is first

¹⁸ In 2 d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, 6; 1, p. q. LVIII, a. 3-4; 2a 2d q. XLIX, a. 5 ad 2, 3; 1 c. *Gent.*, 57, etc. . . .

¹⁹ 1 p. q. XIV, a. 11; 1, c. *Gent.*, 65, 8; *De Verit.*, II, 5; *De Anima*. 2, 5, 20, etc. . . .

known and unless it is itself a representation of something. In order to fulfill the part assigned to it, it must already be present to, assimilated and apprehended by, our mind as meaning and directing toward the reality of which it is the plan or schema. Nay more, it must already be a first step in the very act of knowledge and apprehension of reality.

And not only must this plan or schema be the representation of something, but it must also be clear and definite as a representation. For the Pragmatist assuredly will not maintain that all our concepts have the same value as instruments of direction in every case of knowledge. He will make a discrimination between the useful and the useless concepts in each particular case. He will even retain one as being the most useful in each case. What will then be the criterion of usefulness or uselessness which will serve to distinguish between these concepts? It is not sufficient to say that our concepts are dynamic and directive. A dynamism and a direction have no meaning but by the definite end to which they tend. Their degree of usefulness is measured by their relation to that end and by the representation in our mind of that relation. In a word, our concepts cannot fulfill that function of plan or schema assigned them by the Pragmatist, unless they are known themselves, known as related to, and representing somehow, that very object of which they are the plan or schema. Hence, if our concepts are to be useful instruments, as the Pragmatist understands it, they must first be true representations, and they will be useful as instruments in the very measure in which they will be true representations and known as such.

The same remark must be applied to what the Pragmatist says of concept as a means of communication. If a concept is useful as a means of communication, it necessarily implies a well-defined meaning, assimilable first by the one who communicates it, and then by the one to whom it is being communicated; that is, a meaning not ultimately dependent upon individual experience, but determined by an objective and impersonal standard, which cannot be but the relation of the concept to reality. And if we are told that the process of communi-

cation does not consist in the participation in a common representation, but in the taking up of a common attitude, the answer is obvious. An attitude, if it has any meaning or usefulness at all, cannot be but the expression of a knowledge either already possessed or at least anticipated; in any case, it supposes a certain representation.

Moreover, the final intuition or pure experience, which is considered by the empiricist Pragmatist as the true act of knowledge, is but the ultimate result of that discursive work where concepts have been used as instruments and directive principles; it is but the fulfillment of the plan, the filling up of the schema. The intuition or experience attained will therefore be proportional to the concepts used. It cannot be said that the concept has been used merely as an external frame or a mental scaffolding which must disappear when experience takes place; for, in reality, the concept has acted all along as an internal, vital and organizing principle, as the soul, as it were, of the act now performed. If, then, intuition or experience is asserted to be a real apprehension of things in their true and objective reality, it must be acknowledged that our concepts already contained and represented it in some way. If it is maintained that our concepts have no correspondence with reality or are merely an artificial construction, or in any measure a deformation of it, then this lack of correspondence, this artificiality or deformation must of necessity find its expression in the final intuition or experience.

The Pragmatist may verbally deny the representative value of the concept; in reality he has to have recourse to it at every step and so he does. He may speak explicitly of practical attitudes and schemas of action; he implicitly postulates some representative idea which determines and directs them. How could it be otherwise? How could any practical attitude be reasonable, or any schema of action be truly directive, unless it would be known as having a certain correspondence with, or adaptation to, the term which it is intended to reach? Professor Le Roy, for instance, tells us that "a dogma enunciates above all a *prescription of a practical order*;" that "it is above all

the formula of a *rule of practical conduct*;" that, "in this consists its chief value, its positive meaning." Yet he adds that a dogma "asserts implicitly that reality contains (under some form or other) that which is necessary to justify, as reasonable and salutary, the prescribed conduct."²⁰ Now, if this is the case, does it not mean that every dogma, in order to be and before it may be a rule of reasonable action, must be first apprehended intellectually as a judgment which affirms the existence and nature of a certain reality? Does it not mean that every dogma is constituted primarily of concepts known as corresponding somehow to a reality, since this very correspondence with reality is the source and rule of the reasonableness of our subsequent action? By way of illustration, Professor Le Roy tells us that the dogma "God is personal" means "Behave in your relations to God as in your relations to a human person."²¹ But does not this necessarily and antecedently imply, since our attitude is reasonable and salutary, that we know with certitude that there is in God an element which is to Him what personality is to man? That we have a certain concept—analogical indeed, yet exact and true—of God as a person?

Truly, "pure experience" or "pure intuition" as well as "pure action" is a mere fancy. Concept is a necessary element of every act of knowledge as well as of every action, which pretends to be reasonable, not only as an instrument of direction, but primarily as an object of knowledge. It is only through concepts that our mind can fully apprehend and penetrate into the data of experience.²²

²⁰ *Dogme et Critique*, p. 25.

²¹ *Dogme et Critique*, p. 25; pp. 135 ff.

²² This point is well developed in the fine pamphlet of J. de Tonquédec: "La Notion de vérité dans la Philosophie Nouvelle," pp. 106 ff. Would space allow us, it would be easy to show that the fundamental error of Pragmatic Empiricism, in regard to the notion and value of the concept, has its source in the arbitrary assumptions of Idealism and also in a false notion of Genetic Psychology. On this latter point, see Walker, "Theories of Knowledge," (London, 1910), ch. VII.

THE INTELLECTUALISTIC NOTION OF THE CONCEPT.
CONCEPT AND INTUITION.

It is a fact that we have concepts in our mind: I have the concepts of man, of animal, of tree, of stone, etc. . . . These concepts are more than mere words or sounds, for they certainly mean something to my mind. They are also more than mere images deadened or blunted in the course of time, although they may be accompanied by images. While an image is always the representation of some individual object with its peculiar determinations, a concept signifies a whole class. While a deadened or blunted image is but a confused and fluctuating representation of some concrete object, a concept remains always clear and fixed. Moreover, there are objects of which I cannot obtain an image, while I can conceive and define them; this is the case for most of our mathematical notions. These essential differences between image and concept have been well pointed out by H. Taine.²³

But a concept is also more than the mere combination of an image with a name, as is maintained by Taine, and more recently, by Professor Bergson. According to Taine, a concept is but an "abstract name" which is the sign of or substitute for divers images representing individual objects of the same class, thanks to some element common to all of them. Suppose, for instance, Taine says, a child who sees different types of dogs. The word "dog" will remain associated in his mind with a certain number of individual objects of the same class. When pronounced, it will awake in his mind some image representing one or several members of that class only, and the image of any dog will evoke in his mind the word "dog" only. Hence this term will come to evoke indifferently the image of any dog and it will also be evoked by the image of any dog. It will then become the sign or substitute for a certain element common to

²³ *De L'Intelligence*, tom. I, p. 36 ff.; tom. II, p. 259 ff. Cf. also T. V. Moore: *The Process of Abstraction*, (Berkeley, 1910).

all these individual objects. It will become a general or "abstract name," and this is a concept.²⁴ Similarly, a concept, for Professor Bergson, is merely "an average image" (*une image moyenne*) made of a certain number of objects of the same class, which we come to consider as the essence of that object.²⁵

Here we may call attention again to the same fundamental defect of method which has been already pointed out in the question of perception. Instead of first observing the concept as it presents itself to our mind, Taine and Professor Bergson, probably under the influence of *a priori* empiricism, attempt to build up a theory of the origin and nature of the concept which will show that our concepts *must be* mere empirical constructions, and *how they are* so. Theory is given precedence over facts; observation is subordinated to explanation.

Such a theory, however, appears decidedly insufficient as a description of the concept. As long as we remain in the field of experience, the sign or substitute in Taine's theory, as well as Professor Bergson's "average image," is necessarily restricted to the particular cases observed. Its application and generality are limited to those cases; for, by what right should it be extended to others? But a concept, on the contrary, as that of man, of circle or of triangle has an unlimited universality. It transcends the cases observed and applies to all cases, whether observed or not, even to merely possible cases, of the same class, to all men, to all circles or triangles. If so, the empiricist theory is plainly inadequate in its account of the origin of our concepts as well as in the description of their nature. We are told that a name is associated as a sign with the elements common to the various individual objects of the same class. How is this association possible? A name is conventional by nature. Its meaning is determined by the conscious state or the object with which it is associated. It supposes therefore this conscious state or this object as already given and known. A common or abstract name then implies necessarily the antecedent appre-

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, tom. II, p. 261 ff.

²⁵ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 327.

hension of a common or abstract notion from which it takes its meaning. Now, a common or abstract notion does not exist as such in reality; but it has to be formed by the mind from the data of reality, and only then can a name be attached to it as a sign and become its verbal substitute. An "abstract name" therefore supposes an abstract thought or concept and does not constitute it. When a child comes to apply the word "dog" to all the animals of a certain class, it is because he has first conceived in them some element common to all. He has made an act of abstraction and conceived, under the various and particular determinations of the different dogs, some essential element characteristic of the class "dog;" it is that essential and common element which he expresses by a common name.

We must first abstract in order to speak, and our progress in speaking is measured by our progress in giving more precision to our abstract concepts. To abstract and to conceive is as natural and spontaneous an act for our human intelligence as to see is for the eye or to hear for the ear; for we naturally want to understand what we perceive. In presence of the experimental data of our senses, our intelligence naturally conceives an essence or *raison d'être*, which gives to each object its specific structure and must necessarily be, where any such object possibly is, independently of any peculiar determinations. This essence is represented through a concept with its characters of necessity and universality. A name is then attached to it, in order to fix and express it. The concept takes its rise in sense-images; but it is neither an image nor a combination of images. It contains the element of intelligibility common to the objects represented by images, the constitutive elements which make them the kind of objects they are. And as by the progressive experience and education of our senses we come to a clearer and more distinct perception of the individual character of concrete objects, so by a more mature reflection, our intelligence obtains a more precise and a more comprehensive concept of the essential elements, which constitute the specific nature of these objects. The study of the intellectual development in the child, as well as the psychological study of the development of the

various languages, furnishes us with an experimental manifestation and proof of this fact.

Through our senses, then, we acquire the representations of various objects, and through our intelligence, we conceive the objects represented. And while our senses, in their experimental intuitions, present to us a multitude of various and individual objects, as, for instance, *several men*, each one with its own peculiar changing and dynamic determinations, our intelligence represents these many, various and individual objects in one same, general and static concept, as that of *man*. How is it possible that the reality contained in one and the same concept of our intelligence may correspond and be identical with the reality contained in the many various images of our sense images? How can this single abstract reality in the concept be multiplied in, and identified with, every one of the many individual realities of our images, and yet remain one?

This is the old, and yet ever new, problem of the *one* and the *many*. This problem has been the central question of Greek philosophy and has given rise to its two chief primitive systems and schools, the Eleatic and the Ionic schools, where successively the affirmation of the *many* and of the *Becoming* has ended the negation of the *one* and of *Being*, and the affirmation of the *one* and of *Being* has ended in the negation of the *many* and the *Becoming*. In the Middle Ages this problem was known and discussed as the *Problem of the Universals* and diversely solved by the Realists and the Nominalists. And it is this same problem, with the same opposite solutions, that we find in the present systems of Monism or Absolutism and of Pluralism—a problem which has been Professor James' torment for years, he tells us, has caused him to fill hundreds of sheets of paper with notes and memoranda and finally has led him to abandon the intellectualistic logic to take refuge with Professor Bergson in the Empiricism of pure experience, as it had led Bradley to the Idealism of the Absolute.

In order to reach the true solution, we must come back to the conclusions of Aristotle refuting both Parmenides and Heraclitus, of St. Thomas opposing both Platonic Realism and

Empirical Nominalism, to the conclusions of the traditional and moderate Intellectualism which acknowledges both the many and the one, Being and Becoming in reality, and gives a legitimate place to both intuition and concept in human knowledge.

Experimental intuition is the starting point and the groundwork of all human knowledge—this we readily admit. It is also true that experimental intuition presents reality to us in the concrete and individual conditions of its actual existence, while the concept leaves aside these very concrete elements in which and through which reality actually exists. But if, in its act of conception, our intelligence provisorily neglects some elements of reality, it also discovers and apprehends something which intuition implicitly contains and does not perceive. In nature, only concrete and particular beings have an actual existence. There are, for instance, concrete and individual men; man, as such, does not actually exist. There are in nature, however, elements of similarity between the various concrete beings. There are types and laws. All the concrete and individual men existing are as many realizations of one type or essence, as Aristotle calls it, which essence has a real foundation in nature, although it is actually realized only in concrete and particular beings. And this is the object of the concept. In presence of the various experimental data perceived by the senses, our intelligence, which is as much of a natural knowing power in man as the senses themselves, conceives through them and in them the fundamental *raison d'être* of what they are, which determines and regulates their specific nature independently of any concrete condition. Thus, through its action of conception, intelligence does not only neglect the individual elements—for this is only a preparatory step—but it penetrates more deeply into the nature of the object presented. It removes the envelope in order to read the contents; and by repeating this operation on the various data, it discovers a distinct unity and totality where our senses could perceive only a confused mass.²⁶

²⁶ St. Thomas, *opusc.* 14 c. 14.

Moreover, there are relations and connections between the various beings in nature. Whether we speak of a plan in a state of, or on the way to, realization, or whether we postulate, with the partisans of Empiricism, a continuous direction, a dynamic orientation and evolution, or a creative *élan vital* in nature,—it does not matter in the present inquiry,—the fact is that the world is not in a chaotic state. It contains, whatever the extent of their influence or the law of their action may be, causes and ends, relations and adaptations, order and harmony. It contains or realizes some idea. Now, a direction or an evolution, a plan or an impulse has no meaning unless it is determined; and it cannot be determined, but by a definite end, whatever this end may be, which characterizes its specific nature and regulates its action. In order to apprehend this plan or evolution in its structure or in its continuity, we must of necessity apprehend, not only the concrete and individual elements themselves, but also their mutual relations in the present as well as their relations with the past and with the future. Our intuition perceives at every moment only the concrete phenomena actually given; the concept alone can apprehend their mutual relations of similarity and of interaction, as well as their law of specific continuity.

Thus, a concept is not a deformation of reality, an artificial construction of our mind or a mere instrument of possible action. It is above all a means of knowledge, an apprehension and representation of some elements of reality. It is not a hypothetical schema built up by our intelligence in order to master reality, but the representation of some element, furnished by reality, and apprehended by our intelligence.

All this implies indeed—we confess it without any evasion or fear, even after Kant and the Kantian storm—a correspondence between reality and our mind. But why should we doubt at all the reality of such a natural correspondence? If knowledge exists in any degree,—and it exists as a matter of fact,—it has no meaning except through such an implication. It exacts necessarily that this correspondence exist, or rather it is the very manifestation and expression of the fact of this

correspondence. To begin by doubting it is to render it impossible for oneself to make a single step in the field of mental activity; it is to deny the very fact of knowledge. As soon as one begins to doubt the existence of a fundamental agreement between reality and his mind, any mental advance becomes absolutely impossible, and scepticism is logically the last, as well as the first, word of everything. It would be easy to show that Kant himself, throughout his whole system, although theoretically starting with a doubt as to the relations between reality and mind, postulates at every step their correspondence.

It is true that our concepts being abstract by nature are fragmentary and inadequate. It does not follow, however, that they are false. Each of them represents reality only under a special aspect, yet it represents it in some of its fundamental and real elements. While our senses perceive only external and changing phenomena, our intelligence conceives essential and stable elements. There is no opposition between the perceptions and data of our senses on the one hand, and the conceptions and concepts of our intelligence on the other; nor is there separation between the former and the latter; there is only distinction; nay more, there is always a close union of the two. It is the same reality which is in different ways apprehended by both. The process of abstraction—we can never insist too much on this point—is not primarily a process of exclusion of, but above all a process of penetration into, the data of sense experience. Operations of the same agent and centered upon the same object, sense-perception and intellectual conception accompany and enlighten each other in their development. It is through their union and coöperation that we are able to arrive, as far as is possible for human intelligence, at a complete and intelligible knowledge of reality. The senses in their data furnish the intelligence with the matter of its concepts; and the intelligence, with the concepts thus acquired, reverts to the data of the senses for a deeper and more accurate knowledge of them.²⁷

²⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, 4. d. q. 1, a. 3; *De Anima*, 20 ad 1, etc. . . .

But the great objection, raised against the intellectualistic notion of the concept by the Empiricist, is that it is essentially *static, definitely closed*, while reality is *dynamic and continuous flowing*. This description of the respective characteristics of the concept and of reality may indeed seem to imply an irreducible opposition between them. But this description, in its apparently concise brevity, is false. There is indeed dynamism and change in nature; but nature contains also elements of stability and permanence. A tree grows and yet, at the divers moments of its existence and stages of its development, it remains the same tree. A man passes, in constant progress, from childhood to adolescence, then to manhood and to old age; yet, throughout these successive transformations, he has remained substantially the same man. A tree reproduces a tree of the same kind; a man gives birth to other men. Under all these transformations and developments, there is always a principle of similarity and permanence. Even in pure duration, which is considered by Professor Bergson as the very substance of reality and which he describes as a continuous flowing, there is some fixed, permanent and static element. In order that duration or continuity may exist, there must be fixation of the past and anticipation of the future in the present. This is impossible, unless there exists a certain element of permanence which endures identical to itself in these various moments. Otherwise there would be nothing but present changes and new beginnings at each moment, without any duration or continuity. It is this static and permanent element of reality which the concept apprehends and represents.

Why then should the Empiricists oppose concept to reality? They describe the concept "as a static view taken on the instability of things,"²⁸ as a "crystallized," an "inert" and "dead" thing, as a "fleshless abstraction," or a "bloodless notion"; the concept of motion is presented as an artificial construction of mobility made by the addition of static positions,

²⁸ Bergson, *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 340.

etc. . . . We might remark incidentally that images and combinations of images play too great a part in these descriptions and too often take the place of proofs;—they may appeal to the imagination, but they cannot and should not satisfy the mind. When we maintain that the concept is static, we simply mean that it represents the static or permanent element of reality, that is, the very essence which constitutes the specific and permanent nature of an object. Every object, whether it be movable or immovable, has an essence which constitutes it in its mobility or immobility, and this essence is always identical to itself. It is the very nature of motion, for instance, to move; it is a passage from potency to act; and it is always necessarily so, whatever may be its particular determinations of velocity, space or time. It is this element, truly static, since it is constitutive of motion at every stage of its course and in every condition of its existence, which the concept represents. The concept therefore does not stop motion in order to contemplate it; it apprehends it in its mobility, in its essence as a movable thing, which is always and everywhere the same.

It is equally inaccurate to describe the concept as a "rigid," "inert," "definitely closed" and "dead" schema; as a "bloodless" or "fleshless" notion. As intuition itself, the concept is a vital act of the mind. Far from being inert or definitely closed, it is subject to a continuous development in substantial identity. It traces at first an outline with vague and flexible lines, ready to be filled in and determined by all the results of experience and science. It is like a germ ready to open and grow under the influence and by a vital assimilation of the new data of experimental and scientific investigation, without however losing anything of its fundamental identity. Our concept of animal, for instance, is first made up of a vague notion sufficient to discern its object from any other object. This notion becomes then more and more determined although identical in its essential elements, more and more distinct, by a kind of intellectual intussusception and assimilation of all the knowledge acquired through the various sciences, physical,

biological, psychological, etc. . . . which have for their object the study of animal life.²⁹

What we have just said of our concepts may be applied equally to our judgments. Our judgments are not a mere combination of concepts applied to reality, a mere addition of concepts united by the copula "is," and simply useful to classify various objects and relations. They are, above all, expressions of reality; expressions, which we make as exact as possible, although they may always remain inadequate, of the synthetic unity of the elements of reality. We have indeed to use the process of analysis in order to obtain distinct concepts; but we find in reality the foundation of their distinction. Our judgments are made of these distinct concepts and they are expressed in distinct words, but we are well aware that they mean more than a simple addition of those concepts. These concepts, in our judgments, through a mutual integration and adaptation and yet without losing their proper signification, form together a synthetic and organic whole tending to reproduce the synthetic unity of the many elements of reality. When I say that man is a rational animal, I do not mean simply that man is animal *plus* rational, but that he is a being in whom the properties of animality and rationality are united and adapted to each other in an organic and living way.³⁰

Our concepts are therefore true representations of reality, although they always remain more or less inadequate to reality. And they may equal and even exceed, in clearness of apprehension, our intuitions themselves.

We must not therefore speak of opposition between intuition and concept. Intuition and concept are not in any way opposed to each other. It is not sufficient even to say that they supplement or are useful to each other. They must be united by a process of mutual penetration, if we wish to have a

²⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I p. q. LXXXV, a. 5; *De Natura Verbi*, c. 1, etc. . . .

³⁰ St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*.

truly human knowledge. The concept does not merely add itself to or substitute itself for the data of intuition, it penetrates into them and makes us understand them. If, in order to apprehend the fundamental elements of reality, the concept provisionally neglects the individual phenomena and conditions presented in intuition, it does not, however, deny their existence. It is in them that it finds the matter of its content, and under their control that it grows and renders itself explicit. And when our intelligence has thus apprehended the elements which constitute the nature of an object, it then reverts to the data of the senses with all their concrete determinations and arrives at an intellectual knowledge of the object in its individual reality. Such an operation is not pure intuition; it is more than an abstract conception; it is as it were an apprehension of reality in its individualized and actualized essence, through the mutual coöperation of the intuition and of the concept.

According to the new Empiricism, the concept is merely a useful instrument of action and communication, which we must put aside when we wish to come into direct contact with reality. Professor James points to the experience of the newly born babe or of the drugged man, etc. . . . as the type of experience in its native purity, unspoiled, as yet, by any mixture of concepts. So, Professor James would have us believe that human knowledge has its perfection in the undeveloped and the abnormal states of human nature, and that reflection is an instrument of deformation and error in human knowledge. This is truly too much for common sense to accept, and a system of genetic psychology which leads to such conclusions bears upon its face its own refutation. Professor Bergson would appeal rather to the so-called subconscious intuitions and sudden inspirations which appear to him to be the characteristics of genius, the source of the great scientific discoveries and the mark of true philosophical spirit. But if we study experimentally and psychologically these various facts and operations in their entirety, that is in their preparation, elaboration and production, as they have really taken

place, we shall easily see that, far from excluding concepts, they are the fruit of concept and reflection. What we call historical sense in great historians, literary taste in great literateurs, esthetic feeling in artists or political ability in statesmen, is constituted by concepts. They are the result and embodiment of accumulated reflections and analyses, the fruit of a multitude of concepts acquired, examined, elaborated and applied to reality. It is "by always thinking of it" that Newton discovered the law of gravitation. It is by a reflexive study of the nature and laws of things and in consequence of an incalculable amount of experiments, hypotheses, comparisons and generalizations that genius arrives at its discoveries. They are apparently sudden, but really of gradual growth. And it is only through numerous and successive experiments, often repeated and laboriously controlled, that fecund anticipations and hypotheses are born. Genius does not consist in dispensing with concepts, but rather in penetrating more deeply into their content and in apprehending more comprehensively their various relations. In every occasion it is the concept which animates, vivifies and directs human knowledge.

Professor Bergson displays his power of imagination and expression—which is great—in describing the efforts of the mind to deny itself and its attempts to live the life of pure intuition, by completely identifying itself with the continuous flowing of concrete phenomena. Truly one may ask what is the utility of our antecedent reflexions and of our scientific investigations, on which Professor Bergson insists so much, if we must leave them aside and throw ourselves into the whirlpool of pure intuition? What then becomes of our intelligence? It must disappear to give place to mere organic unconsciousness or sensualism where there is no place for thought and reflexion. It is the ruin of intellectual knowledge. In reality, if we wish to have a true knowledge of things, we must not absorb our intelligence into their materiality, but rather penetrate into their materiality by our reflexion and apprehend under their materiality the intelligible element which informs them. They have a specific nature with its

elements and laws of constitution and development. They are subject to a plan and realize a design. We cannot know them unless we apprehend these elements, these laws and this plan. And in order to apprehend them we have not to lose ourselves in them, but rather to strengthen the energy of our intelligence, to discover by our reflexions and represent by our concepts these intelligible elements which they realize in the concrete. Knowledge does not imply *identity* but *union* of the mind with the object. There must be indeed a certain process of assimilation between the knowing subject and the object known; and we must make that assimilation as perfect as possible. St. Thomas tells us that "to know an object is, in some way, to become that object," not, however, in its physical or natural entity, but mentally or, according to the scholastic expression, *intentionally*.³¹ And we cannot become an object and assimilate it truly, unless we apprehend its constitutive elements and fundamental laws through concepts.

Let us now summarize the true relations between intuition and the concept. Sense intuition is the beginning of all knowledge. It is through intuition that the whole matter of our knowledge is presented to the mind. It is in its data that our intelligence finds the content of its concepts and principles. It is under their direction and control that intelligence, through abstraction and reflexion, forms its divers concepts and judgments and builds up its theories and systems. It is to them that it finally reverts to verify the value of its elaboration and keep itself in contact with reality. But if intuition, as we may see, is necessary at every step of knowledge, at no step is it a sufficient factor to furnish the mind with a truly human knowledge, that is, with an intelligible and explanatory knowledge of anything. Its content is very rich but confused. We cannot apprehend the variety of its elements, their proper nature and relations, the principle which unifies and orders their multiplicity and variety, but by fragmentary analyses and successive syntheses, that is, through concepts. To use Kant's formula,

³¹ Cf. I p. q. XIV, a. 1; q. LXXXV, a. 2; *De Veritate*, q. VII, a. 6; *De Natura Verbi Intellectus*; I *De Anima*, lect. IV; lect. XII, etc. . . .

"our concepts without intuition are empty; and intuition without the concepts is blind." Through intuition we obtain an indistinct and confused mass of data; through the concepts we conceive a harmonious and integral whole with its fundamental relations and laws. Intuition presents the facts, the concept makes us understand them. It is only through their mutual coöperation that we can arrive at a true knowledge of reality in its constitution, laws and causes, that is, in its true nature. It is true that a perfect act of intuition which would apprehend immediately and clearly the whole of reality, without any analysis or reasoning, would be the highest and the most perfect act of knowledge. Such is the knowledge of God. Such is also, although infinitely inferior, the mode of knowledge of the angels.³² Such will be also our way of knowing in heaven; it will be a vision: the beatific vision. But in the present life, we depend for our knowledge on the material data of our senses. We are conditioned by matter and we cannot free ourselves from its exigency. We are necessarily subject to the limiting conditions of space and time. In every act of knowledge we have to rest on these material data. In order to rise above them and discover the higher laws of things and their ultimate causes, we have to use the concepts and be satisfied with them.

Such is the realistic Intellectualism of Aristotle and of St. Thomas. Professor Bergson acknowledges in it the fundamental principles of "the metaphysics natural to human intelligence."³³ It is indeed the traditional doctrine of knowledge. It is an integral part of the "*perennis philosophia*." It expresses the unchangeable principles of human knowledge; it accepts both the data of experience and the principles of reason, and firmly maintains their objective existence and value against the attacks of Idealism and Empiricism, old and new.

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³² See above, footnote 17.

³³ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 352.

ADDISON AND THE MODERN ESSAY.¹

II.

The *Tatler* was brought to a close on January 2, 1711, and the general contemporary opinion was that Bickerstaff had written himself out. Swift, for example, thought that the paper had become "cruel dry and dull." Judge then of the surprise alike of connoisseurs and the reading public when on March 1, 1711—inside of two months—a new paper, the *Spectator*, made its appearance, to be published not three times, but six times, a week, and relying not on news but solely on the essay to awaken and hold attention. The price was one penny per number until August, 1712, when, in consequence of the halfpenny tax which proved fatal to so many other journals, the charge was increased to twopence. The supposed editor was an imaginary Spectator, of great taciturnity but keen powers of observation, admirably described by Addison in the first issue. The machinery for the conduct of the paper was provided by an equally imaginary club, the members of which, six in number, were sketched by Steele in No. 2. These were Sir Roger de Coverley, a Worcestershire gentleman, of ancient lineage and slightly eccentric behaviour, who, at 56, is still a bachelor because in youth he was crossed in love; a member of the Inner Temple, who is more deeply engaged in the criticism of stage plays than in the study of law, and much prefers Aristotle and Longinus to Littleton or Coke; Sir Andrew Freeport, a merchant of eminence in the city of London, well acquainted with commerce in all its parts, opposed to war, and fond of quoting maxims inculcating frugality; Captain Sentry, a retired soldier of great courage but invincible modesty and well stored with tales of adventure;

¹The first part of this article appeared in the *Bulletin* for January, 1912.

Will Honeycomb, an elderly beau, who is an authority on fashions and thoroughly posted in the tittle-tattle of society; and a clergyman of delicate health, general learning, great sanctity of life, and the most exact good breeding. As the idea developed, Sir Roger was largely, but not entirely, taken over by Addison as his own, and in the immortal series of papers which form Addison's masterpiece, there grew gradually into being the most lovable fictitious character in English literature and, with the doubtful exception of Shakespeare's Falstaff, the most genuinely humorous figure that the annals of letters have to show.

The *Spectator* was designed to be a continuation of the *Tatler*, and it aimed at rendering similar services to reform in manners and morals. Its method was insensibly to correct and instruct by good-humouredly rallying and ridiculing the age on its vices and foibles and inconsistencies. Here, in particular, Addison shone. In the more serious Saturday essays, which became in time quite a recognized feature of the paper, he set himself to the production of a series of lay sermons, which are as edifying as they are charming to read. From this set of discourses a fairly satisfactory scheme of elementary theology and metaphysics, as well as of ethics, might be constructed. The existence and attributes of a Supreme Being, the dependence of man on God, the immortality of the soul, the loveliness of virtue, religion, devotion, piety, faith, hope, obedience, chastity, courage, hypocrisy, jealousy, temperance in food and drink, marriage, true happiness, force of habit, gratitude, cheerfulness, neglect of education, waste of time, desire of fame, vanity of earthly honours, death—these are a few of the themes which are so eloquently and so delightfully discussed. In the region of criticism Addison wrote about Milton and the Old Ballads, about Wit and Imagination, in a way that was at that time a revelation. But splendid as was his teaching in morals and criticism, his real forte lay in the direction of playful satire. His happiest efforts are seen in his innumerable sketches of the manners of the day and of individual types; in the allegories and Eastern apologues, in the handling of which he showed himself a wonderful adept; and in his "Horatian

pleasantry on fashionable follies, hoops, patches, or puppet shows."

It is not to be wondered at that a publication which so teemed with good things was a huge success. Everybody who was anybody clamoured to have the popular paper served at the breakfast table, and it was often read aloud for the assembled company. The highest normal circulation appears to have been about 14,000 copies daily; for some issues there was an extraordinary demand which ran the sales up to 20,000; and, when, at the end of a given period, the papers were collected and brought out in volumes, impressions of 10,000 copies of each volume were sold in England as rapidly as they could be printed, and there were, besides, separate editions for Dublin and Edinburgh.

With the 555th number (Saturday, December 6, 1712) the paper was brought to a close. The lion's share of the work had been done by Addison: he wrote 274 essays, and Steele 236, leaving only 45 for occasional contributors, such as Pope, Ambrose Philips, Tickell, Parnell, Eusden, and Hughes.

In the following March (March 12, 1713) Steele started, under the editorship of an imaginary Nestor Ironside, a third paper, the *Guardian*, which ran till October 1 of that year, reaching 175 numbers. To this periodical Addison, then busy with the preparations for the stage production of his tragedy of *Cato*, did not at first contribute, but when the paper was well under way he wrote for it fairly regularly. Other contributors were Pope, Berkeley, Tickell, Budgell, and Hughes. The *Guardian* is generally regarded as being duller than the *Spectator*, but its dullness is more relative than absolute. It is relieved by such delightful contributions from Addison as Simon Softly's Courtship (No. 97), the essays on the Tucker (No. 100) and the Art of Flying (No. 112), the Vision of Aurelia's Heart (No. 106), and the allegory of the Two Sexes (No. 152); nor are Steele's sketches of Nestor Ironside (No. 2) and the Lizard family (No. 5, 6, and 13) without considerable merit.

² Macaulay, *Essay on The Life and Writings of Addison* (July, 1843).

To the *Lover* (February 14 to May 27, 1714) and the *Reader* (April 22 to May 10, 1714), two of Steele's many minor periodicals, Addison contributed three or four papers.

On June 18, 1714, Addison, on his own account and without the co-operation of Steele, began a new series of the *Spectator*, which came out three times a week until December 20, 1714, and ran to 80 numbers, forming an eighth volume. In this publication, which was very largely Addison's own work, are contained some of the noblest as well as some of the most humorous essays in the English language.

Besides the more famous papers in which Addison was concerned he was responsible for three political periodicals, every number of which was the production of his own pen. In 1710, during the heat of the general election, he published the *Whig Examiner* (five numbers, September 14 to October 12), in which he crossed swords with St. John and the other Tory wits who were writing up the winning side with masterly journalism in the pages of the *Tory Examiner*. Swift had not yet been appointed to sole control of the latter paper, but he was probably behind its writers with his inspiration. Against even so formidable a combination Addison made a gallant showing. In fact, Johnson, himself a prejudiced Tory, speaks in the highest terms of the merits of the *Whig Examiner*. "On no occasion," he says, "was the genius of Addison more vigorously exerted, and on none did the superiority of his powers more evidently appear."³

A few years later, while the Rising of the "'15" in favour of the Old Pretender was still raging in Scotland, Addison undertook the defence of his party in the *Freeholder*, which reached 55 numbers (December 23, 1715, to June 29, 1716). Here he gives us the picture of the Tory Foxhunter, one of his most delightful sketches. The papers in which he depicted that celebrated character are not inferior in power to any of his satirical writings. The Tory Foxhunter had the honour of being the original of Fielding's Squire Western in *Tom Jones*, and thus

³Johnson, *Lives of the Poets*: Addison.

establishes a distinct connection between the writings of Addison and the English Novel. In the *Freeholder*, too, we have the noble sketch of Lord Somers; and even in this partisan journal the genial writer found opportunity to show us glimpses of his old *Spectator* wit in his discussion of the vagaries of the Female Sex, French Anglophobia, and the Treatment of Authors.

Addison's last periodical publication was the *Old Whig* (two numbers, March 19 and April 2, 1719), which was called forth by Steele's attacks in *The Plebeian* on Sunderland's Peerage Bill. In these rival papers the two old friends attacked each other with considerable asperity; and it is a sad reflection on the mutability of human affairs that the breach thus caused in a friendship which had been so firm and so long maintained, and had produced consequences so momentous to morality and literature, was not wholly closed before death brought Addison's glorious career to an end on June 17, 1719, at the untimely age of 47.

No better answer to the modern catch-cry of "Art for Art's sake" need be sought than that supplied by the periodical papers we have been considering. Here, if anywhere, we see the highest art employed in one domain of English literature, and it was employed legitimately for the prime purpose of all art. Unless in those numbers that were professedly didactic, such for example as the criticisms on Milton, the main object of the essays contained in the *Tatler*, the *Spectator*, and the *Guardian* was to afford delight; but behind the trifling and the humour there was the serious purpose of the satirist to laugh coarseness and immorality out of existence. The very insidiousness of the method made it more effective than if hundreds of preachers had been thundering from every pulpit in the land. The reader who might have resented or neglected or forgotten the sermon was caught by the humour, the urbanity, the grace of the essay. Insensibly but surely the amelioration of conduct at which the satirists aimed was brought about, so that even to their contemporaries the results were visible. Gay, lamenting the recent decease of Isaac Bickerstaff, tells us:—

"It is incredible to conceive the effect his writings have had

on the town; how many thousand follies they have either quite banished, or given a great check to; how much countenance they have added to virtue and religion; how many people they have rendered happy, by shewing them it was their own fault if they were not so; and lastly, how entirely they have convinced our fops and young fellows of the value and advantages of learning.”⁴

Writing 132 years later Macaulay, in an eloquent passage, which I here transcribe, has more particularly summarized some of the effects of Addison’s periodical writings:—

“Of the service which his Essays rendered to morality it is difficult to speak too highly. It is true that, when the *Tatler* appeared, that age of outrageous profaneness and licentiousness which followed the Restoration had passed away. Jeremy Collier had shamed the theatres into something which, compared with the excesses of Etherege and Wycherley, might be called decency. Yet there still lingered in the public mind a pernicious notion that there was some connection between genius and profligacy, between the domestic virtues and the sullen formality of the Puritans. That error it is the glory of Addison to have dispelled. He taught the nation that the faith and the morality of Hale and Tillotson might be found in company with wit more sparkling than the wit of Congreve, and with humour richer than the humour of Vanbrugh. So effectually, indeed, did he retort on vice the mockery which had recently been directed against virtue, that, since his time, the open violation of decency has always been considered among us as the mark of a fool. And this revolution, the greatest and most salutary ever effected by any satirist, he accomplished, be it remembered, without writing one personal lampoon.”⁵

We are on this occasion, however, more particularly concerned perhaps with the literary effect of the periodicals with which Addison was associated. I have already pointed out how in one or two instances they influenced the novel. In fact, the *Spectator* may be regarded as the direct forerunner of the

⁴ Gay, *Present State of Wit*.

⁵ Macaulay, *op. cit.*

novel as written by Richardson and Fielding, in contradistinction to the fictitious narrative as written by Defoe. The character sketching, the description of scenes of everyday life, the numerous incidents told in so lively, graphic, and humorous or pathetic a manner, the interest arising from the repeated entrances, exits, and re-entrances of the same personages exhibit all the elements of the modern novel except plot. Had there been a plot, the modern novel would have been ushered in full-fledged, but then of course the essay character would have been lost; and everyone of taste and sensibility will be content to know and love the Essays as they are.

In the department of the Essay itself the influence of Addison—and of Steele, for, *pace* Macaulay, they cannot really be separated—made itself immediately felt, and the effect was not ephemeral but lasting. It has been a constant and positive quantity in literature down to our own day. Naturally the success of the Steele-Addison publications, if it produced no serious rival, yet raised up a host of imitators. I have counted no fewer than 221 periodicals, exclusive of newspapers, that appeared in England in the century following the *Tatler*, that is, from 1709 to 1809. We have the *Gazette A-La-Mode*, the *Whisperer*, the *Growler*, the *Grumbler*, the *Weekly Medley*, the *Trifler*, the *Ranger*, *et hoc genus omne*. Of those which appeared in England and in English-speaking countries in the next hundred years, from 1809 to 1909, the name is legion. And the observant student of literary history cannot fail to be struck by the extent to which magazines and reviews have served as nursing mothers to foster nascent genius. In the case of hundreds of the greatest English litterateurs of the nineteenth century the tale is told how they first sought and obtained recognition in the magazine or review, and, after their names had become famous, how often they were glad to fall back on the same medium for the expression of their views. In this respect the debt owed by the republic of letters to the inventors and first writers of the Periodical Essay is beyond computation.

Of the early imitations of the Steele-Addison publications

many were confined to politics, and few possessed much merit, so that now even their names are known only to delvers in the antique. We are not brought to a pause by any special features until we come to Johnson's *Rambler* (1750-52) and *Idler* (1758-60). Great, however, as from certain points of view is the merit of these two series of essays, there are wanting in the ponderosity of the leviathan of literature those airy graces and genialities, that sparking humour, and that lightness of touch which had distinguished the pioneers. Far more like the original in spirit and execution, in thought and style, were Goldsmith's *Bee* (1759) and *Citizen of the World* (1762), as well as the articles he contributed to the *Busy Body* (1759), the *Lady's Magazine* (1759), the *British Magazine* (1759-60), and the *Public Ledger* (1760). The tradition was more or less worthily maintained in such publications as the *Adventurer* (1752), the *World* (1753), the *Connoisseur* (1754), the *Mirror* (1779), the *Lounger* (1785), the *Observer* (1785), and the *Looker-on* (1792). Then comes the era of the great quarterlies and the well known magazines and reviews, the volume of which has received new accretions with each succeeding year. Out of the outstanding phenomena which the future historian of English literature will have to notice and explain will be the dominance of the magazine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and, however tortuous and winding the path he has to follow may appear, he will not have done all his duty until he has traced it to its starting point in the office of the *Tatler* in the London of Queen Anne.

If the effect of the *Tatler* and its companion papers on literary production was great at home, it was scarcely less pronounced abroad. Many European languages were pressed into service to give expression to the new-found form of literature, and in French, German, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, and Italian, periodical essays on the English model were rapidly forthcoming. Throughout the eighteenth century, and well on into the nineteenth, publications of this type were made at such centres as Paris, Berlin, Copenhagen, Stockholm, the Hague, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Leipzig, Zürich, Nuremberg, Dresden,

Leyden, Frankfort, Zelle, Eisenach, Hanover, Göttingen, Breslau, Flensburg, Milan, and Venice. As if to leave no doubt regarding the source of inspiration, the very title was in many cases borrowed. Thus we have *Le Spectateur françois*; *Le Spectateur suisse*; *Le Spectateur danois*; *Le Spectateur belge*; *Le Spectateur en Prusse*; the *Hollandsche Spectator*; *Der allgemeine Zuschauer*; *Der nordische Aufseher*; *L'Osservatore*; *Lo Spettatore Italiano*; the *Nydanske tilskoer*; *Le Babillard*; *Der Freimüthlige Tadler*; *De Babbelaer*; and *Der Getreue Hofmeister*. In America the influence of Steele and Addison is first noticeable in the *New England Courant* after it came under the direction of Benjamin Franklin, but in this country as elsewhere that influence has been of the abiding kind. Even in such an out-of-the-way place as Honolulu there appeared a *Hawaiian Spectator* in 1838-9. It is obvious that the question of the foreign influence of the three great classical periodicals cannot be more than mentioned within the limits of a paper of this kind; but it is a fruitful subject which will well repay investigation and, in my opinion, it certainly lends itself to sympathetic treatment.

So far, I have, in the main, been treating of Addison and Steele conjointly, because, so far, it has been impossible to separate them, nor was it necessary or advisable to do so. But, the title of this article borne in mind, it seems proper that I should now devote a little space to Addison alone.

Addison once expressed the wish that, as it was said of Socrates that he brought philosophy down from heaven to inhabit among men, so it might be said of himself that he had "brought philosophy out of closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-tables, and in coffee-houses."⁶ It has been alleged against him, however, that his own philosophy was not very deep. There is a substratum of truth in that objection; but the answer to it is that the state of education and culture of the public to which he addressed himself had to be considered. He wanted to attract,

⁶ *Spectator*, No. 10, Monday, March 12, 1711.

not repel. He was bound not to write over the heads of his readers, or his paper and his mission would alike fail. He had to convey his lessons gently, gradually, insensibly; to make them easily understood, so that he who ran might read; to depend on iteration of the same instruction in many forms. His philosophy had to be administered in homeopathic rather than in heroic doses. With or without the leave of manufacturers of huge and learned treatises, I venture to say that it is at least arguable that he who distributes philosophy in solution, so that the multitude may readily absorb it without knowing it, renders a better, and certainly a more immediate, service to society than he who piles it up into ungainly slabs and stores it in receptacles to which none but the privileged few can have access. I hold it true, whate'er befall, that one Dickens is worth a score of Jeremy Bentham's. If we bear in mind these considerations, we shall be the more readily disposed to accept Addison as he is, and to hold unto him as righteousness that purposeful shallowness which is more apparent than real. As the adapter of the means to the end he is unrivalled in literature.

As a literary critic Addison was condemned in Johnson's day because his criticism was tentative or experimental, rather than scientific, and because he decided by taste rather than by principles; and in our own day, because he is commonplace and unoriginal. Yet his eleven papers on the Pleasures of the Imagination⁷ form, in fact, the earliest specimens of philosophical criticism in the English language. That his ideas were correct may be inferred from his essay on fine taste, and especially from that passage in which he tells us that the best way to develop it is to be conversant among the writings of the most polite authors, and from that other passage in which he says:—

“It is likewise necessary for a man who would form to himself a finished taste of good writing, to be well versed in the works of the best critics, both ancient and modern. I must

⁷ *Spectator*, Nos. 411–421, June 21 to July 3, 1712.

confess that I could wish there were authors of this kind, who, beside the mechanical rules, which a man of very little taste may discourse upon, would enter into the very spirit and soul of fine writing, and show us the several sources of that pleasure which rises in the mind upon the perusal of a noble work.”⁸

This he himself attempted to do for Milton and the Old Ballads, and his popularization of the great Puritan poet and the removal of obloquy from the Ballads did much to pave the way for the oncoming of the Romantic movement.

In wit, in humour, in power of invention Addison stands preëminent. Assuredly Macaulay does not overstate the case when he says that in wit, properly so called, Addison was not inferior to Cowley or Butler; that Addison’s humour is of a more delicious flavour than the humour of either Swift or Voltaire; and that, if we wish to find anything more vivid than Addison’s best portraits, we must go either to Shakespeare or Cervantes. This is high praise; but if any one doubts whether it is deserved, let him search the Essays, *passim*.

As a stylist Addison is master of an easy, smooth-flowing, and apparently artless prose. He has been the model on which most of our best writers have endeavoured to form themselves. His influence in this department has made itself felt through practically the whole range of English prose since his time, from Oliver Goldsmith and Horace Walpole to Walter Pater, and from Leigh Hunt and Washington Irving to Robert Louis Stevenson and Andrew Lang. It may not be inappropriate here to mention that the Chancellor of the Catholic University of America, the cardinal-archbishop of Baltimore, made Addison his favourite author in youth, and that it is to imitation of Addison’s style that in no small measure is to be attributed the clearness and cogency of those admirable books of his which have been so widely read and translated, and on which Archbishop Glennon of St. Louis recently pronounced so magnificent a panegyric. Even writers like Charles Lamb, who go back to the Elizabethans for inspiration, cannot wholly escape the

⁸ *Spectator*, No. 409, Thursday, June 19, 1712.

infection of the later model. There are passages in Lamb that are quite Addisonian. Addison's style has stood the test of time, and he still offers the almost perfect pattern for us to copy. On this point Johnson's dictum remains as true to-day as when he penned it 130 years ago:—

“Whoever wishes to attain an English style, familiar, but not coarse, and elegant, but not ostentatious, must give his days and nights to the volumes of Addison.”⁹

* * *

A few months ago I handled and inspected, with mingled feelings, the original copies of the *Tatler*, the *Spectator*, and the *Guardian* in the great reading room of the library of the British Museum in London. One day I went from the library and had a good look at the statue of Queen Anne in front of St. Paul's Cathedral, taking in all its details of sceptre and brocade, of stomacher and massive hoops. I then passed, by way of Ludgate Hill, Fleet Street, the Strand, and Whitehall, to Westminster Abbey, following the same route as Mr. Spectator and Sir Roger de Coverley had taken on the occasion of their celebrated pilgrimage. With them I looked at Sir Cloudesley Shovel's monument and Dr. Busby's tomb, at the Coronation Chairs and Edward the Third's sword, and at the other statues and trophies among the tombs of the Kings. In the North Aisle of King Henry the Seventh's chapel I stood at the foot of Addison's grave, and then I turned to Poet's Corner to admire the skilfully wrought image which public veneration has raised to his memory. There I fell to thinking how deep the malice is that goes beyond the grave, and to wondering how much of Pope's satire, mingled as it is with genuine praise, is true. The famous lines, which Macaulay says everybody knows, or ought to know, by heart, occur in the *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*. Pope has been scarifying Gildon and Dennis, Bentley and Tibalds, Namby-Pamby Philips and Nahum Tate. He waves them aside, and then breaks out into this sustained piece of declamation:—

⁹ Johnson, *op. cit.*

Peace to all such! but were there One whose fires
 True Genius kindles, and fair Fame inspires;
 Blest with each talent and each art to please,
 And born to write, converse, and live with ease:
 Should such a man, too fond to rule alone,
 Bear, like the Turk, no brother near the throne,
 View him with scornful, yet with jealous eyes,
 And hate for arts that caus'd himself to rise;
 Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer,
 And without sneering, teach the rest to sneer;
 Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike,
 Just hint a fault, and hesitate dislike;
 Alike reserv'd to blame, or to commend;
 A tim'rous foe, and a suspicious friend;
 Dreading ev'n fools, by Flatterers besieg'd,
 And so obliging, that he ne'er oblig'd;
 Like *Cato*, give his little Senate laws,
 And sit attentive to his own applause;
 While Wits and Templars ev'ry sentence raise,
 And wonder with a foolish face of praise:—
 Who but must laugh, if such a man there be?
 Who would not weep, if *ATTICUS* were he?

I have a high admiration for Pope, which has grown with my growth and strengthened with my strength, and I sat at the feet of a revered preceptor, now alas! gathered to his fathers, who, though an Oxford Tory of the most reactionary type, had yet a consuming love for Addison, and instilled it into others, and particularly into those of us whom he treated as his favourite disciples. From him I learned to regard Addison almost as the just man made perfect. And yet, what of the mean indictments contained in the lines I have just quoted: "damn with faint praise"; "teach the rest to sneer"; "willing to wound and yet afraid to strike"; "reserv'd to commend"; "a suspicious friend"; "sit attentive to his own applause"? Frankly, I don't know. There were between the two men certain passages at arms¹⁰ which might easily move to spite the great master of barbed and pointed satire. Yet I cannot bring myself to think that it is mere mendacity that dictated the series of stinging charges that Pope here makes against

¹⁰ On this point see my article on "Alexander Pope," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XII., pp. 258-260.

Addison: littlenesses all of them, mark you, but such littlenesses as no generous spirit would willingly plead guilty to. I suppose that to Addison's unfriendly contemporaries there appeared to be some basis for them all—which is no more than saying that he had his share of human weaknesses. Well, if he had, we will I think, you and I, be disposed to forgive them to the charming writer who set his mark indelibly on English prose; the accomplished essayist who helped to open up new regions of literature; the gentle but effective satirist who reformed his own and set the standard for other ages; the kindly humourist who by his genial optimism taught the true philosophy of life, and bequeathed to posterity a rich inheritance more precious than gold and jewels and destined to be more lasting than granite or bronze. As was once, on a solemn occasion, said of a distinguished fellow-countryman of my own: "Let not his frailties be remembered: he was a very great man."

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JOHN THE SCOT.

The man who deserves to be singled out as representative of the ninth century in the history of philosophy is the Irishman known to his contemporaries as John the Scot and now generally called John Scotus Eriugena. He is representative, however, not of the average, nor of the usual, but of the highest and the best that that century produced in the way of original speculation. Indeed, he was so far above the average of that century that he may be said to have stood alone. It is part of the mystery that surrounds his personality, that he appears unheralded, shines for a period in the very zenith of the world of thought, and then disappears as suddenly and as mysteriously as he came. He had no rivals of the same rank as his, he had no co-workers equal to him in ability; he formed no school in the strict sense of the word; he "voyaged through strange seas of thought *alone*."

The ninth century began very auspiciously with that wonderful awakening to education and culture known as the Carolingian Revival. Charlemagne, that doughty champion of Christendom and wise, far-seeing organizer of the Christian state, whom legend exalted into the hero of many an extraordinary feat of arms, and whom local tradition in his favorite city of Aachen elevated to the rank of Christian saint, was a generous and devoted friend of learning. He gathered around him scholars from every country in Europe, encouraged them in their literary tasks, even took part in their debates, and showered honors and emoluments on them. Alcuin from England and Clement from Ireland came into closest personal contact with the emperor. Others, like Rhabanus of Fulda and Mainz, Fredegis the Anglo-Saxon and Candidus the German were influenced by the Masters of the Palace School. But, none of these were original thinkers. They did useful service to the cause of learning by their effort to revive and preserve what

previous ages had handed down. In theology and philosophy St. Augustine was their standard authority, and their writings very often consist of mere excerpts from his works. Charlemagne on one occasion showed his disappointment at their lack of originality. For, though he himself was no scholar, and could hardly write his own name—the hand that wielded the good sword “Joyeuse” could not easily acquire the skill to hold the pen—he appreciated scholarship in others, and would have admired a genius “like Jerome and Augustine,” forgetting, until Alcuin reminded him, that “the Lord of Heaven and earth” had the sending of so great geniuses as those in the secret designs of His Providence. The Lord did not send them in Charles’s time. Nor in the days of his immediate successors. In fact, the rulers who, after the death of Charlemagne, reigned over the empire which he so unwisely divided among them, were too weak and indolent, or too much concerned with less worthy projects, to champion the cause of learning, or take an interest in educational matters. Charles the Bald, who began to rule in 840, and was crowned Emperor in 875, seemed alone to inherit his grandfather’s love of learning. He surrounded himself with scholars, and seemed to enjoy their company almost as much as his grandfather had. Among these scholars, too, there was a dismal dearth of original power. The single notable exception was John the Scot, who, as we realize now from the study of his works, was a man of extraordinary genius and of an originality that would have been rare in any age, but was almost miraculous in the age to which he belonged.

His age appreciated his gifts. It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that there is so little known about him. A search, minute and painstaking, through all the documents that have reached us and through his own works results in a keen disappointment so far as information about him is concerned. It is certain that he was born in Ireland, and even that much we know only by inference. The name “Scot”—he was never mentioned by contemporaries except as “John the Scot”—should not mislead us. In the ninth century a “Scot” was an

Irishman. The name Eriugena by which he designated himself, is now understood by all scholars to mean "Native of Ireland." When he was born, and in what part of Ireland; when and why he left his native land; whether he journeyed to France of his own free will or was summoned by Charles the Bald, as Alcuin had been by Charlemagne; whether he was a cleric or a monk or a layman—all these questions remain unanswered, and probably will remain unanswered, unless some new documents are discovered. All we know is that, about the year 847, he appeared at the Court of Charles the Bald and was received at once into royal favor. His knowledge of Greek was quite unusual for that day and generation. It brought him into prominence in many ways, especially by procuring for him a royal invitation to translate into Latin the Greek writings ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, which had recently been sent as a present from the Greek Emperor to Louis the Pious, father of Charles. His reputation for learning and the prominence that his translation brought him secured for him also an invitation to join the controversies then raging about Predestination and about the Eucharist. We still have his work on Predestination and some of the answers it provoked. The age was a rough one, and the style of polemical literature was not what one might call polite. The reproaches flung in bitter mood and in violent language by the opponents of John the Scôt are among the few scanty materials for our knowledge of his personality. One adversary plainly tells him to go back to Ireland where he got his reputation for learning, to the "Ultima Thule," that remote region. Another virulently refers to his doctrine as "Irish porridge" (*pultes scottorum*), and a third upbraids him with his lack of ecclesiastical dignity or status. He himself could be violent of language too. For Gotteschalk, the monk accused of heresy in the question of predestination, he has no sentiment of pity, and though he himself was to be condemned later as a heretic, he considers heresy a most heinous crime and worthy of the severest punishment. It is certain that he did not spend all of his time at the royal court. For, we know that he was one of an Irish colony of schol-

ars at Laon, where Greek and theology was studied and where, probably, he wrote his greatest work, the philosophical treatise "On the Division of Nature." He survived his patron, Charles, who died in 877. But whether he remained the rest of his life in France or returned to his native Ireland is, again, a matter of uncertainty. The legend that he went to England at the invitation of Alfred the Great and was associated with him in the foundation of a great school at Oxford is devoid of all historical proof, and seems to rest on a case of mistaken identity.

Tradition, whether it is reliable or not is another question, ascribes to him an eager, ardent nature, a frailness of body, and a truly Celtic nimbleness of wit. Everyone knows the story of his quickness at repartee. His royal patron, like Charlemagne, was not above badgering a scholar for the amusement of his guests. One day, when John was seated opposite him at table he asked the philosopher in apparent seriousness, "What difference is there (*quid distat*) between a Scot and a Sot." "Only the table, your Majesty," was the ready answer. This venerable anecdote shows among other things that John was no sycophant, and if his poems addressed to the Emperor are full of hyperbolic praise, the fault lay not so much with the poet as with the fashions of the time. Turning to the writings of Eriugena we are able to add to these meager and trivial details and draw a tolerably complete picture of the mental, if not of the physical, characteristics of the man. The staid monkish chronicler to whom we owe the story of John's witticism goes on to say: "He deviated from the path of the Latins, while he kept his eyes intently fixed on the Greeks: wherefore he was reputed a heretic." Several centuries before John's time this predilection for the Greeks was laid to the charge of his fellow-countrymen on the continent. The fact seems to be that there was a kinship of the spirit between the Greek theologians and the Celts. Some historians surmise that there was actual dependence of the ancient Irish church on the Alexandrians in the matter of institutions and ideas. However this may be, we see in the writings of Eriugena the natural affinity of the Celt and the Greek. We have only to contrast

them both with the Latin to see how closely they resemble each other. The Celt excelled in spiritual imaginativeness; he had the power of grasping the reality of the invisible and making it part of his real self. He was inclined to live largely in the thought of the otherworld, and, consequently, to put contemplation above action. He laid hold of Christianity from the side of its ideals, not from the side of its legal prescriptions. He appreciated the force of an inspiration more than he did the restriction of definite formulas. The Celtic theologian took the Gospel of St. John for his favorite text, and the Celtic philosopher found in Platonism the philosophy which exactly suited his intellectual temper. John the Scot lived in the century which witnessed the great schism of the Greek from the Latin Church. Throughout the continent the feeling of hostility was deep and uncompromising. Ecclesiastics in France, where he lived, naturally felt with Rome, and looked with some suspicion on everything Greek. It was characteristic of the Celt to disregard practical and institutional considerations. It was not out of lack of loyalty, as will be made clear later on. It was merely that such considerations did not enter the mind of the Platonic philosopher. Greek theology called to him as to a kindred spirit, and he "deviated from the path of the Latins, while he kept his eyes intently fixed on the Greeks." The Platonic world of ideas was more important to him than the real actual world of events; he lived in it; it was his home and, in a sense, his all. He had no reason to distrust it, since it came to him so well recommended, and if in it he lost his sense of orthodoxy, it was because he lacked the ability to see the practical as his opponents, the Latins, saw it.

The Platonic view came to him principally through the works of Pseudo-Dionysius, which he translated into Latin. Dionysius, as is well known, was an Athenian whom St. Paul converted to Christianity. Tradition identified him with the Dionysius who preached the Gospel in France, and, as Saint Denis, became one of the patrons of that country. A number of works written in Greek were ascribed to him, and it was these that the Greek Emperor Michael sent to Louis the Pious, father of

Charles the Bald—a “Greek gift,” one might say, considering the tense feeling existing between Constantinople and Rome. The whole Greek church believed that the works were written by the disciple of St. Paul. France very readily fell in with the belief, and John the Scot never for a moment doubted their authenticity. It is nowadays, however, a very easy task to show that the writings in question cannot date from the first century, and most scholars agree that they did not see the light until about the year 500. They may have been written by a monk named Dionysius and then, in the good faith of uncritical enthusiasm, ascribed to the Areopagite; or they may have been knowingly and purposely forged. Such things happened before and since. In any case, John the Scot thought that they were genuine, and their effect on his mental development was immediate and decisive. They opened up to him a world of intellectual abstractions and spiritual entities which appealed to his Celtic temperament and suited the bent of his mind which was naturally Platonic. Imagine an enthusiastic botanist introduced to some unusually rich collection of the rarest specimens of plant life, imagine a mechanical genius given his first opportunity to examine at his leisure a vast number of new and cleverly contrived mechanical devices, or a natural born musician admitted to his first experience of the best and most finished products of the great master composers, and you have some idea of how this ardent young Irishman revelled in the limitless region of immaterial entities into which the Pseudo-Dionysius introduced him. It was the Greek taking the Celt by the hand and leading him into a paradise of supreme intellectual satisfaction and untold spiritual delight. But John the Scot was not willing to be merely a disciple. He himself would become a leader. And so, he not only translated the mystic writings of the Greek and commented on them but also composed a great metaphysical treatise of his own, his work *On the Division of Nature*.

It would, I am convinced, be fruitless for any but a trained student of metaphysics to attempt the thorough study of the dialogue on the Division of Nature. Not that the style is

obscure. On the contrary, John wrote a Latin that is lucid as well as elegant. His style was vastly superior to that of his contemporaries. But the thought is of that sustained subtlety and sublimity that characterizes the masterpieces of the great metaphysicians. Metaphysics, all of us realize, is a strenuous study, and not to be undertaken at all except by those who are not afraid of sustained mental effort. Nevertheless, the broad outlines of the system of John the Scot may be made intelligible without very great difficulty.

The word "Nature" as used by John the Scot is synonymous with "Reality." Nature, he teaches, is fourfold. First, there is "Nature which creates and is not created." This is God, the source and principle of all things. Secondly, there is "Nature which is created and creates." This is the world of primordial causes, the world of archetypal ideas existing in the mind of God, the world of types or models according to which all things are made. Thirdly, there is "Nature which is created and does not create," namely the world of phenomena, nature as we understand it, the physical universe and all the contingent, changing, evanescent material things which for the untrained mind is the real world, but for the philosopher of the idealist school, is the least real of all. Fourthly, there is "Nature which neither creates nor is created." This is God the Term or final end towards which all things are tending. It is important that we should try to grasp these distinctions. Perhaps we had better discard the somewhat confusing phrases, "Creates and is not created," etc. There are, then, four divisions of reality. God the Source, and God the final end of all things, the first and the fourth division, are easily understood. The third, too, is easily understood, if we call it by its more usual name, the physical world. The second division is one with which we are not so familiar, it is the world of Ideas that Plato spoke about. We are to imagine it to consist of perfect idealistic types of all things that exist here below. There, in that world of Ideas, is Justice, absolute, unchangeable, undiminished, unending. There is perfect Beauty, Beauty without flaw or imperfection, Beauty infinite and eternal.

There, too, are the perfect realizations of all those things which exist here below in imperfect forms. Suppose, like Diogenes of old, you are looking for an honest man. You will find him, if your standard of honesty is not too rigid. But you will not find perfect honesty in this world, you will not find *honesty itself*. For no matter how honest a man may be, his honesty is only a participation of the perfect, absolute, unchanging type of honesty which there, in the world above us, exists without participation or imperfection of any kind. This is how Plato conceived the world of Ideas. John the Scot agrees with the Platonic view. But, instead of assigning that world of Ideas to a "region above the heavens," giving it, if not a local habitation, at least, a separate existence, John, like all the Christian Platonists, places this world of Ideas in the mind of God. So that God, the source, God the final end, and God containing the ideal types of things are one and the same. This is the doctrine of Christian theism generally, and not of any particular school of Platonism and Neo-Platonism. What is peculiar to John the Scot is the doctrine that the first and the third divisions of Nature are identical. God the Source of all things is identical with the physical universe. This is, of course, pantheism. And, in spite of the efforts that have been made to exonerate our philosopher from the charge of pantheism, notwithstanding whatever sympathy we may have with him as an unusually attractive personality, we must admit that the case is only too clear against him. "The being of all things," he says, over and over again, "is the Overbeing of God." This is pantheism, and is an essential part of the system we are studying. It is, indeed, interesting to note the swaying of the philosophic mind from extreme atheism to explicit pantheism. The first philosophies were pantheistic. There came ages of scepticism and materialism which drew the pendulum across to the opposite, atheism; but, over and over again, metaphysical speculation and poetic enthusiasm for nature carried it inevitably back to pantheism. "All things are full of Gods," the first Greek philosopher is said to have taught. "All things are God" is the conclusion of reflective philosophy wherever the

light of personal faith failed to shed light on the problem of God and the universe.

For John the Scot, therefore, Reality in all its four divisions is God. In the beginning, Reality was, as it were, a folded scroll, included in the ineffable oneness of the Godhead. Creation is the unfolding of that scroll, first in the world of Ideas and then in the physical universe. And the end of all things will be the rolling up of that scroll into the Divine Nature. Creation, or more technically, emanation, is the beginning of the world's history; reabsorption in God, or the final return of all things to God, is the last chapter in that history. The philosopher himself furnishes an illustration which serves to throw light on his theory of reality. Let us imagine he says a point from which several lines radiate in different directions like the spokes of a wheel. The point is God, the source of all things, Whose nature is essentially and ineffably one. In that oneness, however, was the light of intelligence and the warmth of infinite Goodness. It is the nature of light to spread its radiance, and of Goodness to diffuse itself. Therefore it is of the Nature of God to shed around Him, an aura, so to speak, of Ideas and of Forces, *θεία θελήματα*. If, now, we draw a circle around the point at a short distance from it, all that lies within that circle will be Ideas and Forces, the world of primordial types, represented by lines radiating from the One. If, next, we draw a larger circle, having the point once more for its center, all between the second circumference and the first will be the world of concrete, physical, phenomena. When the outstreaming, as the Germans call it, from God will have reached this line, it will cease, and the process of return to God will begin.

Let us see how Eriugena describes this return to God,—the most intelligible and the most picturesque portion of all his philosophy. In the descent from God a definite order was followed. First came Ideas, from these came forces, from forces, matter in all its descending grades to the lowest form, the dust of the earth. When the final return begins, this order will be inverted. The dust of the earth will assume some sort of organ-

ization in the mineral, the mineral will become the elements, the elements will become light, light will become life, life will become sense, sense will become reason, reason will sublimate in intellect, intellect will become ideas, and in the form of ideas all will be reabsorbed in God. Signs of this great cosmic reabsorption are evident everywhere around us: the sphere of the heavens revolving on its axis returns to the same place in twenty-four hours; the sun completing its journey along the ecliptic (*equinoctiale diametrum*) returns in four years to the point which it now occupies; the seasons return each in its own time; the periodic recurrence of the tides is in line with the same phenomena; plant life exhibits the same regularity in the return of leaf and flower and fruit at their appointed seasons. The fact is, says our philosopher, that the *end* of every natural motion is the same as the *beginning*. The truths of nature, he adds, are intended to be a sign of higher spiritual and intellectual truth, and thus the periodicity of natural phenomena is a symbol of the great cosmic cycle of all reality *from God to God*. Remark here the universality of this return. Not only will the human soul go back at last to God Who is its home, but also the human body, and, not only the human body but all bodies whatsoever, even animals, plants and minerals. They will not return, however, in their proper species. Each has to be spiritualized first. The lower must become the higher, the material must be immaterialized, the gross must become refined, the foul must become fair, the base the ignoble, the sordid must become exalted, noble and sublime; for the inapproachable light in which the Godhead dwells will not admit to its presence anything that is dark, and the sanctity of God will not harbor anything that is unholy. The process is, therefore, one of purification and sanctification. And, although it is a natural, cosmic process, it is effected through the redemptive merits of Christ. This, as theologians will recognize at once, is the celebrated doctrine of the Alexandrian Christian Platonists, especially of Origen. It is the doctrine of final *apocatastasis*, the universal redemption by Christ of all created nature—a doctrine on which the Official Church set

the stamp of her disapproval on more than one occasion. John the Scot was not sensitive to the heterodoxy of his Pseudo-Dionysius on this point. The view of all nature as a symbol of the supernatural appealed to his disposition; his poetic soul was charmed at the prospect thus held out to him, and his spiritual imaginativeness was quite equal to the task of looking beyond the physical and seeing the spiritual meaning of it all. One could not say that the sun, the moon, the tides, the recurrent seasons, the periodic succession of leaf and flower and fruit were mere facts to him—"just that and nothing more." They were so much more than facts that they were hardly facts at all. They were symbols, and as symbols alone, one might almost say, they interested him. The same is true of scriptural facts. The story of what happened in the Garden of Eden has for him a predominantly, perhaps an exclusively, spiritual meaning. Adam and Eve he understands to mean mind and sensibility. The temptation and the fall mean the luring away of mind by our sense-nature from the higher pleasures of reason to the lower pleasures of sense. "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children" indicates the efforts which, once man has yielded to the pleasures of sense, are necessary in order to attain the highest knowledge.

This predominantly symbolical view of Nature and of sacred history has its roots in a temperament that is thoroughly idealistic. John the Scot was one of those for whom the spiritual is more real than the material, the world of thought more important than the world of sense. Far from being a materialist, he was a pronounced idealist, almost modern, indeed, in the value that he attaches to *thoughts in comparison with things*. For him, the least real of all the divisions of Nature is the physical world. It would hardly be correct to say that he doesn't believe in the existence of the physical world. But he does say that the existence of the physical world consists in *being thought*: "Intellectus enim rerum veraciter res ipsae sunt." (*De Div. Nat.*, II, col. 538). Things are, therefore, thoughts, and facts are true only in so far as they are thought to be true. This, of course, would lead to scepticism:

each man would make his own truth and that would *be* true which would seem to be true. John the Scot is saved from this consequence of his idealism by the reflection that the thought which dominates and compels our thought is the thought by which God thinks the world. The divine thought is not haphazard or inconsistent or self-contradictory. Consequently, the world is not a chaos but a cosmos, and if we think rightly, we follow the thought by which God thinks, and so are saved from Scepticism. It is, we may think, if not a narrow escape, at least an escape by a ladder which few can climb, a ladder leading to dizzy metaphysical heights which few can reach without danger of losing their mental balance. We are interested here in the general point of view, which, as has been said, is thoroughly and frankly idealistic. Our ninth century philosopher talks like a Modern Hegel or a Bradley: things are thoughts, the thoughts, not of my mind nor of yours, but of the Absolute Mind, of the mind of God, so that their only meaning is a showing-forth (*theophania*) of God and His Nature.

The discussion of the nature of man brings out still more strikingly the idealistic temperament of John the Scot. It is true, I think, that for the average person the body is more real than the soul. That is the view, at any rate, of the materialist, and most people think materialistically until they are trained to think otherwise. It is safe to say that for one person who doubts whether he has a body there are thousands who doubt they have a soul. Indeed, no one naturally doubts that he has a body, however he may be troubled with the question whether he has a soul. The idealist, like John the Scot, inverts this order of importance. He is certain that he has a soul, and interprets his body in terms of the soul. For what is the body? However you describe it, you describe it in terms of quantity and quality. You will have to refer to its height, to its weight, to its color, to its texture, to its functions and activities. But, all these are "incorporeal," that is to say, they are really your thoughts. The soul it is that *thinks* size and weight and color and so forth. Nay more, the soul it is that organizes these

qualities into a kind of unity, by articulating them into the complex conception called "body." Hence, says our philosopher, the *soul creates its own body*. Here we have, not a paradox, but a perfectly logical and a decidedly courageous conclusion from the principles of idealism. "The soul creates its own body," what a setback to materialism that persistently claims the dependence of the soul on the body. And, how modern! Not only does it suggest the doctrine of Absolute Idealism, but the still better known dogma of the faith-curists and the theosophists. The unreality of pain, the non-existence of disease, the contention that suffering is an error of the mind and belief in the body a mistake on the part of the soul—all these find their justification in the contention that the body is a creation of the soul. And this agreement between the ninth and the twentieth century idealist is not so difficult to explain. There is much in the writings of those contemporary idealists to whom I have referred that is borrowed from early Christian heretical sources, and that means ultimately from Neo-Platonic sources from which John the Scot drew his materials.

With idealism there goes very naturally a sturdy optimism. Our philosopher believes to the fullness of the letter that

"Somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill."

This is implied in the final return of all reality to God. But what interests us most is the explanation and justification of his conviction that good will triumph over evil. Evil is, to his mind, more apparent than real. For, all reality is God. Unfortunately it is only a few highly privileged souls that grasp this truth. The rest, living in darkness, failing to see the light, make a distinction between God and what they call evil. Evil will disappear as soon as intellectual and spiritual darkness disappear; the annihilation of evil will be the realization that it does not exist. Here, as is evident, John the Scot gave a reason, as William of Malmesbury says to be "reputed a heretic." But, before we set him down as a heretic let us examine more closely the general question of his orthodoxy.

John the Scot was several times condemned by Ecclesiastical authority. Not only were his views on predestination condemned during his lifetime at the Council of Valence (855) and Langres (859) but also his general system of philosophy in the Council of Paris as late as 1225. There was a special reason for this last condemnation. Pantheism had invaded the schools of Paris in the second decade of the thirteenth century. On the one hand, it sought support in the newly introduced Arabian commentaries on Aristotle, and on the other hand it lent assistance and prestige to the active heresy of the Albigenses. It was evident that the Pantheists were inspired by John the Scot. And so his "Division of Nature," which had hitherto been known only to a select circle of mystics, was dragged into the arena of controversy and its doctrines condemned. There can be no doubt that the predestination doctrine, with its reduction of evil to mere appearance, was contrary to the doctrine and practice of the Church; there can be no doubt either that the "Division of Nature" contains pantheism. In one sense, therefore, John the Scot deserved to be condemned as a heretic. But, in another sense is it possible still to argue the question "Was he a heretic?"

The Church condemns heresy because she consistently maintains that a sin against the truth is an offense against the God of truth, and a crime against the social order, since it leads others into error. She condemns the heretic when he shows disregard for her authority; and here again she is consistent, since she believes her authority to be from God. But what of the case when a man who loves the truth and venerates the authority of God, who never dreams of being a heretic, nevertheless proclaims a doctrine which the Church believes to be false? Then the heresy is condemned because the spread of false doctrine would work injury to the body social and because in itself what is false, like what is foul, is worthy of condemnation. In this case, however, where there is no contempt or obstinacy on the part of the heretic, the Church does not venture to forestall the verdict of the Supreme Judge. *Ecclesia non judicat de internis*. Now, if ever there was a heretic who

erred in good faith it was the courageous Irishman who in the ninth century ventured into the regions of metaphysics and theology with no one to advise him of the danger ahead, nay not only voyaged through uncharted seas but sailed with the danger signals so set that he could not escape disaster.

Consider first how implicitly he trusted his author, the Pseudo-Dionysius. There, he thought, he had to deal with a disciple of the Apostle himself, one who spoke with authority on all subjects ecclesiastical and theological. The subtlety of his metaphysics was no indication that the false Dionysius was an unsafe guide. To the spiritual imagination of the ardent Irish philosopher all that appealed with compelling force. John had not the least suspicion that he was guilty of heresy. In his pamphlet against Gotteschalk he showed how severely he would deal with anyone that troubled the serene waters of orthodoxy or sought to sow the tares of false doctrine amid the wheat of genuine dogmatic teaching. With the crudeness which characterized that age, he recommends that the heretic be burned with tar and pitch. Of course he would not be first—nor the last—to condemn very strongly in others a fault of which he himself was guilty. But may we not rather say that he was not guilty, in intention, of setting up his authority against that of the Church, but that his very piety and his devotion to truth misled him? On more than one point he reformed his teaching in order to conform to the decisions of the official Church. If his devotion to the Pseudo-Dionysius betrayed him into pantheism, there was none among his contemporaries to warn him of the danger, and he erred in circumstances of such exceptional good faith that we cannot but repeat the words of his first editor "*Potuit, ergo, errare; haereticus esse noluit*: He could indeed be wrong, he never meant to be heretical."

This point deserves to be accentuated here because our heart goes out naturally and sympathetically to this brave venturesome spirit. There was in his case a combination of courage and ability which resulted in an originality unique in early medieval times. While all his contemporaries were content with reproducing the past, marking time without advancing, he

had the heart as well as the brain to conceive and execute a great, imposing, original system of Christian theology and spiritual metaphysics. From his contemporaries he received little praise and very much adverse criticism. For, though the legend is certainly false according to which he was put to death at Malmesbury by his pupils who stabbed him with their pens, reliable history shows how he suffered at the hands of his contemporaries in the controversies of the day. And he has not fared much better at the hands of modern critics. By some he is dismissed as a dangerous heretic, the leader of an anti-scholastic movement, a disturber of the peace of the household of the faith. By others he is exalted into a hero of revolt, and is credited with a rationalism which he would have been the first to repudiate. The truth is seen to lie between these two extreme opinions. It is seen especially in his great work "On the Divisions of Nature." At the very outset of that work he defines the relation between theology and philosophy, between revelation and reason, in a manner that shows him to be more of a mystic than a rationalist. Had he placed reason above authority he would have been a rationalist. Far from doing that, however, he places divine illumination so far above reason that he is a thorough mystic. It is true, he uses the phrase "Every authority that is not approved by reason is weak" (*De Div. Nat.* i, 69, cal. 513). But that is the opinion even of the most orthodox. No authority in matters of faith can compel assent unless it is radically reasonable. What distinguishes John the Scot is the view that reason itself must be illumined from on high in order to understand the profound truths of philosophy. It was a sublime thought of his to interpret in that sense the scriptural saying "Every good gift is from above." The greatest perfection of the human mind, he says, is knowledge. But no mind can attain knowledge, especially knowledge of higher spiritual truths, unless he receives light from the Source of all Light. (*Super Hierarch. Cel.* col. 127). To that Light he himself turned constantly with simple piety and devout reverence. To it, so to speak, he appealed his own case. For, at the end of his work he intimates

that he is aware of the possibility of being misunderstood. "If these compositions," he says, "fall into the hands of right minded philosophers, they will receive a hearty welcome and affectionate reception. But if they fall into the hands of those who are more prompt to find fault with what is ill than to approve of what is well done, with such people one should not engage in much contention. Let each abound in his own sense until that light shall dawn to which the light of false philosophy is as darkness, and which changes into light even the darkness of minds which are right in philosophy" (col. 1022).

To that final judgment, then, let us appeal his case. He had his small circle of friends and fellow Irishmen at Laon, among whom he worked and by whom he was, no doubt, understood. In the world of public affairs he took no part, in the polemics in which he did take part he was abused and misrepresented. Silently and mysteriously he disappeared from among the men and affairs of his own day. His great work on metaphysics practically disappeared too. Here and there, however, it was known and appreciated especially by men of kindred spirits, the mystics of the Cistercian order. It was only when its pantheism was brought out crudely and aggressively in the first decades of the thirteenth century that it fell under the ban of the Church. Meantime, Eriugena's work had been done. He had stimulated a few thinkers here and there who could overlook his errors in view of the tender and devout spirituality of the man. Their verdict, I think, should be ours. We should think of him, not as a heretic consciously contemptuous of authority, but as a man of unusual spiritual endowment, kin to some of us in blood, and of spiritual kinship with all who appreciate the higher things of life. His spirit has long since found the light which it sought, and if the reading of his work on metaphysics has not illumined, as he hoped it would, the generations that came after him, the simple, genial, trustfulness of his nature has been an inspiration to many a soul in search of truth. One of these, a distinguished Anglican scholar has taken the trouble to translate from the writings of John the Scot a passage which he calls "The Student's Prayer."

“Assuredly the Divine Clemency suffereth not those who piously and humbly seek the truth to wander in the darkness of ignorance, to fall into the pits of false opinions, and to perish in them. For there is no worse death than the ignorance of truth, no deeper whirlpool than that in which false things are chosen in the place of the true, which is the very property of error . . . Wherefore, we ought continually to pray and to say ‘God, our salvation and redemption, who hast given us nature, give us also grace. Manifest thy light to us, feeling after Thee and seeking Thee in shades of ignorance. Recall us from our errors. Stretch out Thy right hand to us weak ones who cannot without Thee come to Thee. Break the clouds of vain phantasies which suffer not the eye of the mind to behold Thee in that way which Thou permittest those that long to behold Thy face, though it is invisible, which is their rest, the end beyond which they crave for nothing, seeing that there cannot be any good beyond it that is higher than itself.’ ”

The man who prayed thus loved the light. But he loved it, not as a rationalist who knows no light expect that of his own reason. He loved the light as the great mystics loved it, the light supernatural, the light that is not the cold, clear light of science, but the warm and warmth-giving light of mystic contemplation and love of God. To us his life was dark, his personality mysterious. And such they will always be. For, it is vain to hope that anything more can be known about him. Except by the student of his works. To such a one he appears as a lover of light, an optimist, a spiritual visualist, a subtle reasoner, but above all a true seer to whose characteristically Celtic mind the invisible world was more definite and real than the material world is to the man of science.

WILLIAM TURNER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Motive-force and Motivation-Tracks. A Research in Will Psychology, by E. Boyd Barrett, S. J., Doctor of Philosophy, Superior Institute, Louvain. Honors Graduate, National University, Ireland. Longmans, Green and Co., London, New York, Bombay and Calcutta, 1911. Pp. xiv + 225.

In this piece of experimental work Doctor Barrett has made a valuable contribution to the Psychology of the Will. The method that he has used will probably be the starting point for other pieces of research along the same lines. It is certainly a great improvement over the old form of reaction experiment which was for so long the only method known to psychologists for experiment in this difficult field. Doctor Barrett makes use indeed of the old choice reaction but he does so under conditions that make possible the application of the more recent "Würzburg" method of introspection. The technique of the experiment was as follows: The subject was seated at a small table with his finger pressing the reaction key. Just before him on a specially constructed stand were placed two glasses containing different liquids. After a prearranged preparatory signal there appeared just above each glass a nonsense syllable, which the subject (in a set of preparatory experiments) had learned as signifying a certain liquid. On seeing the words he had to choose between the two liquids and drink the one he had chosen. The period between the appearance of the choice and the reaction was measured by means of a Hipp chronoscope, that between the reaction and the realization of the choice (by lifting the glass to drink) was recorded by a Vernier chronoscope. The liquid in a glass might be pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent. The two chapters from which the book derives its name are those on "Motive-force and Its Measurement" and the one "On Motivation-Tracks." Dr. Barrett thinks that he can roughly measure the motive force aroused by one of his solutions by the percentage of times that it was chosen. Furthermore the reaction time is in general shorter for the pleasant solutions and longer for the unpleasant ones. The reaction time therefore becomes a measure of motive

force. In the chapter on Motivation Tracks it is pointed out that under similar conditions the structure of the choice process tends to repeat itself. This however is only partially true, for the process tends to become automatic. For when one and the same choice is repeated often enough, the psychical elements in it tend to disappear. According to the author the structural elements tend to persist, but from the data as given it can only be concluded that they do not disappear to the same extent as do the psychological elements. As a result of the disappearance of the psychical processes the reaction time diminishes. In the evolution of motivation the hedonic preferences tend to be eliminated, feelings become less and less frequent, motives take on a more and more abstract form until finally the reaction takes place mechanically. This is to be regarded as an economy of motive force—a sparing of intellectual and volitional effort.

Dr. Barrett attempts to make a practical application of his results in a study of the psychology of character. He maintains that all the essential elements of character are present in the choice-process. If this is the case then we have only to analyze this process and rate an individual according to the experimental data that are obtained in his choice reactions and we can write a formula that will express his character. This he even attempts for one of his subjects. In the formation of character he advocates a study of values. "The central fact of the researches we have been describing is that, when a choice has to be made between two alternatives, the choice is quick and easy in proportion as the values of the alternatives are clearly and definitely known." (P. 215). In life therefore we must have our fixed scale of values. In answer to the objection; *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor* he says that such a thing is indeed possible but exceptional. Successful effort in moral training is to be directed to the intellectual side rather than the volitional. "The dictum of Socrates, that virtue and knowledge are one, bears out the truth of our contention. He who knows the right acts aright. Not that we are to understand this dictum narrowly; but, taking it in a concrete sense it is true." (P. 218). One regrets that the author did not say a word or two to let us know what this sense is. For it is hard to maintain that virtue and knowledge are one without falling into an intellectual determinism.

By way of suggestion one might urge that the author exercise

a little more care in future always to give exact reference when quoting an author. (Cf. *e. g.* pp. 41, 42, 45.) More pains might be taken in proof reading. (Cf. *e. g.* the lettering designating the solutions page 129 ff. and the explanation of that lettering on page 47.) There should be a general presentation of all the experimental data. For when an author makes selections here and there it weakens the evidence and makes it impossible for the reader to check the results.

THOMAS VERNER MOORE, C. S. P.

The End of the Irish Parliament, by Joseph R. Fisher. Longmans, Green and Co., New York; London: Edward Arnold. Pp. xii + 316. 1911.

This is a very remarkable book. Both in its statements and in its conclusions it is eminently calculated to flutter the dove-cots in Corioli. Mr. Fisher is an iconoclastic historian; he shatters the cherished images of the storied past that we have hugged to our hearts, and makes the pet objects of our idolatry look small and mean. What is perhaps more harrowing still to our feelings, he strips our special abominations of all the objectionable qualities that made them loom hideous in the dark backward and abysm of our imaginations and sets them before us as wholesome and cleanly personalities. He plays fast and loose with our loves and our hates. To a generation that has made a fetish of Grattan's Parliament and regarded it as the *summum bonum* of exemplars it will come as a perfect shock to be told that it was an "impotent and unworkable machine," an "unsubstantial stage picture," and "little better than a patent absurdity"; while those who have been taught to look upon Grattan himself as one of the really great Irishmen to be placed in a class apart with Brian Boru and Hugh O'Neill and Daniel O'Connell, will have a rude disillusionment on learning, *teste* Mr. Fisher, that he was a "mere man of words," weak in character, self-contradictory, variable to every wind of political doctrine and expediency, "the tool of an abandoned English faction," and "the architect of the ruin" of his own parliament! One begins to wonder how such a man achieved the distinction of a public funeral in Westminster Abbey,

or why his statue stands conspicuous in College Green to-day. Not less astounding is the attempt to prove that the bribery by which the Union of the British and the Irish parliaments was effected was an everyday exercise of the normal functions of the English governors of Ireland, and therefore deserving of no special condemnation. There are many other respects in which the author runs counter to generally received opinions, such, for example, as his treatment of the Volunteers and his estimate of the character and motives of Townshend, Fox, and Burke, of Pitt, Cornwallis, and Castlereagh.

Enough has perhaps been said to show that *The End of the Irish Parliament* possesses a particularly pungent interest. Written in a spirit, or at least with an air, of dispassionate fair-mindedness and of historical calm, and yet bristling with points of controversy, it appears to me to be so far out of the common that I hope on another occasion to have the opportunity of dealing with it more fully than the space now at my disposal permits.

P. J. LENNOX.

The Complete Works of George Gascoigne. In two Volumes. Edited by John W. Cunliffe, M. A., D. Lit. (London). Cambridge: at the University Press, 1907 and 1910. Vol. I., pp. 506; Vol. II., pp. viii + 600. Price \$1.50 net per volume.

George Gascoigne (1525-1577), a descendant of Henry the Fourth's incorruptible Chief Justice of that name, was the son of a Bedfordshire knight. Having left Cambridge without a degree, entered Gray's Inn as a law student, written poems, and sat in Parliament for two years (1557-1559), he was disinherited by his father on account of his prodigality. A marriage with a rich widow did not sufficiently diminish the unwelcome attentions of his creditors, and so he sailed for Holland and served for two years (1573-1575) under the Prince of Orange. Taken prisoner by the Spaniards, he remained for four months in their hands, but was at length released, and on his return to England devoted the two remaining years of his life to collecting, re-casting, and publishing his works. He evidently enjoyed some degree of court favour, for he accompanied Queen Elizabeth to Leicester's seat at Kenilworth, and devised part of the entertainments provided on that sumptuous

occasion, and is careful to set the whole thing down in full for our delectation.

Tam Marti quam Mercurio was the motto which Gascoigne prefixed to the edition of his *Posies* which he brought out in the year 1575, and to others of his works, and it may be taken as fairly typical not only of the man but of the busy, aggressive, many-sided age in which he lived. He wished to bring home to his contemporaries that he desired fame for his exploits on the field of battle as well as in the field of literary endeavour. His portrait, printed at the back of the title in the first edition of *The Steele Glas* (1576), with the same motto, and showing an arquebus with pouches for powder and shot on the one side and books with pen and ink-pot on the other, illustrates still more forcibly his dual claim for recognition. It is a sad commentary on the vanity of human wishes that neither as warrior nor as writer has he won anything but mediocrity of renown.

Yet, because of his multitudinous experiments in verse and prose, Gascoigne has an assured place in literary history. Mr. Edmund Gosse, while condemning him as one who has not bequeathed "to English literature a single work or even a single line which is now read with enjoyment, for its own sake," has yet, in the same sentence, to admit that he was "an innovator of extraordinary ingenuity and versatility."¹ Hallam, after devoting half a column to him, and describing "the general commendations of Chalmers on this poet" as "rather hyperbolic," sums up by saying that "we may leave him a respectable place among the Elizabethan versifiers."² Despite this damning with faint praise, Gascoigne occupies with some distinction a whole chapter of twelve pages in the third volume of *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, and in a later chapter has three pages devoted by Mr. Saintsbury to one of his works. When to all this it is added that Gascoigne wrote the first English prose Comedy (*Supposes*, from Ariosto's *I Suppositi*, represented at Gray's Inn in 1566); the first treatise on poetry in the English language (*Certayne Notes of Instruction concerning the making of verse or ryme in English*, 1575); the first translation of a Greek tragedy produced on the stage in

¹ In article "Elizabethan and Jacobean Literature" in *Chambers' Cyclopaedia of English Literature*, Vol. I, p. 238.

² *Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries*, Chap. XIV, Sect. IV, § 60.

England (*Jocasta*, based on the *Phoenissae* of Euripides, enacted at Gray's Inn, 1566); the first English satire in blank verse (*The Steele Glas*, 1576); the first prose tale of modern life (*The Adventures of Master F. J.*, 1573); and the first mask (*The Princely Pleasures at Kenilworth Castle*, 1576), it will be readily understood how worthy his works are of being reprinted in the series of the Cambridge English Classics.

The two goodly volumes that these works fill are turned out in a style that is characteristic of the publishers: good binding, a handsome cover, and clear type, to say nothing of the quaint illustration. The editing has been done in a careful and scholarly manner by Professor Cunliffe. There are three appendices running to 59 pages, with indexes of Titles and of First Lines of Poems. In one of the appendices is given a pamphlet entitled *The Spoyle of Antwerpe* which, although unacknowledged by the author, the editor has no difficulty in identifying as Gascoigne's. Apart from the merits or demerits of the works themselves, students of the historical development of the English language have here a wide field for philological research, which, I am confident, will give ample returns to cultivation. From the point of view of prosody also Gascoigne will well repay study.

P. J. LENNOX.

History of Pope Boniface VIII and his Times, with notes and Documentary Evidence. By Dom Louis Tosti, Benedictine Monk of Monte Cassino. Translated from the Italian by The Rt. Rev. Mgr. Eugene J. Donnelly, V. F. New York, Christian Press Association Publishing Co., 1911. Pp. 546.

Three great figures dominate the history of the Papacy in the Middle Ages: Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Boniface VIII. There were of course many other great Popes whose lives and deeds profoundly affected the course of events in Europe in that period, such men as Leo the Great, Gregory the Great or Nicholas I, but historians dwell more on the achievements of the first-named than on those of any others, and give to them the place of pre-eminence in mediaeval papal annals. When history was written from a polemical standpoint and under the influence of sectarian

animosity those three great figures were usually held up to contempt by non-Catholic writers as monsters of corruption and ambition. Better acquaintance with facts, however, and the spirit of impartiality demanded by true scholarship, have brought about a revision of the unfavorable verdicts of the past regarding Gregory VII and Innocent III. Johann Voigt, a Professor of History in Königsberg who died in 1863 opened a new era in the general estimate of Gregory VII. His work *Hildebrand als Papst Gregorius VII. und sein Zeitalter* which was published in 1815 contained such a favorable, even laudatory, view of the much maligned Hildebrand that Clemens Villecourt, bishop of La Rochelle, supposed it to be the work of a Catholic and later endeavored unsuccessfully by correspondence to convert the author. Gfrörer, a rationalist, was so profoundly struck by the works and deeds of Gregory during the preparation of a life of that pontiff that he became a Catholic. The same thing happened in the case of Friedrich von Hurter, the pastor of the Reformed Church in Schaffhausen, who while writing a life of Innocent III became a Catholic with all his family. Hurter, Voigt and Gfrörer not only changed their own views regarding Catholicity but have profoundly affected the general verdict regarding Gregory and Innocent. So far Boniface VIII has not found such vindication. The charges made by his enemies during his lifetime, charges no more severe than those brought against his two great predecessors are still repeated. Dante, to whom he was the Prince of Pharisees, condemned him to one of the lowest circles of hell "where Simon Magus hath his curst abode." In a recent publication in English Boniface is called "a politician, overbearing, implacable, destitute of spiritual ideals, and controlled by blind and insatiable lust of power." If the work which Monsignor Donnelly has made available in English does not lead to the complete rehabilitation of Boniface it will at least serve to counteract in the minds of many people such estimates as that just quoted. To establish in its day truth obscured by passions; to render to virtue its honor and to avenge the opprobrium of six centuries; to inflict on crime triumphant the reprobation it deserves; to serve also the designs of Divine Providence, which does not defer always the cause of justice to the future life, such is the noble purpose which Dom Tosti had in view, and which we also maintain in our work of translation, "The History of Boniface VIII and his times," is then solely a work of historical reparation, a satisfaction due morality and society.

Whatever objections may be raised as to the advisability of translating a work which first appeared more than sixty years ago, on the ground that so much new material bearing on the life of Boniface has since been discovered, were doubtless not overlooked by Monsignor Donnelly, who evidently did not consider that anything which has appeared since Dom Tosti's time, has invalidated any of his conclusions. His true reparation in the case of Boniface VIII may the more readily be looked for, if his critics will peruse the detailed account of the political conditions which prevailed in the twelfth century as set forth in this translation, and try to form a just estimate of the character and purposes of those contemporaries of Boniface whose views have been accepted with such little hesitation by subsequent historians. Neither Dom Tosti nor his translator attempts to evade the fact that the period inaugurated by Gregory VII came to an end in the pontificate of Boniface VIII. His reign marks the beginning of the decline of papal influence in European state affairs: but, though he has undoubtedly suffered from the condemnation which is so unmercifully attached to failure of any kind, his reign cannot be said to have been a failure. It was his misfortune to be elected to the papacy at a time when the forces productive of new conditions had already made such progress that the old order was in eclipse; but he made no compromise with innovation. Some chapters in this work will especially command attention, as *v. g.* that on the relations between Boniface and his predecessor Celestine, *chi fece per villate il gran rifiuto*. While the abdication of Celestine will long remain a subject of discussion, the part played by Boniface, and his subsequent treatment of Celestine as set forth in this translation will unquestionably relieve the Pope from the charge of bad faith, intrigue and self-seeking. Not less noteworthy is the manner in which the subject of Boniface's relations to the Colonna and Philip the Fair and his proclamation of the Jubilee of 1300 are dealt with. The learned translator deserves the gratitude of all who are interested in the cause of truth, for having found time in the midst of so many pressing pastoral and diocesan duties, to translate a work of such historical importance, and for having made his translation so eminently readable. The long list of documents and the many extensive notes which form the appendix add very appreciably to the value of the work and materially increase its usefulness as a reference volume on this period.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Essays by Reverend Henry Ignatius Dudley Ryder, edited by Francis Bacchus of the Oratory, Birmingham. Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1911. Pp. xvi + 322.

These essays by Father Ryder, the colleague of Newman and his successor as Superior of the Oratory, are with the exception of two, reprints of papers which appeared in the *Nineteenth Century*, *Weekly Register*, *Dublin Review*, *Contemporary Review* or *Macmillan's Magazine*. Those already known are on Friedrich Spee, a Jesuit Reformer and Poet; Revelations of the After-World; Savonarola; M. Emery, Superior of St. Sulpice; The Pope and the Anglican Archbishops; Ritualism; Roman Catholicism and Converts; On Certain Ecclesiastical Miracles; The Ethics of War; The Passion of the Past, and Some Memories of a Prison Chaplain. The two papers which are here printed for the first time are on Auricular Confession and on Purcell's *Life of Cardinal Manning*. The latter will, it is needless to say, attract the most attention. The editor says this "was never intended for publication, and even the reading of it to a small body of friends was a departure from the fixed habits of reticence which the writer always maintained in regard to the estrangement between Newman and Manning." Because of the peculiar relations existing between Fr. Ryder and the two Cardinals, being the intimate friend and devoted adherent of Newman, and being closely related to Manning—his mother and Manning's wife were sisters—his words on this subject will be all the more eagerly listened to. Without impairing his loyalty to Newman, Fr. Ryder finds Purcell's work a subject for the most unqualified condemnation. "Undoubtedly Mr. Purcell means well," he writes, "he honestly desires to do his duty both by his hero and by the public, but he is without a vestige of literary sense, his fingers are all thumbs, and, in spite of the elaborate pains devoted to every line and shadow of his portrait, the result is a caricature, a splendid monster." The severity with which Purcell is condemned does not arise from any feeling of hero-worship, or because the attack was levelled at a kinsman. Father Ryder himself, analyses the character of Manning ruthlessly but judiciously, and while making no attempt to minimise his faults lays stress on the fact that any attention paid to the Cardinal's minor traits of disposition and temperament destroys the general impression produced by his conduct and purposes. "One great re-

deeming trait there is in Cardinal Manning's character," he said, "which would cover more sins than Mr. Purcell could enumerate, and that is his charity. A charity not always prudent in its manifestations, but always heroic in its intensity; and most long suffering in the persistency with which it attached itself to the least attractive and the least deserving of its objects."

An appendix contains some notes on Fr. Ryder's controversy with Dr. Ward. The essays are all readable and valuable as well because of their intrinsic worth as because they bear on a movement which has passed, but left deep traces.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Histoire de l'Eglise. Par L. David and P. Lorette. Bloud et Cie. Paris, 1910. 12mo., pp. 285.

This brief history of the Church is meant for the use of pupils in the *collèges libres et lycées*. The practical purposes which the work is designed to serve very justly lead the authors to treat the history of French Church affairs, especially those of a recent date, with greater fulness than other topics. If supplemented by instruction from a teacher the work will undoubtedly be very useful.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Vie de Saint François de Sales, évêque et Prince de Genève. Par M. Hamon. Nouvelle édition abrégée entièrement revisée par M. Gonthier et M. Letourneau. Paris, Victor Lecoffre (J. Gabalda et Cie). 12mo., pp. viii + 524. 1911.

This abridgment of the well-known life of St. Francis was made with the purpose of providing an edition within the reach of the most moderate purse and in a form more likely to be widely read than the two volumes from which it is drawn. Though the portrait of the Saint as here presented may have lost something in detail it has not suffered in clearness of delineation nor well-proportioned and accurate presentation.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Le Bienheureux Urbain V (1310-1370). Par M. l'Abbé Chailan. 1 vol. in 12 de la collection "Les Saints." Victor Lecoffre. (J. Gabalda & Cie.) Paris. 1911. Pp. 226.

This brilliant and sympathetic life of a French Pope by a Frenchman, contains much that is valuable and instructive regarding this critical period in the history of the Church. The Blessed Urban was one of the Avignon Popes sincerely desirous of transferring the Holy See to Rome, and only failing because the time was not ripe for such a move. This work ranks with the best in the Lecoffre series.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Lectionary: Its Sources and History. By Jules Baudot. Benedictine of Farnborough. Translated from the French by Ambrose Cator of the Oratory. B. Herder, St. Louis. 1910. Pp. vi + 214.

Attention has already been called to the learned work of Dom Baudin of which this is a translation. It is really an adaptation or enlarged revision, containing as it does so much more than was found in the French edition. Several important sections have been added, notably the chapter on the Genesis of the Lectionaries and Evangelaries during the first five centuries. Though the work is brief it has no rival in English. It will be a valuable complement to other liturgical works which are now finding their way into English, and which as no other Studies can, admit us into the very soul of the Christian community life and spirit in times gone by.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Nestorius d'après les Sources Orientales. Par F. Nau, Professor à l'institut catholique de Paris. Paris, Bloud et Cie. 12mo. Pp. 61. 1911.

This brief account of the life of Nestorius is drawn principally from Nestorian sources, and based on documents many of which are new and all of which are little known. The importance

of any study on Nestorius from the pen of M. Nau will be evident to all who are interested in finding out how far history will have to be revised because of the discovery of new material bearing on the Nestorians, notably the Bazaar of Heraclides, which Mr. Bethune-Baker has called to the attention of English readers some years ago. In addition to the life of Nestorius, many other important questions are touched on in this brochure, as *v. g.*, the activities of St. Cyril of Alexandria in the Nestorian controversy and the history of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. A second *opuscule* is promised in which M. Nau will discuss Nestorianism. No more interesting question has presented itself to ecclesiastical historians in a long time than this new phase of the history of Nestorius.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Charity of Christ. By Henry C. Schuyler, S. T. L. Philadelphia, Peter Reilly, Publisher, 1911. Pp. 177. Price fifty cents, net.

This second volume of the *Virtues of Christ Series*, like its predecessor, *The Courage of Christ*, is not only a valuable addition to the study of the Life of Christ but is also a thorough and scholarly analysis of the virtue of which it treats. There are, indeed, as the author remarks "various and vague ideas of Charity prevalent among us." Natural Charity should be carefully distinguished from the supernatural virtue, and natural Charity itself should be studied in its threefold division, Charity towards God, Charity towards our Neighbor, and Charity towards Ourselves. The duties imposed on us by the obligation of Charity towards our Neighbor all make up the substance of Charity "in deed and in truth," which is the only test of the reality of those inner feelings of Charity which we call Compassion, Gentleness, Mercy. The chapter on "Charity and Ignorance" is exceptionally well done. We can heartily recommend this little book to all teachers and to all who in any way are burdened with the care of souls.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Pioneer Catholic History of Oregon. By Edwin V. O'Hara.
Portland, Oregon, 1911. Pp. xii + 236.

Readers of the *Bulletin* are already acquainted with Father O'Hara's researches in the early Catholic History of the Northwest. Studies already published in periodical publications are here augmented by the addition of other materials and the result is a very readable little volume containing the history of Catholicity in Oregon from the days of Joint Occupancy, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, down to the death of Archbishop Blanchet in 1883. Men of heroic stature figure in the story, and the narrative of their deeds and their sacrifices will be read by all who have a proper appreciation of true human greatness as well as by those whose love of God and His Church predisposes them to enthusiastic interest in events that show forth the glory of both. Father O'Hara, by going to authentic and reliable sources, has put in the true light incidents which the spirit of controversy has already begun to misrepresent. In doing this he has set an example that might well be followed in the case of other states and territories; for it is only in this way that materials for the history of the Church in the United States are to be preserved and rendered accessible. We congratulate him and hope that the success of this undertaking will encourage him to continue his efforts.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Story of the Old Faith in Manchester. By John O'Dea.
London, Washburne, 1911. Pp. 248.

Like the preceding volume, this is a successful effort to gather and preserve the historical data relating to the history of a particular territory, a portion of what is now the diocese of Salford, England. Chronologically, of course, Mr. O'Dea has a wide field, his enquiry carries him back to the days of St. Chad, or Ceadda, the monk of Lindisfarne, who labored in the Midlands before the mission of St. Theodore to Canterbury. It brings him down to events as late as 1906 and the educational activity of the present Bishop of the Diocese, the learned Doctor Casartelli. Not the least interesting section is that which describes with much detail the scenes attending the execution in 1867 of "The Manchester Martyrs."

WILLIAM TURNER.

MISCELLANEOUS.

An Irish Homily on the Resurrection: Text and Translation.

The following homily is taken from the Rennes ms., for an account of which, as well as of its contents, the reader is referred to an article by Rev. George W. Hoey, S. S., entitled "An Irish Homily on the Passion," in the *Bulletin* for May and June of last year (Vol. xvii, Nos. 5 and 6). It is intended in succeeding numbers to publish four other homilies from the same source.

The title of the one here presented, "The Resurrection of Christ according to Bonaventure," is justified in the sense that it is based on his views as expressed in various passages of his works where reference is made to the resurrection. The ideas of the homily bear a very close resemblance to the Seraphic Doctor's Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, (Book III, Distinctions xxii and xxv), and to his Commentary on the Gospel of St. Luke, (ch. xxiv, v. 49). The treatment, however, of the text from St. John, "No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven," I am unable to trace in Bonaventure. He discusses the text in Sent., Book III, Dist. xxii, ad Qu. vi, Dub. iv, and in Comm. Joannem, h. l., and gives two ways of reconciling it with the doctrine that all the elect will ascend into heaven, but both are different from that of our text.

The various citations of Scripture are pointed out in the notes. They are generally exact, but in some cases are rather free. The form given to Luke xv, 7, is interesting,—“The soul of one sinner is more welcome to go to heaven than ninety Christians who are in no danger as to their going there.” In the citation from I Cor. xii, at the close of the homily, we find “healing” translated by the same word as “miracles”

in the next clause. If the ms. is a copy of another, it is possible that the first *subailchi* in the text is a *lapsus calami* for *sláinti* or *slánuighiti*, due to similarity of the words, occurring as they do in consecutive lines.

It is possible that in the expression, "as we are taught by many truthful proofs of the faith," we may have a reference to Acts I, 3, "To whom also He shewed Himself alive after His passion, by many proofs, for forty days appearing to them." Likewise the expression, "He is all-perfect, all-sufficient, all-loving," seems to be a quotation, judging by the preceding words, *da derbadh sin*, "in confirmation of that, in proof of that," which generally introduce a citation. The same words occur shortly before the last long citation from *I Corinthians*, but what immediately follows does not seem to be a quotation from St. Paul, though it may be from some other source.

At first sight there appears to be little unity or order in the homily, but on closer inspection it will be found that there is in fact a logical development of a few simple ideas. The author begins by sketching briefly the incidents connected with the Resurrection,—the descent of the soul of Christ into Limbo, the liberation of the souls of the just, the glorious Resurrection of Christ, the ascension of Christ into heaven, His glorification there, the descent of the Holy Ghost and His activity in the Church. Next follows the development of the idea of the great mercy of Christ, shown by the creation, the redemption of the just who lived before His time and of sinners who were then living or were to be born afterwards, and by bringing all the elect into heaven. Then comes the consideration of the help Christ has given us in the work of preparing ourselves for heaven: the soul was created for heaven; He came to redeem us; to be saved we must worship Him by faith, hope and charity; and that we may succeed in doing so, we receive the help of the Holy Ghost. Next our attention is directed to the power of Christ to save us: He has conquered the power of Satan and prepared a dwelling-place for us in heaven, and we receive His help without fail. Finally, we must prepare our-

selves for the coming of the Holy Ghost, and ask for His gifts; the Holy Ghost is charity, and dispenses His gifts according to His will and our deserts, for the salvation of all, through the service of God and the Church.

However there are many repetitions, and frequent summaries of what precedes, so that the logical order of the thoughts is often obscured, and it appears that we are dealing with a series of disconnected statements made with no definite purpose in view.

Despite their imperfections, the publication of such texts as these is highly interesting if not important, for they give us a near view of the literary and theological learning of the Irish of the Middle Ages, and enable us to appreciate the working of the Irish mind in those times. They are all the more valuable as they seem to be the work not of a brilliant scholar deeply versed in the science of his age, but rather of an ordinary man, presumably a monk, who nevertheless shows an acquaintance with the literature of his subject which, to one who still holds the opinion formerly so widely accepted as to the "darkness" of those days, cannot but be surprising. Moreover, some of the other homilies in this collection, to be published later, place this point in even greater relief.

The text is given as found in the ms., the abbreviations being filled out in italics, and the words separated by hyphens. The translation keeps as close to the original as is possible without requiring a reference to the text itself to discover the actual sense. After the publication of the other homilies mentioned, it is intended to add a list of the uncommon words found in them.

TEXT.

(fo. 30c l. 31) Do-eiseirgi Christ d-eis a-chésta ann so 7 mar dlighomitt a-tuicsin do-rer bonauentura 7 do-tarba a-tuicsina an-ar-craidhi 7 can cuntabairt do-beth acaind co-ndecaid anam Crist tar eis a-paisi an-ifirnn do-tabairt cach-aein do creitt dó roim an-mbas a-hifirnn a-fírindi, an creidim beó 7 ac-a-roibi credim (fo. 30d) a-sacramint a-fola 7 a-feóla 7 an tres lá ac-ergí do o-n-páis do gab an corp do bí uime roime uime an-tan so 7 ní mar do bi an-corp so ar-tus do gab uime fa-deoigh hé oir do bí sé somarbtha sopianta ría cesad 7 d-eis a-pianta do bí sé domarbta do-píanta a-mbethaigh mar-tanaig 7 a-cind da XX lá d-eis a-eiseirgi do chuaid a-flathamnus 7 do-hardaighi hé os-cind cach uile creatuir 7 do-shuidh ar-deis dé athar 7 do-foillsighi mét an-tindlaici tuc sé do-na-daeinib .i. a-mac do-tabairt da-cesad tar-a-cend 7 an-a-dáidh so a-cind .X. lá hi cenn adubramar do-cuiredh itir na-hapstoil an-gelladh tucadh dóib .i. an-spirad naem 7 is trit an spirad naem do-cruindidhe an-aen inad eclais nacinedach do-rer examlachta oifici 7 gras 7 tindlaici

7 is é tuicsin na-mbriatar-so adubramar .i. cur an-meitt is-briatar hé .i. in-mét is-mac hé cur cruthaigh sé cach aen-ni co-foirfi 7 cur dligh a-cruthugadh 7 is-é a-adhbar sin .i. gurab é tosach cach oibrighti día 7 cur crichnaid sé cach uile oibriugadh co-foirfi

7 do cruthaigh an-popul co-himlán 7 do cennaig íatt an-a-pais a-comlinadh toile a-athar 7 d-a-derbad sin ata sé ro-foirfi ro-lór ro-dutrachtach oir ata sé ro-lór sa ceim is-airdi do-n medhaighecht indus cor-sín sé a-trocaire do-cum flathamnais 7 do cum-talman 7 do-cum ifirnn g-ar-cennach-ne an-a-césad mar adubramar

óir is-leis do-slanaighi betha suthain cach aein d-a-tainic a-hifirnn in-a-trocaire 7 cach nech d-a-fuil a-talmáin 7 is do-eisimplair a-umla 7 a-trocaire do-leighis iad. 7 cach nech d-a-fuil a-flathamnus is-ac-lenmain a-cesta tiagaitt and co-firindeach.

An céd ceim di so do-roine an-aisced hé do-n-droing do-bí an-ifirnn do creitt and ac-a-fuaslacad do cum-flathamnais co-mar-thanach.

An dara ceim oir do bo mó trocaire Christ (fo. 31a) ac dol sa croich do cennach na-pecach na airceas na-pecach ac-iarraidh a-slánaighi oir is mó airces Christ ac-tabairt na-ngras na cach annuain da-mét ac-a-niaraid air

TRANSLATION.

Of the Resurrection of Christ after His passion, and how we ought to understand it, according to Bonaventure, and of the value of understanding it in our hearts, having no doubt that, after His passion, the soul of Christ went into hell to bring from thence into the truth of the living faith, everyone who believed in Him before his death, and who had faith in the sacrament of His Blood and Flesh. And on the third day, rising from the passion, He took upon Him at that time the body which He had before. But it was not as this body was at first that He took it upon Him at last, for it was mortal and passible before His crucifixion, and after His torment it was immortal and impassible in eternal life. And at the end of forty days after His Resurrection, He went into heaven, and He was exalted above every creature, and He sat at the right hand of God the Father, and there was made manifest the greatness of the gift He bestowed on men, namely, to give up His Son to be crucified for their sakes. And thereafter, ten days after what we have said, the promise that was given them was sent among the apostles, namely, the Holy Ghost. And it is through the Holy Ghost that the church of the gentiles was gathered together in one place, according to the diversity of ministries and graces and gifts. And the meaning of these words we have said is that, inasmuch as He is the Word, that is, inasmuch as He is the Son, He created everything as perfectly as it was fitting it should be created; and the reason for that is, that God is the beginning of every work, and that He finished every work perfectly. And He created the whole human race, and redeemed them in His Passion, in fulfillment of the will of His Father; and, in confirmation of that, "He is all-perfect, all-sufficient, all-loving." For He is all-sufficient in the highest degree of measurement, so that He extended His mercy to heaven and to earth and to hell, in redeeming us in His Passion, as we have said. For it is by Him that eternal life is assured for every one who came from hell in His mercy, and for each one who is on earth; and it was to give an example of His humility and His mercy that He cured them. And everyone who is in heaven, it is truly by clinging to His Passion that he comes there.

The first degree of this He did freely for the multitude who were

An tres ceim is-in-gloir a-tigh neime a-comlinad toile an-athar .i. ac-cur-anmann súas an-inad na-n-aingil do tuit anuas ar-son an dimais 7 d-a-derbad so is forbfailtigi aen-anam pecaig do dol and na-deichnebar 7 cetre XXit Christaidhi ar-nach-fuil cunntabairt fan dol ann 7 is-aire sin do chuaidh anam Crist an-ifirnn d-eis a-césta do-fúasladh na-n-anam do-bí cengailti ac-a-roibi creittim ann fein 7 is sí ar-tuicsin-ne nar-fuascladh acht iad 7 d-a-eisi sin do-eiridh ó-bás do-tabairt betha do-na daeinib do bí beó an-a-corpaib 7 marb is na-pecthaib 7 an-a-díaidh sin do chúaid a flathamnas do-breith na-broitti do bí an-ifirnn leis a flathamnus do-comlinadh an-flathamnais 7 do-cuir an-spirad naem anúas do choimét na-heclaisi talmanta mar adubramar 7 do comlinadh cach-neich is *eigen* do-fuasladh an cined daonna 7 an-a-diaidh so ata an-furtacht so fuirechair is-na-daeinib ac-a-fuil doigh a-techt Christ d-a-slanugad sa-breithemnus oir tanic dia a colainn daonna d-ar-cennach 7 tic cach láei sa-n-indtind d-ar-comairliugad 7 tic fos co-deigenach do-cum an-breithemnais d-ar-slanugad mar adubramar

7 cach aen lenus Christ mar so tiaghait leis n-a-flathamnus óir adeir ant-udar nach-tét ní a-flathamnus acht an-ní-tanic as 7 is-í a-tuicsin so ant-anam resúnta do cruthaigh día co-flathamanda do-cum na betha daonna co-tiagaitt an-a-mballaib díse leis an-a-flathamnus 7 is mar sin do chúaidh día 7 a-baill (fo. 31b) le chele a-flathamnus 7 is mar so do chuadar na-baill leis .i. ac-a-adhrad is-in-creitim 7 is-in dóchus 7 is-in grad 7 is é so an-furtacht do dligh cach-aen nech do beth aici ac-a-ullmugad do-fein in día do-cum dola leis a-flathamnus mar adubramar 7 ar-tus na-daeine do creitt do día co-maith 7 do an-sa-creittim sin co-daingen 7 is ar-na-hadbaraib sin do eiridh Crist 7 do chuaid ind-ifirnn do-tabairt na-droingi sin as 7 d-a-mbreith a-flathamnus 7 do hoslaicedh dorús flathamnais dé a-pais Christ 7 an-aeintecht na-toile so do brisedh doirrsi ifirnn 7 do lacadh cumachta an-díabail ac-tabairt a-ball fein do día do-cum a-flathamnais 7 is-iat so sa-saegal anois an-drong creitis Christ do-techt d-a-slanugad sa-breithemnus .i. an-drong lenus hé sa-creitim 7 annsa dóchus 7 annsa grad 7 beirid día iat sin a-nglóir na kathrach nemda d-a-suidhiugad 7 is-é do ní an suidhiugadh so .i. Christ ata an-a-duine firindech 7 an-a-día fire le-r-b-aill hé fein co-humal d-ar-cennach-ne an-a-páis do-tabairt betha dúinn 7 d-ar-mbreith leis an-a-eisergi 7 ar-na-hadbaraib so do eirig sé

in hell who believed in Him, releasing them to dwell eternally in heaven.

The second degree: For the mercy of Christ was greater going upon the cross to redeem sinners than is the toil of sinners in seeking their salvation; for the toil of Christ in giving graces was greater than any solicitude, however great, in asking them of Him.

The third degree was in the glory of the heavenly abode, in fulfilment of the will of the Father, namely, in putting souls up in the place of the angels who fell thence because of pride; and, in proof of this,¹ "The soul of one sinner is more welcome to go thereto than ten and fourscore Christians [*sic*] who are in no danger as to their going there." And it is for this reason that the soul of Christ went into hell after His crucifixion to ransom the souls that were in bondage and had faith in him. And it is our understanding that they alone were ransomed. And after that, He rose from death to give life to those who were alive in body and dead in sin. And after that, He went into heaven to bring the captives who were in hell into heaven with Him, to fill heaven. And He sent the Holy Ghost down to preserve the Church on earth, as we have said, and to fill each one who is needed for the salvation of the human race; and thereafter this help is watchful among those who expect the coming of Christ to save them in the judgment. For God came in a human body to redeem us, and He comes every day into the mind to counsel us, and He comes also finally to the judgment to give us salvation, as we have said. And all who thus follow Christ go with Him into His kingdom. For the author says that² "Nothing goes into heaven but what comes thereout," and by this is meant the rational soul which God created in a heavenly manner for human life until they go into His kingdom with His as faithful members. And it is thus that God and His members went together into heaven. And thus the members went with Him, namely by adoring Him by faith, by hope, and by charity. And this is the help each one ought to have in preparing himself in God to go with Him into heaven, as we have said; and above all, those who believed firmly in God as well as in Him in that faith; and it is for these reasons that Christ rose again, and went into hell to bring that multitude out, and to bring them into heaven. And the gate of God's kingdom was

¹ Luke xv, 7.

² John III, 13.

o-n-bás a-mbethaidh nem-marbtha nem-truailighiti mar adubrumar romaind ar-fechain na-meitti do-uairib dlichtecha do-bí sé adhlaicti .i. VI huaire X ar XX do-reir bonaventura ar-eiseirgi Christ 7 is annsa comairem so creitfis cach aen-duine nar-eiridh sé ní istúscá na-sin as-an-adlacadh 7 da-mbeth ní bud faitti na-sin ann san-adlacadh adeirthisidhi co-ma-nem-cumachtach hé 7 nach fétfedh aen-nech do-breith do-chum an-flathamnais nemda curab aire sin do-eiridh sé is-in-tres lá sa dochus do-bí ac-na-hainglib 7 ac-na-daeinib ac-comlínadh toile an-athar o-n-mac 7 ní geinter andóchus so choidhchi acht o-n creitim (fo. 31c) firindech 7 o-n dóigh daingin deigenaigh ac dol le Christ a-flaithemnus 7 ní co luath tar-eis a-eiseirgi do chúaidh sé a-flathamnus acht ar-comairem da XX lá d-eis a-césta mar-tecaister duinn a-comarthigte imda firindecha an-creitim 7 is ann sna comarthigte sin daingnigter cach aen acaind d-a-breith a-spas na-catrach nemda 7 an-a-diaidh sin do cuirid an-spirad naem anúas lá na-quincisi do lasadh grada día in-ar-craidedaib-ne 7 ní hadaigter an-tene so a-craidhi aen-duine acht a-craidhi an-tí iaras hí co-firindech mar adubairt ant-apstol nach oslaicter an-doras acht do-n nech iaras a-oslacad 7 is mar sin fuair cach nech ac-a raibi dóchus dutrachtach an-a-craidhi comtidhlaicti an spiraid naem do dail doib 7 is aire sin nach co luath d-eis dola súas do-n mac do cuiridh an spirad naem anuas acht a-spas X lá d-a-eis gurab ann-sa Xmad lá do batar na-hapstoil ac-urnaidhti 7 ac-treigenus do cum an spiraid naem do-gabail cuca mar do-gelladh doib 7 is mar so tucadh an-comarta dlichtech sin .i. ac-a-tangmail an-uairib 7 a-laithib .i. an-eiseirgi Christ 7 an-a-dol súas sa-cathraig nemda 7 ann sa spirad naem do chur anuas 7 a-fundamint tsuidhigti na trinoidi sa-cathraig nemda 7 a-bus ann-sa saegal 7 ac derbad morain do-serbísid ele d-a-ndernaidh 7 d-a-derbad so ata an spirad naem ann-sa gradh 7 cidh b-é marus is-in grad mairid sa-spirad naem

7 ata acaindi a-coiteindi and so re tuicsin curab é in spirad naem an-gradh 7 bun cach uile sacraminti curab aire sin ar-ndul do mac dé sa-cathraig nemda tanic an spirad naem anúas ar-comairem na-haimsire adubramar maille re sacramint na heclaisi mar-tserbistear iat co-hexamail mar ata móran do ballaib ac-seruís an aen cuirp amain 7 na-baill examla ac-denam a-seruís examla ac-comaentugad do-n aen corp 7 d-a-derbad so ar-techt do-n spirad naem ann-sna-hapstoil tue VII (fo. 31d) sacraminti na-

opened by the Passion of Christ, and, in accordance with this purpose, the gates of hell were broken, and the power of the devil was weakened when God brought His own members to His kingdom. And these are they who, in the present world, believe Christ will come for their salvation in the judgment, namely, those who follow Him by faith, hope and charity. And God brings these into the glory of the heavenly city to abide; and He who established this dwelling is Christ, who is true man and true God and who was pleased humbly to redeem us Himself in His Passion, to give us life and to bring us with Him in His resurrection; and, for these reasons, He rose from death into immortal, incorruptible life, as we have said before, considering the number of foreordained hours He was buried; namely, thirty-six hours, according to Bonaventure, on the Resurrection of Christ. And according to this computation everyone will believe that He did not rise sooner than that from the tomb; and if He had been longer than that in the tomb, it would have been said that He was powerless, and that He could not bring anyone to the heavenly kingdom. So it was for that reason He rose on the third day according to the hope of the angels and of men in the fulfilment of the will of the Father by the Son. And this hope never springs except from the true faith and from the firm and final expectation of going with Christ into heaven. And He did not go into heaven immediately after His resurrection, but on the expiration of forty days after His crucifixion, as we are taught by many truthful proofs of the faith. And it is by these proofs that each one of us is assured of being brought into the realm of the heavenly city. And, after that, the Holy Ghost was sent down on the day of Pentecost, to kindle the love of God in our hearts, and that fire is not lighted in anyone's heart except in the heart of him who asks it in truth, as the Apostle said that³ "The door is not opened except to him who seeks its opening." And, therefore, each one who had earnest hope in his heart, received the outpouring of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and, for that reason, not immediately after the ascension of the Son was the Holy Ghost sent down, but a space of ten days afterwards. Hence it is that on the tenth day the apostles were praying and fasting in preparation for receiving the Holy Ghost as was promised them. And this is how that foreordained sign was given, namely, by their happening at the times and on the days [appointed],

³ Cf. Matt. vii, 7, 8; Luke xi, 8-10; James iv, 2.

heclaisi leis ac-denam a-n-oifíci co-hexamail ac-fogham do día 7 do-n eclais 7 is mar so doberar do-n aen nech amain spirad diada ac-comrad na-hegna 7 doberar spirad do-nech ele ac comrad natuicsi 7 doberar creidim daingen do nech ele 7 doberar do-nech ele grasa na-subailchi 7 doberar do-nech ele oibrighti na subalchi 7 doberar faitsine do-nech ele 7 doberar do droing ele deiscribidi a-na spiradaib 7 doberar do-nech ele examlacht na-tengta 7 doberar tuicsi na-comraidti do-nech ele 7 roindter cach aen ní díb so ó-n-aen spirad naem ac-a-tidhlacad a-saeirsi deiscribidi cach aein mar tuilles íad 7 a-tídlacad derlaictech an spiraid naem cédna mar adubrumar qui uiuit 7 regnat deus per omnia secula seclorum. AMEN.

namely, in the case of the resurrection of Christ, and of His ascension to the heavenly city, and of the sending down of the Holy Ghost, and the institution of the dwelling of the Trinity both in the heavenly city and also here in the world, and by the assurance of many other services that He rendered. And in proof of this,⁴ "The Holy Ghost is charity, and whosoever abideth in charity abideth in the Holy Ghost." And we must all alike understand here, that charity is the Holy Ghost and the foundation of every sacrament. Hence it is that, after the Son of God went into the heavenly city, the Holy Ghost came down in the fullness of the time we have said, with the sacraments of the Church, as they are administered in divers manners; as there are many members serving one body alone, and the various members are performing various services in harmony with the one body. And in proof of this, on the coming of the Holy Ghost upon the apostles, He brought the seven sacraments of the Church with Him, performing their various ministries in the service of God and of the Church. And thus⁵ "To one person is given the divine Spirit speaking wisdom; to another is given the Spirit speaking knowledge; to another is given firm faith; to another is given the graces of healing; to another is given the working of miracles; to another is given prophecy; to others is given the discerning of spirits; and to another is given diversity of tongues; and to another is given the understanding of speeches. And all these things are divided by the one Holy Ghost, bestowing them in freedom of discernment" of each one, according as he deserves them, and as a beneficent gift of the same Holy Ghost, as we have said,—*qui vivit et regnat Deus per omnia sæcula sæculorum. Amen.*

JAMES A. GEARY.

⁴I John iv, 16.

⁵I Cor. xii, 8-11; Heb. ii, 4.

The Pierpont Morgan Collection of Coptic Manuscripts.¹

An announcement made privately at the annual meeting of the Archaeological Institute of America in Pittsburgh December 28, 1911, and here published for the first time will be accepted by students of exegetics and scholars and collectors of ancient manuscripts the world over as being of unusual importance. It is that J. P. Morgan has just acquired for his private collection the most complete and most valuable collection of Coptic manuscripts that has ever been unearthed in Egypt and that he intends to put the collection into such shape as will allow the scientific world to profit by the great addition to the knowledge of Coptic literature brought about by this most recent find.

The collection has just been received by Mr. Morgan from Paris, where its purchase from the antiquarians who rescued the sheaves of ancient manuscripts from the Arabs was made. Prof. Henry Hyvernat of the Catholic University of America, who is one of the best known authorities on Coptic literature and who was instrumental in gathering from Arab vandals codex after codex of almost priceless vellum, has done preliminary work upon the collection sufficient to assay the value of the whole collection as a contribution to the world's knowledge of this branch of ancient literature and sacred art. Reproductions of many of the frontispieces and pages of text have been made and the collection has fairly passed through the preliminary stages of editing and collation. Prof. Hyvernat says that it "must be called the most complete and from the point of view of ancient Christian art the most valuable yet known."

In bulk the collection comprises fifty volumes, some of which contain as many as nine or ten treatises by the monks of the ancient Church of Alexandria. Nine or ten of them are still in their original bindings, typical of the severe asceticism of early Christian art. A dozen of the books are adorned with full page pictures representing the Virgin with the Child at her breast, angels, holy martyrs and anchorites of the desert, and throughout the collection there is a wealth of marginal illuminations and text adornments.

One peculiar point of value in the collection is that it contains

¹ *New York Sun*, December 31, 1911.

the oldest dated Coptic manuscripts yet found. These dates range from the middle of the ninth to the latter half of the tenth century. The miniatures and ornate bindings are also the earliest examples of Coptic art uncovered and carry the arts of codex making and bookbinding back further than any previously discovered specimens.

The collection is rich in Biblical manuscripts. It contains six complete books of the Old Testament. These are the books of Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy, the First and Second Books of Samuel and the Book of Isaias. Of the New Testament there are three complete Gospels, of Matthew, Mark and John, an incomplete Gospel of Luke, the fourteen Epistles of St. Paul, two of St. Peter and three of St. John. In the case of all of these previous Coptic finds had been confined to fragments of uncertain age and origin.

When the edited collection comes to the hands of students they will find that aside from the invaluable Scriptures, here complete at least as to the individual books, three liturgical books, unique in Coptic collections and of great importance to the study of exegetics, throw new light upon the liturgical observances of the early church of Alexandria. These are a lectionary, a breviary and an antiphonary all complete.

Apocryphal literature of the Church, which found a fertile field in the Egyptian branch, holds a prominent place in the new Morgan collection. There are treatises on the life of St. John the Evangelist and on the investiture of the Archangel Michael as head of the heavenly host; homilies attributed to St. Cyril of Jerusalem and other semi-mythical early fathers of the Church and numerous biographies of famous anchorites and cenobites, such as St. Anthony and St. Pachomius. Details of early martyrdoms, such as are set forth by Eusebius and hitherto hidden by the mists of antiquity are given in these books of apocrypha.

The story of the recovery of the manuscripts forming the new Morgan collection possesses all the qualities of romance. Wandering Arabs found the great mass of vellum books some twenty months ago in the ruins of what had been the convent of the Archangel Michael in the Fayum district of Egypt.

The manuscripts were hidden in a stone vat as if they had been hastily disposed there by the Coptic fathers in anticipation of a raid by infidels. With them were the writing implements used by the ancient scribes: three ink wells combined with calami cases,

and two of the calami themselves, consisting of reed stems sharpened into pen points at both ends. The ink wells were of lead and designed to contain sponges, once soaked with ink after the custom of the Egypt of to-day.

The Arabs have learned that collectors are willing to pay high prices for the skin and papyrus relics of a past age that are occasionally turned up by chance from their resting place of centuries, and they have come to be shrewd bargainers. It has grown to be their custom during the last hundred years of ardent collecting in the graveyards of Egypt's past whenever they found a cache of manuscripts to tear the sheaves of manuscripts apart and distribute to each man of the party his share of the spoils. By selling the manuscripts piecemeal in this fashion the Arabs have found that they could get bigger prices in the aggregate. Tourists and collectors have been known to pay as high as \$80 for a single fugitive sheet of vellum, while they would hesitate to buy a whole volume at that rate.

Because of this crafty custom of the Arabs many of the relics of Coptic literature collected in the past have been fragmentary and many scattered leaves have been destroyed or lost in the migrations of the original finders. In the instance of the present collection before scientists got wind of the discovery the great mass of manuscripts had been divided among the Arabs who had made the find.

It was due to the energy of M. Chassinat, head of the French Institute of Archaeology at Cairo, and Prof. Hyvernât that the fugitive bundles of manuscripts were all brought together again. This was only accomplished after six months of labor and at the frequent risk even of the lives of the two enthusiasts. To them is due the credit of having preserved the most complete collection of Coptic manuscripts extant.

Prof. Hyvernât gave to a *SUN* reporter the following scientific review of the collection:

"Most of the documents are couched in the Sahidic dialect, the home of which seems to have been in Upper Egypt; but evidently this dialect had spread in the Fayum district as a literary language, at least as early as the eighth or ninth century.

"Many of the colophons to be found at the end of the manuscripts make it clear beyond the possibility of a doubt that the manuscripts were all written in the province of Fayum. Two of the manuscripts are written in the local Fayumic dialect. There

is also a Bohairic manuscript, the copy of the four Gospels. It is the oldest copy of the four Gospels in that dialect."

For the understanding of the layman it should be explained here that the various dialects mentioned by Prof. Hyvernât represent different epochs in the history of the Jacobite Coptic peoples. The Coptic language was an offspring of the ancient Egyptian, or rather the old Egyptian in the various popular corruptions evolved when Egypt as a whole became Christianized in the third and fourth centuries.

The Sahidic (Theban) dialect was that of Upper Egypt and was the earliest language of the Christians in Egypt. The Fayumic dialect, the Coptic speech of middle Egypt, and the Bohairic, or dialect of the region of the delta, seem to have superseded the original Sahidic, but on the point of their historical chronology authorities differ.

The question of priority between these dialects—if understood of the greater or lesser similarity which they bear to the respective dialects of the ancient Egyptian from which they are derived, or of the time when they first came into use as Christian dialects—cannot be safely decided. All we can say is that we have no Bohairic manuscripts or literary monument as old as some Sahidic manuscripts.

The layman also cannot appreciate the enthusiasm with which scientists will welcome the addition of this collection to the store of the world's knowledge of Coptic literature without knowing a bit of the history surrounding the early church in Egypt. The first seeds of the church were planted by missionaries from Judea and Asia Minor, carrying with them the Gospels and Epistles in Greek. The church waxed strong under Roman persecution until Christianity became the recognized religion of Rome and consequently of the civilized world.

Then involved disputes among the churchman upon the physical and spiritual nature of Christ and other dogmatic subjects began to tear the early church apart. The council of Ephesus in 431 condemned the Nestorian heresy, but the differences of the churchmen grew wider and the council of Chalcedon, a city in Bithynia, was called in the year 451. The disputes were carried on with venom and animosity during the twenty odd days of the council's session, everything went against Bishop Dioscurus of Alexandria, and the beliefs held by his people, the Coptic Christians of Egypt, were banned. Thereafter the Copts broke away from the authority

of the church and until the present day under the name of the Jacobite church have maintained a permanent schism.

All of the manuscripts represented in the Morgan collection are of the post-Chalcedon period in execution, though the subject matter of the homilies and treatises on saints and martyrs is of the period proceeding the schism.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Public Lectures: Winter Course, 1912; Thursdays, 4.30 P. M.

January 18—"Catholics in the American Revolution."

CHARLES H. MCCARTHY, Ph. D.

January 25—"The Liquor Question as a Social Problem."

REV. JOHN J. GREANEY.

February 1—"Socialism or Social Reform."

REV. JAMES J. FOX, S. T. D.

February 8—"King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table."

PAUL GLEIS, Ph. D.

February 15—"Footsteps of Dante in Northern Italy."

JOHN M. GITTERMAN.

February 22—"George Washington and the American Constitution."

HON. HANNIS TAYLOR, LL. D.

February 29—"Life and Labors of Father Theobald Matthew."

REV. WALTER J. SHANLEY, LL. D.

March 27—"St. Thomas Aquinas."

V. REV. EDWARD A. PACE, Ph. D.

March 14—"Plain Chant."

REV. ABEL GABERT.

Mr. Maurice Francis Egan, the American Minister to Denmark, will repeat, by request of the President and Faculty of Harvard University, his eight lectures on "Christian Hymns in Common Use" in the winter of 1913.

This course was delivered at Johns Hopkins for the Percy Turnbull Foundation in the spring of 1911.

Feast of St. Paul. The feast of St. Paul the Apostle, patronal feast of the Faculty of Theology, was celebrated on Sunday, January 28th, by a Solemn High Mass in the Assembly Room of MacMahon Hall. The sermon was preached by Reverend John T. Creagh, J. U. D., Professor of Canon Law.

Knights of Columbus Fund. According to the February

Columbiad the Catholic University Fund, which is being collected by the Knights of Columbus, is now close to the \$400,000 mark, and a strong effort is being made to complete the Fund before the next Annual Convention in August.

Lectures. Very Reverend Doctor Pace is giving a course of lectures at St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, on "The Priest and Education." Reverend Doctor Turner is delivering a course of six lectures at the College of Mount St. Vincent, Mount St. Vincent-on-the-Hudson, New York, on "The Catholic Point of View in Philosophy." During the Christmas holidays Reverend Doctor Shields gave courses on Education at San Antonio and Dallas, Texas.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII.

March, 1912.

No. 3.

“Let there be progress, therefore ; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion.”—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

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MONSIGNOR BURTSSELL.¹

Your Eminence, Right Reverend and Reverend Fathers, dearly beloved brethren:—

Scarcely have the echoes of the recent splendid religious festivities died away, when we are called on to mourn the loss of one of the principal priests in this diocese. It was but a short while ago that he quitted this great metropolis, one of the companions of his beloved Archbishop, and went with him to the Apostolic See there to assist at the bestowal of the cardinalitial dignity on the metropolitan of New York. Buoyant and active, despite his age, he seemed the youngest of the large party, and entered fully into the particulars and the spirit of those memorable days at Rome. And again, it was only yesterday that he was one of the chief participators in the magnificent welcome that the citizens of New York gave to their new Cardinal, only yesterday that he walked by his side between the crowded masses of the Catholic faithful, sat beside him in this sanctuary, and thanked God for having ordained all things well for the going and for the coming of your beloved chief pastor, no less than for the high dignity conferred upon him by the See of Peter. And now Monsignor Burtzell is no more.

¹ Discourse preached in St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York, February 10, 1912, by the Right Reverend Rector at the funeral of Right Reverend Richard Lalor Burtzell, pastor of St. Mary's, Kingston, N. Y. Monsignor Burtzell was a distinguished benefactor and friend of the Catholic University.

The time for his reward has come, his hour of peace and rest was near. Mercifully a loving Master gave but a short illness to one who had never known the gradual decay that comes over the frames and the faculties of most men, but had done every day full work in the vineyard of the Lord. Born in this city in 1840, he received his early education in the parochial schools, at St. Francis Xavier's, and at Montreal College in Canada. At the tender age of thirteen he was sent to the Propaganda College at Rome, and during nine years pursued the laborious and profound studies that lead to the Catholic priesthood. He was ordained a priest in 1862, and returned at once to his native city, where for six years he served as assistant pastor of St. Ann's Church, from which office he was called in 1868 to organize the new parish of the Epiphany. He labored in that broad field until 1890, when he became pastor of Saint Mary's, at Rondout, where after another twenty-two years of priestly toil he entered into the rest prepared for those who serve the Divine Master in faith and hope and charity, with singleness of purpose, and with loving upright hearts.

In briefest outline such is the pastoral career of the good priest whose mortal shell, emptied of its bright vivacious spirit,, now lies before us. Had he lived but a few months longer he would have rounded out fifty years of service in the priesthood and taken his place with universal applause among the few glorious veterans of that rank in the Church militant.

But your hearts refuse to be content with such a meagre record of a life so crowded with noble achievements, beneficent deeds, public and private services, that there are few men of his generation to whom ecclesiastical and civil society are so deeply indebted, or whose loss they can with so much difficulty repair. You behold even now the active, scholarly, earnest, resourceful young priest who went about among you building up the Epiphany parish, lifting to God's honor that beautiful edifice, creating the parish school, providing the homes for priests and Sisters, preaching the word of God, the Commandments, the sacramental life, the need and the beauty and the

office of the Catholic Church; visiting the sick, instructing the young and the ignorant, blessing the marriages and hallowing the death-beds of the people; consoling the afflicted, relieving the poor, shedding on all sides the blessings of his ministry, given freely to him by heaven and as freely bestowed upon the vast flock committed to his care. He collected and spent vast sums of money. He was the first to free his splendid church from its burden of debt, he administered wisely the abundant tithe that his beloved people gave out of their toilsome earnings. But all this was as nothing in comparison with his priestly service, the spiritual comforts that he brought to wearied and suffering hearts, the long hours in the confessional, the kindly soothing words of advice, the patient hearing of the tale of woe, old as mankind but forever bitterly new to the unhappy one. What social service is comparable to the daily activities of a good, bright, tactful, sympathetic priest in the highways and the byways of a great modern metropolis? In him Jesus Christ moves among His own; through him they come in contact with the Divine, with goodness and justice and sanctity; through him heaven shines in daily upon their lives, uplifts and comforts them, and assures them of a higher and nobler and eternal order of things. He is indeed a living fountain at which men slake that spiritual thirst which devours all, and unsatisfied is the cause of nearly all our social ills and woes. There is one man at least, who is concerned with the interests, spiritual and temporal, of the community, whose heart is undivided, and whose time and thoughts are all for the beloved people confided to him by God.

Nor were his ministrations confined to the people of his own race and color. His great heart embraced all mankind, and prompted him in the early eighties to establish in this city a church for the colored Catholic population hitherto quite abandoned. I need not recite here his many toils and his great sacrifices for this holy work that was eventually put by him on a firm basis.

Education in all its branches had ever been very dear to Monsignor Bursell. No interest was dearer to him than the

education of the Catholic clergy. He gave constantly of his means for this good purpose, and among other generous acts may be mentioned the foundation of burses for ecclesiastical students in your own St. Joseph's Seminary and at the Catholic University. He was devoted to the welfare of both of these institutions, knowing well that the spiritual progress of the people depends largely upon the good intellectual and moral training of their priesthood. He was equally concerned about the education of the Catholic children of his parish, and the evidences of it are in the fine schools of the Epiphany and Kingston, no less than in his countless sacrifices and labors to put them on a solid basis and keep them in the front rank of such invaluable institutions.

To his new charge of St. Mary's, Kingston, Monsignor Burt-sell brought all the zeal and piety, all the faith and courage, all the frank and direct manliness and all the large sympathies, not to speak of the varied experience, that made him so characteristic a figure in the life of the great city. He repaid amply the hearty welcome of his new flock, soon freed the church from debt, practically rebuilt it, and had it consecrated. And while he ministered to his people with all the affection and regularity of his earlier days, his generous nature prompted him to do abundant social service in the new community which was to profit richly by his active spirit that knew no rest, and was happy only in doing the most good to the greatest number. The public hospital and the public library at Kingston were largely due to his initiative and coöperation. All measures for the public good were sure of his approval and of his practical help. He became the model of a pastor devoted without reserve to every interest of his people, spiritual and temporal. The doing of good was henceforth a passion with him, stamped itself upon his features, shone from his mild eyes, and seemed to radiate from his tall, spare and dignified figure.

His early priesthood was contemporary with no little bitterness of feeling against the Catholic faith, but he lived to witness a profound change in public opinion when on the

occasion of the fortieth anniversary of his ordination all Kingston combined to do him honor as to its foremost citizen. He was, all his life, a model of devotion to civic duties, and gave to them no small portion of his time, his thoughts and his means. His large and comprehensive mind and his great heart were at all times open to plans, ideas, and suggestions whereby the latent forces of the community might be developed for purposes of education or charity or for the general welfare in any and every respect.

He had indeed a great humanitarian heart, though its impulses were admirably guided by his strong Catholic faith, his priestly training, and that large practical experience of popular needs that few ever acquire outside of the parochial priesthood of our great cities. A selfish, indolent, apathetic life was abhorrent to him, nor was he ever happier than in planning some new good work or reviving some older one fallen into decay.

With the Apostle he cherished rightly the good opinion of those who are without the fold, and won in very large measure the confidence and esteem of all non-Catholics with whom he came in contact. They saw in the mild and calm priest a scholar whose learning was varied, deep, and accurate, a gentleman of exquisite manners, courteous and refined, a man of varied culture and rare attainments, who had moved from early youth amid the monuments of history, the treasures of art, the masterpieces of architecture, and who had perfected all these advantages by intelligent travel, close acquaintance with polite literature, and a sincere affectionate regard for all human kind, in itself a most social and elevating trait, and which is nowhere so untrammelled and so natural as in the heart of a virtuous and cultivated minister of the Most High.

And so he is gone from us, the mild and humble priest, the friend and lover of the people, the good citizen, the man of God busied to the end about the service of the Master. But we lose him only for a time, since the true bond between the faithful shepherd and his docile flock is the glorious hope that both shall one day rise again in a city not built of mortal hands

nor governed by the weak and imperfect wisdom of men. He is gone, indeed, but full of days and works and honors, having used to the full his powers and opportunities. The hands are folded in peace once so active. The brain is quiet enough that once teemed with thought. The heart is still that till now beat so steadily and warmly for the good of others. Could he come back to us he would have but one message, that we should remember him always in our prayers and beg of God forgiveness for the human lapses and errors and weaknesses that few children of Adam escape in this hard world, however vigilant and prayerful they may live. For fifty years he offered up daily the holy sacrifice for the spiritual welfare of his people. Let them never forget him, now that he has gone to the eternal home where whole centuries are as a passing moment.

May he soon be gathered to the bosom of that Divine Friend whose faithful servant he was in life, and for whose honor and glory he lived and worked and was glad to die!

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

THE SPIRIT OF MODERNISM.

The particular "Modernism" officially condemned by the Church is not so much the subject of this writing as is that universal modernism of which it seems to be a part, a particular manifestation. For, after all, modernism is becoming to be seen more and more clearly as an attitude not only towards religion but towards everything. In fact, it is something deeper and vaster than a "mental attitude." It is rather a condition of soul of the present-day man from the most cultured professor down to the street-paver and child. It affects every part of him—heart and emotion as much as his thinking: colors every act of his daily existence, his labor and song and art and play and education no less than his religion. Taking the past, chiefly the Medieval past, as a view-point, a sort of "comparative" test, this condition does in innumerable ways seem an unhealthy one. The following pages give the reasons for this opinion. There is, of course an immense amount of good in any civilization, in this particular age perhaps a comparatively unusual amount. But the good is patent and never lacks its exponents. Whereas the evil is always insidious, peculiarly so now because we are blinded by our success. So that, this age, more than any I know of, does really need to be told its faults in the almost desperate hope that with that knowledge it can preserve the good. It is in such a spirit that the following criticisms are offered.

I. THE INDIVIDUAL WITHERS.

Now, as directly compared with a man of the days, say, of Richard Plantagenet, the average modern seems woefully lacking in individuality. Though there is marvellous variety in their activities and even results, yet the men themselves lack

that same variety, because they lack individuality. Peoples are less unlike now than at any period of the race.

To comprehend the justice of this criticism, just remember that our political or civil or social grouping inevitably tends to produce such a result. In the middle ages the grouping was "feudal." That is in small units, restricted areas. True, there was a theoretical vast grouping into what was termed "The Holy Roman Empire," also large groupings into what were more or less called France or England. But the Empire was never more than an imperial dream in practice and those so-called "nations" were, after all, not much more than a loose conglomeration of semi-independent fiefs, with a confusing infinite variety of languages, dialects and customs. Moreover, as travel was so difficult and dangerous, intercourse was vastly more restricted than now. Peoples of even the same country seldom met to exchange ideas except at the great universities or the fairs or the wars or Church councils. Each little city or country-side lived its own peculiar life, receiving and giving little influence so far as its neighbors were concerned.

The consequence was a wonderful, almost bizarre variety, and, therefore, distinctive individuality in Medieval life. There was a strong flavor of "personality" wherever the historian looks into those ages. People seldom copied. They rather seemed to take sheer delight in creating, in doing things each in his own way—be it the building of a church or painting or sculpturing or emblazoning a shield or fashioning his apparel or founding a new religious order. Variety, difference, strong personality everywhere. And because of this, also a grace and charm and joyousness as of men who loved what they did because the creation was part of themselves. Nowhere was there dead monotony, dreary sameness, weary eternal similitude as of men tired of life, of work, of creating, of doing. But a blitheness and vigor and youthful enthusiasm and fearless originality.

How different with us. Our social grouping is on a vast scale, almost worldwide, at least so far as civilized nations are in question, particularly in the United States. Peoples have

gradually coalesced into huge homogeneous bodies politic of millions living under uniform law, speaking identically the same tongue, practising the same customs. The telegraph and the railroad and ocean steamship and newspaper have broken down even the social barrier between these bodies of nations, making them intimately acquainted with one another socially, with one another's literature and ways and possessions. Ibsen is familiar in Boston, Mark Twain in St. Petersburg, The modern American of even small means has trotted from the Hudson to the Himalayas. Lastly, socialism, with its strange gospel of numerical sameness, is helping also to tear down the barriers of difference hitherto distinguishing nations.

And so, as a consequence, strange and disturbing to our pride as it sounds, civilized man today has less real individuality than at any other period of his existence. Peoples are less unlike than ever. We all dress alike whether in New York or London or Paris or Berlin or Rome or Moscow or Madrid or Copenhagen. Everywhere one goes it is pretty much the same old things, except for what relics of Medieval individualism are still left,—the same old hotels, the same rows of monotonous brick houses, same old trains and so forth. Your guide, Mr. Cook, knows everybody. Above all, here in the United States have racial distinctions been boiled together in one huge melting-pot. And I know of no country on the face of the earth which at any time has presented less individuality, less picturesqueness, less personality, less variety, less spontaneity. We all talk alike, think alike (when we do really think, which is not often), dress alike, etc. We Americans, with all our undeniable greatness in some lines, are, nevertheless, the most monotonous set of humans that ever lived. With all our huge population and wealth and physical energy and marvellous resources, we do not right now at this moment create (except in physical science) as much really great things as little Florence was doing under the Medicis. In art, music, literature, philosophy, theology, architecture, in all those things which really do make for life, for the real man, we are slavish copyists or else ridiculous amateurs. And, what is worse yet,

as a result of this monotony we are far from being a happy race as I will point out in detail below. Our very activity in travel and mechanical inventions is, after all, as much a sign of spiritual restlessness as of innate genius. We go, go, go forever at a tremendous pace until the land becomes covered with sanatoria for nerves stretched to the concert-pitch of imminent insanity. "The Individual withers and the world is more and more," sighed Tennyson. And every thinking man hears that sigh echoing in his own disturbed soul. The classic "*taedium vitae*" is upon us. Spencer's "heterogeneous homogeneity" is a fact, and in plain English that means dreary monotony, weariness of soul, loss of that creative individuality and spirituality which alone make life worth living. This is the first characteristic of Modernism—dreary sameness in social life.

II. THE IGNORING OF RELIGION.

Ruskin, in a most remarkable way, anticipated Pope Pius X in coining the word "Modernism"—a bit of news, by the way, for those inclined to sneer at the latter's use of it. In his Lecture IV on "Architecture and Painting"—Pre-Raphaelitism—he said boldly: "*Modernism* began and continues wherever civilization began, and continues to deny Christ." I would amend this statement to read thus: "*Modernism* began and continues wherever civilization began and continues to *ignore* not only Christ, but religion itself." For, herein consists one of the most salient and terrible characteristics of the modern spirit—namely, it ignores God practically in the sense that it dissociates religion from its political and social and artistic and commercial life. And so far as I can see, this is something absolutely new in the history of mankind, distinctly Modern. In this sense, I say unhesitatingly that we are the most un-religious race that ever lived, more unreligious than any pagan, savage or cultured. Now, right away I will be told that never before in the world's history were there more people professing Christianity or at least living under its sway.

Also in refutation of the above ridiculous and extravagant statement will be cited the Lord's Day piety of millions of believers; then, too, there are the churches and orphanages and homes for all sorts of afflicted, charity organizations, the boatloads of Bibles sent to the heathens, etc.

Yes; all very true. But all this does not touch the real point. To understand this, just recall what sort of rôle religion played in pagan Rome and Greece and in Catholic Medievalism, and you will see at a glance what an unimportant one it holds now with us. Now, whether in classic or medieval times religion entered into *every* act of life—that is the point. For illustration, let us consider two aspects of that past life which to the modern man seem to have least connection with religion—art and politics.

Art, therefore, to start with, in classic times was one with art in medieval times in this, that it almost exclusively expressed the faith of the race. Cicero's and Catiline's houses on the Palatine were not adorned with paintings and sculpture of Egyptian or Persian myths, but with the figures of the gods and goddesses which people then believed in. A most idolatrous religion no doubt and most sensual Venuses no doubt. But the point is that the art in their private houses and public places everywhere expressed their faith, their religion, crude however it may have been. Their very Penetralia or household gods ever bore silent witness to the intimate connection existing between their religion and daily, personal, domestic life. Their very temples were hardly more religious in adornment than their actual houses. The statues of Jupiter and Juno and Mercury and a host of lesser deities looked down upon their votaries at work in the Forum or at play in the Circus Maximus. There was not a place nor a season nor an art which was not specifically connected with religion and bore often emphatic testimony to the same in paint or stone.

Herein the Medieval man was more akin to the pagan than the modern, despite the fundamental difference in the kind of religion, because the God, the Christ and the saints, were as

real, as ever present in daily life to him as were Jupiter and Mercury to the classic pagan. If we take art as a test, perhaps they were more real. For your pagan did at times use his art for mundane, often for shamelessly immodest purposes. But the Medieval adhered practically exclusively to the religious expression. And here again the point is that this religious art was not confined to the churches, but everywhere in the street, on a bridge, on the quays, in the public squares, by the county road-sides, in the secret recesses of the homes of both rich and poor—everywhere, with an almost wearying persistence expressed boldly the great Catholic faith of those deeply religious people.

Ruskin in the above quoted lecture so clearly puts this that I quote him in full. Speaking of an order given the Sheriff of Wiltshire to paint the picture of the Blessed Virgin in the bed-chamber of young Edward, son of Henry III, he says:

“You see that * * * the furniture of the King’s house is made to confess his Christianity. It may be imperfect and impure Christianity, but, such as it might be, it was all that men had then to live and die by; and you see there was not a pane of glass in their windows, nor a pallet by their bedside that did not confess and proclaim it. Now when you go home to your own rooms, supposing them to be richly decorated at all, examine what that decoration consists of. You will find Cupids, Graces, Floras, Dianas, Jupiters, Junos. But you will not find, except in the form of an engraving, bought principally for its artistic beauty, either Christ or the Virgin or Lazarus or Dives. And if a thousand years hence any curious investigator were to dig up the ruins of Edinburgh, and not know your history, he would think you had all been born heathens. *Now that, so far as it goes, is denying Christ; it is pure Modernism.*”

There is the point clearly put. Our art today, outside of our churches, no more expresses our religion than if we had no religion. Or rather it expresses paganism and lascivious paganism at that. The decorations of our hotels would almost rival those of the lupanaria at Pompeii. Our public libraries express the ideas of wisdom and strength and industry, etc., invariably in a nude pagan way. And as for our private residences—Well! I do not know whether to laugh at the incon-

gruity or blush for shame at their brazen decorations. Certainly it is a strange idea of the function of art as an expression of life when even a pious Catholic will have naked Venuses welcoming guests in his hallway and seductive nymphs splashing on the walls of his bath and lascivious Auroras greeting his waking eyes from the frieze of his bed-room. If this be art, then art is a curse.

But the point eternally is this, namely, that all this proves what a huge chasm lies between the Modern's religion and his daily thought. In this he is an utterly new personality in the world's history. Never before did man thus dissociate religion from practical life. True! your modern has his religion of some kind or other. But it is a thing apart by itself, ignored except at certain times when there is nothing else to do.

This peculiarity of Modernism is still further exemplified with even more disastrous results in his way of dissociating the State from all religion, something which strikes me as perhaps the most typical achievement of Modernism, its most unique characteristic, for you will not find it before on any page of history.

With all their servile reverence for the State, the classic Greek and Roman and ancient Egyptian or Babylonian were equally convinced that the State should be religious, deeply, intensely so. They seemed utterly unable to conceive of an atheistic State. Hence, the principle obtained universally, "*Cujus regio ejus est religio*." Such a principle we milk-fed moderns term intolerant. Well! so it was. But it proves more than intolerance. It proves that your pagan had a virile faith and insisted upon that faith permeating and regulating his politics. Hence, he hated the Christian, not so much because the latter followed a Jewish dreamer, for, after all, he did tolerate every form of religion under certain conditions. But he hated and killed the Christian because the Christian was an enemy of the State in so far as his Christianity directly and openly subverted the State-religion. Marcus Aurelius venerated Christ at the same time that he slew His disciples—just for that reason. In classic ages no more serious charge could be urged

against a man than that of being contemptuous of the gods, *i. e.*, the State-religion. Say what you will of this, anyhow it proves that the classic pagans universally believed in the State being permeated by religion.

Of the Middle Ages in this connection nothing need be said, so thoroughly Catholic were its politics from imperial concerns down to those of a rural township.

So then it remained for the Modern man to do something absolutely new in history, namely, to create a godless State, to blandly put forth, as the initial axiom of political wisdom, this hopelessly false proposition, that "Religion should have nothing to do with politics." Now, in Ruskin's words, that is what I call denying Christ, denying God. For if religion should have nothing to do with politics, with those very questions which most vitally affect his temporal welfare and by consequence his whole being, then of what conceivable use is religion as a guide in this present existence? It is just as reasonable to push the statement to its logical result and say that religion should have nothing to do with a man's marriage, with divorce, with education, with children, with burial, with the "social evil," with anything—for is there anything which has not some connection direct or indirect with politics, *i. e.*, with human government?

It all goes to show how completely your real typical, consistent Modern has dissociated religion from practical life.

Nor is it pertinent to point in disproof to the various State-churches or to the personal religiousness of public functionaries. That disproves nothing. The bald fact remains that the State is more and more becoming absolutely uninfluenced by religion, that it is calmly ignoring religion in its various laws just as if religion did not exist. It goes on the tacit assumption that it, the State, is the first, last and only authority in human affairs. If religion's claims fit in with its laws, so much the better. If not so much the worse for religion. But, fit in or not fit in, the State is the ultimate source of all authority over mankind. And this, I repeat, is the most unique achievement of the modern mind. This is Modernism pure and unadulterated.

As Ruskin said, Modernism began and continues wherever mankind began and continues to deny Christ. For surely it is a denial of Christ, of God, of religion to ignore them all in the practical, daily concerns of life.

III. THE BLIGHT OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

Every civilization naturally has its specialty because conditions force men to concentrate their thoughts upon one aspect of life more so than upon others. The Roman with his vast work of empire building thought upon law. The intensely speculative Greek was above all a philosopher in spite of being such a wonderful artist. The religious medievalist was pre-eminently a theologian, though also a profound metaphysician. The modern is a physical scientist.

But none of the three former were exclusively specialists. Attracted though they were by one subject of study, yet did they study all else and give all other studies their just attention, with the result that their own minds were wonderfully great, their culture broad and sane. But the modern is so slavishly immersed in physical science that he himself has become little, his culture all one-sided and arrogant, his power to think at times positively anaemic: he seems to have lost the power to reason clearly, to judge adequately the relation of all other things with science. How far this is true the reader can judge from the following.

The modern mind is, I say, little. Ours is an age of little men—brilliant men, keen men, but little. Just consider for a moment that modern times have not produced one single man of that real encyclopedic character so plentiful in classic and medieval times. Take a man, for instance, like Aristotle. Positively it makes one gasp to contemplate the almost super-human power of his brain that covered every known department of knowledge from pure metaphysics down to pure physics; which could build up the vastest and most perfect system of philosophy the world has ever attained to; which grasped all

the known and in fact discovered so much of the physical science of his day: and then, with perfect ease, handle such apparently unrelated subjects as law, music, art and so on.

In the Middle Ages such encyclopedism is equally if not more abundant. Whatever dislike you may have for their theology or contempt for their science, yet you surely cannot but marvel at the sheer brain-power of men like Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, even Abelard, who seemed to have absorbed every single element of culture of their day. Or if you are suspicious because deliberately ignorant of their achievements, pick out at random one of those quattrocento universal minds for whom you probably have more affection. For instance, take Leonardo da Vinci. Now, allowing for the legendary exaggerations that have grown around him, yet sober history tells enough of his vast mentality to make it seem well-nigh incomprehensible. If ever the spiteful fairy god-mother passed by an infant, she surely passed by him and let the good fairies shower him with natural gifts. Not to mention his unusual strength and beauty of body, his mind was perhaps as varied as that of Aristotle. Here is a list of his mental qualifications. He was one of the greatest painters and sculptors of all times. Besides, he was distinguished as an architect, goldsmith, anatomist, botanist, physiologist, astronomer, geologist, chemist, geographer, geometrician, inventor and traveller. Nor is it an objection to pooh-pooh the inadequacy of his physical science compared to modern science. The point is that, however inferior that science comparatively was, yet such as it was his massive brain grasped it all as easily as it would now grasp it were he alive. Perhaps the very limitations of the science of his day made such a task all the harder.

So it went all along the line. Michael Angelo turns with ease from sonnets to military engineering. Raphael from his Madonnas to architecture. It seemed a very age of huge brains that took in everything and correlated every bit of knowledge. Now, I say, all that has disappeared. Modernism cannot point to a solitary genius comparable in vastness with these men. The eighteenth century encyclopedists were by comparison

mere scoffing dilettantes and our nineteenth century scientists, like Spencer and Darwin and Huxley, only brilliant specialists in one subject. Whatever credit moderns may claim—and they may justly claim much—for having extended the boundaries of knowledge, it is equally true that the human brain itself has lost power, has diminished in strength, in intensity; in a word, that the modern man is intellectually smaller than at any other period of civilization.

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And not only smaller, but also has his brain become diseased, and this directly because of its hopeless slavery under the iron hand of physical science. To begin, we have lost intellectual humility, which surely ought to be one of the very fundamental virtues of a thinking man. Our scientific arrogance is as exasperating as it is unscientific. How true in this connection are the words of W. S. Lilly (*Right and Wrong*, p. x):

“It is most astonishing, a most disheartening sign of the times, that people are supposed to be entitled to speak with authority upon questions of theology or ethics merely because they happened to have attained some degree of eminence in some branch of physical science.”

Truly astonishing and disheartening. The very men who most fiercely resent intrusion into their laboratories by either philosopher or theologian, the very staunchest supporters of close investigation, men who demand incessantly that none dare pronounce an opinion in physical science unless thoroughly equipped in the same, who believe only what is scientifically proven by exactest methods—these are the very men who will solemnly pass conclusive opinions upon any other science, be it theology or law or metaphysics or ethics or sacred scripture, even though they have not given hardly cursory attention to it. By some strange perversion of the brain they have come to this astounding conclusion, that though none but a physical scientist is entitled to speak with authority upon physical science (wherein we agree), yet a physical scientist is entitled to speak upon all other sciences; that whilst it is unscientific for a theo-

logian to decline to swallow, without question, the newest and wildest and unproved evolutionary hypothesis, it is scientific for a physical scientist to reject off-hand, without examination, theological positions that have in them at least the venerability and reasonableness coming from centuries of trial; that rules of scientific investigation bind the theologian and philosopher at all times but the physical scientist only in his own restricted science; that it is scientific to reverentially bow at the magic name of Darwin, yet be ignorant of that of Aristotle; scientific to listen with bated breath to a description of some typhoid bacillus, yet fall asleep at a discussion of the immortality of the soul or the idea of space; that, in a word, physical science endows its votaries with a peculiar omniscience whereby it alone understands all things by intuition, and a sort of divine right to judge all things without hearing evidence. And so, because of this peculiar arrogance, the average man of science calmly assumes that his opinion is the last word on any subject from the infinite God to the most infinitesimal ion; and, strange to say, the average man accepts that opinion as such with an unthinking and unquestioning servility truly pathetic. Should you in the name of philosophy or theology or just plain common-sense venture an opposite opinion in the most courteous of terms, you are either rather rudely called narrow-minded and unprogressive by this supreme arbiter of thought or else blandly ignored as more or less of a nuisance.

And this is modern.¹ You seldom find such arrogance in the great classic or medieval thinkers. Aristotle and Plato are as tolerantly calm as their blue Attic skies. Thomas Aquinas, even when discussing a pagan or Jewish or Arabian error, proceeds with the magnificent serenity of truth itself. All of them willing and anxious to learn from sciences other than their own,

¹For a classic specimen of modern impudence hear these words of Renan: "I am the one man of my century that has understood Jesus and St. Francis of Assisi." Such conceit is simply colossal. Try to imagine Thomas of Aquinas saying "I am the only man of my century that has understood Aristotle" and you will realize the fundamental difference in temper between a Medieval genius and a Modern savant.

placidity considerate of the lawful claims of every science to a patient hearing. No! It remained for the modern to be narrow-minded, to imagine that the possession of one bit of knowledge implied the possession of all other knowledge or at least the right and capacity to pass judgment upon the same without even studying it.

* * * * *

This scientific arrogance and exclusiveness are producing specifically disastrous effects upon other branches of mental training which are worthy of serious attention. First in theology. Now, strange as it may sound to the average modern, yet theology is, or rather ought to be, as scientific as physical science itself. Perhaps more so, because it deals with questions of far deeper import to the race, which, therefore, demand investigation far less influenced by passion, yet which are peculiarly susceptible to the influence of passion. However indifferent a few thinkers may be towards the supernatural, towards religion, there is no more universal and more persistent fact in the history of mankind than precisely this belief in a future world. It was old before any present scientific hypothesis was dreamed of. It started with the race. Moreover, no other fact has had such a tremendous influence upon human activity. A scientific theory like Aristotelian matter and form or Darwinian evolution have had their wide influence. But theirs is as passing zephyrs compared to the pentecostal rush of religion. Religion has colored every act of life, be it actual prayer and ceremonial or sculpture or labor or marriage or education—yea, death itself! Lastly there is no fact more intensely emotional, more liable to be vitiated, dergaded, made ridiculous or cruel by uncontrolled emotion. It reaches to every nerve, every impulse, every heart-string, and, therefore is peculiarly susceptible to every thrill of feeling of which man is capable—from love to hate, from virtue to vice, from beauty to hideousness.

This being the case, surely no fact ought to be approached with more scrupulous exactness of observation, with more ex-

pert training, with more patient investigation, with more precision of statement, with cooler head or purer heart or surer emotionalism. Really none should be approached with such downright absence of emotion, curious as this may sound. None should be expounded by such supremely rational criticism. In a word, it is the one subject which needs to be most scientific of all, in the sense that it should follow the lines of fundamental principles, confined strictly within the bounds of scientific methods. Other sciences may, without serious injury, at times be more or less eclectic and abnormal. But theology can never, without utter ruin, be aught than strictly scientific at all times.

Such was it in the days of such theological giants as Aquinas, Scotus, Peter Lombard and Bonaventure. You will, as a Protestant or otherwise, disagree with the faith of such men, even perhaps consider it superstitious. But surely, if you can forget this dislike, you must admire the marvelously strict scientific method of such thinkers. Just run over carelessly the *Summa* of Aquinas. Is it not from just a scientific point of view a marvel? From the tract on the existence of God to that on the Beatific Vision you see a great brain moving slowly, studying minutely every step, taking no conclusions except after the severest scrutiny of the premises, honestly facing every difficulty, putting every fact in its proper relation with all others, and withal in a style utterly free from passion, from temper, from prejudice, from aught that can disturb judgment. Was there ever a writing on any subject more strictly scientific both in method and style? And as a result you will also admit that that Catholic faith, in which you may disbelieve, is calm, serene, perfectly poised, entirely free from either reckless rationalism or ridiculous and disgusting fanaticism; that, whereas no religion blossoms out in fairer flowers of religious emotion, none more intense in its spiritual enthusiasm, none more exotic in its sheer spiritual beauty, nevertheless all this is serenely regulated within proper bounds by cool reason and firm authority.

But you moderns of other or no beliefs, how utterly and

thereby disastrously unscientific you are. Whilst demanding the strictest of scientific methods in physical science, you have utterly abandoned it in your religious inquiries. By a strange contradiction, the very men who exalt scientific methods in one science, calmly discard it in this: men who demand, and justly of course, that years of the most careful training should precede judgment upon a question of chemistry or biology, leave religion, which affects the most vital interests of even this life, to the untrained individual judgment of even any rattle-brained enthusiast who mistakes his misguided emotions for the very spirit of God and his fatuous thinking for supernatural revelation.

And what is the result? Religion has, as above said, become pretty generally a matter of indifference. Society flounders about helplessly in a perfect quagmire of opposing views upon vital questions like divorce, marriage, education. With those who do take religion seriously it becomes so often downright fanatic and ridiculous and mawkishly sentimental. Dowieism, Holy Rollers, Holy-Ghost-and-us, weird forms of religion stalk the land like so many Halloween monstrosities. Every numbskull theologian essays, with ludicrous solemnity and assurance, to solve any religious subject by the very simple touch-stone of his own personal feeling. Verily one doubts whether to laugh at the whimsicality of it all or to grieve over its tragedy or to turn away from such cattle in pure scientific disgust.

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Philosophy, above all logic, suffers no less than religion. Again turning back to the days of Aquinas and Aristotle, the present writer at least more and more regrets the passing of coherent thinking. Doubtless these men did insist overmuch upon logic. Doubtless it was faulty to try to reduce all human experience into the narrow limits of a syllogism, and certainly much valuable time and much brain-power were wasted by the later Scholastics in barren arguments over logic. But withal, these men at least thought clearly, coherently, logically, as all good "thinking" should of its very nature be. They

carefully defined their words before arguing about them. They stated their propositions with a cameo precision. They at least knew what they were talking about and so did their readers and hearers. As a result when they did approach other questions, be they politics or law or theology, they approached them with minds splendidly equipped as thinking machines.

Such coherence and clearness of thought have become a rare quality of the modern mind, whether educated or uneducated. So far as the former are in question, let me again quote Mr. W. S. Lilly (*Ib.*, p. 239):

“Great gain would accrue if a little of the exact methods of the schools could be introduced into the arguments upon momentous subjects which from time to time find place in our leading Reviews. The rigorous definition, careful analysis, precise classification, would soon make an end of much loose thinking and looser writing.”

Reviews have not changed since then. Their contributors attack every conceivable momentous problem and, as a class, with a looseness of thought, an almost sacrilegious carelessness in the use of terms and words, an anarchical contempt of logic known as mental order, a blind assumption of conclusions that have hardly a semblance of connection with their premises—a general looseness of thought and speech that oftendefies the analysis of the most careful reader. In fact, haziness, lack of clear-thinking are definitely recognized as proper mental attributes. *The Ladies Home Journal*, for instance, perhaps the most widely distributed magazine in America, has this delicious bit of wisdom in its issue of March 1st, 1911, (p. 28):

“If you have a clean-cut, accurate notion of any one of these things,” (*i. e.*, Life, God, Love, etc.) “you can be sure of one thing—you are wrong. If your idea is right, it is certain to be confused.”

According to which, if the ladies reading this, their pet magazine, have a “clean-cut notion” that they “love” their husbands and children, then they can be sure they are wrong and that they do not love them. Or if my readers have a

"clean-cut notion" that God exists and is a personal being and created us all, then they can be sure they are mistaken. But if these ladies have only a "confused" idea that in some vague, uncertain fashion they may perhaps be in love, then they can be dead sure they are. And so on. You know you are wrong when you know you are right. Obscurity, haziness, doubt, vagueness are the only tests of certainty, the only attributes of truth.

Now, do not make the mistake of considering this looseness of thought and speech confined to the popular writers and readers. It is a quality also of the foremost men of science of the day. And in proof I merely ask you to read a most remarkable, but comparatively little known book by Samuel Wainwright, D. D., entitled *Scientific Sophisms: A Review of Current Theories concerning Atoms, Apes and Men* (Funk & Wagnalls, N. Y., 1883). With rare keenness it points out the absence of logic, of coherency joined to the reckless use of words and generally unscientific methods characterizing the utterances of such demi-gods in the world of science as Huxley and Tyndall. After reading its amazing revelations, I have often reflected that Christianity, and in particular Catholicity, would not stand for a year were they bolstered up by such a flimsy support as that upon which rests the so-generally accepted theory of Evolution. Just another instance of how "physical science" has the modern mind positively hypnotized to the point of accepting its weirdest dicta without question; of how the brain of the modern man has become enfeebled by its neglect of philosophy. No wonder that Mr. Benjamin Kidd in his *Social Evolution* said that the modern mind is as inferior to the classic Athenian's as that of the negro is to the modern white man's.

Apropos of the above, note the following astounding confession of a modern philosopher:—

Professor William James in his *Pluralistic Universe* thus throws logic and common-sense to the winds: "For my part, I have finally found myself compelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely and irrevocably. * * * Reality, life, experience, con-

creteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it" (p. 22). Elsewhere he says:—"I saw that I must either forswear that 'psychology without a soul' to which my whole psychological and kantian education has committed me,—I must in short bring back distinct spiritual agents to know the mental states, now singly and now in combination, in a word bring back scholasticism and common-sense—or else I must squarely confess the solution of the problem impossible, and then either give up my intellectual logic, the logic of identity, and adopt some higher (or lower) form of rationality, or finally, face the fact that life is logically irrational * * *. Those of us who are scholastic-minded, or simply common-sense minded, will smile at the elaborate groans of my parturient mountain resulting in nothing but this mouse" (p. 208).

IV. HEAVINESS OF SPIRIT.

"Alas for this nineteenth century, by grace of its science-mongers called enlightened," said Francis Thompson. "With so much pleasure and so little joy; so much learning and so little wisdom; so much effort and so little fruition; so many philosophers and such little philosophy; so many seers and such little vision; so many prophets and such little foresight; so many teachers and such an infinite wild vortex of doubt; Poor, purblind, miserable century; let it cease to call itself 'enlightened,' and rather own itself, with all heaviness, in world-wide impenetrable darkness—the saddest of all recorded ages. The one divine thing left to us, in these latter days, is Sadness. Even our virtues take her stamp; the intimacy of our loves is born of despair; our very gentleness to our children is because we know how short their time. Eat, we say, eat, drink and be merry for to-morrow—ye are men" (*Moestitia Encomium*).

Say you: The judgment of a mere poet? A morphine ridden poet? Then listen to this from a critic, cold and glittering as an icicle—Walter Pater:

"The England in which melancholy and levity are becoming prevalent habits is Merry England no more. The nation Thou hast multiplied, but not increased the joy! And we are not the only nation which deserves this lamentation of the prophet. The growths of melancholy and levity have been still more marked in France. In America some traveller has remarked, 'There is comfort everywhere, but no joy' * * * Since about the beginning of this century how many of our geniuses have mingled their songs with tears and sighs; * * * while the scrannel pipes of the lower units have been playing to the sorry Yankee tune of 'There's nothing new, and there's nothing true, and it doesn't signify'" (*Cheerfulness in Life and Art*).

This terrible indictment of modern civilization is backed by the experience of those practical men of affairs best fitted by their very profession to observe—the physician and the priest. No; we do not need the prophetic warning of an inspired poet nor the chilly observation of an uninspired critic. There are too many witnesses in stone and wood and brick to this fearful spirit of heaviness. Sanitaria for wrecked nerves crown mountain tops and nestle in sweet vales, when in a healthier age they were capped by medieval castles or filled with meek convents for real men and women. Soul-tortured remnants of human hopes turn in despair to the ludicrous tenets of Christian Science for the one surcease of peace it does happen to have blundered upon. The very medical profession itself is more and more specializing in means to allay nervous agony with its psychotherapy and hypnotism and mental suggestion and even (the latest) interpretation of dreams.

And as for the priest, any one of them with some years of experience has observed how also even the priestly work is being directed not so exclusively as of yore to the very simple task of saving of souls from sin but, more and more to the more complex and delicate task of dispelling the gloom of their penitents. With Protestant ministers the new Emmanuel movement tells the same tale. Ever increasing is the number of those really good souls who, as they sigh, are "tired of life," who "see nothing in life," who feel "depressed" for no particular reason than just sheer ennui and disgust of life. Thompson is right: this is the "saddest of all recorded ages."

Among the many causes for this social condition, let us note one in particular. And that cause I unhesitatingly name physical science. It is mentioned so specially for two reasons. First, because the fetish-worshippers of modern science persistently praise science for having done so much towards alleviating human suffering by conquering diseases like small-pox, diphtheria, and so forth, which formerly claimed its yearly thousands, and by its inventions having so vastly increased the comforts of life. Secondly, because, if you give time to reflect upon all the various other causes for this age-depression, somehow you will find that physical science seems to create that peculiar swampy atmosphere in which this malady of the soul is born and thrives most tropically.

For instance. Science today is on the whole utterly indifferent to the supernatural, say what apologists will of its alliance with faith in former ages. It does not deny the supernatural or faith with the frank and really more respectable atheism of the eighteenth century encyclopedists. But, as above said, it accomplishes a more deadly because insidious atheism by calmly ignoring the supernatural. So that whilst humanity at present professes as much as ever some forms of religion, nevertheless, religion has gone out of its practical thinking as never before in the world's history. And because of this, then right here it is easy to see why the race is so heavy in spirit. For, surely, what gives life substantial joy in the very teeth of its miseries, before the open door of death itself, but just this hope of a future life. The fear of God is more than the beginning of wisdom; it is the beginning of interior joy, which a foolish agnosticism can never impart with all its science.

It will be urged on behalf of science that it, particularly the medical, has so wonderfully alleviated bodily pain. True enough. But it is equally true that these very bodily comforts are diminishing our capacity to stand pain. We are rapidly losing that splendid discipline of pain under which a less pampered generation grew strong of soul. Our very piety reflects this horror of pain. Even we Catholics turn more to

the Sacred Heart than to the Crucifix, which was *the* great devotion of those rugged but buoyant Middle Ages. So, when pain does come, in spite of all our medicine, we flee like cowards to the drug or the anaesthetic, and in the long run are less happy than those who faced pain like men and never flinched. Science with its coddling of the human body has made the soul soft and cowardly and thereby decreased its capacity to suffer. No wonder dear ladies will weep over the suffering of a pet dog, who in a ruder age would fearlessly die themselves for a principle. No wonder the Middle Ages had no sanatoria for wrecked nerves.

And, now, a last charge in this matter against physical science, namely, it is withering in man that one faculty which, next to a supernatural faith, contributes most to his enjoyment of life—imagination. Just consider for a moment how much happiness we get through our imagination, which I would define (with all due deference to philosophers) as just the plain ability to see the beautiful in things and behind things. A mother's love of the infant at her breast, a lover's seeking of his beloved, a patriot's dying for his country, a student's wasting of life for his science—all that is ever noble and best in life is inspired and driven by imagination, by this seeking for something all the more beautiful because so spiritually intangible. Without it a man becomes a dull-witted and a sad dog at best.

And I say we are fast losing this faculty. The average man on the street, good man though he be, is about as prosaic a human as the world ever saw. He is as matter of fact as his hard streets and as monotonously same. There is a strange lack of resiliency in his spiritual make-up, an undefinable grossness in his thinking, a wearying banality in his speech, a hollowness or lack of boisterous health in his laugh, a mawkish lack of art in their sorrow. He is not only the saddest of men, as Thompson said, but the dullest, the most uninteresting.

Science has made him so indirectly and in some curious ways. Its very inventions have destroyed his sense of wonder. "There's nothing new." The steam engine, air-ship, submar-

ine, wireless telegraph, ocean cable, have done a deadly work of withering up all sense of wonder. "You have no fairies in America," I once heard Seumas McManus say regretfully. Too true! We have no longer any fairies. We have lost the spiritual sight, the sixth sense of wonder, which enables man to see the spiritual beauty beyond the physical eye. We cannot be surprised at anything: the joy of surprise, of hope, of anticipation, has gone from our hearts. The very children mock at poor Santa Claus like the children who stoned the prophet of old.

Travel itself, made possible so largely by science, contributes its share in this dulling process. The world has shrunk almost to the size of a city back-yard. Peary in discovering the North Pole gave the *coup-de grâce* to that delicious wonder we once found in Robinson Crusoe and Treasure Island. "There's nothing new" any more. They say the Sea of Saragossa yet defies the explorer. If so, thank God! there's one spot on the earth's face man has not seen; it leaves something for the imagination.

And as for the children, verily, it is another slaughter of the Innocents by this modern Herod called science. Hans Andersen and Grimm and Santa Claus, with their brave princes and fair princesses and fierce dragons and fairies and witches and Christmas imagery, are fast fleeing. The poor children instead must be taught "facts"—a hodge-podge of public school science. In consequence what an unimaginative lot they are becoming; so mature beyond their age, so sophisticated, so lacking in real child sweetness! Their very mirth is so often downright vapid. Take in instance those awful comic supplements to the Sunday papers with the monotonous idiocy of Jeff and Mutt and Foxy Grandpa and Desperate Desmond. Verily, the future archaeologist will put us down as a race of lunatics, unless the book-worn and time mercifully first destroy these proofs of our want of real humor and imagination. And lastly, is it not a peculiarly depressing commentary upon our senseless withering of the child's imagination when the schools actually employ men and women to *teach the*

children games! Good God! Where is the poor child's innate fantasy gone that he *needs* to be taught how to play, that he cannot invent games of his own. Yes; it is gone along with the fairies and dragons and Santa Claus and the numberless other creatures of the imagination which so prettily lifted up the veil of sense hiding the spiritual beauty lying behind. Verily, I think Wordsworth must have had such thought when he wrote in disgust at the banality of modern life:

"Great God! I'd rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn,
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

V. THE LOST ART OF HUMILITY.

A final word to that type of critic who dismisses all severe criticism as just mere pessimism. Now, none more than the present writer enjoys a keener appreciation of the good in modern civilization or in its chief exponent, physical science. Such simplicities of argument should be dismissed by all serious men as understood formalities. Similarly it can with equal security also be presumed that even a harsh criticism of the faults of an age may after all be the most sympathetic. So much for that.

So then let us conclude with these two comments. First, as to physical science. And on this point are quoted, as sufficiently expressing the attitude of the preceding pages, the words of Sir Oliver Lodge. This eminent observer said that:

"Science is one thing and philosophy another * * *. Science most properly concerns itself with matter and motion, and reduces phenomena, so far as it can, to mechanism. The more successfully it does that, the more it fulfills its end and aim, but when, on the strength of that achievement, it seeks to blossom into a philosophy, when it endeavors to conclude that its scope is complete and all-inclusive, that nothing exists in the universe but mechanism, and that the aspect of things from this scientific aspect is their only aspect,—then it is becoming narrow and bigoted and deserving of rebuke."

Carlyle stigmatized such philosophy as a gospel of dirt. Ruskin contemptuously put it aside. Tennyson seemed at times almost overwhelmed by it and cried out in agony.

With this as a sort of preamble, we come to the second and final comment. Now I would say that this spirit of evil afflicting modern society will not be got rid of very successfully until we cease our slavish adoration of a certain scientific philosophy generally called evolution, which (as a philosophy) popularly amounts to considering ourselves the most perfect because latest expression of human genius. Candidly, I have my suspicions of evolution, at least as applied to historical man, whatever may be said of it as applied to his more or less mythical descent from the anthropoidal or any other ape. Somehow or other—maybe just out of a sense of humor—I cannot shake off the conviction that a dog was always a dog and a cat always a cat, and that said dog to-day takes no more pleasure in chasing the cats in my yard in 1912 than he did in worrying cats by the banks of the Nile in the Pharaoh's days, deliciously irreverent of pussy's divine attributes in the minds of her Egyptian adorers. Similarly I have a most unscientific sneaking suspicion that the modern American is not very far above the so-called cave-man, that his vaunted civilization may be after all not far beneath his skin. Voltaire, by the way, found this out in the case of the eighteenth century Frenchman. He scratched him, and lo! the cave-man appeared in Marat. All of which is just another way of saying, what I have all along been saying, that it is high time for thinking men to refuse to bow down before this modern god of evolution, whose practical creed is that an age is better than a preceding age simply because it comes after. I hold it legitimate criticism to say that a succeeding age can be in many respects distinctly inferior to a preceding.

And I do maintain that this age of ours is, with all its prestige, in many respects a retrogression instead of an evolution in human existence. Granted cheerfully that it has more actual knowledge, more physical comfort, perhaps (though this is doubtful) more gentleness of manner. But there the superiority would seem to end.

For instance. For sake of argument, admit that the cave-man did often steal his wife in between dodging weird-looking prehistoric beasts with such fearfully scientific names. Well! Anyhow, he probably kept her and she bore his many brawny children. Your modern man also often steals his wife; but she is some one else's wife, and he and she shrink from a child's laugh as shamelessly as Onan of old. Between the two men, I choose the cave-man, because his dirt was dirt of earth, but the other's dirt is dirt of soul. As a question of mere moral development, I fail to see the superiority of Reno, Nevada, to a cave.

Then, too, for just sheer spiritual or (lest the term be unfamiliar) emotional development has your science-ridden modern aught to compare with the sublime faith of Abraham, the splendid humanity of David or the gorgeous prophesy of Isaias or the divinely measured wisdom of Solomon? With our shallow thinking and mawkish sentimentality can we not envy the classic Greek who created out of nothing the *Iliad* of Homer, the tragedies of Euripides, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, the Parthenon and Venus de Milo? And our law, with its jungle of technicalities that cover up so well the modern criminal, what a travesty upon justice is it compared with that swift, sure, serene Roman law that made the "Pax Romana" from Britain to Persia!


Lastly, the despised, slandered Middle Ages! I do maintain that we today are man for man inferior in more ways than we are superior. We do not think as clearly as Thomas Aquinas nor build as well as Michael Angelo, nor paint as well as Raphael, nor write as good poetry as Dante, nor solve labor problems successfully and do as fine craft work as the Guildsmen; our nerves are not as well strung as those of Richard Plantagenet, our heart not as light as a Troubadour's, our military courage not as sustained as that of the Crusading Godfrey, our humanity not as catholic as that of Francis of Assisi; we are not as distinctly individual and self-contained as the average highly finished medieval; nor have we his sane, encyclopedic, well-balanced outlook upon life; we have not his

marvellous creative force that hewed a new civilization out of chaos; his serenely magnificent faith, together with its accompanying emotionalism in hymn and ceremonial, is replaced by our doubt and almost absurdly pathetic attempt at mysticism, for who, unless a hopeless victim of his prejudices, would compare a modern half-baked Christian with a Bernard, a Maeterlinck and Rostand with a Thomas à Kempis or Tauler or Francis of Assisi? We have lost even the art of sinning, for our sins are of the skulking kind, shadings off from our virtues and very largely making use of the mask of piety, a cowardly, sneaking, "eminently respectable" way of sinning, compared to which a robber-baron cutting a Jew-peddler's throat by the Rhine or Loire seems positively artistic, and Colonna beating a Pope almost to death at Anagni appears Satanic in his sin—Why?—because, those men in their very sin paid tribute to God by defying Him brazenly, and did not, like your modern Sunday-school superintendent or affinity-seeker or half-naked opera-box holder, skulk around in the clothing of piety and love and art. And so on. The list grows indefinitely of modern shallowness of thought, rotting of emotion, until a plain man knows not whether to lash it all like the prophet interpreting the writing on the wall or, like that superbly devilish Voltaire, wish that he had twenty more years of life wherein to see all this pretense collapse—as it did collapse—and as this will.

Therefore, let us, once and for all, cease our uncritical, indiscriminating prattle about "modern progress" and the "dark ages" and "gradual evolution of the race" and "modern enlightenment"—shibboleths on the lips of every smug professor and yellow journalist. Let us shake off the hypnotic spell of a tyrannical physical-science and tell it boldly that, while we admire it and are grateful to it and unreservedly accept its facts *as science*, yet, that it is impertinent and silly and out of its sphere when it presumes to become a philosophy and to make itself the supreme and sole judge of truth. Let us, while being in full sympathy with all the genuine worth in our age, nevertheless keep our heads clear enough and our

hearts pure enough to see the false in it. Surely this is not pessimism, but merely rational criticism. And, if a bit rude in style, let me say finally that some such brusque language would seem to be needed if we would succeed in waking up the modern sentimentalists from their day-dreaming in their fools' paradise.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.



WHY PRIVATE LANDOWNERSHIP IS A NATURAL RIGHT.

A natural right is a right derived from the nature of the human individual, and existing for his welfare. Hence it differs from a civil right, which has its source in society or the State, and is intended to fulfil a social or civil purpose. Such, for example, is the right to vote, or the right to hold a civil office. Since a natural right is neither derived from nor primarily intended for a civil end, it cannot be destroyed, and it may not be ignored, by the State. For instance, the right to life and the right to liberty are so sacred to the individual, so necessary to his welfare, that the State cannot rightfully kill an innocent man, nor punish him by a term in prison.

While all natural rights are equally valid, they differ as to their basis and urgency. From this point of view, we may profitably distinguish three principal types.

The first is exemplified in the right to live. Life, the object of this right, is intrinsically good, good for its own sake, an end in itself. It is the end to which even civil society is a means. Since life is good intrinsically, the right to life is also valid intrinsically, and not because of consequences. Since there is no conceivable equivalent for life in the case of any individual in any contingency, the right to life is immediate and direct in all possible circumstances.

Among the natural rights of the second class, the most prominent are the right to marry, to enjoy personal freedom, and to own consumption-goods, such as food and clothing. The objects of these rights are not ends in themselves, but means to human welfare. Confining our attention to marriage, we see that membership in the conjugal union is an indispensable means to reasonable life and self-development in the majority of persons. The only conceivable substitutes are free love and celibacy. Of these the first is inadequate for any person, and the second is adequate only for a minority. Marriage is,

therefore, *directly* and *per se* necessary for the majority of individuals; for the majority it is an *individual* necessity. If the State were to abolish marriage it would deprive the majority of an indispensable means of right and reasonable life. Consequently the majority have a *direct* natural right to the legal power of marrying.

In the case of the minority who do not need to marry, who can live as well or better as celibates, the legal opportunity of marriage is evidently not directly necessary. But it is necessary indirectly, inasmuch as the *power of choice* between marriage and celibacy is an individual necessity. No argument is required to show that the State could not decide this matter consistently with individual welfare or social peace. Whence it follows that even the minority who do not wish or do not need to marry, have a natural right to embrace or reject the conjugal condition. For them the right is indirect, but none the less inviolable. (The marriage-rights of criminals, degenerates, and other socially dangerous persons, are passed over here as not pertinent to the present discussion. For the same reason no use is made of the perfectly valid social argument for the individual right of marriage.)

The right of private landownership belongs in a third class of natural rights. Inasmuch as ownership of land is not an intrinsic good, but merely a means to human welfare, it differs from life, and resembles marriage. On the other hand, it is essentially unlike marriage because it is not *per se* and *directly* necessary for the majority nor for any one individual.¹ The alternative to marriage, namely, celibacy, would not under the most perfect social administration enable the majority to lead right and reasonable lives. The alternative to private ownership, namely, complete or partial Socialism, if efficiently administered would attain all the vital ends of private ownership. At least, this result has been attained in many pastoral societies, and conceivably it may be repeated in other social conditions than those now existing. Food, clothing, shelter, secu-

¹ Cf. Vermeersch, *Quaestiones de Justitia*, no. 204.

rity of livelihood and of residence, and all the other vital goods to which private landownership is a means, could be obtained through the managerial use of productive land by the individual, or even through a system of wages and insurance, together with long-term leases of the land used for residence sites. Even now something of this kind happens in the case of many persons who work upon or live upon land owned by the State. Such persons are not by nature exceptions. Any other person could be adequately provided for in the same way. Comparing the nature and needs of the individual with the nature and capacities of State ownership we see that the latter are *per se* sufficient in any and every case. No individual, neither Brown, nor Jones, nor Smith; no group of individuals, neither Germans, nor Irish, nor French, exists for whom this system of land tenure is essentially insufficient.

In our present industrial civilization, however, private land ownership is *indirectly* necessary for the welfare of the individual. It is said to be *indirectly* necessary because it is necessary as a social institution, rather than as something immediately connected with individual needs as such. It is not indeed, so necessary that society would promptly go to pieces under any other form of land tenure. It is necessary in the sense that it is capable of promoting the welfare of the average person, of the majority of persons, to a much greater degree than State ownership. It is necessary for the same reason and in the same way as a civil police force. As the State is obliged to maintain a police force, so it is obliged to maintain a system of private landownership. As the citizen has a right to police protection, so he has a right to the social and economic advantages which are connected with the system of private ownership of land. These rights are natural, derived from the needs of the individual in society, not dependent upon the good pleasure of the city or the State. They are individual rights to the existence and benefits of these social institutions.

But man's rights in the matter of land tenure are more extensive than his rights with regard to a police force. They are not restricted to the presence and functioning of a social

institution. Every citizen has a natural right to police protection, but no citizen has a natural right to become a policeman. The welfare of the citizen is sufficiently looked after when the members of the police are selected by the authorities of the city. On the contrary, his welfare would not be adequately safeguarded if the State were to decide who might and who might not become landowners. In the first place, the normal condition is that in which *all* persons can easily become actual owners. In the second place, the mere legal opportunity of becoming owners is a considerable stimulus to the energy and ambition of all persons, even of those who are never able to convert it into an economic opportunity. Therefore, only a very powerful reason of social utility would justify the State in excluding any person or any class from the legal power to own land. No such reason exists; and there are many reasons why the State should not attempt anything of the sort. As a consequence of these facts, every person, whether an actual owner or not, has a natural right to acquire property in land. This right is evidently a necessary condition of a fair and efficient system of private ownership, which is in turn a necessary condition of individual welfare. The right of private landownership is, therefore, an indirect right; but it is quite as valid and quite as certain as any other natural right.

Now this right is certainly valid as against complete Socialism which includes State management and use, as well as State ownership. Is it valid against the Single Tax system, or against such modified forms of Socialism as would allow the individual to rent and use the land as an independent cultivator with security of tenure? Would the introduction of some such scheme in a country in which only a small minority of the population were actual owners, constitute a violation of individual rights? While we cannot with any feeling of certainty return an affirmative answer to these questions, we can confidently affirm that reform within the lines of private ownership would in the long run be more effective, and, therefore, that the right of private ownership is *probably* valid even against these modified forms of common ownership.

The indirect character of the right of private landownership, its relativity to and dependence upon social conditions, is not always sufficiently grasped by either its advocates or its opponents. In the writings of the former we sometimes find language which suggests that this right is as independent of social conditions as the right to marriage or the right to life. "The State has no right to abolish private property [in land] because private property is not a social right, but an individual right derived from nature, not derived from the State." It exists for *human* welfare, not merely for *civil* welfare.² The only defect in this reasoning is that the premises do not justify the conclusion. Undoubtedly the State may not abolish private ownership, *so long as it is necessary for human or individual welfare*; but, when this necessity ceases, the moral justification of the institution likewise disappears. The institution may then be abolished, somehow, by some agency, without any violation of individual rights. Why may not the task of abolition be performed by the State? No other agency is available. The assertion that the State is incompetent to decide whether the institution of private ownership has outlived its usefulness, is entirely gratuitous; besides, it implies that a small minority of selfishly interested persons may justly require the continuation of a system of land tenure which has become harmful to the overwhelming majority of the community. Extreme defenses of the right of private landownership are largely responsible for the misconceptions of many of its opponents. Occasionally the latter represent this right as an *a priori* monstrosity which is serenely independent of the facts of life and industry. While such persons are at liberty to reject the interpretations of facts contained in the preceding paragraphs, they cannot reasonably deny the logic of the process which has led to the conclusion that the individual has a natural right to own land.

So much for the natural right of landownership as seen in the light of reason. Let us now consider it briefly from the

² Liberatore, *Principles of Political Economy*, pp. 134, 130.

side of doctrinal authority, namely, the writings of the Fathers and Theologians of the Church, and the formal pronouncements of the Popes.

Some of the Church Fathers, particularly Augustine, Ambrose, Basil, Chrysostom, and Jerome, denounce riches and the rich so severely that they have been accused of denying the right of private ownership. The facts, however, are that none of the passages upon which this accusation is based proves it to be true, and that in numerous other passages all of these writers explicitly affirm that private ownership is lawful.³ Speaking generally, we may say that they taught the moral goodness of private ownership without insisting upon its necessity. Hence they cannot be cited as authorities for the doctrine that the individual has a natural right to own land.

Some of the great theologians of medieval and post-medieval times denied this right, inasmuch as they denied that the institution of private ownership was imposed or commanded by the natural law. Among them are Scotus,⁴ Molina,⁵ Lessius,⁶ Suarez,⁷ Vasquez,⁸ and Billuart.² Since private landownership is not absolutely necessary to human welfare in all forms of society, it cannot, in their view, be regarded as strictly prescribed by the natural law, nor be instituted without the positive action of civil authority, or the consent of the community. Nevertheless they all admit that it is much better than common ownership in contemporary societies. The difference between their position and that of De Lugo, for example, seems to be two-fold; First, they put stronger emphasis upon the doctrines that the earth belongs to all men in common, that in

³ Cf. Vermeersch, *op. cit.*, no. 210; Ryan, *The International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1903.

⁴ *In IV. Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, n. 5; and *Reportata parisiensia*, d. 15, q. 4, n. 7-12.

⁵ *De Justitia et Jure*, tr. 2, d. 18 and 20.

⁶ *De Justitia et Jure*, c. 5, n. 3.

⁷ *De Legibus*, l. 2, c. 14, n. 13 and 16.

⁸ *In Summa*, 1ma 2ae, d. 157, n. 17.

⁹ *De Justitia et Jure*, d. 4, a. 1.

the absence of original sin ownership would likewise have been common, and that this arrangement is therefore in a fundamental sense, normal, agreeing with nature and the natural law; and, second, they put a lower estimate upon the superiority of private ownership even in contemporary conditions. In a word, they denied that private ownership was so much better than any alternative system as to confer upon the individual a natural right in the strict sense; that is, a right which laid upon the State the correlative obligation of maintaining the institution of private landownership.

On the other hand, many of the ablest theologians of the same period declared that private ownership was enjoined by the natural law and right reason, and consequently that it was among the individual's natural rights. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, private property is "necessary for human life," and is one of those social institutions which are prescribed by the *jus gentium*; and the content of the *jus gentium* is not determined by positive law, but by the dictates of "natural reason," by "natural reason itself."¹⁰ These statements seem to convey the doctrine of natural right as clearly as could be expected in the absence of an explicit declaration. Cardinal De Lugo sets forth the same teaching somewhat more compactly, but in substantially the same terms: "Speaking generally, a division of goods and of ownership-titles proceeds from the law of nature, for natural reason dictates such division as necessary in the present circumstances of fallen nature and dense populations."¹¹ This view is to-day universally accepted among Catholic writers.

The official teaching of the Church on the subject is found in the Encyclical, "On the Condition of Labor," by Pope Leo XIII. In this document we are told that the proposals of the Socialists are "manifestly against justice"; that the right of private property in land is "granted to man by nature"; that it is derived "from nature not from man, and the State has

¹⁰ *Summa Theologica*, 2a 2ae, q. 57, a. 2 and 3.

¹¹ *De Justitia et Jure*, d. 6, s. 1, n. 6.

the right to control its use in the interest of the public good alone, but by no means to abolish it altogether." These statements the Pope deduces from a consideration of man's needs. Private property in land is necessary to satisfy the wants, present and future, of the individual and his family. Were the State to attempt the task of making this provision, it would exceed its proper sphere, and produce manifold domestic and social confusion.

While Pope Leo defines the natural right of private ownership as incompatible with complete *Socialism*, that is, collective use as well as collective ownership, his statements cannot fairly or certainly be interpreted as condemning the Single Tax system, or any other arrangement which would leave to the individual managerial use and secure possession of his holding, together with the power to transmit and transfer it, and full ownership of improvements. These are the only elements of ownership which the Holy Father defends, and which he insists upon as necessary. The one element of private ownership which the Single Tax System would exclude, namely, the power to take rent from and profit by the changes in land values, finds no place among the advantages of private ownership enumerated in the Encyclical.

There is, indeed, one passage in which Pope Leo seems to allude to the Single Tax or to some similar scheme. He rejects the views of those who would "grant to the individual man the use of the soil, and the various products of landed possessions, but who declare it absolutely wrong that one should consider himself the real owner of the land upon which he has built, or of the estate that he has brought under cultivation." Such persons, he declares, "are robbing a man of the very fruits of his labor"; that is, the labor that he has expended in improving the land. Now, the first of these statements is not against the Single Tax system as such, but against the assertion of Henry George that private ownership is essentially unjust. It condemns one of the arguments for the system, not the system itself. It could be accepted by any Single Taxer who rejects this particular argument, or by any other who desires to see

the Single Tax system established, but who does not admit that the present system is morally wrong. As to the second statement quoted above, it does not apply to the proposals of the Single Tax advocates; for they would concede to the individual holder the full ownership and benefit of improvements. Nor is there anything in the principles of the system to deprive the individual of full protection against confiscation in any case in which improvement values could not be exactly distinguished from land values.

It is true that Henry George wrote his "Open Letter to Pope Leo XIII," with a view of refuting the doctrines of the Encyclical. But all his arguments are directed against the principle that private landownership is right and just. Apparently Henry George did not find that Pope Leo condemned any essential element of the Single Tax itself, considered merely as a system of land tenure. Apparently the head and front of the Holy Father's offending was his ethical defense of the present system.

To put the sum of this article in two sentences: Private landownership is a natural right because in present conditions the institution is necessary for individual and social welfare. The right is certainly valid against complete Socialism, and probably valid against any such radical modification of the present system as that contemplated by the thorough-going Single Tax advocates.

JOHN A. RYAN.

GERBERT, POPE SYLVESTER II.

What John the Scot was in the ninth century, Gerbert, Pope Sylvester II, was in the tenth—a great light shining in a world of comparative darkness and ignorance. John the Scot is a mysterious personality, because so little is known with certainty about the beginning and the close of his career; Gerbert's biography is perplexing because with much that is historically certain there is intermingled still more that is legendary, with the facts that are simple and intelligible is interwoven a mass of fables that are weird and bewildering. Gerbert as we know him from history, the student, the teacher, the mathematician, the philosopher, the prelate, the pope, and Gerbert as he was known to some of his imaginative contemporaries and to his enemies of a later time, the magician, the sorcerer, the dealer in uncanny contracts with the evil one, seem to be two entirely different personalities. It will be our task to try and unravel the mesh of fact and fancy, to extricate history from fable, and to place the true personality of the man in contrast with the false creation of minds that were misled partly by hatred of the papacy and partly by uncontrolled love of the marvellous.

The tenth century was a chaotic age. Politically, France was passing through the series of disturbances which resulted in 987 by the crowning of Hugh Capet as King,—it was the end of the Carolingians and the beginning of Capetian line. In Germany, there was similar confusion, which resulted in the substitution of the Saxon line for the Carolingian, out of which came, at the end of the century the comparatively prosperous reigns of the first three Ottos. Italy, North and South, was in a condition bordering on anarchy, and in central Italy, and especially in Rome, the usurpations of the Counts of Tusculum, led to a series of aggressions which plunged the papacy itself into one of the severest trials in all the history of that institution. There was factionism everywhere, and a

spirit of pagan worldliness against which spiritually-minded prelates like Ratherius of Verona protested with indignation. Ecclesiastical and monastic discipline were disturbed by the confusion of political conditions, and synods like that of Coblenz in 922 and Erfurt in 932, made strenuous efforts to restore the ancient order and the regularity of ecclesiastical life. The reign of ignorance and superstition was very widespread. Men like Brother Bruno of Cologne, Bishop Ulric of Augsburg, Blessed Wolfgang of Regensburg, and other noted ecclesiastics strove for the restoration of learning in the cloister and cathedral schools, but were often unsuccessful owing to fresh invasions of the restless Huns who pillaged and burned their way through Germanic provinces, and seemed especially bent on destroying art and literature as well as religious and political institutions. There was a general, though by no means a universal, belief that the end of the world was at hand, that the year one thousand was the limit set for the reign of Christianity. And where there was already little room for learned leisure and no encouragement for cultivating the arts of peace, the belief in the approaching end of all things was readily adopted as an excuse for the suspension of all literary labor. It reacted too on morals in what seems to us a curious manner. For, instead of turning men's minds to the practices of piety, the fear of a world catastrophe acted like a panic, and brought out the worst elements in human character. It would be easy, of course, to overdraw the picture. Reformers, like Ratherius of Verona, are not to be taken literally in all their invectives against the prevailing conditions. Like him who, in his attempt to purify the stream, often stirs up the mud and sediment and makes matters worse, temporarily at least, so the prelates who exerted themselves in favor of a stricter moral life among clergy and laity bring to the surface in their writings the very worst abuses of the time, and their testimony must be offset by other narratives if we are to form a just estimate of the age which they were trying to reform. Nevertheless, we are forced to admit that the age was one of unusual darkness in matters intellectual and of exceptional confusion in matters of

morals. If only we do not generalize too freely, we may with many Catholic historians, describe the tenth century as the darkest age, the *leaden age*, as Cardinal Baronius calls it.

In all the darkness and confusion of the age, and in spite of the sad succession of unworthy popes, it was to the papacy and to Rome that the world looked as to its only hope, as to the only possible source of reform and amelioration. Out of the gloom of the tenth century comes a collection of curious little books written for the guidance of pilgrims to the catacombs and the shrines of the apostles. These interesting treatises, often passed over by historians who see only the darker side, are full of spiritual idealism, of an idealism which we must analyze here, if we are to understand the rôle that Gerbert played in the work of reform. The idealism is partly religious and partly political. It is aroused not only by the sight of the scenes of early Christian heroism, the catacombs and the Colosseum, the shrines of the Apostles and the tombs of the martyrs, but also by the sight of the stately monuments of pagan antiquity, the relics of the political past, which now loomed up as a golden age of worldly grandeur and civil supremacy. Calmness and dignity was what the age needed most, the calmness of religious piety and the dignity of Roman legal institutions. Rome symbolized both, and when, through the patronage of the Emperor Otto III, Gerbert the monk and scholar found the road open to the highest dignity of the Church, the Empire and the papacy seemed to be restored to ancient peace and to pristine splendor. The prestige of Otto as Emperor put an end to local factionism for the time, and the fame of Gerbert as a man of learning promised better times for the See of Peter and the condition of the Church in every land. The interference of the first three Ottos in the affairs of the Church was not in itself a desirable thing, nor is it in agreement with the spirit of ecclesiastical law. Nevertheless the actual event to which we refer put an end to a condition that was intolerable, and may be judged to have been a benefit. Under Gerbert as Pope Sylvester II, the See of Peter resumed its authority in the affairs of the Church all over Europe, and, according to

some historians, took the first step towards dealing with the great problem of the Orient, the check of Saracen aggression and the Mahometan advance on Christendom.

These general conditions in the tenth century needed to be described before taking up the study of Gerbert as a philosopher. Once more, however, the caution should be repeated that the age was not entirely dark nor was there complete and absolute dearth of letters and education. In some of the monasteries, especially in Germany and Switzerland, there was considerable activity. The *Annals* of Hildesheim and St. Gall, the *History of Saxony* written by Widukind, a monk of Corvey, the Latin poems of the learned nun Hroswitha of Gandersheim, and the German poems in praise of the Ottos, all date from the tenth century. In order to appreciate the preëminence of Gerbert as a scholar it is sufficient to draw the picture of his times as they really were; it is not necessary to exaggerate nor to deny to others the credit that is due them.

Gerbert was a Burgundian by birth. He was born at Aurillac, or near Aurillac, between the years 940 and 945. Whatever success he had in life he owed to his ability and his talents; he certainly did not owe it to birth or family influence. His parents were poor and probably peasants. He was educated at the Benedictine monastery of Aurillac, and there he joined that great historic order which had already distinguished itself as a factor in European civilization. At Aurillac he studied grammar and rhetoric under a teacher named Raymond, for whom, all during his later career, he retained the warmest and most cordial affection. Had Gerbert remained at the monastery of Aurillac he might in turn have become the master of a school there, but his talents would have been hidden, and it would have been impossible for him to play the important part he actually did play in the history of the Church and of the world. Fortunately, while he was still a student, there came to the monastery Count Borel of Barcelona, who ruled a considerable part of the Spanish Marches. With him Gerbert journeyed to Barcelona, which had been recovered from the Moors about a century earlier, and where, even in the ninth

century, there was to be had an education in mathematics more thorough than anywhere else in Europe.

At this point begins the legend of Gerbert. He went, we are told, to Cordova and there attached himself to the household of a Saracen philosopher, who possessed all the secrets of natural science and of magic. The Christian pupil was so eager and so apt that in a short time he acquired all the knowledge in the possession of his Mussulman teacher,—all except the contents of a certain book on magic which the ancient sage preserved with the most jealous care. Gerbert sought by service and by presents to win access to this precious volume, but in vain. Then the element of Romance comes in. He made love to the daughter of the philosopher. She administered a sleeping draught to the venerable teacher and stole the book from under his pillow. With the much-prized volume in his hands, the pupil hastened from the city, bent on escaping to Christian lands; but he was closely pursued by the enraged master, who somehow discovered the loss. Gerbert, always a diligent student, literally read as he ran, and so discovered a trick which saved his life. For it was written in the book of magic that anyone reciting a certain formula might render himself invisible so long as he touched neither earth nor water. The formula was soon learned, and put to immediate use. All the fugitive had to do was to hurry to the next bridge, swing over the railing, cling to a beam, recite his formula and become invisible, hanging between earth and water. Unfortunately the picturesque story will have to be relegated to the department of fiction. We have good reason to believe that Gerbert never visited Moorish Spain, never had a Saracen teacher, and owes whatever learning he acquired to the Christian teachers of Barcelona and Vich.

After three years spent at Barcelona Gerbert went to Rome in the company of Count Borel and the Bishop of Vich. There he was introduced to Otto I who, three years before, had been crowned Emperor. He made a favorable impression on the young prince, who thenceforth took a lively personal in-

terest in his career. Given his choice of various ecclesiastical offices, he preferred to go to the cathedral school of Rheims "in order to study logic." To Rheims, therefore, he went, and there he spent the happiest years of his life. Gerbert had a talent for friendship, and at Rheims he found in the person of Adalbero, the Archbishop of that See, a man on whom he could lavish all his affection and devotion. "We were one heart and one mind," he writes, when, in 989, death deprived him of his patron and friend. For ten years Gerbert as head of the school at Rheims led a life of ideal peace in spite of the disorder that reigned in the political and ecclesiastical world around him. He was wonderfully successful as a teacher. He had a talent for clearness, and spared no pains to facilitate the task of his pupils. In his lectures on rhetoric and argumentation he used diagrams to illustrate the text. In mathematics he employed the Abacus, a mechanical contrivance for multiplication and division of numbers, and in his lessons in astronomy he used a wonderfully constructed sphere to show forth the positions and the motions of the heavenly bodies. Of these facts we are certain from his own writings. It is less certain, however, that he constructed a kind of rude telescope, although we know from his own letters that he was in the habit of taking his pupils at night to view the actual positions of the stars and mark them in the artificial sphere. Here again legend takes up the narrative and tells us that, by the assistance of the evil one, he constructed an automaton that could nod its head and speak, and which he consulted in all the important affairs of his career. Fables such as this are of interest in so far as they bear witness to the acknowledged greatness of the man. His success as a teacher was so great and his reputation so widespread that pupils flocked to Rheims from every part of France and Germany.

In 983 his peaceful career as a teacher was interrupted. Otto II had succeeded his father as "Caesar and Augustus," and, like his father, held Gerbert in high esteem. The affairs of the monastery of Bobbio in Italy having become very un-

satisfactory owing to outside aggression and internal mismanagement, the Emperor had the master of the school at Rheims transferred to the ancient Abbey of St. Columban. There, in the fastnesses of the Apennines, among a strange people who misunderstood him and misrepresented him, he showed that he could be loyal to his imperial patron, energetic in the assertion of his feudal rights, impartial in the administration of justice, severe towards persistent wrongdoers and forgiving towards his personal foes. His life was not a happy one. His only consolation was the library which, ever since the days when Columban and the other Irish monks settled down in that wild inhospitable region, had been rich in manuscripts relating to profane as well as sacred sciences. There, moreover, he found the books of the Roman *agrimensores*, or land surveyors of the Roman Empire, and in those, as a mathematician, he took special delight. He was not content, however, with what he found there, but sought in every way to increase the literary treasures of the monastery. He never stopped at expense where books were concerned, and when money considerations did not avail he could have recourse to other motives. From his letters we see how he entreated, pleaded, cajoled and wheedled when it was a question of securing some precious manuscript or a copy of it. He was an inveterate booklover, and, as some of us, perhaps, know to our cost, a true bibliophile considers that "all is fair" in love of books. Indeed, Gerbert seems more like a fifteenth century humanist than a tenth century abbot in the letters in which his zeal for book collecting appears.

At the end of a year he gave up his residence at Bobbio and returned to his classes at Rheims. Henceforth, however, the untroubled peace of former days was to be his no longer. He was drawn inevitably into the stormy events which mark the history of the end of the tenth century. After the death of his friend Adalbero and the doubtful, or at least contested, election of Arnoul, Gerbert was elected Archbishop of Rheims. His election, also, was contested. He was transferred in 998 to the see of Ravenna, and in 999 was elected Pope and took the title of Sylvester II.

With his career as head of the Church we are not concerned here except to remark that he had a truly enlightened view of the dignity of that office. His chief care was to restore order and peace in Christendom, and to accomplish that he was willing to sacrifice his personal feelings. The trouble both at Bobbio and at Rheims he settled in the most generous spirit by confirming in the one case the appointment of the man who had caused him the greatest annoyance, and in the other that of his rival Arnoul. He is generally credited with having first given form to the idea which afterwards materialised in the Crusades, and whatever may be our verdict of those expeditions, in detail sometimes painful enough to contemplate, no one can deny that the idealism which they evoked was just what the Christian world needed most at the time. His reign as Supreme Pontiff was very brief. His death occurred in 1003, just four years after his election. The circumstances of his death are unknown to us now; for his enemies of a later date and the enemies of the papacy have woven a most wonderful tale of magic and sorcery which obscures the historical facts.

According to legend, Gerbert had sold his soul to the devil in exchange for assistance and enlightenment in his studies and inventions. The bargain was explicit enough. Gerbert was to have all the secrets of the black arts so as to enable him to construct ingenious and weird instruments and solve the riddles of mathematics and astronomy. The devil was to have the soul of Gerbert at the last. There was, however, a proviso that, namely, the scholar and future pope should visit the Holy Land before he died. The deed, we suppose, was duly signed and sealed. But the philosopher had, apparently, the advantage. All he had to do was to delay his visit to the Holy Land, and so put off the day of reckoning. Thus the devil was defeated; but only for the time. He bided his chance. And it came when, one day, Pope Sylvester went to officiate at the Church of Santa Croce in Rome where a portion of the soil of the Holy Land is preserved in front of one of the altars. No sooner had the pope stepped on this spot than the

devil came and claimed the fulfillment of the contract. It was, one realizes, a credulous age, and one that dearly loved a marvellous tale. What surprises us is that a later age should accept the fable and use it to the discredit of the papacy. For us it has value like the other legends about Gerbert, because it is the tribute of popular fancy to the extraordinary greatness of a scholar, whose learning seemed to be more than human.

What, then, were Gerbert's real attainments, and what is his importance in the history of medieval thought? In the first place, he enjoyed great renown in his own day and for many centuries after his time as a teacher of mathematics. It is often said that he introduced the Arabic system of numbers into Christian Europe. This, however, is a statement which is only partly true. More than four centuries before his time the Christian martyr Boethius used a system of number signs very like those which we nowadays call Arabic numerals. Bernelius, a disciple of Gerbert, used a modified form of these Boetian *apices*, as they were called, numerals from one to nine. But, neither Boethius nor Gerbert nor Bernelinus used the zero, or cipher. That seems to have been first used in arithmetic by Mahommed-ibn-Mousa, surnamed Alkharismi or Alchwarismi, who lived in the first half of the ninth century but was not known to Latin Europe until a century or two later. The introduction of the zero, of course, facilitated in a wonderful degree the expression of numbers and the processes of arithmetic. What Gerbert seems to have done is to have introduced a system of columns, so that numbers would receive definite value in units, tens, hundreds, thousands, etc. according to the column in which they were placed. Imagine trying to handle the Roman system of numerals, the C, the M, the X, L and V in a complicated process of multiplication or division. The task, as I say, was very much facilitated when the nine signs were introduced by Boethius, and still more so when Gerbert's system was added, by which the numeral received its value from the *position* or column. This seems to have been the chief merit of his Abacus, or adding machine, and so

greatly was the invention appreciated that for a long time an Abacist was commonly called a Gerbertist.

Gerbert's contributions to geometry were of a practical nature, applications, one might say, of the theory to practical questions, the science which in some countries is still known as mensuration. On this point, however, it would not be safe to go very far into the discussion of his originality, because the whole matter turns on some intricate questions of paleography, the authenticity and age of certain manuscript works on geometry. Of greater interest are the applications which he made of geometry to the science of astronomy. Mention has already been made of the spheres which he constructed, "to show forth the glories of the heavens," and of the telescope which he is said to have invented. Examining very closely the texts in which these inventions are described, we are forced to conclude that, while the spheres were, indeed, very ingenious for that age, the *tubes* which are described in the text were not made for the purpose of enlarging the apparent size of the stars but merely in order the better to determine the positions of the heavenly bodies; and so, there was in this invention of Gerbert, nothing of the principle of the telescope. He did construct clocks, however, which were considered wonderful in those days, though, once more, we must not exaggerate. The clocks that he constructed were sundials, and, although his were evidently very cleverly and accurately made, the principle was far from being new, sundials having been known in Greece as far back as the sixth century before Christ.

As a philosopher Gerbert was far from possessing either the magnificent universality of genius that characterized St. Augustine or the extraordinary originality of John the Scot. With metaphysics, psychology and the philosophy of nature he seems to have concerned himself very little. His activity as a teacher and a writer was confined to problems of logic, as we now call it, dialectic, as it was called in his day. As a logician he did a double service to the cause of philosophy: he resumed in his teaching the inheritance of the past and he made a distinct contribution to logical method. His prede-

cessors in the ninth century—with the exception of John the Scot—did nothing but preserve the logical texts of Aristotle, Porphyry, Boethius and Cicero, and write commentaries on them. Gerbert did this too, but, owing to his diligent search in the libraries of France and Italy, he was in possession of a richer literature than was accessible to those who went before him, and he did his work as commentator in a more erudite fashion, with greater wealth of illustration and wider range of reading. His original contribution to logical method is his work “On Reasonable and Using Reason,” a title which sounds unintelligible, but which can be made clear by recounting an event that took place in 980 or 981, while he was still head of the school at Rheims.

There was at Magdeburg in Germany a teacher of logic named Otric, whose renown beyond the Rhine was as great as Gerbert's in France. Otric had heard of Gerbert, and was anxious to come to a war of wits with him. So, he sent a disciple to Rheims, who incorrectly, it seems, reported that Gerbert, while strong in rhetoric, was weak in logic, and taught a division of philosophical branches which was not logical. The Emperor Otto II knew Gerbert's ability, and was all too willing to witness a contest between the two teachers. Like Charlemagne, perhaps, he was one of those patrons of learning who delight to pit scholar against scholar and do it not without a certain kind of malice. Besides, it was an age of military tournaments. Emperors, kings and nobles loved the brilliant display of personal prowess, and jousting, as it was called, was a favorite pastime in the intervals between actual combats, or even in the brief intermissions of a campaign. In the winter of 980 an opportunity occurred for an encounter between Gerbert and Otric. Both the German and the French teacher were in the train of the Emperor as he journeyed through Northern Italy. At Ravenna the contest was arranged, and there, in the presence of Otto and his court, surrounded by scholars and ecclesiastics of every rank, the contestants stepped into the arena and began their contest, in which learning and dialectical skill were the weapons employed,

and the laws of logic the only rule of the game. We have, fortunately a detailed account of this picturesque disputation from the pen of the historian Richer who was a contemporary and a disciple of Gerbert. Some of the questions discussed may seem futile to us; we may wonder that the ruler of three kingdoms, "Caesar and Augustus," as he was reverently styled, the Head of the Holy Roman Empire, whose word was law in Western Europe, should sit all day long and preside at a discussion about the meanings of words and the subtle divisions of philosophy. But we should remember that the age had other standards than ours, and who can say whether a future generation will not condemn as meaningless many of the questions which to us seem so vital and worthy of discussion? Gerbert and Otric first took up the definition of philosophy, which they agreed is "the science of things human and divine"—the words are Cicero's and indicate an almost humanistic view, considering that many of Gerbert's predecessors had defined philosophy as "the art of living a Christian life"—a pragmatic Christian view, if one may so style it. From the definition of philosophy they went on to the question of the purpose of philosophy, and here again Gerbert is almost a humanist. Philosophy, he says, in substance, is its own purpose: the knowledge of things human and divine is the justification of the philosopher's efforts. Thence they went off, on a tangent, as we say, to discuss the causes of shadows, and, so, to a number of other topics, the transition not being always apparent in Richer's narrative. The contestants were still undaunted and evidently in as good form as ever when, at the end of the winter's day the Emperor closed the debate. We can sympathise with him when we recall that his interest in philosophy was not very profound. We can, indeed, imagine that the pleasure of witnessing so novel an encounter soon grew less, and tediousness took the place of the zest with which he opened the debate. The honors, apparently, rested with Gerbert; so, at least his admirer Richer would have us believe.

Gerbert, however, was not satisfied with the result. When the Emperor put an end to the contest the question before the

assembly was this: There is a rule of Aristotelian logic as interpreted by Porphyry to the effect that the predicate of a proposition should always have wider extension than the subject. Thus, we judge that: "All trees are plants," "All lions are animals"; "plants" has a wider extension than "trees," and "animals" has a wider extension than "lions." How, then, can we say "A Reasonable Being uses reason," since "Using reason," the predicate, is not wider in extension, but narrower, than "Reasonable?" To this problem, therefore, Gerbert devotes his treatise "On Reasonable and Using Reason," which he dedicates to the Emperor Otto II. The "Little Book" (*libellus*) as he calls it, does not, indeed, interest us on account of the problem which it discusses. We care very little now for Porphyry and his artificial rules of logic. But the method used by Gerbert is interesting, for it is that which was later developed by Abelard, and still further perfected in the thirteenth century, until it became the recognized manner of debating a question in the medieval schools. The "Scholastic Method" as it is called, is now very generally discarded, although it is still in force in academic debates in Catholic Schools of Theology. To those who have never used it or seen it used, a description would only make confusion worse confounded. Let us then be content with recording here the verdict of hostile critics that the scholastic method of debate, while dry and unprofitable as to results in the line of discovery, has very distinct merits as a measure of mental discipline. It proceeds by strict syllogistic argumentation and accurate distinction and definition. It leaves no room for rhetorical display. It holds the disputants strictly to the point, and is calculated to reveal a fallacy or puncture a sophism more quickly than any other method that has been used in discussion. It is severe; but so is all discipline that is profitable. And if it is judged by its results, it has not altogether failed. For it has produced men capable of accurate and sustained reasoning. It has precised philosophical terminology in the schools, and, according to no less a critic than Sir William Hamilton, whom no one surely will accuse of partiality, it

has given to the languages of Western Europe whatever precision they have in the technical use of words. Hamilton says: "To the schoolmen the vulgar languages are indebted for what precision and analytic subtlety they possess"—words which are placed without comment by John Stuart Mill at the head of the first chapter of his *System of Logic*. And Carlyle writes: "It was the schoolmen who made the languages of Europe what they now are. We laugh at the quiddities of these writers now, but in truth these quiddities are just the parts of their language that we have rejected, whilst we never think of the mass we have adopted and have in daily use" (*Table Talk*, 58). The so-called Latin mind, which we are beginning, I may say, to know and admire, has been trained to a great extent in the scholastic method, which the Latins were the last to discard. We are learning now to appreciate the strength of the Latin mind, and its talent for clearness, its suppleness and its accuracy, its singular combination of aesthetic appreciation and logical precision. All these qualities it owes in a measure to the method so long in vogue in the medieval schools. Gerbert's little book, therefore, despite the minuteness of the problem it discusses and the triviality of the rules of logic which occasioned it, is a precious little volume to one who sees in it the first formal adoption of the scholastic method of debate.

If we turn now from Gerbert's technical works on mathematics and logic to his Letters we find there a "philosophy" in the popular sense of the word. Gerbert was a Christian Stoic. That is to say, he had fortified himself by a general view of human life and its vicissitudes which enabled him to bear with patience and submission the trials and sufferings to which he was exposed, and to possess his own soul in patience amid circumstances that would have disturbed another or driven a less disciplined soul to despair. All human events, he reflects, are ruled by Divine Providence: in everything that happens we should see the Will of God, which when it brings us peace and happiness, we bless, and to which, when it brings us trials and misfortune we should submit with patience and

resignation. It was a favorite maxim of his that: "If we cannot have what we desire, we should desire that which we can have," a saying quoted from the poet Terence. All through the *Letters* there runs a plaintive note, a longing for peace. Gerbert was a Benedictine, and the motto of that ancient and scholarly congregation was *Pax*. He was destined to have very little peace, except during the ten years that he spent as teacher at Rheims. That was probably why he sought it so assiduously and longed for it so pathetically. Though he was called into the world of affairs and took an active part in the political life of his time, his inclination always was toward a life of learned leisure and the peace of scholastic occupations. His dissertations on friendship are in the same lofty strain of Christian Stoicism. "If God has given to man anything greater than friendship, I know it not." Friendship is the bond which binds families, cities and nations, nay even the whole world. Between friends all things are common, not only external goods, but thoughts and sentiments as well. "One heart and one mind," as he said in reference to his own friend, Adalbero. He had the true Stoic disdain for the commonplace, and showed on more than one occasion how one may conquer pettiness and malice by showing true greatness of mind. When, as Pope, he was called on to judge the case of Arnoul, his former rival at Rheims, he wrote a letter full of dignity and condescension, in which he did not minimize the guilt of the accused, but reminded him that the executive clemency was one of the prerogatives of the See of Saint Peter, and in virtue of that prerogative he confirmed Arnoul in the See of Rheims and all the privileges thereto belonging. Once only did he seem to compromise with his lofty ideals. And that was when, as secretary of Arnoul, he deserted the Ottos who had befriended him and went over to the cause of Hugh Capet. The defection was a momentary lapse. For his own conscience soon troubled him and his sense of benefits received would not let him rest until he had returned to his allegiance. He has been accused of hardheartedness. But his letters and his conduct fully disprove the accu-

sation. On the contrary, we know him to have been kindhearted and truehearted, loyal to his friends in adversity, grateful to his old teachers at Aurillac, and risking his reputation as a Churchman in his effort to befriend his own relatives who were dependent on his care. He had the proper sense of the value of money. Its best use he considered was in almsgiving, and its next best in the purchase of books: and he had a right to spend it as he wished, since it was acquired, he reminds us, "*proprio labore*," by his work as a teacher.

In order to understand how a man so admirable in his personal conduct and so exceptionally well endowed in intellectual talents could be misrepresented and calumniated it is necessary to recall that the times were credulous and that confusion in political life engendered bitter enmities. Then, as was remarked before, it was a prevailingly ignorant age. Those who were themselves ignorant affected to distrust as well as despise all learning. Mathematics especially was suspected because of the use of mystic numbers in magic. Astronomy, too, was considered dangerous because of the practices of the astrologers. Besides, in a superstitious age the extraordinary is always suspected of being somehow uncanny. And, yet, it was not Gerbert's contemporaries, but his successors that first accused him of sorcery and invented legends about him. Hatred of the papacy in the days of the stern Hildebrand was the impelling motive in the fabrication of the Gerbert legends. To his contemporaries, the scholar, the teacher, the abbot, prelate and pope must have been known as he is known to us from his letters and his writings. Hatred dies hard. Readers of Victor Hugo will recall how, in order to attack Napoleon III and Pius IX, the French dramatist revives in his "*Welf, castellan d'Osbor*" the old misrepresentations and holds up the Gerbert of legendary infamy as a prototype of Pius IX, while in the *Otto* of his drama he would have us see the lineaments of the third Napoleon. A contemporary French scholar, M. Picavet, who has made a profound study of the philosopher-pope, but who, it must be said, is a partisan neither of the papacy nor of the philosophy of the schools,

is properly indignant at their singular instance of historical travesty. He concludes his remarks by saying: "If we place ourselves at the modern point of view, exclusively, setting aside every preoccupation as historians or as Christians, we must record our verdict that Gerbert invariably followed the search for truth and strove for the triumph of justice—justice, which however, he knew how to perfect by considerations of charity. This alone entitles us to count him among those who were great in the eyes of their contemporaries and are still in the eye of posterity." ¹

Gerbert's influence will appear in the subsequent development of medieval thought. The school at Rheims over which he presided was the mother of many schools throughout France, which flourished in the following centuries, were centers of philosophic activity in the days of St. Anselm and Abelard, and not only developed scholastic philosophy up to the era of its greatest perfection, but prepared the way for the intellectual activity of the end of the twelfth century, out of which the first medieval universities sprang. At Chartres especially, where stands today the most magnificent example of French Gothic architecture, there were gathered under Fulbert, a disciple of Gerbert, a group of scholars who by independent philosophical speculation, and by an enlightened, almost a Humanistic, appreciation of the classics, kept thought and taste alive in France until the days of Anselm and Abelard. Every generation owes something to that which goes before it. If the parent generation has not increased, it has at least done something to preserve, the inheritance of the past. In this way, then, the tenth century may receive credit for what was done in the eleventh and twelfth, and Gerbert who sums up what was best in the tenth century may be said to be the teacher of the better known scholastics who came after him.

WILLIAM TURNER.

¹ Gerbert, *un pape philosophe*, Paris, 1897, p. 221.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Private Ownership: Its Basis and Equitable Conditions. By Rev. I. Kelleher. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. New York: Benziger Bros. \$1.25.

In the preface to this excellent book the author says: "Our present evil conditions are not only utterly unsatisfactory but so completely discredited that they cannot possibly continue nor should anyone possessed of a particle of humane feeling desire their continuance, even though it were possible." This frank condemnation of present conditions is reiterated throughout his work, the purpose of which, nevertheless, is to defend the principle of private ownership against socialism, so, one need not be told, Father Kelleher seeks to show that the only escape from the dangers of the present rapidly growing social crisis lies in the direction of drastic reform through the power of the State of the enormous evils to which the abuse of private ownership has led. The success, such as it is, of the Socialist agitation, he says, is due not to any virtues in the system itself but solely to the rottenness of the order against which it is a protest. The gist of Father Kelleher's work, and its distinctive value, consists in this, that, whilst it duly defends the legitimacy of private ownership, it insists very strongly on the duties and limitations of ownership; important considerations which too many of the defenders of the sacred rights of property are apt to pass over too lightly. How many of our moralists in their treatment of this subject, content themselves with setting forth in strong light the indisputable but not very far-reaching principle, *in extrema necessitate omnia fiunt communia*, and then, as if this were the last word that justice had to say in the matter, they transfer the case to the jurisdiction of charity?

The book opens with an introductory chapter containing a brief, but, for the task in hand, sufficiently detailed history of the Socialist movement from Marx to the present day. The doctrines of Marx, the modifications which they have undergone, with the result of dividing Socialists into two distinct parties are very

clearly stated. The present position and the respective policies of the two parties, the Revolutionists and the Revisionists, or Evolutionists, are carefully defined. A failure to make this distinction diminishes very considerably the polemical efficiency of a great deal of otherwise strong writing directed against Socialism. In his general discussion Fr. Kelleher takes the Revisionist type for his target. "Gradually," he believes, "the dogmas that seemed essential to Marxian Socialism—the Materialistic interpretation of history, the war between the Classes, the Catastrophic Theory, etc., have come to be abandoned or ignored." One is inclined to place a note of interrogation after this statement. It is true that as Fr. Kelleher adds, the most influential protagonists of Socialism at present belong to the evolutionary school. But, on the other hand, as a competent judge, Miss Hughan, in her recently published survey of American Socialism, as it exists to-day, shows, while the present policy of the national socialist party leans towards constructivism, it follows, in general, the policies of the German Marxians led by Kautsky. (*American Socialism of the Present Day*, p. 237.)

The second chapter is taken up with the origin and nature of individual rights; "one of which," the exposition shows, "is an indefinite right all men have received equally from God, for he has commissioned all to live on the fruits of the earth." "All Christians must admit such a right; and all, whether Christians or not, will admit it if I abstract from its origin and say simply that all men have a right to a means of living from the bounty of the earth." Having then explained how, through the intervention of social authority this indefinite right is transformed into definite rights in material goods Father Kelleher takes up the criticism of Socialism, or, more precisely, collectivism, that is, the socialistic economic theory. It is one of the merits of his method that Fr. Kelleher treats the economic theory by itself, apart from the sociological theories and anti-religious principles which are propounded in association with it by many socialists, but which other socialists desirous of conciliating those who oppose the system on moral and religious grounds, declare to be no part of Socialism. With regard to these sociological views, which he refutes, he observes: "That distinctive conception of society which I have called socialistic is not essential to Socialism as such; in fact it would be vehemently repudiated by all the earlier socialists

as well as by not a few eminent socialists at present. Still as socialism should inevitably modify the constitution, and as this concept appears peculiarly adapted to the economic and political conditions that Socialism is striving for, and as, in fine, it is propounded as socialistic and defended by prominent exponents of socialism, there can be no objection to our giving it the name socialistic. Although all socialists would not accept this concept it is of the utmost importance for us to be warned against it, for whether formally professed or not it is very frequently at the bottom of the advocacy by socialist and non-socialist of extensive and compulsory state interference which would be little consistent with individual independence."

Against Collectivism Fr. Kelleher urges the usual arguments based on the difficulty or the impossibility of instituting a satisfactory scheme for the assignment of labor, for the regulation of production, for the distribution of the product of labor, the absence of an adequate incentive to vigorous effort, and of any safeguard for individual liberty against a vast bureaucracy armed with enormous power and in complete control of the press.

Socialism having been weighed and found wanting, Fr. Kelleher next lays down the ethics of private ownership, emphasising especially the limitations to which all private property is subjected through the existence of the indefinite right of all the community to a living. He repudiates the *laissez-faire* principle as a grossly unjust abuse of the principle of individualism, and argues very effectively that it is not only the right but the duty of the State to exercise its power of jurisdiction in order to abolish the present iniquities.

Having specified in a general way, what these evils are, Fr. Kelleher discusses the question of reform; is it to be prosecuted on individualist or on evolutionary socialist lines? He replies, of course, on individualist lines. For, though the greater part of the practical programme of this party might be, and, in fact, is advocated by the individualist reformer also, the very important difference between the individualist reformer and the evolutionary socialist is that while the first values these measures of amelioration for their intrinsic worth, the latter pursues them chiefly as provisional gains contributing to the ultimate establishment of collectivism. To everybody engaged in the work of combatting the spread of socialist doctrines this book will prove invaluable.

J. J. Fox.

Socialism and the Workingman. By R. Fullerton, B. D., B. C. L.
Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. New York: Benziger.

It is perhaps somewhat unkind to this little book to place it alongside the one just noticed, for it must suffer severely by comparison. Its purpose, the author informs us is to set forth briefly and plainly "the fundamental principles which govern the relations of man to man and which must be maintained in accordance with the dictates of the Natural Law in any proposed solution of the problem that at present confronts society; and then to take a glance at the solution of present day difficulties which the socialists propose."

In his preliminary exposition of the nature of private ownership the author fails to bring out the limitations imposed on ownership by the common right of all to a living. He admits, indeed, that in case of grave necessity the State can provide for the common welfare out of private property. But he affirms that this is only lawful in order to avoid national disaster; and says, furthermore: "It is the bounden duty of the State to uphold and safeguard the rights of its members, to prevent and punish violations of these rights, to secure private individuals in peace and tranquility in the enjoyment of what is theirs; and if the State fails in this it neglects its duty; but if it attempts to go further and interfere with the sacredness of private ownership then it oversteps its duty, flagrantly violates the precepts of the natural law." If this were true, then to borrow an example from Fr. Kelleher, a few colliery owners might, if it so pleased them, shut up their mines, and condemn thirty or forty thousand miners and their families to starvation; and if the State interfered with these proprietors in thus exercising their sacred rights of ownership the State would flagrantly violate the natural law!

The author strongly denounces socialism as anti-religious and subversive of all morality. He justifies this condemnation by numerous and ample citations from socialist writers, such as are to be found in Mr. Balfour's armory "The Case Against Socialism." He, however, somewhat strains the evidence in order to present socialism as exclusively of the revolutionary type; indeed though he mentions evolutionary socialism he almost completely disregards it and the character of its programme. Yet it is evo-

lutionary socialism that, generally speaking, is just now presented by the socialist propaganda to the workingman, and the workingman thus prepossessed would most likely refuse to place any confidence in an adviser who would draw the picture of socialism exclusively from the data here furnished. Nor would any socialist admit, and we should not care to have imposed on us the task of convincing him, that the evil consequences of the stupid English poor relief system furnish us with the means of forecasting how the masses of the population would refuse to work if socialism were once put into practice. It would be fair game too, for a socialist confronted with the respective arguments of Mr. Fullerton and Fr. Kelleher, to comment sarcastically on the fact that while the latter describes socialism as sure to terminate in a reign of boundless despotism over the toilers, the latter assures us that under the socialist regime the laboring classes would shirk work altogether and there would be no means available to compel them to furnish labor sufficient to support themselves.

J. J. FOX.

Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, von Dr. Martin Grabmann. Zweiter Band: Die Scholastische Methode im 12. und beginnenden 13. Jahrhundert. Herder, Freiburg and St. Louis, 1911. Price \$2.95 net.

This is the second volume of a very valuable work on the history of scholastic method by the learned professor of Dogmatic Theology in the episcopal Lyceum of Eichstätt. Like the first volume, it shows a thoroughness, a width of information and a keenness of judgment which are rare in histories of scholasticism. The author avails himself not only of printed sources but, to a very great extent, of manuscript sources also. When it is remembered that the scholastic method was determined in all its essentials by the struggle between rationalism and mysticism which took place in the twelfth century, this volume, which treats so learnedly of that century will be studied eagerly by all who wish to know what the scholastic method was, both in philosophy and in theology. It is no exaggeration to say that the work is the only one in any language which treats the subject adequately from the historical

side. Every teacher of the history of philosophy and every teacher of dogmatic theology will find the work indispensable.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Father Lacombe. The Black-Robe Voyageur. By Katherine Hughes. Illustrated. New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1911. 8°, pp. xxvi + 467.

This is the biography of an Oblate priest, a missionary, who commenced his apostolic career as far back as 1849 and who is still in his declining years active and zealous in the cause of religion. The book is interesting beyond the ordinary, as well because the subject of the narrative is typically American, being of mixed French and Indian blood, as because his life was spent amid scenes which are fast disappearing from the western continent as civilization progresses. Over and above these however, is the interest which comes from a record of unselfish and self-sacrificing effort to bring to the pagan aborigines of the country the truths and blessings of religion. What the life of a missionary in those distant days was can be understood only from such a narrative as this. A clever touch is imparted to the book by the references to Lord Strathcona, the Empire-builder and life-long friend of Father Lacombe. The work of neither suffers by contrast with the work of the other, though the zealous labors and fruitful efforts of Father Lacombe as the founder of the Empire of religion comes out into stronger light when placed side by side with those of the great statesman and builder of the Northwest. Father Lacombe is fortunate in his biographer, whose sympathy and insight into his purposes and his projects have enabled her to write an account of his life which brings out its nobleness and greatness without resort to exaggeration or rhetoric.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Primitive Catholicism. By Mgr. Pierre Batiffol, Litt. D.
Translation by Henri L. Brianceau, of St. Mary's Seminary,
Baltimore, from the fifth French edition of *L'Église Naissante*, revised by the author. Longmans, Green and Co.
New York, 1911. 8vo., pp. xxviii + 424.

This book may be considered the culmination of centuries of polemics between Catholics and Protestants, and it shows that the appeal made to history so long ago by Protestant controversialists has resulted merely in the confirmation of the Catholic position. It is a long cry from the "Magdeburg Centuriators" to Batiffol, but the underlying cause of the discussion has remained the same: did Christ found the Church and is the Church He founded the Catholic Church of today? Protestantism has found its latest and best exponent or defender in Harnack of Berlin, and it was with the view of combating the views of Harnack and assailing liberal Protestantism in its last stronghold that this work was written. Batiffol here presents the "history of the formation of Catholicism, that is to say, of the Church in so far as it is a visible, universal society built upon the framework of a rule of faith and a hierarchy" down to and including the time of St. Cyprian. The enormous learning and minute accuracy with which the subject is handled reflect the long and laborious preparation which preceded the composition of this book. The subject is discussed in eight chapters: 1. The Jewish Dispersion and Christianity. 2. The Infant Church. 3. The Infant Church (continued). 4. The Catholicism of St. Irenaeus. 5. The Case of Clement of Alexandria. 6. Tertullian's Variations. 7. Origen and Greek Orthodoxy. 8. St. Cyprian and Rome. The mere enumeration of these titles, however, gives no indication of the fullness and accuracy with which the subject is treated. All the literature of the early Church is carefully analyzed and accurately appraised, the writings of modern authors are thoroughly sifted with the result that we have here a work to which no objection can be raised on the ground that any of the laws or requirements of modern scientific historiography has been violated or neglected. Many advantages will accrue to Catholicism from the publication of this work. In the first place it will serve to clear away a swarm of half-formulated theories regarding the early days of

Christianity which are the result of applying evolutionary theory to history, and it will bring out into clearer light the fact that the Church was "from her origin a living and divinely assisted preservation of the gift made by God to men in the Incarnation." Though the last word on this important subject has not been said, and though the work of Batiffol will not by any means put an end to controversy, he has placed the opponents of Catholicism represented by those who rejected the Church and based their claims on the Bible alone, in the anomalous position of saying in the words of Harnack that 'the chasm that separates Jesus from the apostles has not yet been bridged over nor can it be.'

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism. By Franz Cumont. With an Introductory Essay by Grant Showerman. Authorized Translation. The Open Court Publishing Company. Chicago, 1911. 8vo., pp. xxvi + 298.

This volume contains a series of lectures delivered in 1905 at the Collège de France, supplemented by others given at Oxford a few months later where the author was invited "to develop certain subjects which he had touched upon at Paris." The translation is made from the revised second edition published in 1909.

The purpose which the author had in mind was to show that the religious syncretism arising from the presence and commingling of so many different pagan creeds in the Roman Empire had the result of essentially modifying the dry, formal cult of the Romans themselves and of giving rise to a higher form of religion better calculated to satisfy the religious ideas and cravings of mankind. There are eight chapters dealing respectively with:—Rome and the Orient; Why the Oriental Religions Spread; Asia Minor; Egypt; Syria; Persia; Astrology and Magic; The Transformation of Roman Paganism. The study of the religions of the different localities mentioned is not a presentation of their essential features, but of the modifications they underwent and especially the changes they caused in religious concepts after their spread to other parts of the Empire. A subject so vast discussed so briefly, necessarily implies that the author takes much for

granted and that he does not prove all his assertions. It is needless to say that M. Cumont has an enormous array of fact at his disposal; but his theories will not always hold water. Though well aware of the dangers of such generalization, and though he warns his readers that "resemblance does not necessarily presuppose imitation, and frequently a similarity of ideas and practices must be explained by a common origin, exclusive of any borrowing," M. Cumont can hardly be exonerated from the charge of having envisaged the pagan cults somewhat in the light of the Christian Church, and of having read to some extent Christian organization and Christian ideas into them. Unwarranted statements or statements requiring proof are met with on nearly every page. Thus, p. 21, speaking of the reasons for the spread of the oriental religions, Cumont appeals to the fact that occidental paganism was almost exclusively Latin under the Empire, and finds either a conclusion or confirmation of this in the additional statement that, "by imposing her speech upon the inhabitants of Ireland and Germany, Christian Rome simply continued the work of assimilation in the barbarian provinces subject to her influence that she had begun while pagan." No more misleading or erroneous opinions regarding the spread of the Latin liturgy in the West can be conceived than this. It is regrettable that M. Cumont has not given the subject more consideration. Another evidence of the same readiness to make positive statements without explanation or modification is found on the following page: "It is a characteristic fact that the worship of the deified Emperors, the only official worship required of every one by the government as a proof of loyalty, should have originated of its own accord in Asia, received its inspiration from the purest monarchic traditions, and revived in form and spirit the veneration accorded to the Diadochi by their subjects." Tacitus (Ann., I, 78), says: *Templum ut in colonia Tarraconensi strueretur Augusto petentibus Hispanis permissum, datumque in omnes provincias exemplum*, and the authority of Tacitus counts for something.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Bossuet, Correspondance, publiée sous le patronage de l'Académie Française, par Ch. Urbain et E. Levesque, Vols. I-IV. Paris, 1909-1911.

France has a way of paying national honor to her great writers which is not possible to us *de langue anglaise*, in England or America. The edition of which this work forms part, *Les grands Écrivains de la France*, published by Hachette, is a sort of canonization by the highest literary tribunal of France, the French Academy, a proclamation that the authors so honored have attained what may be called heroic excellence in literature. Their works are edited, in a monumental edition, with all the carefulness employed by the best scholars in their editions of the Greek and Latin classics, but with the greater thoroughness and completeness that are possible in dealing with modern productions.

That Bossuet should find a place in this standard edition was of course to be expected. He holds a rank in French literature accorded to no English writer who has chosen religion as the theme. He did not write to please, his pages are not eloquent for the sake of eloquence. He was intent only upon the fit expression of his ideas and sentiments, but he expressed them with the force, the elevation and the copiousness of his native genius; so that, though he is a Christian and a churchman above all, France, religious, irreligious and indifferent, cherishes him as a national glory.

The works to which we are calling attention comprise the first four volumes of Bossuet's correspondence (1651-1691); they will be complete in ten volumes. They are edited by two Catholic priests, M. Ch. Urbain, a fine literateur, well known for his minute acquaintance with the seventeenth century, and M. E. Levesque, former editor of the *Revue Bossuet* and discoverer of many Bossuet manuscripts as well as one of the most distinguished scriptural scholars of France. Only men like these with deep and solid knowledge of theology and Scripture could be competent to edit the correspondence of this prince of controversialists. They have taken infinite pains to light up every obscure passage—necessarily very numerous—in this vast correspondence. They have ransacked parish registers all over France and every contemporary publication in order to glean information about personages and

events commemorated here by Bossuet. The letters are published in chronological order; and, under the guidance of the editors, the modern reader feels he can understand this correspondence almost as well as the men who conducted it. The most valuable features of this new edition, however, which will make it standard and definitive, is the publication of much new material discovered by the editors and the minute verification or rectification of the old. Some former editors took liberties with the text, suppressing or combining or altering as they saw fit, and their successors perpetuated their errors. Here all the letters are published after the originals, if extant and, we have every confidence to believe, with the utmost accuracy; and where the originals have perished, we are put into a position to judge, as far as possible, the fidelity of their first editors. All in all, we have here as perfect a piece of editing as learning, sound judgment and a loving and untiring industry could produce.

We needed the authentic text of Bossuet's letters; and considering the important place occupied by him in the literary, religious and general history of his time, we must be grateful for the immense labor expended on this edition. His correspondence had the widest range, from Louis XIV and Innocent XI down to the obscurest names in history. Probably more has perished than is preserved in the ten volumes which remain. Yet Bossuet was not a born letter-writer; he does not condescend to the leisurely, newsy, chatty letter; he does not write to unburden himself to a friend, unless in some of his spiritual letters; he is a serious man and writes always for a serious purpose, which does not mean that his letters are dull or heavy, no more than his *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*. He appears always in these volumes as the churchman of lofty aims who has at heart always the interests of religion and the good of souls. He is the ecclesiastical statesman intent on the reunion of the churches, he is the controversialist against Calvinism and the light of souls seeking the Catholic faith, he is the adviser of the great scholars of his day, he is the very solicitous preceptor of the Dauphin, he is the watchful pastor of his diocese and the high-minded, if not always very penetrating, director of souls. One thing he does not appear, an author jealous and careful of his literary glory; a great genius and a great and simple soul, he puts to shame the lesser geniuses who husband every talent and strain every effort to raise their literary stature.

We see Bossuet reserved and dignified, but not cold nor proud nor hard as he is often pictured. The letters here published antedate the Quietist controversy, from which has come the prejudice which many entertain against Bossuet. The present instalment ends with the letters of 1691, some years before the encounter between Bossuet and his more winning antagonist, and shows Bossuet in his most favorable light.

JOHN F. FENLON.

MISCELLANEOUS.

An Irish Homily on Poverty: Text and Translation.

This Homily, from the same sources as the one given in the *Bulletin* of last month, shows a decided lack of orderly sequence. It is nothing more than a series of citations from various sources, the Bible, the Fathers, the later Theologians, on the subject of poverty. They are quoted to show that poverty as a state of life has not only the approval of the greatest minds of the Christian era, but has as a foundation the declaration of Our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount that poverty is a source of blessings. For it is not with poverty in the sense of privation of the goods of the world, even with the detachment of the mind from riches because of their vanity and the anxieties they bring, which appealed to the pagan Seneca, that the author of the Homily is concerned. He deals with poverty in its Christian sense, which goes beyond the pagan ideal by adding to the conquest of self something more positive, namely, attachment of the mind and heart to the love and service of God and the truth, and moreover makes this positive side the *raison d'être* of the other. How much the world owes to the practice of this Christian virtue during the Middle Ages, historians are doing much to make known to an awakening age. The Homily makes it plain that those who have embraced this state must distinguish between the outward appearance of poverty, which is condemned severely when it exists along with the desire of riches, and the inward reality, or poverty of spirit, by which one follows in the footsteps of the Master, and gains abundant graces which enrich the soul and obtain greater glory for God. The example of Christ, the rewards promised to those who follow Him faithfully, and the necessity of referring everything in this life to a spiritual standard for correct judgment, are constantly insisted upon. Perhaps we should not look for an orderly development of ideas

where the subject-matter displays so close a unity, but should rather be pleased at the variety with which it is presented.

The verification of the citations is frequently a difficult matter owing to their brevity. A certain number, however, have been traced, and their sources indicated in the foot-notes. Nine of the Fathers and Ecclesiastical Writers are cited by name, as well as two books of the Old Testament and three writers of the New. St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great seem to be the favorites, each one being referred to by name six times. Besides, it seems worthy of remark that one of the citations purporting to be from St. Ambrose appears to be in reality from St. Gregory. However, it may be due rather to the imperfection of the indexes available that no trace of such a passage could be found in St. Ambrose's works. One, and possibly two, of the passages ascribed to St. Bernard would appear to be taken from a sermon of the Abbot Guerrius, whose works were at one time attributed to St. Bernard.

TEXT.

(fo 33d l. 29) Do-n bochtacht and so óir adeir bernard *curab* *conaich* an-bochtacht toilemhail an-a-treicter *cach-æn-ní sægalta* 7 an-a-lentar día co-díles 7 is *conach* comlan 7 is *inellus* can-guásacht an-bochtacht an-a-faghtar glóir día 7 is *conaich* co firindech beith a-fochar muindtiri día 7 is *conaich* beith ac-mebrugadh na-beatha an-a-tabairter gloir do día (fo 34a) .i. na bochtacht[a] spiratalta an-a-lentar día co-sær tria tribloid an-tsægail so 7a

Adeir senica an-neach ac-a-fuil móran is mór iartar air 7 a-nech ar-a-n-iartar móran is-imda ní n-a-easbaidh 7 an-neach ac-a-fuil becan is bec iartar air 7 is-terc ní n-a-esbaidh gurab aire sin adeir bernard *curab* fonomaidech do nech beith bocht sa-sægal monabfuil sé saidhbir ac día ac-furtacht na-firinde is-na-h-eclaisib 7 in-a-contrárdha so is-imda ac-furtacht na-h-anffirinde ac-gabail anma día co-dimsach 7 aibídi crábaidh 7 ac-cur a-ngním 7 a-mbés an-a-h-agaidh 7 cret ele sin acht nech do beith ac-foghnám do-n-diabal 7 ac-tarcaisniughad dia co-mór. 7.

Adeir pilosupus *sancedus* cad hí fein an bochtacht .ni *annsa* .i. maith shofhuathuighiti hí 7 máthair na-slainti 7 tethedh na-ndeithidi 7 can beith dimæin hí 7 casain na-h-egna 7 ullmugadh na-ndegoibrighti can damnad hí 7 sealb nem-conaich 7 sealb can-iúl hí .i. can iúl ca-fuil 7 hé acatt 7 conách neimf-ní hí. 7a

Adeir casiodorus *curab* acfaindech an *conach* atá ac-na-bochtaib .i. méit a-sláinti a-forbfailti na catrach nemda 7 *curab* é is cara didin dóib an breithem co-a-tíagat na h-uile do-chum a-breitheamnais. 7 adeir

Adeir ambrocus ar-briatraib Lucais sóscéluidhe cidh bé ní docraidh a-mbéraidh tú ar an-duine mbocht ní dligenn tú a-tarcaisniugadh ann óir ma-do-rindetar a droch-besa a-cogcubus do lot slaineócar a-leighes na-bochtaine hé 7

Adeir augustin ar-briatraib in-apstoil 7 ar-genicis dá-leanmais Crist an-a-bochtacht ní bemháis can beith bocht 7 do beith saidhbris a-craidhe acaind óir is an-a-bochtacht fein do-ní día saidhbres da cach nech co-deigenach ar-a-leanmain fein. 7 adeir

Adeir augustin *cur-tarcaisnigh* Christ cach uile ní-talmanta 7 *cur-tarcaisnigh* a-corp féin indus cur (fo. 34b) taisbén sé duinne cach uile ní intarcaisnighiti 7 do-fulaing cach aidbeirseoracht co-foidhhidech d-ar-tecusc-ne sa-slidhid cédna. 7 a

TRANSLATION.

Of Poverty here, for Bernard says that blessed is voluntary poverty in which all worldly things are forsaken and God is followed faithfully, and this poverty is perfect happiness,¹ and a protection² without danger, in which the glory of God is acquired. And it is truly blessed to be in the presence of the servants of God, [in a monastic community], and it is blessed to be meditating on the life wherein glory is given to God, which is spiritual poverty, in which God is followed without hindrance through the tribulation of this world.

And Seneca says:—"Of him who has much, much is asked; and he of whom much is asked, lacks many things; and of the one who has little, little is asked, and few things are lacking him." Hence it is for this reason Bernard says³ that "it is ridiculous for a man to be poor in the world unless he is rich in the sight of God, by advancing the truth in the churches [as a member of a religious order]; and on the contrary many are giving support to error by arrogantly taking the name of God and the habit of religion, and setting their actions and their way of life at variance with Him." And what else is that but to serve the devil, and to offer a great affront to God?

And the holy philosopher⁴ says:—"What is poverty? Not hard to tell.⁵ It is a good that is easily hated and the mother of health, and the flight of cares, and freedom from idleness, and the path of wisdom, and the laying up of good works without loss;⁶ and

¹ Cf. *Sermo VIII in Ps. xc, in fine.*

² Cf. *Sermo XLVIII* (alias *iv Ex parvis*), in Luc. x, 38, "Et ipse intravit in quoddam castellum." St. Bernard says:—"Castellum, ubi Christus intravit, voluntaria est paupertas, quæ habitatores suos a gemina impugnatione, qua hujus mundi amatores expugnantur, reddit securos, etc." Possibly the author of the Homily may have had this *castellum* in mind and chosen the word *inellus*, "protection, security," because of its resemblance to *indlis*, "a hall, or court."

³ This seems to be a citation from Guerrius, a disciple of St. Bernard, whose works are given in Migne (tome 185) in connection with those of his master. The passage referred to is in the "*Sermo in Solemnitate Sanctorum Omnium*," par 5.

⁴ St. Thomas Aquinas?

⁵ A survival of the Old-Irish formula introducing an answer to a question.

⁶ Perhaps in the sense of Matt. vi, 20, "Lay up to yourselves treasures

Adeir augustin curab do-n tæb amuich d-a-gæltibh is eicean da-cach æn le-n-ab-aíl Crist do leanmain beith .i. a-slidhi na-bochtaine mar adubramar

Adeir augustin an-neach do-rindi naimdenus ar-a deoraighecht is milis do dol n-a-dúthaigh 7 is mar sin do-n popul pecach do-rinde a-n-aimleas ar-an-sægal so is milis doib dul an-a-nduthaigh .i. a-flathamnus a-slidhi na-bochtacht[a]

Adeir augustin curab imda slidhi do tecaise día duinn do dul ó-gradh tseacranach an-tsægail so a-flathamnus a-slidhi na-bochtain-eachta. 7

Adeir béda atá ní ac-a-reic acam .i. flathamnus día 7 is air cennaigter hé .i. ar-an-mbochtacht fírinich 7 ar-galar cuirp co-foighidech 7 a-forbfailti 7 a sæthar 7 a-ngorta 7 a-nglóir óir is-í feracht leanmana día do dul n-a-flathamnus an-bochtacht spiratalta. 7 adeir

Adeir béda da-mbeith eгна solaim acat 7 socraidecht absolon 7 nert samsoin 7 airdi meic an scáil 7 conach geisi 7 nert octaui-ánuis 7 luas amsuél cat hé an-tarba do dendaís sin duit da-tucta do corp do crumaib 7 t-anam do-n-díabal d-a-adlacad leis an saidhbir sanntach re-n-abarar tantulus an-ifirnn mar adeir an soscél an innad eile. 7

Adeir grigoir ca-fuil ní is glormaire na-in-bochtacht an-a-cennaig-ter flathamnus dé 7 ca-fuil ní is-docraidhi na hí an-tan-treicter hí ar grad an-tsægail 7 ca-fuil ní is-socraidhi anas-í ac-faghbail luach a-formala .i. flathamnus dé

Adeir grigoir ar gradh na-firindi do-b-áil lium sib do treicen gradha an-tsægail ó-nách fétaidhi ar¹ leas do denam leis na a-breith lib mar-a-teighti

Oir adeir an-feallsamh ní h-aíl leam maith do gairm do-n-ní urcoidech .i. do gradh an-tsægail (fo 34c) 7 bith a-fis acat curab conaich anbochtacht an-a-n-ullmuighter flathamnus día romat 7 an-a-faghtar an-betha tsægalta mailliughadh ecin

Adeir grigoir a-lucht gradhaghti an-tsægail ataithi ac-facbhail ar-¹ngradha ar cicin tar ar-¹n-eisi .i. na-spreidi aimsirda óir ní leir díb slainti flathamnais dé trí tría nell nel (sic) tsalach an-tsægail. 7

Adeir ieoronbus is-ro-gradach an-ridire ac día do gebann anóir an-tsægail mar bud ail leis fein 7 flathamnus dé fa-deoigh. 7

¹ For *far*, which is translated.

it is wealth without riches, and a possession without knowledge, that is, without knowledge where it is, though you have it; and it is an immaterial wealth."

Cassiodorus⁷ says that abundant is the wealth of the poor, namely, the greatness of their assurance of possessing the joy of the heavenly city, and that their protecting friend will be the judge with whom all go to judgment.

Ambrose, commenting on the words of Luke the Evangelist, says:—"Whatever harsh name you give the poor man, you should not give it with contempt, for, if his wretched life has dulled his conscience, he will be healed by the remedy of poverty."⁸

Augustine, commenting on the words of the Apostle and on Genesis, says:—"If we followed Christ in His poverty, we should not be otherwise than poor, and we should have the riches of His heart, for it is in His poverty that God bestows riches on everyone at last after following Him."

Augustine says that Christ despised everything earthly, and that He despised His own body, so that He showed us that everything is worthy of contempt; and He suffered every adversity patiently teaching us to walk in the same path.

Augustine says that everyone who wishes to follow Christ should be away from his relatives, that is, in the path of poverty, as we have said.

Augustine says:—"He who has incurred enmity during his exile, it is sweet for him to go to his own country; and so it is for the race of sinners who have led a vicious life in this world, it is sweet for them to go to their own country, namely, heaven, by the road of poverty."

Augustine says that many are the ways in which God taught us to go from the erring love of this world to heaven by the path of poverty.

in heaven, where neither rust nor moth doth consume," etc. But the word translated "loss" means also "damnation."

⁷ Cf. *Expositio in Psalterium*, Ps. ix, v. 9.

⁸ The following passage is found in St. Gregory the Great, *Hom. xl*, par. 10:—"Cum quoslibet in hoc mundo abjectos aspicitis, etiamsi qua reprehensibilia eorum esse videantur, nolite despicere, quia fortasse quos morum infirmitas vulnerat, medicina paupertatis curat . . . Pauper ergo cum reprehensibilis cernitur, moneri debet, despici non debet." Cf. also par. 6. I have found nothing in St. Ambrose resembling the text.

Adeir an-feallsamh da-nderntadhi an-sægal cin tseilb dīlis ac-æin-neach do beith flathamnus an-tsída 7 na-h-ænt[acht]a itir na braithreachaibh co dul a-flathamnus dé 7

Adeir casiodorus ata aibeirseoir acam acam (*sic*) ac-techt am-timchill cach læi .i. an-sægal duines-lem-nem-cairdib mo-slidhi .i. mo V cédfadha corpda g-a-lot d-a-n-urchoidibh fein 7 tic an-bás lé-soighdeoracht trí fuindeogaib mo cuirp .i. trí organaib mo cédfadh 7 an-fuil an-nech do-ní so in-molta an-æn-inad. Ma-sedh eist 7 cret do-n-neach adubairt .i. do-pol apstol an-doman do beith co-h-olc in-a tosach 7 an-a-bolgan 7 an-a-dered. 7 adeir

Adeir grigoir naem co-fagann an-corp dænna a-acfaind 7 aealadha amuich ac-fagbhail báis 7 a-contrardha so ar-ngabail na-bochtacht[a] ænda an-a-coiméttar an-corp 7 an-t-anam an-æn-inad ac-a-treorughadh do chum-flathamnais

Adeir ambrosius tabair t-aire re-beith bocht ar an-sægal so do-t-deoin óir is mór a-lúach ac-día 7 da-testaighd maithes sægalta uait ní-teisteochait grasa 7 da-mbía do tech can-bethaidh 7 can beith lán do-toicti² tsægalta atá an-flathamnus acatt 7 do cuid do-n-talmáin.

Oir adeir an-soscél mar-tsuidhfeas Christ a-teagais an-breithem-nais cid bé neach do (fo 34d) roine séirgi re grad día 7 do dúisigh o chodladh na-caire a-fuireacras gradha na-bochtaine 7 do-treice a-sealba dīlsi ar-grad día do gebatt breithemnus sær can-chunnta-bairt do-n ló deigenach ar-son an-ní do-rónsat.

Adeir grigoir co-tiucfatt so le Crist o-n-breithemnus .i. an drong ar-a-rucad droch-bretha ar-an-sægal so 7 do-fulaing co-foighdech iatt ar-gradh día can-scandail do-tabairt na-n-agaidh. 7 adeir

Adeir ieronmus ar-bochtacht Christ cur-cosmail Crist ris na-bochtaib an-étaigib crina athcaithiti do eur uime 7 an-a-breith a-maindser an-asail 7 a-moran do docraib ele 7 d-a-derbadh so cach ní is-lé día is-leis na-bochtaib hé mar adeir an-soscél curab leis an-mbocht spiratalta an-flathamnus neamda. 7 adeir

Adeir matha sósceluidhe i-sin VIII caibidil atat uamanda ac-na-sinnchibh 7 neit ac-na-h-enaib 7 ní fuil inatt a cind ac mac día sa-sægal so 7 d-a-derbadh sin ní-d-oighrecht dīlis meic³ día gradh an-tsægail na-a-anoir ac-tuicsin briatar an-tsoscél a-timchill inatt meic día. 7 adeir

² Probably the second *t* is meant for *c*.

³ In these two words *t* is written for *c*.

Bede says:—"I am engaged in selling something, namely, the kingdom of God, and the price with which it is bought is true poverty, and bódily ills patiently [borne], both in joy and in toil, in affliction and in glory; for the true character of the following of God even into heaven is spiritual poverty."

Bede says:—"If thou hadst the wisdom of Solomon, and the beauty of Absalom, and the strength of Samson, and the stature of the son of the Giant,⁹ and the wealth of Giezi (?),¹⁰ and the power of Octavianus, and the swiftness of Asael (?),¹¹ what profit would that bring thee, if thou gavest thy body to worms and thy soul to the devil to be buried in hell with the covetous rich man who is called Tantalus, as the Gospel says¹² in another place."

Gregory says:—"Where is there anything more glorious than [monastic] poverty in which the kingdom of God is purchased, and where is there anything more ignominious than it when it is forsaken for love of the world, and where is there anything pleasanter than it when it receives the price of its hire, namely, the kingdom of God."

Gregory says:—¹³ "I would like you to forsake for the love of the truth, the love of the world, since you will not be able to profit by it nor to bring it with you to the place whither you are going."

For the Philosopher says:—¹⁴ "It pleaseth me not to apply the term 'good' to a hurtful thing, namely, the love of the world; and know that blessed is poverty in which the kingdom of God is got ready before thee, and in which the life of this world is found to be, as it were, a delay."

Gregory says:—¹⁵ "O ye who love the world, ye are perforce leaving behind you your love, namely, temporal possessions, inasmuch as the salvation of God's kingdom is not visible to you through the dark cloud of the world."

⁹ Cf. II Kings xxi, 20 (Vulgate).

¹⁰ Cf. IV Kings v, 20 (Vulgate).

¹¹ Cf. II Kings ii, 18 (Vulgate).

¹² Cf. Matt. xvi, 26.

¹³ Cf. *Hom. xxxvii in Evangelia*, par. 19, and *Expositiones in I Regum*, lib. v, par. 13.

¹⁴ St. Thomas Aquinas?

¹⁵ For the latter part of the citation, cf. *Super Cantica Canticorum Expositio*, cap. viii, par. 10.

Adeir día fein sa-soscél cédna a-dæine lenus mé ac-iarraid an-tsægail ní raibi sé acam fein oir ní-roibe tech oighidhechta acam⁴ and a-cuirfind mo cenn

Adeir matha sóscéluidhe sa IX caibidil X ar-fechain caich æn ní n-a-timchill do Crist .i. na-catrach⁵ nemda⁵ 7 an tsægail nach-fuair inatt a-cuirfedh a-cenn acht a-craidhi an cristaidhi indraic a ænar 7

Adeir ad-cuirincios sa VIII madh caibidil ó do bí Crist saidbir and fein do rinde deoradh daidhbir de indaindi sa-sægal ac-comlinad toile an-atar

Adeir augustín ní abraim cur-bocht hé sa-sægal cidhead do gab bochtacht cuigi d-a-deoin 7 ni-treic a saidbris díada .i. a-trocaire mór do-n tæb astigh oir do bí bocht do-n-tæb amuich mar-duine ac-gabail eisimplara ar-slidhi-ne cuigi ac-a-foillsiughad fein bocht indus co lenmæisne (fo 35a) sa-slidhi cédna he oir do cuir deimbrig an-a-corp ac-a-caithem mar étach t-sætair ac-a-césad mar cennach oraindi ac-comlinad toile an-athar. Is mar sin dligmit-ne étach arsaigh na h-ainghidhechta do chur dinn 7 stoil na-h-aitrigi do-gabail umaínd .i. étach baindsi na bochtaine ac-leanmain Crist a-flathamnus a-toil an-athar cédna 7 is annsa-bochtacht so bias cach-æn-nech saidhbir o-lenmain Christ 7 is mar so lentar hé .i. cach æn tarcaisniges hé fein 7 do-ní bocht do reir cuirp de 7 saidbir n-a-cogcubus oir is millse codlus an-bocht an-a-ceirtib .i. san-umla na tigerna an-étaigh orda 7 na-bíd naire ort ac-iarraid deirci an-anoir an-tigerna oir is hé día do-múin duit hí mar-slidhi 7 tue mar étach duit hí 7 mar sásad spiratalta 7 aimserda. 7

Adeir iob sa .IX. caibidil .X. ar .XX. ma-tá æn-tsalcár a-m lamhaib na-a-m-craidhi ní abraim bocht spiratalta do día rium an-æn-inad ar-doman 7

Adeir grigoir is-iat atá an-a-mbochtaib spiratalta .i. na-dæine as-ar-teith a-spirat dimais 7 le nach olc beith easbadach sa-sægal ar grad an-maithis spiratalta 7 is doib sin geallaim-si flathamnus dé arsi Crist mar aderar sa-soscél curab leis na-bochtaib spiratalta an-flathamnus oir dligter urfuigell an boicht do-denam ar-tús roim cach uile tigerna an eisimplair Christ sa-breithemnus deigenach. oir adeir

Adeir Prouerbia sa-tres caibidil .XX. oscail do bel a-boicht

⁴ The text has *and acam* with the usual signs to indicate an insertion.

⁵ No doubt an error for *naemta*, which is translated.

Jerome says:—"A most acceptable knight in the sight of God is he who acquires the esteem of the world as he deems best, and wins the kingdom of God in the end."

The Philosopher says¹⁴ says:—"If the world were made the certain possession of some one, then would the reign of peace and harmony exist among the brethren until going into the kingdom of God."

Cassiodorus says:—"I have an adversary going about me every day, namely, the world, which hems in my way in league with my enemies, namely, my five bodily senses, which defile it with their own iniquities; and death comes shooting his darts through the windows of my body, namely, through the organs of my senses; and is the one that does this to be praised in any way? Listen, then, and believe him who said [it], namely, Paul the Apostle, [who said] that the world is bad in its beginning and in its middle and in its end."

Saint Gregory says that the human body gives up its power and its skill on dying; and it is the contrary of this on embracing poverty in a community, whereby, in the one place, body and soul are kept directed towards heaven.

Ambrose says:—¹⁶ "Give thy attention to being poor in this world voluntarily, for its worth is great in the sight of God, and should worldly goods be lacking to thee, graces will not be lacking, and though thy house should be without food, and not full of worldly treasure, thou hast heaven and thy share of the earth."

For the Gospel says:—¹⁷ "When Christ will be seated in the house of judgment, whoever practised charity for the love of God, and awoke from the sleep of sin to the watchfulness of the love of poverty, and forsook their own possessions for the love of God, will doubtless receive a favorable judgment on the last day on account of what they have done."

Gregory says¹⁸ that these will come with Christ from the judgment, namely, those against whom were given unjust judgments in this world, and who suffered them patiently for the love of God, without giving scandal against Him.

Jerome says, on the poverty of Christ, that Christ was like the poor in putting on old outworn garments and in being born in the

¹⁶ *Hexaëmeron*, Lib. VI, cap. VIII, no. 52.

¹⁷ Cf. Matt. x, 42; xxv, 35.

¹⁸ Cf. *Moralium*, Lib. x, cap. xxxi.

spiratalta ⁊ is-í tuicsin an-tex so .i. na-breithemna do-tabairt na-mbocht d-a-n-aire ar-son día ac-denam a-cúisi doib o-nach etir leó fein a-denam ⁊ denaid-si an cert doib mar sin a breithemna. ⁊ adeir

Adeir iacob sa dara caibidil ma-s-é an-recht riagalta do b-aileat do congmail a-duine na-tarcaisnigh agaidh an-boicht *spiratalta* ⁊ agaidh an-dimsaigh do anorugadh oir ní bí deithbir ac-día *itir* nech tar a-cele ac-tabairt luach a-sætair dóib mar do tuilleadar ⁊ is-é recht día grasa do-tabairt do cach æn (fo 35b) do-reir a-gnima mar-tuilleas iatt sa sæghal

Adeir matha soscéluidhe sa V caibidil is conaich an-bocht *spiratalta* óir is leis an-flathamnus nemda ⁊ is-iat so na-dæine do-treice a-ní fein ⁊ ac-a-fuil sealb caich æn-ní *spiratalta* ⁊ is-amlaidh tuices bernard an-bocht *spiratalta* curab-í an-umla is buime d-a-spirataltacht mar adeir an-t-udaras curab-í tús cach uile ecna ecla día ⁊ is mar sin is-í tús cach uile næmtacht[a] lenmain día sa-bochtacht *spiratalta* mar adubramar ⁊ is aire so atait na boicht *spiratalta* in-tohgtha an-a-prelaidi ac-coimét an-rechta *spiratalta*.

Adeir iacob i-sin dara caibidil eistidh rium a-braithreacha ⁊ coimetaigh co-dútrachtach a-n-abraim rib óir ní híat lucht antsaidbris tsægalta is-ferr a-fiadni día sa-breithemnus deigenach curab aire sin nach-fuilitt siatt in-toghtha do coimét anma caich óir ní coimetait a-n-anam fein ar gradh an-tsægail ⁊ is-uime sin atat na-boicht *spiratalta* toghtha ar-a-febus coimétait a-n-anmanna fein ar gradh día ⁊ ar-fuath an-tsægail dimbúain. ⁊ adbar ele ar-son nach-gabaid a-luaidhidhecht ar in sægal ac-fuireach re grasaib día mar a-ndentar solás úasal dóib ac-gabáil a-sochair a-mbreithemnus día curab aire sin cid bé thógas an saidbir ar-a saidbris ⁊ diúltas an-bocht *spiratalta* ar a-bochtacht do-pecfadh co-follus a-ndía ⁊ a-nduine quí uiuit ac ragnat deus per omnia secula ceclorum. Amen FINIT Amen.

manger of the ass, and in many other hardships. And to confirm this, "Everything that God has belongs to the poor," as the Gospel says ¹⁹ that "the kingdom of heaven belongs to the poor in spirit."

Matthew the Evangelist says in the eighth chapter:—²⁰ "The foxes have holes and the birds have nests, but the Son of God has not a place for His head in this world," and this is to prove that it is not a part of the true heritage of a child of God to possess the love of the world nor its honor, understanding the words of the Gospel concerning the place of the Son of God.

And God Himself says, in the same Gospel:—²¹ "O ye who follow me, and are seeking the world, I had it not myself, for I had no place of shelter therein where I might lay my head."

Matthew the Evangelist says in the nineteenth chapter, ²² on Christ's looking at everything around Him, namely, the holy ²³ city, and the world, that He found no place to lay His head but in the heart of the upright Christian alone.

Ad Corinthios says in the eighth chapter:—²⁴ "Since Christ was rich in Himself, He made a poor exile of Himself among us in the world, fulfilling the will of the Father."

Augustine says:—"I do not say that He was poor in the world although he embraced poverty voluntarily, seeing that He did not abandon His divine riches, namely, His great mercy within; for He was poor externally, as man, taking on Himself the similitude of our manner of life, showing Himself poor so that we might follow Him in the same way." For he put weakness in His body, wearing it as working-clothes in His crucifixion as a ransom for us, fulfilling the will of the Father. It is thus that we ought to put off the old garment of wickedness and take upon us the robe of penitence, namely, the wedding garment of poverty, following Christ into heaven in the will of the same Father. And it is in this poverty that each one is rich from the following of Christ; and it is thus He is followed, namely, everyone that despiseth himself and maketh himself poor according to the body, and rich in his conscience. For the poor man sleeps more sweetly in his

¹⁹ Matt. v, 3.

²⁰ Verse 20.

²¹ Apparently referring to the same passage.

²² Perhaps a thought drawn from some commentary on vv. 27 to 29, on leaving all things to follow Christ.

²³ See note (5) in text. MS. has "heavenly."

²⁴ II Cor. viii, 9.

rags, that is, in his humility, than a lord in cloth of gold. And be not ashamed of asking alms in honor of the Lord, for it is God who taught thee it as a way of life, and gave it to thee as a garment, and as a spiritual and temporal solace.

Job says in the thirty-ninth chapter:—²⁵ "If there is any uncleanness in my hands or in my heart, I do not call myself a man who is spiritually poor for God's sake in any way whatever."

Gregory says:—²⁶ "These are the poor in spirit, namely, those from whom their spirit of pride has gone out, and who do not dislike being in want in the world for love of spiritual good." "And it is to these I promise the kingdom of God," said Christ; as it is said in the Gospel ²⁷ that "heaven is of the poor in spirit." For it is fitting that the judgment of the poor man should be given first before every lord, after the example of Christ in the last judgment. For Proverbs says in the twenty-third chapter:—²⁸ "Open your mouth, ye poor in spirit"; and the meaning of this text is, that judges should take notice of the poor for God's sake, espousing their cause since they are not able to do so themselves; "and do justice to them therefore, ye judges."

And James says in the second chapter:—²⁹ "If thou wishest to keep the royal law, O man, do not despise the face of him who is poor in spirit, and honor the face of the proud man"; for there is no difference between men before God in giving them the reward of their labor as they have merited. And the law of God is to give graces to each one according to his works as he deserves them in the world.

Matthew the Evangelist says in the fifth chapter:—²⁷ "Blessed is the poor in spirit, for the heavenly kingdom is his"; and these are they who have forsaken their all, and who have possession of every spiritual thing. And thus Bernard ³⁰ understands the poor in spirit, that humility is the nurse of his spirituality, as the Authority says ³¹ that "the fear of God is the beginning of

²⁵ Perhaps from a commentary on Job. The first part resembles xxxi, 7.

²⁶ Cf. *Moralium*, Lib. xxi, par. 25. But the same thought is found frequently.

²⁷ Matt. v, 3.

²⁸ The reference is evidently mistaken. Cf. xxxi, 9.

²⁹ James ii, 2-8.

³⁰ Cf. B. Guerriaci Abbatis, *Serm. in Solemn. SS. OO., l. c.* Cf. also Bernard, *Lib. de Modo Bene Vivendi*, par. 112. But the text follows the former more closely.

³¹ Ps. cx, 10. Prov. i, 7.

wisdom"; and thus the following of God in poverty of spirit is the beginning of all holiness, as we have said. And it is for this reason that the poor in spirit are fit to be chosen as prelates to maintain the spiritual law. James says in the second chapter:—³² "Hearken to me, brethren, and keep faithfully what I say to you, for it is not those who have earthly riches who are best in the presence of God in the last judgment." Hence for that reason they are not fit to be chosen to keep the souls of all, for they do not keep their own souls because of love of the world. And therefore the poor in spirit are chosen, for the perfection with which they keep their own souls for the love of God, and for hatred of the passing world. And another reason is, because they do not take their reward in the world while waiting for the graces of God, when a noble comfort is given them, taking their ease in the judgment of God. So that it is for that reason that whoever receives the rich man on account of his riches and refuses the poor of spirit on account of his poverty, would sin ³³ manifestly against God and man—*qui vivit ac regnat Deus per omnia sæcula sæculorum*. Amen. Finit. Amen.

JAMES A. GEARY.

³² Cf. verse 5.

³³ James II, 2, 3, 9.

Notable Gift to the Library.

Catalogue of the Manuscripts and Early Printed Books
now forming Portion of the Library of J. Pierpont Morgan. Four volumes. London, 1906-7.

This beautiful set of four quarto volumes printed for private distribution is number one hundred of an edition confined to five copies printed on vellum and one hundred and seventy copies on paper. It comes as a gift from the library of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan.

No description can do justice to the beauty and artistic excellence of the workmanship of these volumes. The medieval woodcuts, the ornamental initials, the miniatures and the samples of manuscript work reproduce the originals with a skill and taste that leave nothing to be desired. Students who, either indirectly, through their interest in Church History, Ecclesiastical Liturgy or ecclesiastical art, or directly through their study of the bibliography of early printed books and medieval manuscripts, have acquired an appreciation of the art of beautiful bookmaking will enjoy and profit by the study of these volumes. In the fourth volume, especially, the student of ecclesiastical liturgy and ecclesiastical art will find many beautiful miniatures and illuminated pages which will, in default of the originals, give him an opportunity to study the Psalters, Books of Hours, etc., which form an interesting chapter in his studies. The detailed descriptions of contents and of marginal notes are valuable especially to the historian. As an example one may select the Kildare "Book of Hours," described Volume IV, 139 ff., on the margins of which are several inscriptions, here quoted, referring to the family history of the celebrated Fitzgeralds, Earls of Kildare. Among the manuscripts described and illustrated are several "Bestiaries," a treatise on Chess, texts of the "Roman de la Rose," a curious work "Of the Government of Health," etc.

RIGHT REVEREND AUSTIN DOWLING.

In elevating Father Dowling, Rector of the Cathedral of Providence, Rhode Island, to the new See of Des Moines, Iowa, the Holy See has once more honored the alumni of the Catholic University of America. Austin Dowling was born in New York City, received his education at the Sisters' Academy, Newport, R. I., and at Manhattan College, New York. He made his theological studies at Brighton Seminary, Boston. In 1890, he entered the University as a post-graduate student of theology, and was ordained priest at Providence in June, 1891. In 1892 he obtained the degree of S. T. L. His first appointment was to the Sacred Heart Church of Providence. Two years later he went to Brighton Seminary where, for four years he taught Ecclesiastical History. Later, he spent two years as editor of the *Providence Visitor*, and was successively assistant at St. Joseph's, Providence, Pastor of St. Mary's, Warren, and Rector of the Providence Cathedral. As an editor, a preacher, a lecturer and a devoted pastor, he reflected credit on the University, and his friends and admirers were not at all surprised when his talents were recognized by his appointment to the See of Des Moines. His former professors, his fellow-students at the University, his fellow-alumni, and the editorial staff of the *Bulletin* to which he was an occasional contributor, wish him a long and successful career as chief pastor of the Diocese to which he has been called.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Public Lectures. The Winter Course of Public Lectures at McMahon Hall on Thursday afternoons is attracting a good deal of attention this year. On February 15 Mr. John M. Gitterman lectured on "The Footsteps of Dante in Northern Italy." On Washington's Birthday the lecture was given by Hon. Hannis Taylor, LL. D., who chose for his subject "George Washington and the American Constitution." The following are the remaining dates and subjects: Feb. 29, "Life and Labors of Father Theobald Matthew," Rev. Walter Shanley, LL. D.; March 7, "St. Thomas Aquinas," Very Rev. Edward A. Pace, Ph. D.; March 14, "Plain Chant," Rev. Abel Gabert.

Debating Society. On February 7 the Shahan Debating Society held its annual Prize Debate, for the Cash Prize of Seventy-five Dollars presented by the Right Rev. Rector. The subject was "Resolved: That a tariff sufficient to offset the difference in the cost of production at home and abroad is desirable." On the Affirmative were Patrick F. Kerby, South Dakota; William C. Walsh, Maryland; Eugene M. Dwyer, New York. On the Negative side, John T. Clancy, New York; John L. Finn; Pennsylvania; Thomas R. Robinson, Washington, D. C. The Judges, Rev. William Turner, Professor of Logic, Dr. John C. French, of Johns Hopkins, and Hon. David J. Lewis, Representative in the House of Congress from Maryland, unanimously decided in favor of the Negative.

New Instructors. Two new instructors have been appointed in the Faculty of Law. Mr. Peter J. McLaughlin, A. B., Holy Cross (1895), LL. B., Georgetown, 1897, LL. M., Georgetown, 1898, has been appointed to teach Equity and Agency, and Mr. Walter B. Kennedy, A. B., Holy Cross, 1906, LL. B., Harvard Law School, 1909, has been appointed to teach Sales and Negotiable Instruments. Both, until their appointment, were prac-

tising lawyers at Worcester, Mass. Owing to the death of Judge William C. Robinson, Dean of the Faculty of Law, the Faculty was reorganized on February 9: Dr. Thomas C. Carrigan was appointed Acting-Dean, Professor Peter J. McLaughlin, Vice-Dean and Professor Ammi Brown, Secretary.

Department of Architecture. The first semi-annual exhibit of the work of the Department of Architecture was held last week in MacMahon Hall and an opportunity was afforded the public of viewing the results of the half-year's work in free-hand Drawing, Water Color, Design and Construction. The exhibit was arranged by Mr. Fred V. Murphy, Instructor in Architecture. It gave evidence of exceptional ability on the part of some of the students in the various branches taught in the department. The students exhibiting were: Messrs. Baum, Beall, Haaren, Baumer, Ball, Robinson, O'Neill, Murphy, McGill, McManus, Baltzley, Cronin and Druhan.

Department of Egyptology. Professor Henry Hyvernât, head of the Department of Assyriology and Egyptology is at present in Egypt in the interests of the important collection of Coptic Manuscripts henceforth to be known as the *Pierpont Morgan Collection*. He has already made a preliminary examination of the collection and pronounced it "the most complete, and, from the point of view of Christian art, the most valuable yet known." It comprises some fifty volumes, consisting chiefly of biblical manuscripts and early ecclesiastical literature. These are now in the Library of Mr. Morgan in New York. Dr. Hyvernât shares with M. Chassinat, Head of the French Institute of Archæology at Cairo, the credit of having assembled and completed the collection, a task which was accomplished only after six months of labor, and at the frequent risk of the life of the Cairo scholar. Dr. Hyvernât hopes soon after his return to America next summer to go over the collection more carefully and lay before the learned world the rich treasures of biblical, linguistic and historical lore which it contains.

The Library. The Library has just received from the Library of Mr. Pierpont Morgan four beautiful volumes containing a list of the manuscripts and early printed books now in Mr. Morgan's collection. The set is number 100 of an edition confined to five copies on vellum and one hundred and seventy-five copies on paper. The reproductions of medieval woodcuts, miniatures, and ornamented script are exceptionally beautiful, and the descriptive notes are most valuable for the student of early bibliography. The class in Library methods during the Summer Session will find this an interesting and useful contribution to the department of bibliography in the Library which has already reached the point where it may claim to be one of the most complete and systematic in the country. The department is especially strong in the bibliography of *incunabula*, and other early printed books.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII.

April, 1912.

No. 4.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

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THE END OF THE IRISH PARLIAMENT.¹

It was, I think, the late Lord Morris of Killanin, himself a stalwart champion of the parliamentary union between the component parts of the United Kingdom, who, on being asked by the charming wife of an English viceroy of Ireland to tell her what was the real cause of Irish disaffection, replied that all the trouble arose from the fact that a stupid race like the English persisted in trying to govern a clever race like the Irish. It was one of those quizzical remarks for which some of Lord Morris's countrymen are famed, and which, made, *more Hibernico*, half in jest and wholly in earnest, contain a great truth embedded in a gruff, satirical turn of expression. Its force and cogency emerge clearly after a perusal of Mr. Fisher's book. I must not, however, be taken as suggesting that Mr. Fisher's principal object is to indicate any such conclusion: far from it, for his purpose is altogether different; but his marshalling of facts, his revelation of the weakness and iniquity of the Irish parliament, and his exposure of the methods of corruption employed by the English executive in Ireland leave clearly discernible to the thinking man the basic truth that English misgovernment, flowing from callousness

¹ *The End of the Irish Parliament*, by Joseph R. Fisher. Longmans, Green, and Co., New York; London: Edward Arnold. Pp. xii + 316. 1911.

For a short preliminary review of this book see *The Catholic University Bulletin* for February, 1912.

towards the rights of a conquered nation and from a culpable unwillingness or neglect to understand the character of the race with which the rulers had to deal, was primarily responsible for most of Ireland's woes.

Swift and Whately, quoted approvingly by Mr. Fisher, have very well illustrated the attitude of English statesmen towards Irish affairs in Church and State. In his own grimly satirical way Swift describes the bishops of the Irish established church—that church in which he himself held so distinguished a position as Dean of St. Patrick's. "Excellent and moral men," he says, "have been selected upon every occasion of vacancy. But it unfortunately has uniformly happened that as these worthy divines crossed Hounslow Heath, on their road to Ireland to take possession of their bishopricks, they have been regularly robbed and murdered by the highwaymen frequenting that common, who seize upon their robes and patents, come over to Ireland, and are consecrated bishops in their stead." And Whately, who had studied his subject at close range, is no less pungent when speaking of the civil governors. "People who think it easy to govern Ireland," he says, "because it is poor, half-civilised, and full of ignorance, are like the medical student who imagined that he had learned enough of medicine to doctor very little children."

There we have the keynote of the whole disgraceful situation: the tyranny and extermination of Elizabethan, Jacobean, and Cromwellian days were succeeded by the savage religious enactments of the reign of Anne; and when religious persecution had in some degree abated in practice, it gave way in turn to a coldness, a want of sympathy, and an almost invincible ignorance of the wants and requirements, the ideas, feelings, and aspirations of the Irish people. In Mr. Fisher's forcible language, the English conquerors "no more dreamt of providing a Parliament for the 'Irish enemy' than did the New England colonists for the Indians who had inhabited the territories lying round Massachusetts Bay. To them the native Irish outside the Pale were public enemies, and were treated as such . . . The overwhelming bulk of the Irish people stood aloof and lived their own lives" (p. 4).

In their dealings with the sister country, especially from the sixteenth century onward, the cardinal error of English statesmen, for which they stand condemned at the bar of history, was the dispossession of the ancient owners of the land of Ireland, the presentation of the titles to their property to a horde of adventurers and planters, and the consequent impoverishment, generally accompanied by the outlawry, of the masses of the population. This policy, initiated by Henry II. and developed to an extraordinary pitch under Elizabeth, was continued with a will by her successors. Its evil results have been apparent even down to our own times. They were particularly noticeable during the reigns of Anne and the Georges. For the greater part of the eighteenth century anything more wretched than the condition of the peasantry of Ireland the annals of mankind can scarcely show. Their religion proscribed, their priests banned, their property assessed for tithes to support an alien church, their children and themselves debarred from education, their country periodically swept by famine, the land let at rack-rents to sub-tenant under sub-tenant, six deep, so that even at the best of times potatoes and water were the staple food of the common people, is it any wonder that they were ultimately goaded into revolt against the system, and that their many wrongs came to a head in such movements as those originated by the Whiteboys and the Defenders? If there has been an "Irish Question," it is mainly because there have been bad land laws, and if there were bad land laws, it was mainly because the English conquerors did not give themselves a thought about the application of the first principle of good government, namely, the happiness and welfare of the people governed. The "mere Irish" were left out of account: the concern of English rulers for centuries was only with the party of ascendancy, which, in a very literal sense, acted as a garrison for overawing and holding down the conquered natives.

All this is told in masterly fashion, if with slightly provoking historical calm, by Mr. Fisher. Further, in pursuance of his thesis, he takes special pains to show, first, that the so-called Irish parliament was never really representative of the majority

of the people of Ireland, the Nonconformists, who were specially strong in the province of Ulster, being barred from membership thereof from 1704 until 1780, and the Catholics being excluded not only from membership but even, until 1793, from a vote towards the election of its members; and, secondly, that the shifting and vacillating policy of the government in England resulted in leaving the great majority of the inhabitants of Ireland a prey to the "Undertakers" and a few great families, who engineered the parliament as a machine for wholesale jobbery and for the promotion of their own interests, wholly irrespective of the rights of the remainder of the population.

It is only when he gets down to Grattan's parliament and the carrying of the Union that Mr. Fisher runs counter to generally received opinions. The proposition that he sets himself to prove is that, contrary to the belief of most Irishmen, the much belauded Irish constitution which is known by Grattan's name was "surely the most impotent and unworkable machine ever devised by the wit of man" (p. 135), that it was, in fact, "little better than a patent absurdity" (p. 218), and that, from 1782 on, the union of the British and Irish parliaments was a logical necessity, as inevitable as the crack of doom.

Mr. Fisher begins his account of the end of the Irish parliament with the viceroyalty of Lord Townshend (1767-1772), whom he holds up for an admiration that hitherto has not been usually accorded, and thereafter he carries us interestingly along through the rule of the Harcourts, the Carlises, the Rutlands, and the rest, until he brings us up fairly and squarely before Cornwallis and Castlereagh and the Earl of Clare. Of necessity in this account he introduces us to the agrarian revolt in South and North, the exploits of Paul Jones and the *Ranger* in Carrickfergus Bay in 1778, the consequent Volunteer Movement, Grattan's Declaration of Independence, Pitt's Commercial Propositions, the Peep o' Day Boys and the Defenders, the organisation of the United Irishmen, the plots, plans, attempts, and failure of Wolfe Tone, the Rebellion of 1798, and the final scene of the Union. Here and there, too, we get most interesting

glimpses of the world movements of the American and French Revolutions and of their effect upon Irish feelings and ideas.

He who undertakes the perusal of this volume without an intimate knowledge of the history of the period under review to serve as a corrective to Mr. Fisher's *ex parte* statements, or with prejudices derived from the wholesale inaccuracies of successive generations of stump orators, will receive many an unpleasant jar. If such a one takes Mr. Fisher for guide, he will be made sullenly to realise that several of his idols have feet of clay, he will see with amazement many brilliant reputations dimmed, and, stranger still, he will find one or two of the blacker characters of popular imagination unexpectedly whitewashed. Among those who come under the lash are Flood, Foster, Fox, and Burke; but however it may be with the counts brought against these, Mr. Fisher will find few to agree with him in his estimate of Grattan; and surely it is a stiffer task than even he can accomplish to rehabilitate in the good opinion of Irishmen Castlereagh or Pitt or "black Jack" Fitzgibbon.

That Molyneux in 1698 sighed for a union, that the Irish Lords and Commons petitioned Queen Anne for it in 1703 and 1707, and that Montesquieu and Adam Smith and other philosophers and statesmen raised their voices in its favour throughout the century, are interesting sidelights let in on the history of the question, which will, however, be new only to those who are not familiar with the works of previous writers.

The religious difficulty here, as elsewhere in the troubled pages of Irish history, plays a prominent part. Readers of a historian like Lecky will moult no feather when told by Mr. Fisher that the Catholic bishops, the leaders of the Catholic laity, and the masses of the Catholics so far as their opinion was ascertained, were in favour of the Union, and that some of them fought strenuously for its accomplishment. Thus Dr. Lennan, Bishop of Dromore, led the newly enfranchised members of his flock to such effect in Newry in 1799 that he was in a position to report to Dr. Troy, Archbishop of Dublin, that

"the Catholics stuck together like the Macedonian phalanx, and with ease were able to turn the scale in favour of the Chancellor of the Exchequer." This Chancellor of the Exchequer was Isaac Corry, an out-and-out supporter of the Union, who had been appointed to his office in succession to Sir John Parnell, dismissed for opposing that measure. A more surprising example of the irony of history is supplied by the experience of Maurice Fitzgerald, the Knight of Kerry. "Having accepted office," he says, "as a supporter of the Union, I went to two elections pending the measure, and was returned without opposition in a county where the Roman Catholic interest greatly preponderated, and a declaration almost unanimous in favour of the Union proceeded from the County of Kerry. . . . One of my most strenuous supporters in bringing forward that declaration was Mr. Maurice O'Connell, a gentleman of wealth, respectability, and decided loyalty, uncle of Mr. Daniel O'Connell, and my most active partisan on the occasion was Mr. John O'Connell, brother of Mr. Daniel O'Connell."

This action of the Catholics is easily understood if viewed in the light of two great facts: the attitude of Irish Protestants and of the Irish Parliament towards their faith, and their reliance on Pitt's pledges as to the measures for Catholic relief which were immediately to follow the Union. On the first point, which doubtless was obvious enough at the time, there has been an extreme divergence of opinion since. Mr. Fisher takes the most sinister view of all. But there are some who go a good part of the way with him. Thus Dr. J. R. O'Connell, in a lecture delivered quite recently in Dublin, tells us that "in reading the proceedings of the Irish Parliament the thought that rises uppermost in one's mind is the narrowness and bigotry, as well as the pettiness and arrogance, which marked all the proceedings, from the least to the greatest." Even Mr. Erskine Childers in his book in favour of Home Rule² is somewhat hard on Grattan's Parliament. The gen-

² *The Framework of Home Rule*, by Erskine Childers. London: Edward Arnold.

erally accepted Irish view is that expressed by a writer in *Sinn Féin* last December. Speaking of Grattan's Parliament, he says, with some slight inaccuracy as to dates:—

“Its faults and vices are notorious. But they were the faults and vices of its age. Its virtues were its own. When the mob of London, led by a British nobleman, were chasing English Catholics through the streets of the British capital, the Parliament of Ireland was using its regained liberties to strike the heaviest shackles from the Irish Catholic's limbs. With a hundred thousand English bayonets at its breast and the wealth of England opened to corrupt it, 130 of the 300 members of the Irish Parliament were found equally impervious to intimidation and bribery. No contemporary legislature menaced by power and cajoled by corruption made so strong a resistance. It was not to crush an anti-Irish Parliament that the English Minister provoked civil war in Ireland and lavished millions of money.”

A more temperate but equally enthusiastic tribute was once paid by Isaac Butt. At the Home Rule Conference held in November, 1873, he thus delivered himself on the subject:—

“A Protestant Parliament, elected exclusively by Protestants, it had repealed the Penal Laws which ground down the Catholic people. In 1793 it admitted the mass of the people to share political power with their fellow countrymen. In that year it gave Catholics the elective franchise, long before their exclusion was removed in England; and in the same year the degrees of the University of Dublin were opened to Catholics, a measure of liberality which English Universities have imitated within the last few years. It was the same Protestant Parliament that established and endowed a Catholic College for Catholic Priests. It is hard for us now, in the advance of liberal opinions, to realise all that was involved in these measures. But when we remember that a Parliament representing a portion of the people who enjoyed a monopoly of political power, of the learned professions, of the landed property of the country, had gone thus far in admitting their Catholic fellow-countrymen to a share in all these, we may well believe with O'Connell that, if that Parliament had not been extinguished, a very few years would have seen the removal of every religious disability and the admission of the Catholic people to a full participation in all the privileges of the Constitution.”

Lecky's tribute to the liberalism of the Irish Parliament is well known. “It was,” he writes, “during the period of its

independence probably more free from religious bigotry than any body that had ever sat in the United Kingdom."

In spite, however, of all this *ex post facto* testimony, it seemed as if the Catholics had not much to expect from the Irish parliament after 1795. Mr. Fisher proves that even the half-measure of relief granted by the Act of 1793 was primarily the work of Pitt and Dundas. And there were not wanting danger signals in plenty. When the second Dungannon Convention of the Volunteers was held in September, 1783, an amendment moved, in favour of the Catholics, to a resolution declaring that the elective franchise should be extended "to those, and those only, who will exercise it for the public good," was defeated, and Lord Charlemont considered the attempt as "the first appearance of that unaccountable frenzy which afterwards became so dangerously epidemical." Even Grattan, who in 1795 introduced a Bill to admit Catholics to seats in parliament, only to see it rejected by his fellow-members, and who afterwards in the British House of Commons most earnestly championed the Catholic cause, could write thus in 1792:—

"I love the Roman Catholic. I am a friend of his liberty, but it is only in as much as his liberty is entirely consistent with your ascendancy, and an addition to the strength and freedom of the Protestant community. These being my principles, and the Protestant interest my first object, you may judge that I shall never assent to any measure tending to shake the security of property in this kingdom, or to subvert the Protestant ascendancy."

If it was so in the green wood, how was it likely to be in the dry? Clearly, Catholics had no great reason to expect from men in such a frame of mind any speedy or extensive relief from the grievous disabilities under which they still laboured.

In addition to their other anxieties the Catholic Bishops were apprehensive of the spread of the principles of the French Revolution and of secret societies among their people. Harassed on every side, they looked more to the Parliament of England than to the Parliament of Ireland to bring about a more tolerable condition of affairs. When Grattan found them unani-

mous for the Union he denounced them as "a band of prostituted men," and hinted that they were in the pay of the government; they have since at odd intervals been greatly blamed for their supposed want of patriotism in the matter, and I suppose it is one of those subjects on which controversy will be never-ending; but, looking at the question impartially now after the lapse of more than a century, one is almost forced to the conclusion that they followed the path along which, as it seemed, true liberty led them.

For on the second point noted above, the relief for Catholics, there appeared to be no possibility of doubt. Pitt and Castle-reagh were pledged up to the hilt to grant, as a sequel to the Union, complete Catholic Emancipation, with state recognition of the Catholic as well as of the Episcopalian and Presbyterian Churches, and a thorough reform of the system of tithes. That they were prevented from carrying out these promises by the treachery of their colleagues and the blind obstinacy of the King is one of the saddest episodes in the long drawn out story of Ireland's wrongs. Of course the two ministers resigned (1801): as honourable men they could do nothing else; but the Union stood and the grievances of the Catholics remained. A few years later (1804) Pitt, to his eternal discredit, headed a ministry pledged against Catholic Emancipation, and not all Mr. Fisher's special pleading can clear him of the stigma that indelibly attaches to such an abandonment of principle.

Taken all in all, *The End of the Irish Parliament* is a stimulating book. It will bear reading and re-reading. It has also its warning. The Union, which the author has so ingeniously defended, has been tried for 112 years, and has been found wanting. Almost from the beginning attempts were made to have it repealed. Now that we are confronted with what seems a genuine determination to dissolve or, at least, to amend it, and to give to Ireland not a sectional but a thoroughly representative Parliament of her own, Mr. Fisher's volume is to be regarded as a timely publication. It sheds so lurid a light on the defects of Grattan's Parliament that

it ought to be impossible to repeat them. The attention of British and Irish statesmen should be focused especially on the following passage:—

“Grattan’s Parliament . . . could talk and it could vote or refuse certain additional taxes: but the bulk of the income of the country came from the hereditary revenue which was independent of the vote of Parliament, and which, honestly collected and administered, would render the executive—nominated in England—independent of additional votes. It could pass resolutions, but it had no authority subject to its orders to carry them out. No number of votes of censure in Parliament could shake the position of the Viceroy and his Chief Secretary, who held their offices under the Great Seal of England. It could pass Bills, now that Poynings’ Law was gone, without previously submitting them in turn to the Irish and to the English Privy Council. But they only became statutes, as we have said, when they came under the Great Seal of England, and that Seal could only be applied by the English King on the advice of his English Councillors.”

Care should be taken that the Irish parliament to be established by the Home Rule Bill of 1912 is subject to no such limitations.

P. J. LENNOX.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

A GREAT SOUTH AMERICAN SCIENTIST—FRANCISCO JOSÉ DE CALDAS.

In the year 1910 there were feasts and rejoicings in one of our sister republics of the American continent. Meetings were held, speeches were delivered; there reigned in the whole country an enthusiasm which had not been witnessed since the foundation of the republic. Colombia was celebrating the centenary of her independence.

The lives and deeds of the founders of the nation were brought once more before the public eye. Many points of interest were made known, which had been forgotten or overlooked. All who are interested in South American affairs shared Colombia's enthusiasm. We learned to admire her heroes, to sympathize with her history, to peruse the works of her poets and scientists.

I propose in this modest essay to give to the American people a slight idea of one of the purest glories of the Colombian nation. Francisco José de Caldas united in his person many titles to the admiration of posterity. He was at the same time a scientist, an educator, a patriot. After devoting all the resources of his genius to raise the intellectual and moral level of his countrymen, he shed his blood in their defence. All Colombians venerate him as a martyr to liberty.

Of special interest to us Catholics is a man who, in the midst of a revolution inspired by the *Contrat Social*, wrote these eloquent lines:

"Great God, how shall we acknowledge the benefits due to thy kindness? Thou didst save us from the hands of our enemies; save us now from our passions; inspire us with gentleness, humility, moderation; implant all virtues in our hearts; mould the empire of New Granada. In this Thy work shall we adore Thee; we shall sing Thy praise and offer Thee the sacrifice of our hearts, the most grateful in Thine eyes."

The traveler who, having started from the seaport of Buenaventura, on the Pacific coast, has journeyed westward across the

Andes, finds himself face to face with one of the most sublime spectacles which the human eye is able to contemplate. A narrow, winding road leads you to the top of the Cordillera. You follow it day after day, surrounded with virgin forests, without horizon, seeing nothing but the path before you and the huge trees on either side; when, at a winding of the road, you suddenly stop, your soul filled with the amazement which overpowers man at the sight of the infinite. You have before your eyes an immense valley extending on either side as far as your sight can reach. In front of you, almost at the farthest limit of the horizon, you see a bluish elevation of ground above the level of the valley. It is the Middle Cordillera. A luxuriant tropical vegetation fills the whole scenery spread before you. The king of the valley, the Cauca river, hidden under the bamboos, now and then appears as a winding, silvery thread in the centre of the landscape. At the foot of the mountain, a classic Spanish town displays her exceedingly white houses and a net of streets intended to run at right angles and giving you the impression of an awkwardly constructed chessboard. It is Cali, the Eden of the Andes.

The length of the Cauca Valley, from Popayan, at its southern extremity, to Cartago, on the North, is nearly two hundred miles. Its width between the Western and the Central Cordillera is more than fifty miles. "The Cauca Valley is the land of intelligence and valor," said John Montalvo. According to Garcia Zamudio, its capital, Popayan, has furnished to Colombia most of her great men.

In the city of Popayan, Francisco José de Caldas was born on the 25th of September, 1771. The New Kingdom of Granada was at that time one of the most precious jewels of the crown of the Spanish kings. The North American colonies had not yet proclaimed their independence. The French Revolution had not caused the magic word of liberty to resound throughout the world. There was for the Spanish monarch no reason to doubt that he would forever be the peaceful possessor of the most beautiful part of the New World.

Caldas's early years were spent in his native town. In the Seminary of Popayan, he learned the rudiments of religion and

science. He studied Latin, mathematics and philosophy. In the mathematical studies he chiefly delighted. His biographers tell us that after spending the day at the college he would sit up by night and meditate for long hours on the great problems brought before his mind. His health being undermined by excessive work, his mother would deprive him of candles to compel him to retire; but the boy, after feigning to sleep, would get up again and resume his study.

At the age of seventeen, Francisco was sent to Bogota to devote himself to the study of the law. On the 21st of October, 1788, he entered the College of the Rosary. This famous educational center had been founded in 1653 by the Archbishop of Bogota, Cristobal de Torres. In the eighteenth century, its fame attracted youths from all parts of the New Kingdom. Endowed with republican institutions in the midst of an absolute monarchy, it implanted within the hearts of its members the seeds of that patriotism which was soon destined to give so splendid fruits.

After completing his studies in Bogota, and obtaining the degree of Doctor of Laws, Caldas returned to his native city, where he arrived in the year 1793. Caldas's ambition at that time was to devote his whole life to the pursuit of science. Unhappily, his means were scant, and he had to seek some remunerative employment. He then applied himself to commerce, but with little success. From a financial point of view, his commercial transactions were seldom happy. Far from engrossing his mind to the point of making him forget his favorite studies, they often furnished him favorable opportunities of acquiring some new scientific data. Thus, having made a journey to Bogota in 1796 in search of articles of commerce, he saw for the first time Lelande's *Astronomy* and some other scientific works which were destined to exert a considerable influence on his future career.

The pursuit of science was no easy task in New Granada during the eighteenth century. Books were scarce and instruments unknown. Jorge Juan's *Observaciones astronómicas* was the only scientific work Caldas was able to find in Popayan. Unable to obtain the instruments he wanted, he formed the

gigantic plan of making them himself. He first succeeded in constructing a gnomon. Being then in need of a pendulum and of a chronometer, he made use of an old English clock that lay abandoned in a corner of the house, and, by means of a few alterations, modified it so as to suit his purpose. In 1799, he constructed a telescope, with which he was able to study the satellites of Jupiter.

In the year 1800, having ascended Mount Puracé in company with some of his friends, there flashed before his mind the thought that the height of mountains could be measured by means of the thermometer. The heat of boiling water, he thought, is proportional to the atmospheric pressure, and the atmospheric pressure is proportional to the height above the level of the sea. The heat of boiling water may show us therefore the atmospheric pressure, and hence the altitude at which our experiments are performed. He at once began a series of experiments to confirm his discovery. He calculated various altitudes by means of both barometer and thermometer, and the results of his calculations filled him with joy. He resolved, however, not to publish at once the discovery he had made. Was it really a discovery? Had not some European scientist formulated long before the principle that had just dawned upon his mind? And Caldas thus waited until some opportunity would enable him to find out whether his theory was really unknown to the world.

The desired opportunity soon presented itself. In April, 1801, Caldas learned with the most vivid joy that the famous German naturalist, Baron Humboldt, had just landed in Cartagena and was about to undertake a scientific expedition through New Granada and Ecuador. Caldas met Humboldt in Ibarra on the last day of the year 1801. The German scientist was not long in discovering the talents of his youthful admirer. "Mr. Caldas," wrote he in his *Relations of Travels*, "is a wonder in astronomy. Born in the darkness of Popayan, having never traveled further than Santa Fe, he has constructed a barometer, a sector, a telescope. He draws meridians, he measures latitude by means of gnomons. What would not that young man do in a country where he would not be compelled to learn every-

thing by himself!" Caldas's earnest desire was to accompany Humboldt in his expedition. Through the influence of a Spanish scientist then residing in Bogota, and director of a Botanical Expedition, José Celestino Mutis, he obtained from the government the defrayment of all the expenses of the journey. But Humboldt would not have him as a companion and preferred to travel alone.

This was not the only time New Granada had some reason to complain of her German guest. Caldas disclosed to Humboldt his theory as to the measurement of altitudes. Humboldt acknowledged the originality of the idea; but, on his return to Germany, he published an account of his expedition, and in a chapter entitled "Degrees of Heat of boiling water at different altitudes," there appeared the following lines:

"The degree of heat acquired by liquids before ebullition depends on the weight of the atmosphere; and, as the weight varies with the altitude above the level of the sea, each altitude has its corresponding point of ebullition. In the course of my travels, I made numerous experiments on the ebullition of water on the summit of the Andes. I propose to publish them, with some others performed by Mr. Caldas, of Popayan, a distinguished physicist who has devoted himself with an uncommon ardor to astronomy and many branches of natural history."

Not a word in these lines makes us aware of the fact that this Mr. Caldas of Popayan is the discoverer of the law. We are simply told that he performed a few experiments, and are even left under the impression that he performed them under Humboldt's direction.

The disappointment experienced by Caldas on being unable to join Humboldt's expedition did not cause him to abandon his plans. Endowed with an extraordinary degree of will power, he was one of those noble souls for whom obstacles and difficulties are mere incitements to action. In that same year we see him undertaking on his own accord various scientific expeditions. Now he explores the volcano of Imbabura, not visited by Humboldt, and almost loses his life; later he dwells among the Peruvian Indians, studying the customs and the architecture of the Incas. We finally find him in the forests

of Ecuador, engaged in one of the tasks for which posterity thanks him most, the study and classification of the numerous varieties of cinchonas. For, although his thirst for knowledge would lead him to explore all departments of science, there were a few fields which attracted his attention mostly, and botany was one of these. In 1801, Mutis, knowing his enthusiasm for botany, had sent him Linnaeus's *Philosophia Botanica*, which Caldas studied and made his own. Later, Caldas was ambitious to join Mutis's famous Botanical Expedition, and, in point of fact, became its most conspicuous member. And thus, in the years 1804 and 1805, Caldas travelled through the Andean forests, engaged in the study of the cinchona and made important discoveries and for the first time a thorough classification of the varieties of one of the most interesting and useful members of the vegetable kingdom.

An attack of malaria acquired in the forests of Ecuador while studying the plant which was destined to become a specific for that same disease hardly interrupted his work. Almost at the same time, we find him in Bogota taking charge of an astronomical observatory recently constructed and which, to use Caldas's poetic expression, was "the first temple erected to Urania on the New Continent."

A new phase of Caldas's activity now presents itself to us. European periodical publications have not seldom praised the Colombian nation for the interest taken by her great men in the education of youth. If we open the catalogue of a Colombian college, we generally find among the members of its faculty some of the most eminent men of the nation. This reminds us of Socrates devoting his genius to the education of the Athenian youth, and we ask ourselves whether it is only on account of her literary achievements that Bogota has been called the Athens of South America. The same spirit reigned in New Granada at the dawn of the nineteenth century. In 1793, we already find Caldas giving lectures in the law school of the University of Popayan. In 1809, in spite of the excessive work entailed by his scientific researches, he managed to teach in the College of the Rosary.

His teaching was not limited to the professor's chair. His

influence through the press was also very great. In *El Semanario del Nuevo Reino de Granada*, which he founded in 1808, there appeared articles on agriculture, industry, commerce, science, all that could make the country greater and more prosperous. With all his might and main he endeavored to excite in the hearts of the Colombian youth a love for scientific pursuits. "Let us recognize," wrote he in 1799, "that the cultivation of a science is an almost insuperable barrier to vice. Would that parents were convinced of this truth! Would that, instead of threatening and chastising their children, they would give them a taste for some field of science! Young men would then be less vicious, wiser and better."

The *Semanario* soon opened competitions for the solution of the most important social and economical questions which then interested the country and counted among its contributors the most eminent men New Granada then possessed. The Colombians are unanimous in asserting that, since Caldas's day, there has not appeared in the republic so notable a periodical as *El Semanario*.

The year 1810 is a memorable date in South American history. It marks the beginning of the great struggle which was to continue for so many years and to snatch from the domains of the Spanish monarch an entire continent. But, how much blood was to be shed before the newborn republics could peacefully enjoy their independence! How many heroes were destined to die without witnessing the freedom of their country!

While Bolivar combatted the Spaniards with the sword, Caldas attacked them with the pen. He understood that the revolution could not be successful unless the people were instructed. In collaboration with Joaquin Camacho, he founded the *Diario Politico*, the first number of which appeared on the 27th of August, 1810. The South Americans were thus able to understand what grievances had led to the war, what were the aims and the hopes of the revolutionists. With a wisdom seldom found in great political crises, Caldas took pains to make plain what true liberty is: "What is liberty?" asked he, "Does it consist in breaking all law and all respect? In shaking off the yoke of all moral and civil obligation? In giving course

and satisfaction to all passions? By no means. This would be libertinage, an accumulation of all vices and all evils."

"A free man is the man who obeys the law and is not subject to the caprice and the passions of the rulers."

"We must be slaves to the law in order to be free."

"To be free, it is necessary to be virtuous. Without virtue there is no freedom. A corrupted people cannot be free."

"We have had enough valor to conquer liberty; shall we have enough virtue to preserve it?"

A new mission was soon confided to Caldas. In 1812, on taking possession of the presidency of Cundinamarca, General Nariño appointed him captain of engineers. And he who had just instructed the public through the press now instructed the army in the science of war.

His activity was then unequalled. We see him almost at the same time in all parts of the country engaged in the fortification of towns, in the manufacture of gunpowder, in the organization of artillery establishments. In Medellin, he founded a school of military engineering in which all that could lead to the success of the war was carefully studied.

It was no easy task to dislodge the Spaniard from the American soil. Often, during the great war, the future appeared gloomy and the patriots were disheartened. In 1816, Morillo and Enrile arrived from Spain with the purpose of reconquering the American colonies at any cost. All means appeared lawful in their eyes and the reign of terror began.

In the southern part of the country the cause of the revolutionists soon became desperate. The patriots were defeated at Cuchilla del Tambo and Popayan was captured. On hearing of these dismal events, Caldas hastened to the point where his presence was most needed; but he was captured with some friends in his mansion of Paispamba, in that same mansion where he had lived so many happy days with his family, and where he had made his first scientific experiments.

Many of his friends at once took a deep interest in his fate. Even his captor, Muñoz, offered him facilities to escape; but, since the same facilities were refused to his companions in captivity, he rejected the proposal as an insult to his dignity.

Life was dear to him, however. He craved to live to see the freedom of his country; he craved to complete his scientific pursuits. And he therefore wrote a letter to Enrile asking him to pardon his life for the benefit of science. "Spain needs no scientists," was the answer he received. Let us believe that these harsh words were not the expression of the will of a nation which was destined to give Ramon y Cajal to the world.

The College of the Rosary, where Caldas had learned the rudiments of science, where later he had so generously contributed to the education of the Colombian youth, now became his prison. Between its walls he learned the fatal sentence. In the same cloister he had so dearly loved, he prepared his soul for the great journey. On the 29th of October, 1816, the greatest South American was shot by the Spaniards as a traitor to the king. He breathed his last with the valor of the hero; but the cause he had espoused did not die. Colombia is now free; and, after one hundred years, the memory of the man who gave his life for her freedom is universally venerated.

JOSEPH L. PERRIER.

THE NEW IRISH ART.

The work of the "Irish Players," about which we hear so many varied opinions at the present day, is not purely Irish in character. The genuine Irish drama is written in the Irish language, but, being in its infancy and dealing largely with the ephemeral topics suggested by Gaelic propagandism, it has hardly reached the standard of genius, nor does it display as much brilliancy and wit as the works of the Anglo-Irish playwrights. There is an important difference between the spirit of the Anglo-Irish drama and that of the purely Gaelic movement. The former is not a child, though it may be called a cousin of the Gaelic League. Both are to be traced to a wide-spread tendency towards a Gaelic renaissance, which during the last century began to assert itself in more directions than one. That is the only connection between the work of the Irish Players and the Gaelic League. Members of the Anglo-Irish Dramatic Society are not officials of the Gaelic League, nor distinguished Gaelic scholars. Unlike the Anglo-Irish dramatic movement, the Gaelic League is often, though not necessarily, Catholic in spirit, since the Irish language itself is so redolent of the purest Catholicity, that its revival, like the romantic renaissance, cannot fail to turn many minds to things Catholic. Ordinarily salutations in Irish are generally prayers, such as, "God bless you," and the answer, "God and Mary bless you." It is the only language in which one finds a separate name for the Blessed Virgin, *Muire*, while *Maire* is the name for any other Mary.

The chief figures in the Anglo-Irish dramatic movement are W. B. Yeats, J. M. Synge, P. Colum, and Lady Gregory. Yeats and Synge are the greater lights and the others are subordinate satellites revolving round these central luminaries. Before turning his attention to drama, Yeats was a poet of considerable standing. One of his lyric poems, "The Lake

Island of Innisfree," created a literary sensation, and was admired by Robert Louis Stevenson, to whom it came as a new revelation. The poem is supposed to voice the feelings of an Irishman in America, who is dreaming of a joyous return to Ireland:—

'I will arise and go now, and go to Innisfree
And a small cabin build there, of clay and wattles made
Nine bean rows will I have there, a hive for the honey-bee
And live alone in the bee-loud glade.

And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow
Dropping from the veils of the evening to where the cricket sings
There midnight's all a glimmer, and noon a purple glow
And evening full of the linnet's wings.

Whether in ode or in drama, it were vain to deny that Yeats reveals himself as a true poet. He sees the uncommon ideal in the common concrete. He sees the glory of all true womanhood in a tiny tress of hair. Even the beauty often associated with ugliness does not escape his art, as flagger-lilies are seen to spring from stagnant pools. He is able to gild the common dust of Irish country life. Through the rare alchemy of imaginative insight, tinkers are in his pages transformed into seers, and peasants into poets. In small things perceiving great mysteries, and symbols of a higher Reality, his mystic sense can discern a Divinity pronouncing oracles through the tossing reed, the moaning wind, and the curlew's cry.

The message of Yeats's poetry and drama is one of joy, rapture, ecstasy. He tries to infuse more joy into the world, a mystical kind of joy. But unfortunately, it is the joy of the pagan, rather than the Christian. Regarding the invisible as the true Reality, and conceiving the dreams of poets and seers to be realities and the ordinary actualities of life to be passing dreams, he does not ultimately rest in external nature. Joy, obtained by a mystic contemplation, he identifies with God. The method by which he enforces his central idea is a kind of anarchistic lawlessness. Yeats, in his dramas and poems, expresses contempt for law and rule and measure; like a true disciple of Ibsen he says that "law was the first sin."

What is justified in the ideas of Yeats? There must be some life-giving principle as a basis for the wide appeal which his poetry makes. A poem without reality is written on sand; without it a poet cannot make a name in literature. The grain of reality underlying this anarchistic method is that genius is above ordinary law. The modern dramatic movement as manifested in England and America, dealing largely with such matters as the life of the upper classes, and other ephemeral conditions, provoked the serious displeasure of Yeats. Individuality was necessary, that quality which makes a writer a *genus* in himself, which presents a mind not mortgaged to any man, or body of men, or set of conventional opinions. His contempt for conventionality, however, is carried beyond bounds; in the exclusion of law Yeats makes no exception. An example of his method is found in "The Wanderings of Oisín," in which the celebrated hero of the Fenian cycle of legend is represented as returning to the world after death:—

. You stars
 You slaves of God
 He rules you with an iron rod
 He holds you with an iron bond,
 Each one woven to the other
 Each one woven to his brother
 Like bubbles in a frozen pond.
 But we
 Unchainable
 With hearts that know nor law nor rule.

As machinery to convey the message of his poems he uses the Fianna, or ancient Irish warriors, whom he represents with flesh and blood before our eyes. Also he makes use of fairies, spirits who are supposed to haunt the old forts of Ireland. The machinery here becomes very delicate, and it is difficult, at times, to understand the full meaning of Yeats. The fairies are very happy people, yet with a strain of sadness. According to the poem called "The Host of the Air" a woman is spirited away by the fairies, and her husband hears one of them playing the bagpipes in her presence:—

He heard while he sang and dreamed
A piper piping away
And never was piping so sad
And never was piping so gay.

And he saw young men and young girls
Who danced in a level place
And Bridget his bride among them
With a sad and a gay face.

But Bridget drew him by the sleeve
Away from the merry bands
To old men playing at cards
With a twinkling of ancient hands.

Yeats also makes use of sensible objects as the symbols of another world. He speaks of "the incorruptible Rose," symbol of the ideal that will never die. Inebriation, "the redness of wine," symbolizes mystical joy.

In his drama, "Where There is Nothing," he gives free scope to his wild method of anarchistic lawlessness. According to the plot an aristocrat in Ireland determines to join a band of "tinkers," who are a sort of Bohemians traveling around Ireland, doing no work, and leading a Gipsy life. He becomes a prominent member of the company, and in trances he gets skilled in seeing visions and dreaming dreams. When at length his failing health renders him unfit for this reckless life, the tinkers leave him in a monastery. Here he preaches, surrounded by nine or ten candles. He extinguishes the first candle, saying while doing so, "I put out Law." Extinguishing another, he says, "I put out Thought, the waster of life." Quenching another, he says in substance, "I put out Cities, we must get back to the Earth—the old way of living." Extinguishing another, he says, "I put out the Church," and thus he continues, "putting out" Work, and, finally, the external World itself. The only thing left is Laughter with cruel claws made to tear aside everything else. There remains joy in excess—one idea characteristic of all Yeats' writings. "Where there is nothing, there is joy, there is God." In this play he fulfills his own wild maxim: "Get your pick to root out the foundations of the world." He abuses a tiny

germ of truth that gives the drama the only poetic reality and life which it possesses. Yeats does not clearly express it, for there encircles him a druidic cloud of perverted mysticism. The great Catholic mystics, during contemplation, concentrated their ideas for the time on one being,—namely, God, and excluded aught else, even religious symbols. Even the Church itself is only something that enables us to obtain eternal life; it is but a means to an end, and the end is inner sanctification. Yeats follows those great Catholic mystics, but at how great a distance! In this play he dares to represent several monks, who dishonour God's altar with mystical exaggerations, which might be worthy of the Dionysian mysteries, but could only dishonour Catholic worship.

He composed another dramatic orgy with the same message but with different machinery—"The Unicorn from the Stars." A peasant, suffering from epilepsy, sees in a vision a unicorn trampling the whole world and treading the mystic grapes of joy. In imitation of this Heavenly anarchist the seer tries to destroy the Church, Law, Cities and everything else. He admits in the end that he did not see the vision properly; he made a mistake by transferring it to the region of fact, and trying to subvert the Church and Law. The purpose of the vision was revelation, not revolution,—a distinction which will not blind our eyes to the misleading and anarchistic tendency of the play, since revelation is of little account except as an appeal to action.

A drama of Yeats, which is not merely unobjectionable, but instructive from the religious standpoint, is "The Hour-Glass." The chief characters are a wiseman and a fool. The wiseman is a scientist who has come to the conclusion that there is no God. He could not discover God with his instruments. A fool meets him, and gives expression to his religious faith, but is laughed to scorn. To the scientist Hell, Heaven, and Purgatory are all a dream. The wiseman has encountered a monk in controversy, and the latter is defeated by means of the dialectics and rhetoric of the former. The wiseman is satisfied,—another Haeckel with the riddle of the world answered.

But a disturbing element is introduced,—an angel is represented as coming to his door. He recollects that long ago he saw some one like the visitor in his prayers. Told that he has but one hour to live, he demurs and tries to change the allotted time, but the angel is inexorable; when the sand drops in the hour-glass, he must depart from life. He is informed, however, that, if he can bring one person back to the old faith, he will enter Heaven. He approaches his wife, whose mind he has perverted, but she believes nothing beyond the material world. He questions his children thinking that they may not have fully lost the faith. As even they do not believe, he is in despair, when the fool arrives. He asks the fool if he believes, and for awhile the fool mocks him but ultimately confesses that he does believe in Hell, Heaven, and Purgatory. The drama represents the folly of the wise, and the wisdom of fools. It owes nothing to the creative faculty of Yeats, as in almost every detail it is found in an ancient Irish legend. (See Lady Wilde, *Ancient Irish Legends*, The Priest's Soul.)

A drama with a patriotic motive is "Cathleen Ni Hoolihan"—symbol of Ireland. According to the plot an old woman is seen coming towards a farmer's house. The old woman is Cathleen Ni Hoolihan, or Erin. The peasants believe that she is an old beggar woman, and they interrogate her about her history. They ask her if she is old, and she replies that she is very old. They ask her if she ever got married, and she says that she did not, but that she has had innumerable lovers who were ready to die for her. The farmer's son is about to marry a peasant girl, but the old woman tells him that he must put away everything to follow her. This plot recalls the sacrifice demanded of the rich young man in the Gospel. Later in the play the bent old woman of the ages, the Erin that was, is transformed into a stately and beautiful queen, the Erin that shall be.

"The Countess Cathleen" deals with a similar topic, but is not so free from objection. "The Countess," or Ireland, is represented as selling her soul to the devil in order to save her children who are starving through famine. One of the

peasants loses confidence in the Blessed Virgin, and crushes her shrine under foot. It is deplorable that Yeats should draw this unfavorable picture of Erin, whom he himself is forced to describe as the "Saint with sapphire eyes," and the "great white lily of the world." It matters little to Yeats if Erin is untrue to her religion for the sake of wealth and prosperity, since he finally represents her as saved through the goodness of her motive. It reminds one of the manner in which Goethe ultimately saves the soul of the old and unrepenting libertine, Faust. The principle that the motive hallows a black deed, or that the end justifies the means come with bad grace from a member of a sect which has often falsely represented a great Catholic order as holding the same tenet. Enough of disfiguring cobwebs have to be brushed from the fair character of Ireland, and there is no necessity for poetic fancy to weave another ideal web misrepresenting the religious genius.

"The Land of Heart's Desire" presents the conflict of Christian and pagan ideals, and gives an interesting insight into the mind of Yeats. A priest, who is introduced into the drama, hides away the crucifix, "the tortured thing" as it is described by a fairy child. Yeats' philosophy is that children must not hear of the sad symbol of their redemption because, forsooth

We must be tender with all budding things.
Our Maker let no thought of Calvary
Trouble the morning stars in their first song.

"The Land of Heart's Desire" is "where nobody gets old and godly and grave." It is the home of the pagan fairies who

ride upon the winds
Run on the top of the dishevelled tide
And dance upon the mountains like a flame!

It is to be found among "the woods and waters and pale lights." In the play the pagan naturalism is made to vanquish Christianity in the person of the priest; in his very presence the soul of one of his flock is spirited away by the fairy child, Christian "gravity," "godliness," and "loneliness of heart"

are exchanged for pagan "merriment." The prophetic words of "a reed of Coolaney" are sympathetically cited at the very end of the play, and are triumphantly echoed by some of the Irish peasants.

"The fairies dance in a place apart
Shaking their milk-white arms in the air;
For they hear the wind laugh and murmur and sing
Of a land where even the old are fair,
And even the wise are merry of tongue;
But I heard a reed of Coolaney say,
'When the wind has laughed and murmured and sung
The lonely of heart is withered away.'"

In this play behold Yeats in his true colours, heartily sympathetic with pagan modes of thought, and all the more insidious because of his undoubted gift of poetry and brilliancy, and his indirect and distant way of preaching his new evangel.

J. M. Synge, who was the colleague of Yeats until death prematurely took him away, is the author of "The Well of Saints." It introduces the reader to an old man and an old woman, both of whom are blind. Before being cured of their blindness, they had the refined joys of a poetical vision. They thought, however, that they would be much happier if they regained their sight. When cured of their blindness by a friar who had the gift of working miracles, they were at once disillusioned. The woman had fondly thought that her husband was another Adonis, and the man had imagined that his wife was a Venus. Each being dissatisfied with the other, they wished to become blind again, and have their old visions. After they had lost their sight for the second time, the friar came to them and wished to cure them, but they refused the proffered gift; they were satisfied with a blindness which saw the grand visions of imagination.

"Ah, it's ourselves had finer sights . . . I'm telling you when we were sitting a while back hearing the birds and bees humming in every weed of the ditch, and when we'd be smelling the sweet, beautiful smell does be rising in the warm nights, when you do hear the swift, flying things racing in the air till we'd be looking up in our minds into a grand sky and

seeing lakes, and big rivers, and fine hills for taking the plough . . . I'm thinking it's a good right ourselves have to be sitting blind, hearing the soft wind turn round the little leaves of Spring, and we not tormenting our souls with the sight of the gray days, and the holy men, and the dirty feet is trampling the world."

The "Well of the Saints" is a typical example of what is best and worst in the productions of Synge. A romanticist and a realist at the same time, he is able to picture high idealism and hideous actuality, for few can see as well as he does the poetry of things as well as their repulsive reality. He sees the grand and the gray in human life. But his perverted and anti-Catholic instincts will be noted in the last sentence where he associates "holy men," such as the friar, with "dirty feet" and "gray days."

As regards "The Playboy of the Western World," which has at least the best-known title of all Synge's plays, the plot cannot be fairly represented unless some attempt is made to give its psychology. The central character is a young man whose life has been rendered miserable by a cross and eccentric father. The old man decides that his youthful Romeo must marry a superannuated Juliet. The son refuses, and his father insists on the sacrifice. He again refuses, and his father saying, "May the Lord have mercy on your soul," attempts to kill him with a scythe, but the son evades the blow, and strikes his father with a log, felling him to the ground. The young man leaves his own locality and, in the west of Ireland, meets some persons who, when told how he killed his father, take a great interest in him. In human nature there is sometimes found a certain admiration for a notorious character. An American dramatic company, who knew this trait of human nature, offered the companion of the murderer Crippen strong inducements to join their corps. In the case of "the playboy" the admiration for him becomes so great that his admirers are represented as vying with one another in bringing him different kinds of food. He gradually grows proud of his parricidal achievement, and, becomes champion of the place,

winning everything in the local games. "He is able to lick the world." The women of the locality like him, and say that they "would not give a thraneen for a man who has not a mighty spirit and a gamey heart." His heart light as air, his imagination brilliant as fire and displaying itself in poetic language, and, above all, his perverted courage are depicted as the magnetic forces of the playboy's personality. There is some distorted courage even in a villain, as not everybody, owing to a kindly dispensation of Providence, could become a Nero. Under the inspiration of a mighty passion of pride, resulting from his having done a "great deed," the playboy is represented as finding himself; he breaks through the narrowing limits imposed by his original shyness, and attempts and performs wonders. In "The Playboy of the Western World" Synge seems to have painted the struggles of his own wild spirit which has been the parricide of older and more reverent forms of art. Towards the end of the play it transpires that the father has not been killed at all and the son tries again to kill him but fails. Those friends of his who now see the actual attempt at murder become disgusted with him and he is rejected by the woman who admired and loved him. The whole drama is a wild extravaganza and must not be treated as a sober and serious picture of life. In accordance with a characteristic bias of Synge, the ordinary "holy" person and the Irish priest, who interferes with a boundless freedom of social intercourse between the sexes, are painted in repulsive colours.

"The Riders to the Sea," and Synge's last work, "Deirdre of the Sorrows" have much poetic and dramatic value, though the latter is stained by some indelicacy in dealing with the sexes. The theme of "The Shadow of the Glen" is marital infidelity; it is based on a story heard from a peasant in the Arran Islands. It contains indirect lewd suggestion, which is almost unavoidable when one stoops to the choice of such a topic. Freedom from burdensome marital ties is set forth in an attractive light.

The plays of this Anglo-Irish dramatic company are often

anti-moral. Yeats in his drama, "Where There is Nothing," speaks of "passions which they (the people) call sins." This dramatic orgy, as well as its counterpart, "The Unicorn from the Stars," with their insistence on the destruction of law, are calculated to cause mental confusion in regard to the moral order. The plays are anti-Christian in tendency. Doubtful passages are made clear from the analogy of works of the authors in prose. In a preface to a composition of Lady Gregory, Yeats wrote à propos of the effect of pagan mythological study: "Ireland (will become) again a holy land as it was before it gave its heart to Greece and Rome and *Judea*." The plays are anti-clerical,—they exhibit little sympathy for priests. No priests and no "peelers" (or policemen) will be present at the millenium desired of Yeats. Synge's unspeakable "Tinker's Wedding" represents a priest as the butt of the coarsest practical jokes. And if they are anti-moral, anti-clerical, anti-Christian and anti-Catholic, they must be anti-Irish. They are Irish only in translating Gaelic idioms and poetic modes of thought. They abound in such expressions, common in Ireland, as, "We saw him and we walking the road," "and we not tormenting ourselves." There is a certain beautiful glimmer of poetry and mysticism in their plays, and this, too, is true to Irish life. Synge said that some of his best thoughts were found among the peasants, and, instead of the thread-bare words of modern literature, he uses practically none but the living language of the common people. The poetic expression, "May the heavens be his bed," is frequent among the Irish peasants. There is a great deal of mystic symbolism to be found among the ordinary people. When opening a gate they say, "May the gates of Heaven be opened before us," and when lighting lamps, they say, "The light of Heaven to our souls." They have a certain mystical sense of the supernatural in their daily lives, and by the light of this world they see vividly the world to come.

The reason for the serious faults of the Anglo-Irish playwrights is not far to seek. It is difficult to have a revival basing itself to a certain extent on a pagan period without some

being swept from their Christian moorings. During the great Classic renaissance some became so enamoured of pagan models that their Christianity grievously suffered. So is it with the revival of past glories in Ireland. The Anglo-Irish dramatic School of non-Catholics, like Yeats and Synge, offer us some of the pagan rubbish as well as some of the pagan gold. But they compose only a small part of the great Irish renaissance. When the first murmurings were heard of the earthquake revival, which is now stirring Ireland to its foundations, few suspected the magnitude of all the forces that were let loose. People thought that it was to be a mere revival of the ancient language, and, behold! industries began to flourish again. Gaelic novels, literary publications, historical investigation, archaeological research, mythological inquiries give token of some good directions of the movement. And no one can yet foretell its full possibilities. The Anglo-Irish players may have the merit of turning the attention of many lands to this multifarious spiritual activity of Ireland. Not Ireland alone may benefit by this general revival. The world, which in periods of renaissance obtained reasoning from Greece and law from Rome, may once more procure imagination and fire from Celtic sources, as it did in the times of McPherson and of Arthurian legend. This Promethean fire, which is borrowed by Yeats, though in the pale reflection of the English tongue, from the heaven of Irish mythology, is characteristic of Irish writings and oratory, but can find its adequate expression only in a native Gaelic drama and literature.

GARRETT PIERSE.

ST. PAUL SEMINARY.



ST. ANSELM.

The student of history is sometimes inclined to think that epochs, eras and centuries, though they are only arbitrary divisions of time, almost have a personality and an individual power of thought. He knows that he is using figurative language when he says that such and such a century was longing for a leader, that such and such an epoch was brilliant or dull, or conservative, or liberal. He knows that it is the men who live in a certain epoch that think and feel. Nevertheless, he is inclined to attribute collective thought and collective consciousness to a certain group of men who live within the boundary, so to speak, of a certain period of time. The student of the history of philosophy is in a special manner inclined to this view of history. He deals with ideas and tendencies, and they seem to belong less to the individuals within a definite era than to the era itself. Thus, we may say that the century of Gerbert, the tenth, was chiefly concerned with the heritage of the past, and took little thought beyond its own immediate need of that heritage. That heritage had survived, as if by a miracle. Over and over again its transmission had been endangered; the waves of barbarian devastation seemed certain to submerge it. But it was not submerged. Owing to the efforts of men like Bede, Alcuin, Isidore and Rhabanus, it had been preserved. The fragments that were accessible were put together in slipshod, almost haphazard, manner, without literary skill and according to an entirely conventional method of elucidation. The tenth century came into this inheritance with a certain insecurity of tenure, and even when the tenure was made less insecure, the heritage was not catalogued, inventoried and arranged, so to speak, for use and enjoyment. That was the task which the tenth century undertook. By means of logical division and logical definition it put its own house in order; it studied, classified and ar-

ranged what had just come into its possession, and, by the end of the century, it was like the householder who, after days of bewildering chaos, in which all is furniture-van outside and all confusion within, at last sees each piece of furniture in its proper place, heaves a sigh of relief, and feels that he can sit down to his desk and work.

The eleventh century, therefore was in position to begin constructive work. It is not easy to find a general term to describe that constructive effort in all its phases. The word "freedom," strange as it may seem to some, has been suggested. The eleventh century was dominated largely by Norman ideals. It was the Norman spirit of individuality that inspired many of the eleventh century movements; Hildebrand's struggle for freedom of the Church from imperial control, his effort for the ethical uplift of clergy and laity, the Crusader's struggle with the Saracen for the freedom of the Holy Places, and, finally, the effort of the spirit in the movement known as scholastic philosophy to attain freedom of thought. This, to some, may seem a paradox, if not a downright historical misrepresentation. And yet, it is literally true that scholastic philosophy was actuated by the spirit of intellectual freedom. The "*Fides quaerens intellectum*," "Faith seeking understanding" which is the motto of scholasticism, is the watchword of a kind of knight-errantry of the mind. Faith, as the early Christian writers understood it, and as the scholastics understood it, was necessary to salvation. It was obligatory on every Christian to accept certain truths on the authority of God and the Church. He who accepted those truths was a true believer; he who rejected them was a heretic. But, now the time had come to seek a national foundation for faith. He who believed without trying to understand was as a child compared with him who believed and understood what he believed, as far as it is possible to understand what is above us. The thought was not by any means new. Clement and Origen and others of the Greek Fathers, especially, had used this very comparison. But, now the eleventh century takes the thought up, in its own way. "*Fides quaerens intellectum*,"

Faith is now in the field like a gallant knight, seeking contest with reason, and hoping by using reason against unbelief to win fresh victories for God. Other centuries had striven to conserve the past and put it in order, the eleventh is "out for" conquest in the realm of truth.

There were many difficulties in the way. First and most serious of all difficulties was the choice of weapons. If battles are to be fought, for God and truth, what weapons shall be used? Some will advocate pious meditation, spiritual intuition, humble acceptance of God's teaching: they are the mystics. Others will be in favor of reasoning, of logic, or dialectic, as it was then called, of argumentation, and disputation; they are the rationalists. In the twelfth century the question will be decided, as we shall see when we come to speak of Abelard. In the eleventh century, some use one weapon, some another; the purpose, even, of the campaign against error and unbelief will not be definitely understood, but the "fight is on," as we say, and it is our purpose in this paper to describe how one very conspicuous fighter, Anselm the monk and Archbishop of Canterbury bore himself in the contest.

Anselm was born at Aosta, in the confines of Lombardy, in the year 1033. Those who attach importance to the influence of environment will be interested in noting that both in his own home and in the scenes amid which he spent his childhood and his youth, the boy Anselm had his mind and his heart trained in the direction in which he afterwards distinguished himself. From his mother he imbibed a spirit of simple faith and ardent piety, and from the sublime scenery by which he was surrounded he was led to thoughts of the exalted greatness of God. A charming anecdote of his childhood years illustrates the influence of both. His mother had often spoken to him of the God "Who dwells on high," and the child had taken the phrase, as children do, all too literally. She had described heaven as the ideal Court, and, in phrases suited to the boy's years, had told him of the angels who minister to the throne, as servitors do in the court of an earthly monarch. Day by day, the child looked up at the mountains wrapped in

eternal snow and ice, until one night the summons came, and in dream he set out to climb the highest of them all in order to reach the heavenly court. There at last, after much difficulty encountered, he came into the presence of the Great King and from the hands of His seneschal received a "bread of exceeding whiteness," which refreshed him and enabled him to return to Aosta. The dream was soon recounted to his mother who saw forthwith that God had set His mark on the child. In the anecdote we see a forecast of Anselm's career as a thinker; for him, through life, God was to be the greatest and highest reality, and his effort to prove this by argument has earned him a place forever in the history of human thought.

We shall not narrate here the incidents of his public career nor those which concern his choice of a vocation. It is enough to know that from childhood he chose the Church as his portion, and after many extraordinary experiences, went finally to Bec in Normandy, and became a disciple of the great canonist, Langfranc, whom he succeeded first as teacher at Bec, then as Abbot of that monastery, and finally as Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of England. His dealings with William Rufus and with William's successor, Henry, his strenuous defense of the rights of the Church against the aggression of the secular power, belong to general history. They mark a turning-point in the political history of England, and in the history of the Church in general. His unswerving loyalty to his convictions, his courage in the face of tyrannical oppression, his patience in exile, his willing sacrifice of his own comfort and what he valued most, of his peace of mind, made it possible later for those who came after him to solve the same vexed problem both in England and in Germany. We are not specially interested here in these events except in so far as they throw light on the character of the man. We are more concerned with his achievements in the world of thought.

St. Anselm is the typical monk-philosopher. Over all his writings and over all his reasonings there falls the shadow of the cloister, with its peace, its freedom from confusion, its calm, placid detachment from worldly cares and mundane

interests. Not that he was ignorant of the world outside. He had learned much about the pagan past, and without sharing the enthusiasm for the classics which characterizes the humanist, he valued the literature of pagan antiquity because of its perfection of style. This, he contended, the Christian scholar should acquire and use in the service of truth. Neither was he ignorant of the world of his own day. First by family prestige, and later, by reason of his position in the Church, he was brought into contact with the world's greatness and was no stranger to the pomp and picturesqueness of life among the feudal nobility. But, through all his experiences he preserved the simplicity of heart that marked him in childhood; he was unspoiled by the world's artificiality and unsullied by its selfishness. His singleness of purpose, to serve God and the Church, inspired his public career. The same singleness of view characterized his activity as a philosopher. To bring the truth of God within the comprehension of all, to train men to think, and to think not only in harmony with what God had revealed, but in such a way as to believe more firmly and more profoundly—that is the explicit motive of all his philosophical works. He was, then, a typical eleventh century knight-errant in the cause of truth. Not a boisterous, brawling dialectician like Abelard in the twelfth century, who loved a fight better than he loved the truth itself, and as gleefully cracked skulls, figuratively, of course, with the weapons of logic, as ever medieval knight rode with lance at rest and unseated his opponent. Anselm's warfare is the gentle warfare of the spirit, which is compatible with tenderness of heart and almost feminine horror of suffering in any form.

The first of Anselm's great works on philosophy is his soliloquy, entitled "Monologue, or the method by which one may account for his Faith." The very title strikes the keynote of the work. Its aim is to render Faith reasonable. In content and method it follows very closely St. Augustine's line of reasoning. Its central idea is the idea of goodness, and its chief contention that if any good exists there must be a Supreme Good "Whom every creature, with all his strength

should reverently love and lovingly venerate, to Whom alone prosperity is to be attributed, to Whom alone we should have recourse in adversity, and from Whom by supplication we should ask what we need" (Migne, *P. L.*, CLVIII, col. 224). The treatise begins with the consideration of good in general. Some good things are sought because of their utility, others because of their beauty. Among goods of both kinds there are various degrees of excellence; some possess goodness in a lesser, some in a greater degree. But, *where there are degrees of anything, there must be an absolute standard* by which the degrees are judged. This is manifestly Platonic, though it comes to St. Anselm through St. Augustine. The absolute standard of goodness, which is good, not by participation but by essence, is God. Similarly, if we consider greatness, or existence, or any other perfection, we shall be forced to conclude that there is a Supreme Great, a Supreme Existence from Whom all other things are denominated great or existing. This is the main contention, as has been said, of the work entitled *Monologium*. It is candidly and consciously Augustinian. But, does it effectively render faith in God reasonable? Does it convince anyone that God exists? St. Anselm, as he tells us, wrote the work at the request of his brethren, when he was teacher of the school at Bec. Perhaps the brethren were bewildered when they heard the argument in the classroom, and wished to have it, as we say, "in black and white"; they desired to have it in writing, so as to study it more closely. Were they, then, convinced of its force. Evidently not. The argument appeals only to the Platonist already convinced that the fundamental assumption of Platonism is true. Anselm, consequently, did not meet with the success that he hoped for.

Once more, therefore, he set to the task of rendering Faith reasonable. To the *Monologium*, or Soliloquy, he added the *Proslogium* or Address to God, in the form of a prayer. And, as this is his most influential work in philosophy, let us study in detail the circumstances that surrounded its composition. Anselm, as has been said, was dissatisfied with his failure to convince his brethren of the reasonableness of faith. Impelled

by this sense of failure he besought God with prayers and tears to show him one form of argument that would convince even the most dull-witted. The scriptures say: "the fool saith in his heart: there is no God." The philosopher of the cloister is now seeking an argument that will convince even the fool. He is grieved to the heart that there are so many in the world and even among the learned who cannot justify to themselves and others their faith in God, and most of all it grieves him that there are those to whom faith is denied, who know nothing of God, or even go so far as to deny His existence. He prays therefore, for light to see among the reasonings of the philosophers or in the nature of divine existence, one strong, simple, convincing argument that all men will be compelled to accept. Here we have, I think, the heart of the man and the philosopher. No one ever sought more sedulously or searched more keenly for an argument to convince himself than does this philosopher already convinced but desirous as a Christian and a saint to see conviction brought home to others. "I try not, O Lord," he writes, "to reach the inaccessible heights in which thou dost dwell"—perhaps a memory here flits before him of his childhood's dream—"but I desire in some measure to understand the truth of Thee, which my heart already believes and loves. For I seek not to understand in order that I may believe, but rather, believing, that I may understand." Here is Faith seeking Understanding, truth already possessed in the form of belief, seeking reasons to justify itself to the understanding, and in such a way that none can fail to be convinced.

At this point contemporary history takes up the tale. Anselm was at last rewarded by discovering just such an argument as he sought. Overcome with joy, he hastened to write it down in waxen tablets. But when, next day, search was made for the tablets, they had unaccountably disappeared. Again the saint committed the argument to his tablets and gave them in safe keeping to one of his brethren. But, again, when they were wanted, it was found that the wax had been broken into fragments and the argument was illegible. The

next time, he took pen and parchment, gave the argument its permanent form, and, this time, it was not interfered with. A singular story, that to the minds of Anselm's contemporaries suggested the interference of some uncanny force, and is obviously a compliment to the virtue and power for good that the argument possessed. To the modern mind it is a symbol of what happened to the argument at the hands of St. Anselm's critics.

The argument, in spite of the fact that it was intended for the mind of less than average acumen, is not so easily grasped. Perhaps in the eleventh century they were better trained in close reasoning than we are, and more accustomed to concise statement. This is the argument in strict form: "God is that than which nothing greater can be thought. That than which nothing greater can be thought cannot exist in the mind alone, for then the same thing existing outside the mind would be greater. Therefore, God exists, not merely in the mind, as an idea, but also outside the mind, as a reality." The first premise offers no special difficulty, the thought of God is the greatest that the human mind can conceive, or, more correctly, it represents more than any other idea; it represents the greatest perfection in every line of perfection. Goodness is great, but no goodness is greater than the goodness of God. Power is great, but no power is greater than the power of God; wisdom is great, but no wisdom is greater than the wisdom of God. Briefly, God is infinite, and nothing greater than the infinite can be thought. And we, looking back through history since Anselm's day and further back still, before his time, to the very dawn of history, see clearly that, of all the ideas which have moved men and nations the greatest and most potent is the idea of God. But this is not just what Anselm meant. He meant simply that the idea of God represents the maximum of perfection: "God is that than which nothing greater can be thought." Now comes the second premise. "That than which nothing greater can be thought cannot exist in the mind alone, for then the same thing existing outside the mind would be greater." Let us try to grasp this

too. If A exists in the mind alone, then A plus existence outside the mind would be greater than A. Now suppose that A has no greater than itself, then, to say that A exists in the mind alone would be a contradiction in terms, like a square circle or a line that would be straight and not straight at the same time. "That than which nothing greater can be thought" *must* exist outside the mind, otherwise our thought of it would involve a contradiction.

What is to be our estimate of the argument? First, let us see how it fared at the hands of St. Anselm's contemporaries and successors. This time, the brethren at Bec were silent. But from another monastery, that of Marmoutier, came an answer with the curious title "Book in Defense of the Fool." Gaunilo was its author, and the meaning of the title was not far to seek. Anselm, it will be remembered, claimed that his argument would convince even the fool "who saith in his heart: There is no God." Now Gaunilo shows how the fool could answer Anselm and remain unconvinced. The "fool" has, of course, ceased to be a fool, and, like Macaulay's "Schoolboy," is a figure of speech standing for a rather well-equipped opponent of Anselm. The Fool's answer, in substance, is this: existence in the mind is one thing, existence outside the mind is another; from the perfection of that which exists *ideally* in the mind one may argue to conclusions which regard ideal existence, but not to conclusions which have reference to real existence. Good logic, in the mouth of the "fool." But somewhat abstract. Gaunilo, consequently, uses a concrete illustration to make his meaning clear.

He knew that, for long ages past, people had dreamt of an island or a group of islands far out in the ocean, where life was ideally perfect. The "Isles of the Blest," "Atlantis," the "Hesperides," "Hy Brazil," "The Land of Everlasting Youth" were some of the names by which this land was known to the imaginative Greeks and Celts. But, no one had ever reached that land, no traveller had ever come back to tell the story of its real existence. Poets had sung of it, dreamers had dreamt of it, saintly mystics had gone there in

imagination, but no Columbus had as yet laid his course successfully towards that incomparable island. Let us then apply Anselm's argument to this matter: "I have in my mind the idea of a most perfect island. But, a most perfect island, in order to be most perfect, must exist, for if it did not, it would not be most perfect. Therefore such an island exists." You see how convenient is the so-called ontological argument, how it facilitates the task of demonstration and how, moreover, it responds to the longing of our nature for the supremely perfect in every line. But, is Gaunilo quite fair, in his comparison? St. Anselm thinks that he is not. Our philosopher of the cloister did not love controversy. He was for peace in the realm of speculation; but, Gaunilo's criticism demanded an answer. The argument, he says, does not hold except in the case of the Supreme Being, Whom we are not only forced to think of as existing, but Whom we cannot think of as not existing. Your island, no matter how perfect, if it exist, has a contingent existence; one can well think of a world in which such an island does not exist. But no one can think of God as not-existing. This is St. Anselm's last word on the subject, and his adversary, so far as we know, did not return to the criticism of the argument.

St. Anselm's argument, generally called the *ontological* argument to prove the existence of God, has had a different effect on different minds. Some of the later schoolmen, like Alexander of Hales and Duns Scotus accepted it as valid. St. Bonaventure seems to approve it. In modern times Descartes, Leibniz and Hegel renewed it in modified form. Hegel, especially, is enthusiastic about it. He says: "Anselm was right in declaring that only to be perfect which exists not only subjectively but also objectively. In vain we affect to despise this proof, commonly called the ontological, and this definition of the perfect set forth by Anselm: it is inherent in the mind of every unprejudiced man, and reappears in every system of philosophy, though against the knowledge, and even the will, of philosophers, as well as in the principle of direct faith." These are weighty words and not to be set aside lightly or

inconsiderately. The mind of man is mysterious; in spite of what psychology teaches us, we do not know its nature perfectly, and, if there are men, great men, like Hegel, to whom the argument appeals, who will say that it is entirely useless? Nevertheless, from the point of view of strict logic, the argument is invalid. So it appeared to the majority of the schoolmen, especially to St. Thomas, and so it appeared to many modern critics, particularly to Kant, who analyzed the argument very carefully.

St. Thomas finds fault with the argument because it passes from the ideal order to the real order, from the world of *thoughts* to the world of *things*, this transition, he says, being always and everywhere invalid. A definition is never a source of proof of existence, unless we suppose the thing defined to exist, and then we suppose what we undertake to prove. If one were to ask, "What is a centaur?" the answer would be a description or definition of that mythological animal: "A beast, half man half horse," and if one were asked, "What is a tiger?" one would likewise answer by means of the definition: "A tiger is an animal of the genus *felis*, etc." In both cases one is describing the contents of one's own mind, and in neither case does the definition bring us a single step nearer the proof of existence. If you wish to ascertain whether a centaur exists or a tiger exists, you may, indeed, use the definition, but you must go outside the definition to establish the fact of existence. One may not define God, for He is infinite; but in the description of God is included supreme perfection. So far, however, "supreme perfection" is to be understood in the order of ideas or thoughts. Real existence belongs to the order of things. And one may not pass from the one order to the other without being guilty of a fallacy.

It was Kant, perhaps, who brought this out most clearly by a comparison that will be intelligible to everyone. Imagine, he says, the sum of twenty dollars (thalers). Not a difficult feat. Now imagine the sum of thirty dollars. Thirty imaginary dollars is greater than twenty, forty is greater than thirty, and so on, if we think of fifty, sixty, seventy, eighty, ninety,

one hundred, *imaginary* dollars. Each thought is greater, in content, than the one that preceded it, and greater in a definite way, greater by ten imaginary dollars. When you have reached the hundred mark, and are thinking of a hundred imaginary dollars, pass at once to the thought of a hundred *real* dollars. Everyone sees that there is a vast difference. A hundred imaginary dollars represents more than ninety imaginary dollars. But, a hundred real dollars means more than a hundred imaginary dollars, and the "more" has an entirely different meaning. Your idea of a hundred dollars not existing in reality is greater than your idea of ninety dollars not existing in reality. And your idea of a hundred real dollars is greater than your idea of a hundred imaginary dollars, but by greatness of a different kind. The "greatness of an idea," as we call it, is the greatness of its representative content; an idea is "greater" if it represents more.

Let us apply this to our idea of God. "God is that than which nothing greater can be thought." Perfectly true of our idea of God in the order of representation. That idea must represent all perfections. It must represent God as a substance, because substantiality is a perfection. It must represent God as living, because life is a perfection. It must represent God as supremely wise, because wisdom is a perfection. But, must it represent God as really existing? No, because existence is not a perfection of the same kind as substantiality, life and wisdom. To establish real existence as an attribute of God, we must go outside our definition, that is, outside our idea of God, and prove it in some other way.

It is hardly necessary to declare that in attacking a proof one is not attacking the thesis. Many a conclusion otherwise certain is supported by arguments that are invalid. And facts may be adduced to show that St. Anselm's argument, notwithstanding its logical weakness, has had a profound influence on many a philosophical mind. Perhaps his hope has, after all, been realized. If he has not convinced all, he apparently, has convinced some of those who came after him, and even those whom he has not convinced pay tribute to the nobility

of his purpose in seeking out this one incontrovertible argument. The reasoning may seem faulty, but to adverse as well as to friendly critic the heart of the man and the saint speaks in the noble *Allocution* in which Faith seeks reasonable proof, and the goodness of God which all men unconsciously seek, is shown forth in such wise that, so at least the philosopher hopes, all men shall know that it exists. We honor the man who in time of dire distress and famine gives to human beings the bodily food for which they crave, and we call him a benefactor. We honor the revolutionary hero who gives to a downtrodden people the liberty for which they struggle, and we call them a liberator. We honor the man of medical science who, by a life of devotion and many personal sacrifices, puts in the hands of the people a simple remedy against disease and gives them back the health for which they long, and we call him a savior. Anselm, in the simplicity of his piety and the purity of his own life, thought that God is what all men need most, and we should honor the effort he made to bring God home to their minds by an argument the force of which none could resist.

On one question of theology St. Anselm contributed a point of doctrine that made as great an impression among theologians as did this ontological argument among the philosophers. I refer to the question of Atonement, and, although, as a rule we have studied the medieval teachers as philosophers and not as theologians, the present matter is so intimately associated with Anselm's fame as a Master of medieval thought that it cannot be passed over without a word of explanation and comment. The doctrine of Atonement, or Satisfaction, as it is sometimes called, is, in its simplest terms, the fact to which the scriptures so often refer, that Christ reconciled the world to God, that by shedding His blood for our sins, He paid a price by which we were freed. The more technical theological doctrine is the attempt to explain this fact in intelligible terms. The Greek Fathers, as a rule, took the mystical view that, by the union of Divinity with humanity in Christ, all human nature, indeed, all created nature, was lifted up, and in the

large sense of the word, deified. The Latins, generally, and Irenaeus and Augustine in particular, laid stress on the notion that sin is a state of bondage, that, before the coming of Christ, mankind was in a condition of slavery, out of which human souls had to be bought by the price which Christ paid. In the popular conception of this explanation, the devil was the one to whom the price of emancipation was paid, and he was supposed to have some kind of right in the matter until the price was paid. In the writings of some of the theologians the crudeness and the harshness of this idea are softened down considerably, but in others they appear in full force. What St. Anselm did was to go back simply and without any parade of learning to the scriptural notion of satisfaction, that, namely, Divine Justice was outraged by sin and a price should be paid, not to the devil, but to outraged justice itself. This is the essential point; later theologians modified St. Anselm's doctrine in detail, but the main point still remains as the core of Catholic teaching in the matter. Some recent writers have sought to refer St. Anselm's explanation to the German custom by which a criminal instead of undergoing punishment, could make satisfaction to the injured parties by paying a *wergild*. But, the custom was Celtic as well as Teutonic, and so far as theological speculation goes St. Anselm's explanation is more likely to have been suggested by the "sin-offerings" of the Old Testament times, or by the system of ecclesiastical penalties which was present in the Christian Church from the beginning. This is not the place to go any deeper into the matter. It is sufficient to note that in his little treatise on the subject, the curiously titled *Cur Deus Homo?*, St. Anselm introduced an explanation so lucid, so consonant with human notions of right and justice, and so singularly free from the inconveniences of the then current bondage-idea, that his theory was accepted at once and became the starting-point for further elucidation of the mystery. For mystery it is, and to be treated reverently by all, whether they agree with him or not. Like his *Proslogium*, so also, this treatise is an attempt to make Faith reasonable, and to show by symbols that are confessedly

inadequate and by comparisons, which are always defective in some respect, how the mind that thinks can agree with the heart that believes.

This is why St. Anselm is often called the founder of scholasticism. Some prefer to give the honor to Abelard, and still others ascribe it to John the Scot. They all had their share in it. For they were all actuated by the same motive, the hope to make Faith reasonable, to show the harmony between revelation and reason. When we come to speak of St. Thomas of Aquin, who was heir to what these pioneers accomplished, we shall go into the question more in detail and attempt to define the scholastic movement. Meantime, it is our task to try to place Anselm in the position in which he belongs in the history of medieval thought.

The inspiration of all his activity as a thinker was, as has just been said, his belief that the time had come for the contents of Faith to be made reasonable, and therefore acceptable to the thinking mind. St. Augustine had the same conviction in regard to his time. But, the conditions were different. The Latin Europe of the fifth century was different from the Latin Europe of the eleventh. Then there was over all things the shadow of impending decay and ruin. Like the ship that, shivering at the impact of the storm, is said to shudder at the doom that is awaiting her, the pagan world of St. Augustine's day felt a tremor of anticipated disaster and dissolution. There was no vigorous consciousness of present strength for future success. The age was, in a sense, decrepit, and all that the Christian philosopher could advise was to seek refuge in the mystic contemplation of a higher and better world. Platonism was, consequently, the haven of all aspiring spirits, and the last resort of Platonism was not to reason about spiritual truth but to try to grasp it intuitionally. In the eleventh century a new and vigorous race of Christians were beginning to be conscious of new intellectual needs. That consciousness was not very definite as yet, but it was none the less strong. The world of Christianity was Teuton and Celtic as well as Latin. It was full of hope, and full of lusty ac-

tivity. It could be crude, it could be inconsistent, it could be barbaric in its love of sharp contrasts, it could be violent, but it could not bear to be indolent. Even the quiet life of the cloister could not escape the influence of this spirit of strenuosity. On the intellectual side that spirit showed a curious restlessness that was to burst out into lawlessness very soon in the schools of Paris and elsewhere. The restlessness in Anselm's world was kept in check by simple piety and devotion to the Church. But the restlessness was there, and it could not be satisfied by Platonism or any form of mysticism that did not give room for the exercise of reason. Wild animals in captivity will gnaw their cages, because they must find work for the "tooth and claw" with which nature meant that they should find their food. The Norman mind in Anselm's day was in some such predicament. It could not be content with classifying and arranging the heritage of the past: that had been begun in the days of Alcuin and completed in the days of Gerbert. It demanded new and so to speak, *real* exercise for its powers, and Anselm made his attempt to meet the demand.

He did not see the whole subject of truth as his successors did, in the thirteenth century. His view was partial and his task took him over a mere province of the great kingdom of knowledge. And what he did see he saw through the color of his own spiritual temperament. He had, although a Burgundian by race, the true Italian emotionalism of the intellectual kind, the emotionalism which glows to a real white heat. He had not the tearful sentimentality of St. Bernard, nor the gloomy spiritual temperament of the typical German mystic. The more he felt, the clearer became his vision and the firmer his intellectual grasp of the truth. He is, then, the St. Augustine of the eleventh century, but with all the difference that goes with the difference of time. He will not save souls by turning the thoughts inward on one's own spiritual life, or upwards towards the ineffable truth of God. He does not advocate withdrawal from the world of sense and con-

centration on higher truths. He will, as far as he sees his task before him, make the truths which he loves clearer to himself and clearer to others, so that his mind and their minds shall be satisfied, as their hearts are satisfied already. The instrument, as it is called, which he uses, is dialectic, which hitherto has been used in the schools merely for the purpose of arranging and classifying traditional knowledge. Its application to the discovery of new truth and the elucidation of the higher spiritual truths is new. Anselm is not skilled in those uses. He will live to see the dawn of the twelfth century with its "dialectic madness." But, by that time, his work as a philosopher will have been accomplished. As Primate of England he will be involved in a different kind of struggle. The contest between rationalism and mysticism will not interest him so much as that which was waged between the Church and the State.

All his life he dwelt, intellectually, in the heights. This accounts for the serenity of his thought. In the days of his exile from England he was invited by Pope Urban to attend the Council of Bari which was summoned to deal with the difficulties that had arisen between the Greeks and the Latins. "From an elevated seat," we are told, "Anselm began his discourse. He established from Scripture the orthodox doctrine that the Holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father and the Son, and he spoke with a self-possession, force of argument and power of eloquence that seemed like an inspiration. A deep *Amen* was the one response of the whole assembly, when Urban exclaimed 'Blessed be thy heart and thy understanding, blessed be thy lips and the words that flow from them'" (Hook, *Eccl. Pol.* II, 229). And thus we like to represent him, seated in a high place, above the turmoil of dialectic debate, calmly and dispassionately discoursing of spiritual truth to an age that craved for such food, free from self-consciousness, free from the disturbance of the passions which controversy breeds, apparently emotionless. Yet, under all the calm exterior there glows a fire of spiritual sentiment,

there burns an ardent longing, as glowing as the fire in the heart of a crusader. The monk-philosopher loves the truth and he loves the Faith. He has harmonized those two in his own heart; his life is devoted to the task of showing that harmony to others and establishing it in the hearts of others. In that sense, because he had that feeling, and because he had that desire, he is one of the founders of Scholasticism.

WILLIAM TURNER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Sermons and Addresses. By His Eminence William Cardinal O'Connell, Archbishop of Boston. Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1911. Three Volumes, pp. 242, 402, 432.

The first of these volumes contains undated Sermons and Addresses, the second contains discourses pronounced during the years 1887-1906 while the author was Assistant Pastor at St. Joseph's Church, Boston, and Bishop of Portland, Maine, and the third is made up of Sermons, Addresses and Pastorals dating from the period 1906-1911, ending with the Pastoral in which the Archbishop announces his elevation to the Cardinalate.

The volumes are, in the first place, a record in which all may read the career of the distinguished author as priest, bishop and archbishop. Through them there runs the revelation of a personality, strong, devoted, loyal, consistent. There is evidence of a steadfastness, an intelligent grasp of fundamentals in church policy, and a broad sympathy with present day conditions, a sympathy which, however does not lead to inconsistency, opportunism or the diminishing by one jot or tittle of the Catholic claims or the demands of Catholic Christianity. The Archbishop who announces to his clergy his elevation by the Holy See to "the sublime Senate of the Pope" has nothing to suppress, nothing to explain away, nothing to apologize for in the sermon on "The Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of the World" which dates from the earliest years of his priesthood. The absoluteness of his fidelity to Catholic doctrine and to the policy of the Holy See is the key to this consistency and may, indeed, be said to be the most distinguishing trait of the author in these volumes.

In the second place, there is here a message clear, forceful, ringing with the note of sincerity, to which the clergy and laity who read cannot but give willing ear. It is the message of a prelate who stands high in the Councils of the Church, and who is at the same time an American devoted to our institutions and conscious of our national aims and aspirations. It is the message,

moreover, of one who has not only felt the call of loyalty to the State as well as to the Church but has also thought out the principles involved and given them intelligent expression. One has only to turn to the discourse on "Thanksgiving Day" (Vol. 1, 225 ff.), "The Church and the Republic," (Vol. 3, 91 ff.), and the various addresses to the Knights of Columbus, in order to realize that here we have a leader who does not speak of "good citizenship" until he has analyzed what good citizenship means, and who, in his analysis has discovered that the essential in patriotism as well as in religion is not sentimental but ethical. "It has been said that *ideas* rule the world. This is not strictly accurate. It is *ideals* by which the world is governed. For ideas are but conceptions, of themselves stationary, inactive. But, when the conception is perfected by birth, when the idea is moved into activity by a power which has embodied it, then alone is there reality, life, action. . . . Individuals form a nation. If the ideals of the nation be for justice and right she will, by the power of God, stand up great and strong upon the earth that God shall give her. Of this let every one be certain; each of us individually contributes to the glory or the shame of the nation to which we belong. Not he alone who sits in power, but he who is the humblest laborer in the land has his share in the making of his country's honor among men; and so, on all rests a responsibility, varying in degree, from which none is exempt." (Vol. 1, pp. 228-279.) This is an excellent definition of patriotism. It is practical. It is Catholic. And it is timely, considering the number of those who imagine that patriotism is restricted to heroism in war and the glorification of the flag in times of peace.

The preacher in search of inspiration and material for his Sunday Sermon will find among the Cardinal's discourses many that will help him by the thoroughness of treatment, the forcefulness and appropriateness of the illustrations, the freshness and vigor of the style. For example "Miracles a Proof of Revelation," "Intemperance," "Confession," "The Unjust Steward," "The Forty Hours' Devotion," "Causes of Irreligion," "Purgatory," etc. The volumes should be in the library of every priest who knows the value of books, and who realizes that in sermon literature the best and the best alone is worth while.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Medieval Mind. A History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages. By Henry Osborn Taylor. 2 vols. Pp. xv + 613, viii + 59. Macmillan & Co. \$5 net.

In many respects these two volumes represent the high water marks of non-Catholic appreciation of the Middle Ages, as least so far as English-speaking people are concerned. For, we do not know of any work on this subject in English from a non-Catholic source which combines such thorough scholarship with such an honest attempt to do justice to these ages so different from our own and seemingly so difficult of understanding on the part of non-Catholics. The author's sincerity is above suspicion as his equipment for his task is above cavil. He has gone straight to the sources and lets these people of a past age speak for themselves. He admits quite honestly and quite correctly too "he cannot state the facts and sit aloof, impartial between good and ill." An historian is after all human and must judge by his standards given him by his conscience. But, withal, he also gives this so much needed warning to readers that we should honestly endeavor to judge the past in the light of the circumstances affecting the same. "We have to sympathize with their best and understand their lives out of their lives and the conditions in which they were passed." On the whole he himself has succeeded in so estimating the Middle Ages, and has done so because he has grasped this great truth that these ages can only be understood by a "realization of the power and import of Christian Faith" animating them. Only we would substitute "Catholic" for Christian.

But, learned and sincere as the author is, yet even he does not seem to have completely shaken off the old time-dishonored prejudice which here and there mars some of his most agreeable chapters. Here are one or two typical instances selected at random. In the chapter xxv, "The Heart of Heloise," speaking of Heloise's disinclination to marry Abelard after he had corrupted her, on the ground that marriage would injure his worldly prospects, he justifies her attitude with this remarkable statement: "Marriage was holy in the mind of Christ. But it did not preserve its holiness through the centuries which saw the rise of

monasticism and priestly celibacy. . . . The Church sanctioned marriage but hardly lauded it or held it up as a condition in which lives of holiness and purity could be led." Such a statement is nothing short of an outrage upon history. The church not only then as now looked upon marriage as something inexpressibly holy, a Sacrament, but as well taught that a life of holiness was to be expected in that state as in all other states. And, as a matter of fact, she canonized many of that very age who were married people—St. Louis, Elizabeth of Hungary; not to mention such beautiful and holy lives as those of Mabel Rich and Blanche of Castille. It is indeed strange that the most sincere and intelligent non-Catholic seems to be unable to grasp this very simple attitude of the Church, namely, that though a celibate life undertaken for the love of God presents greater means for personal sanctification as a state of life, yet the married life and every other life is *in se* holy, and should be holy and as a matter of fact is holy for millions.

A second typical misunderstanding occurs in the chapter (XVIII, p. 418), on Saint Francis. He says that "he had not taken the Christ handed over by the transition centuries to the early Middle Ages: he had not adopted the Christ of the ecclesiastical hierarchy." Now, really, that is pure twaddle. Francis was, as the author himself admits a few pages further on, a most "obedient and reverent" son of the Church. He was just as plain, simple, undoubting Catholic in the strictest sense of the word as is any simple Catholic in 1912 or one in the days of Augustine or Peter. True, he modelled his life upon a close, direct study of Christ. But surely that is precisely what the Catholic Church wanted every Catholic of his day or our day to do. That is precisely what every Catholic has done or is doing when he kneels in prayer before the Blessed Eucharist or recites the Lord's prayer by his bedside. Why is it that the non-Catholic mind cannot grasp such elementary facts!

There are some omissions which we do not understand. For instance why a chapter was not given to Gregory VII. Surely if any man moulded the thought and emotion of Medieval people at least along religio-political lines, he did so more than any other. His genius is stamped upon them from his day to that of Dante. Similarly it is regrettable that he should not have given some chapters to those splendid women like Elizabeth of Hungary or

Blanche of Castille or Mabel Rich or St. Clare. Such studies would give his readers a much clearer and cleaner idea of a Medieval woman than that disgusting story of Heloise or the legendary romances of Tristan and Lancelot. Lastly, is not the "thought and emotion" of the "average" man just as important a study as that of the more exceptional men? And yet there is hardly more than scattered allusions to what the average man thought and felt—the gildsman, the poor artist, the craftsman, the villager, the cotter.

However, with these faults, which are after all principally faults of interpretation, the work is all in all a most agreeable study of the Middle Ages. It represents, as above said, the high water mark of scholarship and sincerity on the part of the non-Catholic English world. A book like this could not have been written fifty years ago. The fact that it has been written is a most pleasing proof that history has at least made substantial progress towards clearing itself of the ancient religious prejudice towards ages which, with all their faults, possessed so much real grandeur and beauty and good.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

Bible Symbols, Designed and Arranged to Familiarize the Child with the Great Events of Bible History, by Rev. Thomas C. Gaffney, D.D. Chicago: J. A. Hartel, 1910. 8vo, 275 pp.

Catechism is not interesting to the average child, but short stories and pictures never fail to arrest his attention. For this reason, the book under review ought to prove to be popular with children. It is well calculated to stimulate their interest in religious things, particularly with some of the striking instances of God's providential dealings with the human race. Each chapter begins with two or three questions with their respective answers taken from the simple catechism and bearing on some important truth, which is then exemplified by some story taken from the Old or New Testament. At the end is a sentence or two, appropriate to the lesson, presented in the form of an illustrated rebus. The key to their decipherment is to be found in the last pages of the book, where the full text of the passages with their page indications is given. The book will be most effective in the hands of the

older members of the family, for whom it will prove a valuable help in the home instruction of the little ones. Most of the stories and Bible texts are well chosen. Perhaps the barbaric story of Sisara could have found a more worthy substitute, one more edifying for the child mind. In a book for children, it were surely better not to give for study the sentence, "For the drunkards and the wenchers shall be brought to poverty," particularly as the objectionable word, "wenchers," is not to be found either in the Douay or the Revised version of Proverbs, 23: 26. Eight beautiful half-tone engravings embellish this useful volume.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Jesus All Holy, by Father A. Gallerani, S. J.: Translated from the Italian by F. Loughnan. New York: P. J. Kennedy, 1911. 16mo, 273 pp.

This little book of devotional reading is deserving of commendation. It is suited alike to layman and priest. It consists of sixteen short sermons or meditations on Jesus as our religious model, marked by sound, common-sense piety, and told in simple, direct language. The original Italian has been excellently turned into pure, idiomatic English. This, together with the superior quality of type, and the pretty vignettes that adorn each chapter, make it a very attractive little book of devotional reading.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Lamennais; Pages et Pensées Catholiques, Édités par L. Maugin-Enlart. Paris: Bloud et Cie., 1911. 16mo., 202 pp.

One cannot dip into the pages of this little book without feelings of sadness as well as of admiration. For here the genius of Lamennais speaks to us, not in the sullen bitterness of revolt and separation from the Church that marked the late years of his sad life, but in the tenderness, the sympathy, the piety of his earlier faith and devotion to the sacerdotal ideal. These gems of Catholic thought and piety are arranged under eleven heads,—

Practical Philosophy of the Christian Life; Human Misery; Death; Eternity; the Moral Life; Christian Friendship; Spirituality and Asceticism; Church and Christianity; Apologetics; Miscellanies; Prayers. Many of these paragraphs are like sparks struck from the red-hot iron. They reveal a mind of the first order and a priestly heart beating to the noblest aspirations, the tenderest and holiest emotions. Few prayers are more touching, more expressive of confiding devotion to God, to Jesus, and to His blessed mother, than those that are here given from his pen. No wonder that those who knew him best in the days of his Catholic faith did not cease to pray for him after his death, in the fond hope that the merits of his earlier years may have secured for him in his death agony the saving grace of repentance.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique, sous la Direction de A. D'Alès. Fascicule VII. Paris: C. Beauchesne, 1911.

The seventh part of the new Apologetic Dictionary, constituting the opening pages of the second volume, brings to the reader a number of articles bearing on highly important subjects and treated with the care and breadth of scholarship that they deserve.

In the first article, Georges Goyau gives an excellent historic account of the futile efforts of Protestant writers from Dumoulin to Count von Hoensbroech to fasten on Jesuit teaching the dictum that the end justifies the means. Then follows a masterly exposition of Faith and Fideism, to which the author, the Abbé Bainvel, devotes no less than thirty-six pages. With a rich indication of literature, given at the end of each important division, he sets forth the Catholic doctrine, and refutes the erroneous views of Protestants, Modernists and Rationalists, subjecting their principal arguments and objections to a thorough criticism. Especially timely is his refutation of Sully Prudhomme, whose thesis that Catholic faith involves contradictions has been set forth with more than usual subtlety in his recent work, *La vraie religion selon Pascal*.

The long article on Free Masonry by Gustave Gautherot, professor at the Catholic Institute of Paris, offers a richly documented account of this evasive subject that for thoroughness and trust-

worthiness stands in the front rank. The different solutions of the problem raised by the Gospel terms, the brother, brothers, sisters, of Jesus, are treated in a scholarly manner by Father Durand, S. J. Then follows an erudite study of the famous trial and condemnation of Galileo. This article, to which the author, Pierre de Vergille, devotes twenty-two pages, is destined to supersede all previous accounts by other scholars, for it is based on the Vatican documents of the trial, published for the first time in their integrity in the recent work of A. Favaro, *Galileo e l'Inquisizione*, Firenze, 1907.

Another article of great value and interest is that on Gallicanism, the joint work of two authors, the Abbé Dubruel and the Abbé Arquilliére. In this scholarly treatise of forty pages, the antecedents of Gallicanism are carefully traced, and its different phases with their respective forms of condemnation are described. It is a help of great value in the study of the relations of Church and State. In an article of ten pages, Father Brucker, S. J., gives a careful treatment of the main difficulties raised against the historic value of the Book of Genesis, and the Abbé Duchesne follows with an article on Gnosis, describing the chief forms of this heretical teaching, which disturbed the Church of the first few centuries. Few will quarrel with the article on the ground that it is an excerpt from a chapter of his *Histoire ancienne de l'Église*, recently put on the Index; for the passages that gave occasion for the condemnation do not bear on the subject here treated. The closing pages of this excellent number are given to part of Father Neyran's article on Church Government, the completion of which will be found in number eight, soon to be published.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

MISCELLANEOUS.

An Irish Homily on Confession: Text and Translation.

In the Homily on Poverty printed in the *Bulletin* of last month, we had an example of a loosely constructed composition made up of a series of quotations from writers of authority. There follow immediately in the Rennes ms. two pieces having Confession as their subject, which are given below. That they are of an entirely different character from those which precede is evident at once. For they give in a form which admirably combines succinctness with detail a complete summary of Catholic doctrine on the subject mentioned. The first presents the matter in a theoretical way; the second gives a concrete illustration of the manner in which one should confess his sins. Their completeness and the fulness of detail with which the various points of doctrine are exposed indicate on the part of the author a thorough grasp of his subject. Yet, as far as style and the characteristics of the language used are a trustworthy standard of judgment, we can conclude with reasonable probability that they have the same author as the Homilies on the Passion, the Resurrection, and Poverty already published from the same source.

We see in this Homily additional reason to believe that this manuscript is only a copy and not the original. There was pointed out in the Homily on the Resurrection the strange use of the word *subailchi* where a word similar in appearance would naturally be expected. This Homily presents two more instances of a like confusion of words: in one, *neamda*, "heav-

only," is found where it is evident that *naemta*, "holy," is the word intended; in the other, we have *catæirib*, "chairs, or seats," where *cataisib*, "vigils," is required by the sense. It is possible, of course, that these errors are due to the first author, but it seems far more likely that they were made by a copyist. There is, besides, the fact that several times the references, though explicit, are erroneous. A mistake in the reference is hardly to be attributed to the carelessness of the original author when the quotation is so accurate as to suppose a first-hand citation of the source mentioned. A copyist, on the contrary, not having made the extract himself, would be more likely to be inexact in such a point.

As to the sources from which the matter contained in this Homily is drawn, it is to be remarked that the initial reference is misleading. In the first place, it is not clear just what is meant by it, unless we take "fifteenth distinction" to be a correction of the preceding "fifth distinction." Besides, it is not certain that *s—r—quantum sumarum* is to be equated with *Quantum Sententiarum Collectum*, the terms in which the title of the *Supplement of the Summa Theologica* refers to the *Commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences*. However, no alternative presents itself. But even supposing this correct, Distinction XV of this commentary supplies little if any of the matter sought. It has for its titles, "De Satisfactione, et de Partibus Ejus, de Eleemosyna, de Jejuniis, de Oratione." Moreover, the verses referred as containing the sixteen qualities of a good confession are not found there, but in the *Supplement*, Qu. ix, Art. iv, entitled, "Utrum sexdecim conditiones assignatæ requirantur ad confessionem." These lines (which limp, as memory lines are apt to), are given by Saint Thomas not as a key to his presentation of the Catholic doctrine, but merely as summarizing the requirements according to the "Masters."

He accepts them only with reservations, and does not develop the subject according to their order. Here only the fundamental questions concerning the virtue and the sacrament of penance are treated.

The resemblance, however, between our Homily and two of the *Opuscula* is so striking both in thought and in language that it seems impossible not to consider the latter as sources extensively drawn upon. They are entitled "De Modo Confitendi, et Puritate Conscientiæ," and "De Officio Sacerdotis," and in the Roman Edition are numbered LXIV and LXV respectively.

The Irish author, nevertheless, was not a mere translator. He laid the *Summa* under contribution extensively, as might have been shown by references if it had been thought useful, and he threw the whole into a form distinctly his own. His presentation of the doctrine of the Church in regard to Confession is for the most part in accord with Saint Thomas's views. On a few points, however, he diverges. For instance he seems to make satisfaction in the state of grace necessary for the validity of the sacrament, as if it were an essential part, whereas Saint Thomas says clearly that it is only an integral not an essential part. He differs likewise in saying that one who has fulfilled his penance should go directly into heaven, a doctrine not to be found in the *Summa*, though the Angelic Doctor recognizes its possibility in particular cases. The author of the Homily evidently confused the satisfaction required by God for the sins committed, with the satisfaction imposed by the confessor as a part of the sacrament. This view is easily understood considering the gravity and length of the penances imposed at the time when he wrote. It is to be noted here that he speaks of these penances as likely to inspire fear in the penitent.

The author appears to refer to some local ordinance when he says it is a "decree of the canon" that all should confess three times a year. The general law of the Church requires confession once a year ever since the Fourth Council of Lateran, in the year 1215. A century earlier, Gillebert, Bishop of Limerick, wrote a treatise entitled *De Statu Ecclesiæ*, dedicated to the Bishops of Ireland, in the prologue of which he made various recommendations, one being that all should be obliged to confess three times a year, at Easter, Pentecost, and Christmas. Whether or not this recommendation was put into force later, I am unable to ascertain. Some account of the acts of various councils and synods held in Ireland since then, has been found in histories of the Irish Church, but none,—not even those whose biassed tone in regard to Catholic practices, especially confession, would make the reader confidently expect to find such a decree seized upon with avidity and made much of, if it were known to exist,—none even of these make any mention of such a law. Neither is any record of such a canon being decreed in an Irish council to be found in Mansi's *Collection of Councils*. However, the practice existed in various countries long before the date of our text. As early as 506 the Council of Agde, in Gaul, prescribed communion on the three feasts mentioned. According to Bede, (d. 735), it was the custom in his time in England, and the Council of Clovesho, in 747, declared that no one neglecting to receive communion at those times should be considered a Catholic. Similar prescriptions are found in succeeding centuries and in other countries until well into the thirteenth century, some of them later than the Lateran Council. All these enactments imply a preliminary confession. Express recommendation of confession three times a year was made by St. Chrodegang, Bishop of Metz, (c. 760), and by Regino, Abbot of Prüm, (d. 915),

while the practice was made obligatory by the Council of Gran, in Hungary, in 1114. On the other hand, the Council of Enham, in England between 1110 and 1116, commands confession only once a year, at Easter, and certain councils held in Scotland in the time of Queen Margaret, (c. 1076), enacted the same regulation. The recommendation of the Bishop of Limerick cited above shows that the custom had at this same time fallen into desuetude in at least some parts of Ireland, while our text would go to prove that it once more came into vogue, or at any rate the attempt was made to restore it. Further information on this point may possibly throw some light on the date of the present text.

The second treatise on Confession given below was evidently intended to serve as a model of the manner of avowing one's sins, and also as an aid in the examination of conscience. Its scope is not limited to any particular class of persons, for many of the sins alluded to are such as are likely to be committed only by men living amid the temptations of the world, while others apply only to the clergy. It will be noticed especially that the author makes much of the circumstances which may change the species of a sin. Here he follows the *Opuscula* cited above rather closely. There is likewise a striking resemblance in form and in content, though not in the order, to a formula of similar nature in Alcuin's *Liturgica*.¹ It was a common method of examination of conscience then, as now, to follow the order of the seven capital sins. The enumeration of the various senses, and many expressions here and there, recall Alcuin's composition. It is interesting to note that the seven capital sins are given exactly as they would be in a modern treatise of the kind (disregarding the order), whereas in the *Life of Guy of Warwick* edited with a translation by Professor Robin-

¹ *De Psalmorum Usu*, Part II, § IX, Migne, P. L. 101, col. 499-500.

son (ch. 34), mention is made of eight. Our text combines the eighth, backbiting, with anger. The *Life of Guy*, by the way, seems by its language to be a good deal older than these Homilies.

On the margin of the manuscript, near the end, a later hand has written the note: "There are few people in Ireland who make their confession as this book says." If the writer thought it a sample confession, his wonder appears quite natural, and finds a response in the mind of every reader. Anyone following the admonition of the preceding treatise to "tell the story without any twisting at all," and acquitting himself of that duty in the fashion of the second, must needs have been a reprobate.

TEXT.

(fo 35b, l. 28) Siad so na sé cuingill dége dhlighis an-fæisidin do beith indti amail adeir *sanctus* tomas sa V deisdingtio do-n lebar re-n-abarar *sententiarum* quartum sum[m]ar [i]um decima qungta testincione .i. co-fuilitt fersada aici do cruindiugadh an-adbair 7 is-iat so na cuingill sin

An *céd* cuingill díb .i. an-fæisidin do beith ænda .i. can dublad oir do bod-é a-láidiugadh an-gnim maith do-indisin re cois an pecaig do *éd*tromugadh na mbreath. Ma-seadh na-h-indis an (fo 35c) maith 7 indis an-t-ole mad-áil leat torad do beith ar-t-fæisidin óir tuicenn día in-maith

Oir is-eadh is-fæisidin ann do-rer *augustin* næm .i. oslucað an tedhma folaighiti a-ndóig an *leighis* o-día 7 tuicter a-h-oslucaðh an-tedma nach cóir an-maith do oslucað oir is-run dlegar ar in maith 7 ní-h-eað ar an ole oir is hé ceilt an pecaig can-a-nochtad do-n-t-sacart 7 admail na-maithesa a-cheilt co maith

An dara cuingill .i. a-beith umal .i. do-truaidhi 7 t-eslainti do-admail do-rún *craidhi* 7 maithmidhi do-iarraid do-torad trocaire 7 ní do-torad cirt as do-maith fein iarfair hí

An-tres cuingill .i. a-beith glan díreach co-día .i. anscél do-indisin can cam ar-domhan

An IIII cuingill .i. a-beith tairisi .i. tairisi do beith acatt as-do-tigerna co-maithfidh do-pecad duit ar-druim na-trocaire 7 na-toirrsi sin 7 sin co maith do creidim mar creidfir each artecal ele sa *cré* co-h-immlæn díreach

An V cuingill .i. a-beith com-menic ris-an-cin oir toirrsigter an-diabal sa-fæisidin menic 7 bith a-fis acatt co-fuilitt IIII cáis in-a-b-eicen duit an-pecad do-fæisidin arís.

An *céd* chás díb .i. an-tan nach bí *cumachta* ac-an *céd* oidi ort .i. ar-a-beith coindelbaidti nó bean co-follas do beith aici.

An dara cas .i. an-uair nach-eol do-n *céd* oidi itirdealbadh na-mbreath na-na-pecad co-cóir

An tres cas .i. an-uair do-facaib duine pecad marbta co-fésach can indisin ní fodhann can an-pecad sin 7 na-pecaid ele do-indisin aris

An IIII cás ma-do-tarcaisnighis do breithemnas can a-comlínad is eicen duit na pecaig *cédna* do-fæisidin aris 7 bith a-fis acat nach eicen duit na-pecaid do-fæisidin (fo 35d) aris *acht* is-na-

TRANSLATION.

These are the sixteen conditions that ought to be found in Confession, as Saint Thomas says in the fifth distinction of the book called the Fourth Commentary on the Sentences, fifteenth distinction, namely, where he has verses to summarize the matter.¹ And these are those conditions.

The first of the conditions: namely, that the confession be simple,² that is, without concealment; for it would be equivalent to diminishing the sin to tell one's good deeds along with it, in order to lighten the penance. So tell not the good, but tell the evil if thou wishest thy confession to be fruitful, for God understands the good. For according to Saint Augustine,³ confession consists in revealing the hidden plague in the hope of its being cured by God; and one understands by the revelation of the plague that it is not proper to reveal one's good deeds, for one's good deeds should be kept secret, but not the evil, for not to reveal the sin to the priest is to conceal it, and to confess one's good deeds is to conceal it as well.

The second condition: namely, to be humble;⁴ that is, to admit thy misery and thy weakness from the inclination of the heart, and to ask forgiveness on the score of mercy; and it is not on the score of justice, as owing to thine own goodness, that thou shalt ask it.

The third condition: namely, to be sincere⁵ and straightforward with God; that is, to tell the story without any twisting at all.

The fourth condition: namely, to be confident;⁶ that is, to have confidence in thy Lord, that He will forgive thee thy sin by reason of His mercy and that contrition; and to believe that also, as thou dost believe every other article in the creed entirely and sincerely.

The fifth condition: namely, to be as frequent⁷ as the guilt;

¹ "Sit simplex, humilis confessio, pura, fidelis,
Atque frequens, nuda, discreta, libens, verecunda,
Integra, secreta, lacrymabilis, accelerata,
Fortis, et accusans, et sit parere parata."

This order is followed in the Homily.

² This corresponds to "simplex" in the verses above.

³ Cited by Saint Thomas, *Supplement*, Qu. VII, Art. I.

⁴ That is, "humilis."

⁵ "Pura."

⁶ "Fidelis."

⁷ "Frequens."

casaid sin cided ní-budh misti duit an-t-æn-pecad do-fæisidin co-menic ⁊ do-bo-fearrdi co-mór. an

An VI*madh cuingill* .i. can a-beith dorcha ar-ecla nach tuicfedh an-sacart hí do-leiges na-locht

An VII*madh cuingill* .i. a-beith deiscrībidech oir is-eadh is deiscrībidi di .i. an-peacad mór do-indisin maille-re-h-eri mór ⁊ a-díl deire do cur ar cach æn-pecad ele o-sin amach. an VII (*sic*)

An VIII*madh¹ cuingill* .i. a-beith toilemail .i. can ní ele do-t-chur do-atmail do-pecad acht grad día ⁊ toil na-h-aitrech

An IX*madh cuingill* .i. a-beith naireach ⁊ can lúthgair do denam a-pecad ⁊ can-a-atmail do-cum dimæinis do-denam oir is-é dubladh an-pecaigh bogáchus do denam as do cum dimæinis. Mas-seadh na-féich do-naire óir is-é an-diabal benus do-naire dít ac-denam an-pecaid tic atrat ⁊ an-fæisidin ⁊ ata cunnam mór acat an-agaidh na-naire sin .e. mar nach cuim nigenn día an-pecad do-níter do-fæisidin ní cuimnighenn an-sacart s-n-lathair sin amach hé ⁊ cuimnidh an-agaidh do naire a-mét tógus sí purgatóir dít ⁊ cuimnidh fós an-ní nach-aíl leat do-leicen ris-an-sacart a-bus curabeicen duit a-leicen risa-fiadni na-tri slúadh ⁊ can-do rad duit d-a-chind ⁊ beir fein rogha dib sin ⁊ narab-é an-díga do-rogha. óir ní fagtar maithem an-pecaig can-an-fæisidin do denam da-faghtar hí ⁊ muna-fagar rún a-denmus[a] do beith agat

An X*madh cuingill* .i. a-beith imlán óir is-amlaidh dlegar an fæisidin do denam .i. na-pecaid uile do-indisin .i. a-fuil ar-cuimnedh acat díb óir ní feirdi duit céid pecad marbta do-indisin ⁊ æn pecad do facbail co-fesach duit ⁊ muna-rab cuimne agat air ní-millenn an-fæisidin acht co-n-indisir mar cuimneochair hé ⁊ mona-cuimnightea choidchi do-rachadh lát co-marthanach candígail

(fo 36a) Adeir an-dochtuir co leighisenn caithem cuirp Christ na-pecaid marbtha atá ort can-fis duit fein na-do-n-t-sacart

An XI*madh cuingill* .i. a-beith folraigtech ac-comall a-breithe ⁊ Masa-pecad cosaird do-níter ann dlegar an-aitrigi do-faicsin ⁊ ní-mar-glóir sin acht mar-eisimplair

An XII *cuingill* .i. a-beith dírech o-toil an-craidi óir is a-ndéraib an craidhi atá maithem an-pecaig ⁊ fæisidin do denam ri-san-oidi cuirfes leorgnim ort ⁊ maithfidh día pian ifirnn duit ar-son do-toirrsi óir indtaigter pian ifirna duit a-pein an-t-sægail

¹ MS. has VII with I added below the line.

for the devil is wearied by frequent confession. And know that there are four cases when it is necessary for thee to confess the sin again. The first case: namely, when the first confessor has no jurisdiction over thee, namely, because he is excommunicated, or is notoriously living in concubinage. The second case: namely, when the first confessor has not the necessary knowledge to distinguish properly the penances nor the sins. The third case: namely, when a person knowingly omitted telling a mortal sin, nothing suffices but to tell that sin and the other sins again. The fourth case: if thou hast rejected the penance and hast not fulfilled it, thou must confess the same sins again. And know that it is not necessary for thee to confess thy sins a second time except in those cases, although it would be no harm for thee to confess the same sin frequently, and it would be much better.

The sixth condition: namely, not to be obscure,⁸ for fear the priest might not understand it, in order to remedy its defects.

The seventh condition: namely, to be discreet;⁹ for discretion, in this matter, consists in telling a great sin with great care, and in defining sufficiently every other sin from that on.

The eighth condition: namely, to be voluntary;¹⁰ that is, that nothing should induce thee to confess thy sin but the love of God and the will of the Fathers.¹¹

The ninth condition: namely, to be shamefast,¹² and not to rejoice in one's sin, and not to confess it for pastime; for it doubles the sin to make light of it for the sake of pastime. Therefore consider not thy shame, for it is the devil, who takes thy shame from thee when committing the sin, who comes between thee and confession. And thou hast great assistance in conquering that shame, in that, as God does not remember the sin that is confessed, the priest likewise does not remember it outside of that place. And remember, to overcome thy shame, how much of the pain of Purgatory it takes away from thee; and remember, too, that what thou dost not wish to make known to the priest in this world, thou must make known in the presence of the three hosts, and with nothing to say in defence thereof; and take thine own choice of those things, and may thy choice not be the worst thing. For forgive-

⁸ "Nuda."

⁹ "Discreta."

¹⁰ "Libens."

¹¹ The law of the Church, enacted in her councils.

¹² "Verecunda."

cid hé ifirnn do-dlighis do-faghbail ar-cind do-torrssi 7 da-com-línair an-pennaith sin re-n-ecc do-reir aithne an-oitti fæisidi is coir duit dol a-flathamnus can purgatóir 7 da-rab cuid do-n-pennait sin can íc nó hí uile is-éicen sin do-glanad a-purgatóir re ndol a-flathamnus o-nach eidir'sal do-breith ann. Ma

Mas-seadh bíd martanach at *céd* toirrsi 7 na-cuir pecad ele a-cenn an *céd* pecaigh nó co-n-ícair do-breithemnus óir da-cuirir do chuaidh t-fæisidin do díth ort óir ní-bud-ferrdi duit an-íc 7 æn-pecad marbta can íc ort *acht* muna-bfuil fæisidin núa 7 aitrigh nua acatt ar-son do-pecaidh óir is-ann aisicter do lorgnim duit an-uair do-fácaib comartha ort mar atá treigenus do-truadugadh do cuirp nó almsana do-laidiugadh do-maithesa sægalta 7 ní-fuidir aisice an chena nar-facaib na comartaidhi sin ort. Oir an-gnim ruccadh béo 7 fuair bás le pecad marbtha tice anam ann arís o-n-aithridhi foirfi.

An XIII *cuingill* .i. a-beith luath can cairdi *acht* mar do gebair an-toirrsi 7 an-t-oiti 7 bith a-fis acat co-foghnann rún na-fæisidi duit *acht* a-dá-cásaib

An *céd* cás díb .i. mad-ail leat corp Christ do caithem ní-foghnann a-rún duit 7 can hí fein do-faghbail *acht* mona-bfuil gúasacht báis ort.

An II cás .i. a-ngúasacht an-báis muna-féttar an-fæisidin do denam ní-damantar tú *acht* co-mbía (fo 36b) rún a-denmusa acatt 7 do-toirrsi ar bun 7 na fuirid re-bliadain hí oir atá a-n-aithne na canoine 7 na-h-ecailsi næim[e] da-cach cristaidhi a-fæisidin do denam fo-trí sa-bliadain 7 corp crist do caithem 7 cuimnidh comairle an-doctuir næmta ac-furaileam na-fæisidi com-meinic ris an cin ar-ecla nach bertha uirre arís can-bás.

An XIII *cuingill* .i. a-beith laidir can-féchain do-toil an cuirp oir atat míana an-cuirp ac-cathugadh an-agaidh an-anma curabaire sin nach furail treisi spiratalta do cungram leis an-resún .i. le-toil na-h-anma 7

Adeir an-doctuir næmtha curab-iatt so na-neithe le-mbacann an díabal an-fæisidin do denam .i. an-naire ar-tus 7 cuimnidh an-agaidh na-naire sin in-leighes adubart sa *céd cuingill*

An II ní gellus an-diabal duit .i. sægalt fatta 7 cuimnidh an tí geallus sin duit nach-fuil sé aici duit

Oir adeir augustin nach-fuil ní is-nem-cindti na-uair an-bais 7 nach-fuil ní is cindti na-an-bás fein. Mas-seadh na-fuirigh an fæisidin 7 na-creitt an-gealladh sin

ness of sin is not obtained without confession, if there is opportunity for it. And if it is impossible, thou must have the purpose of confessing.

The tenth condition: namely, to be complete;¹³ for it is thus the confession should be made, namely, by telling all the sins, that is, as many as thou rememberest of them. For thou art no better for telling a hundred mortal sins and omitting one sin knowingly. But if thou dost not remember it, it does not spoil thy confession, provided thou tellest it when thou rememberest it; and if thou shouldst never remember it, it would go with thee forever without punishment. The Doctor says that partaking of the Body of Christ heals the mortal sins that are upon thee but unknown to thyself or to the priest.

The eleventh condition: namely, to be secret¹⁴ in fulfilling one's penance. But if it is a sin that has been committed publicly, the penance should be seen, and that not for vainglory, but as an example.

The twelfth condition: namely, to proceed straight from the desire of the heart;¹⁵ for the forgiveness of sin is in the tears of the heart, and in avowing it to the confessor, who will bind thee to satisfaction, and God will remit to thee the pains of hell because of thy contrition, for although it is hell thou oughtest to get, the pains of hell are commuted for thee to a temporal punishment because of thy sorrow; and if that penance is fulfilled before death according to the command of the confessor, then shouldst thou deserve to go into heaven without Purgatory; and if thou shouldst have a part of that penance unfulfilled, or the whole of it, that must be cleansed in Purgatory before going into heaven, since it is impossible to bring any defilement therein. Therefore be stedfast in thy first sorrow, and add not another sin to the first before thou fulfillest thy penance. For if thou dost, the good of thy confession has been lost, for thou art no better off for the healing if there is one mortal sin on thee without healing,¹⁶ unless thou renewest thy confession and thy contrition for thy sin. For it is in this way thy satisfaction is rendered, namely, when it has left an impression

¹³ "Integra."

¹⁴ "Secreta."

¹⁵ "Lacrymabilis."

¹⁶ It is impossible to say whether this word, occurring twice in this sentence, should be translated "healing" or "satisfaction, payment"; for *it* in the text has both meanings. Just above it has the latter sense.

Andara (*sic*) ní fuiriges hí .i. ecla na-mbreath aitrige 7 cuimnid an-agaidh na-h-ecla sin cach-breith da-truma beires in t-oidi ort a-bus curab so-íca hí ac-fechain na-breath tall

Is sí eisinplair do-beir an doctuir ar-an-rád sin .i. simind 7 sliab .i. do-rogha duit dib re-n-imchur 7 is-í an-simind re-h-imchur .i. na-breatha aitrige 7 is hé an-sliab .i. pian ifirnn tall do-dith imchuir na-mbreath aitrige

An IIII ní bacus an-fæisidin o-n diabal . . .² 7 cuimnidh-si n-a-agaidh sin co-n-abair an-dochtuir co-fuilitt da-cuirt ann .i. cuirt a-ndentar an coir .i. in eclais tall 7 cuirt na-trocaire .i. in-eclais a-bus

Mas-seadh an cuirt a-ndentar an trocairi .i. an-eclais a-bus sir an-toirrsi indti do-fagbhail maithmidhi 7 gras ar-son do pecaid 7 muna-fagair an-toirrsi 7 muna-dernair an fæisidin ar-a-druim na-bíd dóig acat a-trocaire día

Mas-seadh ar grad día cathuigh an-agaidh toile na-colla mad-áil leat búaidh do breith o-t-naimbídib. an

(fo 36c) An V cuingill X. .i. bí cosaidech ort fein 7 na-bí ar-duine ele 7 da-tecmad co-mbenfad cuid do-t-pecaid re duine ele na-nocht a-ainm na-a-sloinded na-comarta as-a-n-aitheontaidhi hé 7 da-ndernair do-mill torad t-fæisidi co-leir

An VI cuingill X .i. do-run do-beith ullam do-cum do-breithem-nais do-fulang oir muna-rab ní bía tarba sa-fæisidi cideadh dambeit in rún ullam 7 nach féttar na-breatha do-fulang mi millenn t-fæisidin 7 cided ícfair a-purgatoir cach breith nach ícfair a-bus. Finit.

* * * * *

(Fo 36c, l. 12) Do-n fæisidin béus .i. a-oidi 7 a-athair inmain indisim mo chair do día 7 dib-si ar-mo-pecaib fein co-h-imlan 7 co-h-airidhti ar-na-pectaib do-ronus tar éis m-fæisidi fa dered 7 do céd neithibh nach derna an-fæisidi co-h-imlan amail do-dlighfind 7 nar comlinus co-dutrachtach na bretha do cenglad dim 7 nar coimétus mé fein ar-na-pecaib cédna mar do-fétfaind 7 mar do dlighfind 7 is ar-na-h-adbaraib sin indisim mo chair do día 7 dib-si a-athair inmain

Ar-tús indisim mo cair do-na-pecaib marbtha co-foirlethan 7 an-a-ngnethibh co-h-imlan 7 ma-do-chintaigeas an-æn-pecaid díb do beirim mé fein tar ceand mo-chaire do día 7 d-a mathair

² *Sic MS.* Probably *an-t-édocas* is omitted.

on thee, such as fasting for the mortification of the body, or almsgiving to lessen thy worldly goods, and nothing is gained by satisfying for the fault unless those signs are left on thee. For the deed that was born alive, and died through mortal sin, receives its soul again through contrition.

The thirteenth condition: namely, to be prompt,¹⁷ without delay, but according as contrition and a confessor is obtained. And know that the desire of confession suffices for thee except in two cases. The first of these cases: namely, if thou wishest to receive the Body of Christ, the desire of confession does not suffice without (obtaining) confession itself, unless thou art in danger of death. The second case: namely, in the danger of death, if thou canst not make thy confession, thou art not damned, provided thou hast the desire to make it, and thou hast contrition. Do not delay it for a year, for it is a decree of the canon and of the Holy Church to every Christian, to make his confession three times a year, and to receive the Body of Christ. And remember the advice of the holy Doctor, ordering confession as frequent as the sin, for fear one might not be able to obtain it again before death.

The fourteenth condition: namely, to be strong,¹⁸ without regarding the will of the body. For the desires of the body are fighting against the soul, so that there is need of spiritual strength to aid the reason, that is, the will of the soul. The holy Doctor says that these are the things by which the devil prevents one from confessing; namely, first, shame. And remember against that shame the remedy I mentioned in the first condition. The second thing the devil promises thee is long life; and remember that the one who promises thee that, has it not to give thee. For Augustus says that nothing is more uncertain than the hour of death, and that there is nothing more certain than death itself. So do not delay confession, and do not believe that promise. The third¹⁹ thing that delays it: namely, fear of the penance; and remember against that fear, that every judgment, however hard, that the confessor imposes upon thee in this world is easily fulfilled compared with the judgments of the next world. The illustration the Doctor gives for this statement is a rush and a mountain; that is, thou hast thy choice of these to carry. The rush to be carried is the sacramental penance, and the mountain is the pain of hell in the next world,

¹⁷ "Accelerata."

¹⁸ "Fortis."

¹⁹ MS. has *dara*, "second."

Do *céd* neithib indissim mo chair ar-an-dimús óir ataim dímíach co-mór ac-am-toebail fein ós na-dáinib ele ac-sanntugadh m-anoraigti 7 mo-molta o-m-dáinib fein 7 o-dáinib ele 7 ac denam dimais as-mo-nert 7 as-m-óici 7 as-mo-slainiti 7 a-subalcaibh³ nach-fuil indam .i. ac-am-foillsiugadh fein do-beith umhal genmnaidh craidbtech gen co-bim 7 do-beirim tatháir ar-dáinib ele 7 ní-h-áil leam mo-thathair o cach 7 is-mó de chim pecad cáich 7 brethnaigim iatt na-mo pecad fein 7 ní-fuilim umal do día na-do-duine amail do dlighfind 7 is ar-na-h-adbaraib sin (fo 33d) indissim mo chair do día 7 dáib-si sa-pecad sin

Do-n-tnúth indissim mo chair oir do-ronus tnúth co-meníc ac-tnúth re-slainiti 7 re h-óici 7 re socraidecht na-ndáine ele 7 ac-tnúth re-h-anoir 7 re-deglú na-adáine ele 7 is-mo-forbfailtigim do-míclú mo-comarsan na-d-a-deglú 7 ar-na-h-adbaraib sin indissim mo chair do día 7 dáib-si in cach gne a-fuil in pecad sin.

Do-n ferge indissim mo chair oir ataim fergach co mór ac fergugadh co h-écoir an-agaidh cach áen duine itir cleirech is-tuata 7 ac-míclú na-ndáine re-mbí ferg acam 7 ac-a-n-ithimrád mar nach dlighfind 7 ac-tabairt uile an-agaidh uile doib 7 congmaim cennaraic an-agaidh mo-comarsan co-meníc 7 ní-maithim doib ant-andligedh do níd^{*}dam mar do dlighfind 7 ar-na-h-adbaraib sin 7 ar-cach uile gné d-a-fuil ar-an pecad so indissim mo chair do día 7 dáib-si. do-n

Do-n-leisci indissim mo chair oir ataim lesge do-cum na-nde-goibrighti 7 lúath laidir do-cum-na n-oibrech ndimoin .i. lesce do-cum-na-h-urnaidhti 7 do cum-an cradbaidh 7 luath do-cum óil 7 caithme 7 cach uile dimóinis 7 ní sáethrighim co corparda na-co-spiratalta mar do dlighfind 7 mar do fétfaind 7 ar-na-h-abaraib sin indissim mo cair do día 7 díb-si

Do-n saint indissim mo cair oir ataim sanntach do-cum gach áen ní aimsirda .i. ac-sanntugadh óir 7 airgit 7 étaigh 7 cach-maithesa ságalta ar cheana cid b-é cor as-a-fuidhind iatt oir do-nim slidhti seacranacha d-a-fagbhail 7 is-mór mo doilges im-na-neithibh bís acam do dol uaim 7 is-mó smuainim na-neithe aimsirda na-mo-día fein 7 ar-na-h-adbaraib sin indissim mo chair do día 7 díb-si an cach gne d-a-fuil ar an pecad so 7 an-a-casanaib co-foirlethan

Do-n craes indissim mo chair oir ataim craesach co-mór ac-am dortad fein ar gach uile bíadh can modh ac-a-caithem 7 ac ól

³ MS. has *t* for *c*.

[to be borne] for want of undergoing the sacramental penance. The fourth thing that hinders confession through the devil is ———; ²⁰ and remember, against that, that the Doctor says that there are two courts, the court in which justice is done, namely, the Church in the next world, and the court of mercy, namely, the Church on earth. Therefore pray [God] for contrition in the court where mercy is shown, namely, in the Church on earth, so as to obtain pardon and grace for thy sin, and unless thou obtainest contrition, and unless thou makest thy confession through it, hope not for the mercy of God. Therefore, for the love of God, fight against the will of the flesh if thou wishest to conquer thine enemies.

The fifteenth condition: namely, accuse thyself and not anyone else;²¹ and if it should happen that part of thy sin should have to do with another person, do not reveal his name or his surname, nor any sign by which he might be recognized; and if thou doest that, it has destroyed the fruit of thy confession altogether.

The sixteenth condition: namely, to be resolved ²² to undergo thy penance; for unless thou art, there is no profit in the confession, although if thou hast the intention, and it is impossible to undergo the penance, it does not spoil thy confession, and, anyhow, thou wilt satisfy in Purgatory every penance thou dost not satisfy in this world. FINIT.

* * * * *

Further in regard to Confession,—to wit:—Dear Father Confessor, I declare my fault to God and to you for my own sins in general, and especially for the sins I have committed since my last confession; and in the first place, that I did not make my confession completely as I ought, and that I did not fulfill faithfully the penance imposed on me, and that I did not guard myself against the same sins as I might have done and ought to do; and for those reasons I declare my fault to God and to you, dear Father.

To begin with, I declare my fault in regard to mortal sins, in general and in all their kinds, and if I became guilty of any of these sins, I give myself to God and to His Mother, because of my fault.

²⁰ Probably "despair" is the word intended.

²¹ "Accusans."

²² "Parere parata."

(fo 37a) Do-n-craes indisim mo chair oir ataim craesach co-mór ac-am-dortad fein ar-cach-uile-biadh can-modh 7 ac-ól co-h-imar-crach mar-nach dlighfind 7 ní-traethim mo-thoil co-ríaghalta *acht* gradh mór acam ac-a-tabairt do-bíadhaib a-corgusaib 7 a-cataëirib⁴ na-næm 7 ní-bím buidech o-becan sásaidh 7 an-uair bim lán do-bíadh 7 do digh bim ullam do cum uile do denam 7 leasc do-cum maitheas 7 is-ar-na-h-adbaraib sin 7 ar-cach uile gné d-a-fuil ar-an-pecad so indisim mo cair do-día 7 díb-si.

Do-n druis indisim mo cair óir ataim druith ac-sanntugadh na-mban tar-an modh cóir do cindtugadh ríu da-fétaind 7 do-ním frichnum mór do briathraib 7 do-gnim do denam pecaig comígenmnaid ríu 7 ní-fechaim do cinel ban tar-a-cheile mar-atait ogha nó caillecha *diadha* nó mná fer pósta nó-mná do dealba nó mná do-druim uird écin 7 ní-fechaim do inat na-d-aimsir d-a-h-uaisle doib mar-ata fiadni dæine nó-tempul nó-relice inaid-domnaidhe nó-saire cengailti na-h-ecailsi 7 ataim truaillichti o-aislingib collaidhi na-h-aidhechi ó smuained an-pecaig sin 7 ar-na-[h-a]dbaraib sin 7 ar cach uile gné do-n-pecad sin indisim mo cair do día 7 díb-si

Do-na-h-ocht cairib collaidhi indisim mo chair 7 an-gach uile gné a-faicenn día mo chin indtu co-foirlethan 7 co-h-airighti annsa-snimchi 7 and sa torrsi 7 ann sa maidhmidhi oir dublann sí cach uile peacad co-h-imlan.

Do-na V cédfadhaib corpda indisim mo chair óir ní coimétaim iad amail do dlighfind 7 co-h-airighti mo-bél oir-labraim briatra dimæine so-tarcaisnighti co-menic 7 do-nim ithimrád menic ar cléirchibh 7 ar túatadaib 7 ar cach lucht uird ar-cheana 7 ní congmaim an-modh do dlighfind do congmail ar-mo-tengaidh 7 bí frichnam iarata acam (fo 37b) ar-blasandaib maithe 7 ar biadh 7 ar digh

Do-n-eistecht indisim mo cair óir is urusa lium briatra dimæine do-eistecht 7 is-mó tsanntaigim briatra docraidhi tathæireacha do eistecht na-briatra do rachadh a-tarba dam a-leth re día

Do-n radarc indisim mo cair óir féchaim neihce sægálta maille re gradh 7 re-saint a-fagbhála ac-fechain ban co-frichnamach maille re smuaintigtib dimæine 7 ní congmaim mo-radarc co-maith o-neichibh dimæine an-tsægail ar-a-ta[ng]mair a-buss.

⁴ Evidently an error for *cataisib*, which is translated. The word given means "seats."

In the first place, I declare my fault in regard to pride; for I am very proud, exalting myself above other men, coveting honor and praise for myself from my own people and from others, and taking pride in my strength and my youth and my health and in virtues which are not in me, that is, publishing myself as humble, chaste, pious, though I am not; and I have contempt for other men and I do not like to be despised by anyone; and I see everyone's sin, and judge them more than my own sin; and I am not humble before God nor before man as I ought to be; and it is for those reasons I declare my fault to God and to you in that sin.

In regard to envy I declare my fault, for I commit the sin of envy frequently, being envious of the health and youth and beauty of others, and envying the honor and good name of others, and I rejoice more in the ill-fame of my neighbor than in his good-fame; and for those reasons I declare my fault to God and to you, in every species of that sin.

In regard to anger I declare my fault, for I am much given to anger, being angry unjustly against everyone both cleric and laymen, and defaming those with whom I am angry, and backbiting them as I should not, and returning them evil for evil; and I maintain strife with my neighbor frequently, and I do not forgive them the wrong they do me, as I should; and for those reasons, and in every species there is in this sin, I declare my fault to God and to you.

In regard to sloth I declare my fault, for I am slow to good works and quick and strong to idle deeds, that is, slow to prayers and to piety and quick to drink and to eat, and to every sort of idleness; and I do not work corporally nor spiritually as I should, and as I could; and for those reasons I declare my fault to God and to you.

In regard to covetousness I declare my fault, for I am covetous of every temporal thing, that is, coveting gold and silver and raiment and every worldly good besides, by whatever means I might get them, for I devise tortuous ways to get them, and I grieve more over the loss of the things I possess, and I think more on temporal things, than on my God Himself, and for those reasons I declare my fault to God and to you, in every species there is in this sin and in its different ways, in general.

In regard to gluttony²³ I declare my fault, for I am very

²³ The first two lines of this paragraph are repeated in the text, the only difference being that the second time the word "eating" is omitted.

Do-*n* tadhall indísim mo cair óir glacaim mná 7 neithe docraidhi ele nach-dligfind do-glacad maille re-míán 7 re saint æ-fhagbhala.

Do airtocalaibh an creitim indísim mo cair óir ní fuilim daingen sa creitim amail do dligfind 7 ní-denaim deithbir itir na h-airteclaib 7 ní-smuainim íat in-a-n-inadaib fein mar-do dligfind co-frichnamach.

Do-*n* maindechtaidhi im-an-oifc ndíadha indísim mo cair oir is fúar mídutrachtach adeirim mo tratha o-indtind corraig maille re mídútracht craidhi 7 ní bí m-indtind leis an-ní adeir mo bél 7 is-mó adeirim mo-tratha o-n-a mbeith do-fíachaibh oram na-ó-dútracht 7 ní abraim iatt an-a-n-aimsir fein amail do dligfind 7 is-lúath bím do chum smuaintigti dimæin tri-m-urnaigti 7 ar-na-h-adbaraib sin indísim mo cair do día 7 díb-si

Do-na-h-athantaib do-facaib día a-talmáin indísim mo chair óir ní comláinim iatt .i. do céd neithibh ní charaim mo-día as-mo corp 7 as-m-anam amail do dligfind 7 caithim a-ainm co-dimæin ac-a-tabairt n-a-luidhe le breice 7 creitim do dimæines 7 do aislingtib mar nach dligfind 7 ní coimétaim na-domnaidhe inaitt-na-laithe sære amail do dligfind 7 is-mó bís m-aire ar-ól 7 (fo 37c) ar-caithem 7 ar-dimæines i-sna-laithibh sin na ar-urnaigti 7 ní-gradaighim mo caraitt 7 mo-namaitt mar do dligfind 7 ní-anoraim m-athair collaidhi 7⁵ m-athair spiratalta mar do dligfind 7 bim lethtrom co-menic ac-denam lethfiadni an-agaidh mo-comarsan 7 do-nim breg le-h-adbar 7 can adbar adeirim ar mo bel oibrighit maithe nach bí a-m-indtind 7 sanntaigim ben posta mo comarsan 7 ar na-h-adbaraib sin indísim mo-cair do-día 7 díb-si. 7 fós indísim mo cair ar comæinecha cuirp Christ ac-a-caithem comídingmala 7 an-uair do-rindes comæinecha fa-dered nir-ullmaiges mé rompa mar do-dligfind 7 nír coimétus mé an-a-ndíaidh mar-do dligfind 7 is-ar-na-h-adbaraib sin 7 ar-cach adbar d-a-nderna indísim mo cair do día 7 díb-si.

Do-na-pecthaibh so loghta indísim mo cair 7 cach leithe a-tiagatt a-peacad marbta tri n-a-ngnathugadh nó do-míán a-ndenmusa 7 co-fóirlethan da-cach degobair do-leices toram tria-maindechtaidhi 7 cach olc do rónus mar do aithin día mé d-a-denam indísim mo cair do día 7 díb-si.

Do oibrighthibh na-trocaire indísim mo cair óir ní furtachtaigim ar-bochtaib na-ar-an-neach ric a-leas biád 7 étach mar do dligfind

⁵ Here *na* is inserted above the sign for *ocus*. The former is translated.

gluttonous, indulging myself with every sort of food, eating and drinking to excess, as I ought not; and I do not restrain my will regularly, but take great delight in feasting in Lent and on the vigils of the Saints; and I am not thankful for a little satisfaction; and when I am full of food and of drink I am ready to do evil, and slothful in regard to good; and it is for those reasons, and for every species there is in this sin, I declare my fault to God and to you.

* * * * *

In regard to the eight carnal sins I declare my fault, and in every species of guilt that God sees in them, in general and in particular, in grief and in sorrow and in forgiveness, for it [forgiveness] covers every sin completely.

In regard to the five bodily senses I declare my fault, for I do not guard them as I ought, and especially my mouth, for I often speak idle spiteful words, and I frequently backbite clerics and laymen, and members of religious orders besides, and I do not observe the restraint I should observe over my tongue, and I seek diligently for pleasant tastes in food and drink.

In regard to hearing I declare my fault, for it is easier for me to listen to idle words, and I am more eager to hear harsh contemptuous words than words that would help in God's sight.

In regard to sight I declare my fault, for I look at worldly things with love and the desire to get them, looking curiously at women with idle thoughts; and I do not guard my sight well from the idle things of the world, on which I happen in this life.

In regard to touch I declare my fault, for I take hold of women and other unseemly things that I should not grasp, along with the wish and the desire to have them.

In regard to the articles of faith I declare my fault, for I am not strong in the faith as I should be, and I make no distinction among the articles, and I do not meditate on them individually as I should do with diligence.

In regard to negligence in the divine office I declare my fault, for I say my hours coldly, negligently, from an inconstant mind along with carelessness of heart, and my mind is not on what my mouth speaks; and I say my hours more because it is an obligation on me than from zeal, and I do not say them at their proper time

7 ní tecaism na-dæine ainmfesacha sa-méitt fesa do beith doib
 acam 7⁶ ní-fisraidim na h-eslain 7 ní fóirim a-míana fa-m-
 acfaind mar do dlighfind 7 ní nertaigim anmaind 7 ni-adlaicim
 marb 7 ni-tabraim furtacht dóib do derc na-do-urnaigti na de
 aithfirindaib 7 ar na-h-adbaraib sin 7 ar-cach-uile ceim a-facann
 día mo pecad indisim mo cair do día 7 díb-si 7 do nim comann
 ris-na-dæinib atá ar fogra o-n-eclais 7 cuirim neiche a-menmain
 7 teigim iatt indti nó-co-ndenaim pecadh díb 7 ar-na-h-adbaraib
 sin indisim mo cair do día 7 díb-si. (fo 37d) 7 bimm lethtromm
 amairsech ar-oibrightib día 7 teigim an-eclais día co-mídingmala
 do-fechain cuirp Christ 7 do eistecht tserbisi día 7 cach inat a-
 faicenn día me co dimæin san-inad an-a-cóir dam fognam día do
 denam 7 congmain smuaintigti peacacha acam mar nach dlighfind
 7 caithim m-aimsir co-dimæin ac-denam toile an-tsægail an-agaidh
 toile dé 7 ar-na-h-adhbaraib sin indisim mo cair do día 7 díb-si
 7 bethaigim na-pecaig is-na-laithibh saire gen-gob-cet dam a-
 ndenam is-na-laithibh ele 7 cach inatt a-faicenn día cor-caith mé
 mo cédfadha corparda an-agaidh a-toile .i. mo-chosa 7 mo-lama
 7 mo-súile 7 mo cluasa 7 mo-bél 7 mo-sron 7 mo-tenga 7 mo croidi
 7 toil mo cuirp an agaidh toile dé 7 ní-h-ead amain acht cach-uile
 ceim a-faicenn día mo-pecad sirim espalóiv oraib-si ar grad día 7
 breithemnus aithrige do cengal orum. FINIT.

⁶ At this point the margin has this note in a later hand:—Is terc duine
 an-erinn do ni a fæisidin mar adeir an leabar-so. The translation is given
 in the preface.

as I ought; and I am quick to idle thoughts during my prayers; and for those reasons I declare my fault to God and to you.

In regard to the commandments that God left on earth I declare my fault, for I do not fulfill them; namely, in the first place, I do not love my God with my body and my soul as I should, and I take His name in vain, swearing to falsehood by it, and I believe in nonsense and in dreams, as I ought not; and I do not keep Sundays nor holydays as I ought; and my attention is given more to drinking and to eating and to idleness on those days than to prayer; and I do not love my friend and my enemy, as I ought; and I do not honor my fleshly father nor my spiritual father, as I should do; and I am frequently unjust by bearing false witness against my neighbor; and I tell lies with reason and without reason; and I claim with my mouth good deeds that are not in my mind; and I covet my neighbor's wife; and for those reasons I declare my fault to God and to you. And also I declare my fault in regard to partaking of the Body of Christ, for receiving it unstedfastly, and when at length I received communion, I did not prepare myself for it as I ought, and I did not keep myself after it as I ought; and it is for those reasons and for every cause I have given, I declare my fault to God and to you.

As to venial sins I declare my fault, and every way they become a mortal sin through habit or from the desire to commit them; and in general as to every good deed I have omitted through negligence, and every evil I have done, according to the commandment of God, I declare my fault to God and to you.

As to the works of mercy I declare my fault, for I do not help the poor nor him who needs food and clothing, as I ought, and I do not instruct the ignorant as far as I might have knowledge to give them, and I do not visit the sick and do not help their minds according to my ability as I ought, and I do not strengthen the weak, and I do not bury the dead, and I do not help them with almsgiving nor with prayers nor with Masses; and for those reasons and for every degree [of guilt] that God sees [in] my sin, I declare my fault to God and to you. And I have dealings with excommunicated persons, and I put things in [their] minds and foster them there till I cause them to commit sin; and for those reasons I declare my fault to God and to you.

And I am unsteady and distrustful concerning the acts of God; and I go seldom into the church of God to visit the Blessed Sacra-

ment, and to listen to the service of God; and [I confess] every occasion when God sees me idle when I should be serving God; and I entertain sinful thoughts, as I should not do, and I spend my time idly, doing the will of the world instead of the will of God; and for those reasons I declare my fault to God and to you. And I entertain sinners on holydays, though I am not permitted to do so on other days; and [I confess] every occasion that God sees that I have used my bodily senses against His will, namely, my feet, and my hands, and my eyes, and my ears, and my mouth, and my nose, and my tongue, and my heart, and the inclination of my body, against the will of God, and not only that, but [for] every degree [of guilt] that God sees [in] my sin, I ask absolution of you for the love of God, and that you impose on me a sacramental penance. FINIT.

JAMES A. GEARY.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Gifts. By the Will of the late Mrs. Lucy Wharton Drexel, of Philadelphia, the University received the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars. Mrs. Drexel was an aunt of Mother Katherine Drexel, who founded the Institute of the Blessed Sacrament for the education of Indian children. Last Summer Mother Katherine, together with several other Sisters of her community, attended the first session of the Catholic University Summer School.

Miss Della Hamilton, of Omaha, Nebraska, has given to the University the sum of Five Thousand Dollars, to found a scholarship for ecclesiastical students, in favor of the diocese of Omaha.

Lecture on the Arthurian Saga. Dr. Paul Gleis, Walburg Professor of German language and literature, delivered February 14 a very important discourse on the origin and development of the Arthurian saga. He traced the legend beyond Norman England, Brittany and the Celtic peoples to the remote Orient. The lecture was one of the most impressive delivered in recent years in McMahon Hall.

Portrait of Father Walburg. The University has acquired an excellent oil painting of Reverend Anthony F. Walburg, late pastor of St. Augustine's Church, Cincinnati, who donated the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars for the foundation of a chair of German language and literature. The portrait now hangs in the Rector's office, where it attracts general attention as a lifelike resemblance of this generous benefactor.

Gift to Library. Mrs. George May, of Washington, D. C., recently presented to the Library a copy of Fox's *Book of Martyrs*, an early and rare edition, in three folio volumes, of that curious and influential polemic of the fifteenth century.

Feast of St. Thomas. The feast of St. Thomas, the patronal feast of the Faculty of Philosophy, was celebrated in MacMahon Hall on Thursday, March 7, by a solemn High Mass at which Reverend Doctor George Sauvage was the celebrant. In the afternoon Doctor Pace delivered a learned and eloquent lecture on the life and character of St. Thomas Aquinas.


Retreats. The Lenten Season began with two Retreats, one for the lay students and one for the ecclesiastical students. The lay students' retreat was preached by Rev. James W. Dolan, Pastor of West Winfield, N. Y., former student of the University. The retreat for Ecclesiastics was conducted by Reverend Doctor Francis P. Duffy, Professor of Philosophy at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, New York, also an alumnus of the University.

Gibbons Hall. Work is progressing on the tower of Gibbons Hall, which is being built in commemoration of the double Jubilee of His Eminence, Cardinal Gibbons. The tower will be five stories high and will accommodate thirty students. It is in the best Collegiate Gothic style and built of Port Deposit Granite with carved stone trimmings.

Sisters' College. The Sisters' College has begun the second term of its first year's work with twenty-nine students, members of the various teaching orders throughout the country. The largest groups come from Terre Haute, Ind., and Dubuque, Ia. They are all preparing to teach in the Catholic Academies and Colleges for girls, and hope, by reason of the work they have already done elsewhere, to obtain their academic degrees at the end of this school year. At present the classes are held in the schoolroom of St. Benedict's Convent in Brookland. There are nine University Professors on the teaching staff, representing the Faculties of Letters, Science, Philosophy and Education. The Sisters are regularly registered students of the University and subject to all the conditions which govern the granting of degrees to laymen and clerics. The college was

opened last October in response to a need which our teaching communities have long felt, but which has never before been met except by Summer Sessions and brief Institutes for Catholic teachers. The results so far have amply justified the undertaking, and the time is not far distant when the University will be able to go into the work of training Catholic teachers, members of the religious orders of women, in a manner commensurate with the importance of the work which those teachers are doing.

Summer School. The Prospectus for the next Session of the Summer is now being prepared. The first session, held last summer, was a success beyond all expectation. There were in attendance, besides Catholic lay teachers, almost three hundred teaching Sisters representing forty States of the Union and half a dozen from Canada. From present indications the attendance next summer will be at least double that of the first session. Last year there were thirty-five courses given: the Prospectus this year will offer the same courses, and some thirty others will be added to the curriculum.



The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII.

May, 1912.

No. 5.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

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SOCIALISTS AND SOCIALISM.

It is a commonplace that Socialism has already become a powerful world-wide movement and is destined to acquire still greater momentum. The strength which it already possesses in the German Empire is considered to be one of the most significant factors in the political world today, and many competent persons are of the opinion that if German Socialism could but dissociate itself from the anti-religious elements of its constitution it would at once obtain an immense accession of Catholic workingmen. If you wish to gauge its power in England, you have but to observe the present situation in which a responsible government has endeavored to meet the recent national, industrial and commercial crises by the introduction of legislative measures, which the most prominent English statesman has designated as pure, unadulterated Socialism. In America the strength of the Socialist party is comparatively slight, but its numbers are by no means trivial; and the extent to which Socialist views prevail is not to be measured by the figures which represent the strict party affiliation. There are many organizations which though not constituents of the Socialist party itself are yet active promoters of Socialist economic and political ideas. Besides, outside of all Socialist and semi-Socialist associations, the feeling and conviction is in the atmosphere of the wage-earning world that the toilers are not getting their just share of the wealth which, without them,

would not exist—and this atmosphere is the very one to favor the growth of Socialism. For, to great numbers of those who suffer under the present distribution of the good things of life, Socialism presents itself as the messiah announcing a new kingdom of justice wherein the worker shall receive the full product of his labor, and where if any man shall not work neither shall he eat. What is the source whence Socialism draws its vitality and vigor? To this question a unanimous answer is returned by clouds of witnesses, many of whom would agree upon scarcely any other matter regarding the subject. Here Leo XIII and Archbishop Kettler are in accord with Mr. Bax and Mr. Hyndman. "It is the giant task of our age," declared Kettler, "to fill up again the abyss that divides the rich from the poor and woe to us if it is not filled up." Said Leo XIII: "All agree and there can be no question whatever that some remedy must be found and found quickly for the misery and wretchedness pressing so heavily and unjustly at this moment on the vast majority of the working classes." The twenty years that have elapsed since these words were written, which epitomize ten thousand pages of burning invective thrown out continually by the Socialist press, have not witnessed the application of the needed remedy. It certainly does not lie within the lines of thought developed by Mr. Mallock who would preach to the workingman that he is very well off indeed, if he only knew it; and is obtaining more than his fair share of the fruits of industry. "Injustice," iterates the Socialist, "continues to press heavily on the working classes; and matters will not cease to grow worse until you cut the root of the evil, that is, the present system of capitalism, in which the workers are robbed of the fruit of their toil, in order that the idle rich may live, not merely in comfort, but in boundless luxury and splendor." There can, he argues, be no adequate improvement obtained from the present political, economic and social constitution. The two great political parties? A plague o' both your houses; they, like the judiciary, the legislature and the executive are controlled by the money-bags. Individualism means capitalism;

and capitalism means, and will, till it is abolished, continue to mean the exploitation of the wage-earner in the interest of the money-owners! These ideas are set forth skilfully, in form best adapted to stir the blood and imagination of the workers and of those who resent the evils of the present condition. Parallel columns are drawn up. On one side, the factory-worker striving to feed a wife and children on six or seven dollars a week; the unhealthy factory and the still more unhealthy tenement or shanty; anaemic childhood and pauper old age; girls toiling for a pittance insufficient to support them, and the abodes of infamy recruited largely through the pressure of penury. On the other side, the five thousand dollar bulldog, the hundred thousand dollars paid for my lady's pearl necklace, or to decorate a church for a bridal ceremony; a million and a half spent on champagne in the public hostelryes of one city to welcome in the new year with its message of good will; the fortunes sunk to buy a European title for the daughter of some successful exploiter. The Socialist suffers from no lack of colors on his palette to cover the canvases that he presents to the labor world with "Look on this picture and on that." This attack on the abuses of capitalism and the injustices engendered by them is one feature of the Socialist campaign. If it were the only one, the duty of the Catholic Church to oppose the party would be much less obvious than it actually is. There is another feature, which is a downright warfare against religion and especially against the Catholic Church as the one consistent representative of the supernatural; and the great danger which threatens in many quarters of the country the welfare of Catholic flocks is that many Catholics see in Socialism only the former character, ignoring or denying altogether the existence of the latter. The term Socialism has acquired a vague, shifting, elastic signification which leads not merely to confusion but also to a great deal of pernicious deception. The pastor who finds himself called on to protect or rescue any of his people from the Socialist drift should know that he must, in the first place, be able to grasp and to expose the various ideas, doctrines, principles, programs, parties, as-

pirations, movements, which now in the aggregate, now separately, are designated under the terms Socialist and Socialism. In the second place he must be able to present the principles of Catholic ethics upon which may be based a program of social reform broad enough and deep enough to satisfy the aspirations of those whose Socialism consists in a very reasonable dissatisfaction with the abuses of the present condition, and a willingness to promote any movement that promises to bring about a salutary change.

What are the various implications gathered under the term Socialism? It means a certain economic theory regarding the production and the distribution of the material goods used for the satisfaction of human needs and desires. It means, in the second place, a philosophy of life, a sociology; and a scheme of social and political organization constructed upon this economic and its associated philosophic theory. Again, it means an organized party or parties, with a definite history behind them, that have advocated and prosecuted a movement to bring about the reconstruction of society in accordance with this economic and philosophic doctrine—that is, in the concrete, *the Socialists*. Again, Socialism is used to designate this party's immediate and ultimate programs; sometimes only the immediate; at other times, this or that measure proposed by the Socialists; and very frequently it simply means an attitude of sympathy with the provisional measures of social reform proposed by the party—and approved by many who are strongly and irrevocably opposed to socialist philosophy and to the party inasmuch as it is committed to that philosophy. Finally, not to pursue distinctions unnecessarily far, owing to the discordant oracles issued by the professed exponents of Socialism, quite disparate and even contrary ideas and programs are presented as being, respectively, the genuine tenets of the Socialist party. The Socialist party is atheistic, declares Mr. Jones, for has he not read Belfort Bax and Hyndman and Ferri and a long list of other Socialist authorities stretching back to Marx and Engels themselves, not to speak of the uninterrupted witness of the current socialist newspapers? Not at all, replies Mr.

Smith, you are mistaken; read Spargo and Kirkup; look at the official program of the American Socialists in 1910, in which they squarely affirm that the Socialist party is primarily an economic and political movement; and is not concerned with matters of religious belief. In a similar fashion Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith argue over the destruction of the family, free love, confiscation of private property, etc., etc., till the wordy duel ends with each party standing exactly where he stood at first, except that he has probably conceived a very low opinion of either the intellect or the sincerity of his adversary. No-where more than in serious discussion with persons who are inclined towards Socialism, but are not actually members of the Socialist party—with the genuine, confirmed Socialist argument is usually thrown away—is there profit to be reaped from keeping in mind the words of Locke: "If the idea be not agreed upon betwixt the speaker and the hearer for which the words stand the agreement is not about things but names. As often as such a word whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them comes into use their understandings have no other object wherein they agree but barely the sound; the things they think of at that time as expressed by the word being quite different."

Of Socialism properly speaking, that is, the professions and aims of the Socialist party, the economic theory may be said to be the very essence. That theory is formulated as follows by one of the foremost American exponents of the system today: "Socialism advocates the transfer of ownership in the social tools of production, the land, factories, machinery, railroads, mines, etc., from the individualist capitalist to the people to be operated for the benefit of all." This statement may be called the greatest common measure of every group or body that can lay claim to the name of Socialist. It was proposed by Marx, it continues to be the definition of the ultimate aim of the party to-day. Frequently the economic theory which is embodied in this principle is said to be the only doctrine maintained by official Socialism today as the basis of its activity and its practical program. Many a man who

approves Socialism believes that the movement and the party stand simply for the realization of the change advocated in this formula, along with some definite proposals in the way of provisional measures to bring this desideratum about. But unless we are ready to refuse credit to its most brilliant champions from Marx down, we must believe that Socialism, not the vague mental attitude, but concrete Socialism, the Socialist party, stands for a great deal more than the affirmation and realization of the purely economic theory, which, frequently, to the advantage of clear thinking, is conveniently called Collectivism.

Is Collectivism, in itself, isolated from any other kind of theory, immoral and irreligious? Speaking in the abstract, a community might without any violation of the principles of natural justice or the teachings of supernatural religion be organized on a collectivist basis. In such a community the land, the cattle, tools and implements, buildings, etc., might be owned in common; all the members should labor in their respective departments, and all receive their just share of the product. Individual and family rights might be respected, and everything go merrily as a marriage bell under this arrangement. Such was the system established in the missions of Paraguay. If sound moral and religious principles governed all or the greater part of the individuals comprising the community, however large, then the administration of the Commonwealth would be regulated with due consideration for both morals and religion. But the problem assumes a very different aspect when there is question of introducing such organization of society into a modern nation in which the entire social structure is constituted on the basis of private ownership. To reason effectively, however, with the man who is merely a Collectivist, though he may call himself a Socialist, the argument to be fruitful must be conducted on economic rather than on moral and religious grounds. The impracticability of Collectivism, owing to the difficulties of organizing labor, of assigning employment, of establishing a proper scale of remuneration, of finding an adequate motive to stimulate industry and thrift, has been lucidly and forcibly demonstrated by a

host of anti-Socialist writers. Even pure Collectivism, advocated without any admixture of directly immoral views regarding marriage and the family, is open to the charge that if established on a national scale it could not fail to be destructive of the most sacred bonds of family life. This charge will be strenuously denied by many sympathisers with Socialism, who are conscious of their own rectitude of purpose and conduct in this regard. But what would be the inevitable result on the institution of the family of setting up the state as the universal producer and provider may be easily inferred.

The second content of the term Socialism is a well-defined philosophy of life, and a scheme, not well defined in detail, but thoroughly clear in its principles, for the reorganization of society and the direction of all the members of the society in their individual capacity. This philosophic theory, historically speaking, has been presented by the founders and leaders of the Socialist party as the indispensable, logical, scientific foundation of Collectivism. The central doctrine of this philosophy is, it need not be said, the materialistic interpretation of history. This teaching is that the entire development of man and human society, all ideas and institutions, intellectual, moral and religious, have been originated and determined in their character by the successive conditions in which he found himself with regard to the production and distribution of the goods consumed in daily life. Man liveth physically and morally by bread alone, and not by any word that cometh out of the mouth of God. The Christian religion, therefore, its creed and its moral institutions are the efflorescence of the conditions that prevailed in economic production at the period when it made its appearance; its vicissitudes and development are to be ascribed to the same causes. And, as the economic system of individualism has almost run its course to yield to a new constitution of society, so, too, Christianity is doomed to disappear. It is, in fact, on its last legs:

“Though before thee the throned Cytherean,
Be fallen, and hidden her head,
Yet thy kingdom shall pass, Galilean,
Thy dead shall go down to the dead.”

All religion, indeed, is but a transitory device of evolution, which having played its part, sometimes beneficently, sometimes injuriously, in the great drama, has now become positively pernicious, because it would continue to persuade the victims of the present unjust capitalistic system, by worthless promissory notes drawn on a future life, to submit to their lot and leave the spoilers in peaceful possession of the cash of this present world. Volumes might be filled with quotations amplifying this view from an unbroken chain of Socialist writers in every decade from every country beginning with Marx and Engels, and reaching to but not ending with Mr. Bax and many of his American comrades. Let a sample of one of the most brilliant and cultivated of Socialists suffice here. Some Socialists and pro-Socialists occasionally assert that Socialism, meaning the principles of the organized Socialist party, are in harmony with Christianity. Let us hear Mr. Belfort Bax, who presumably knows what he is talking about:—"As to the ethical teaching of Christ, with its one-sided, introspective, and individualistic character, we venture to assert that no one acquainted with the theory of modern scientific Socialism can, for a moment, call it socialistic. Socialism aims rather at a rehabilitation in higher form of the classical utilitarian morality of public life. It has no sympathy with the morbid, eternally-revolving-upon-itself transcendent morality of the Gospel discourses. This morality like that of the whole Oriental movement of which it is a development, is essentially subjective, its criterion lying in the individual conscience, and its relation to a divinity supposed to reveal himself in it. It sets up a forced—to the vast majority, impossible—standard of 'personal holiness' which, when realized, has seldom resulted in anything but (1) an apotheosised priggism (*e. g.*, the Puritan type) or (2) in an epileptic hysteria (*e. g.*, the Catholic Saint type) and which at the best is a *tour de force* involving our wonder perhaps, like the concentrated physical energy of the tight-rope dancer, but which we feel to be just as useless."¹ The same author

¹ *The Religion of Socialism.* Ed. 1908, p. 97.

summarizes the common, if not quite universal testimony of Socialist writers as to the nature of their system: "Socialism has been well described as a new conception of the world, presenting itself in industry as coöperative Communism, in politics as international Republicanism, in religion as atheistic Humanism, by which is meant the recognition of social progress as our being's highest end and aim. The establishment of society on a Socialistic basis would imply the definitive abandonment of all theological cults, since the notion of a transcendent god or semi-divine prophet is but the counterpart and analogue of the transcendent governing class. . . . As the religion of slave industry was Paganism; as the religion of serfage was Catholic Christianity, or Sacerdotalism; as the religion of Capitalism is Protestant Christianity or Biblical Dogma; so the religion of collective and coöperative industry is Humanism, which is only another name for Socialism."² When the Socialist comes to consider the Christian family and marriage his views are the complement and the logical corollaries of these pronouncements on religion. The author of the latest Socialist survey of the position of the party in America puts the case very euphemistically when she writes: "As has been seen, the economic interpretation of history dominates the Socialist philosophy, and no institution is therefore held permanently sacred; religion, the state, and the present form of the family are outgrowths of the bourgeois system, and as such are subject to change as were the corresponding institutions at the close of the classical period. In its external forms, at any rate, religion is allowed by the Socialist no exemption from criticism."³

Now it is evident that no person enjoying the use of reason could for a moment cheat himself into the belief that he might continue to be a Catholic and yet entertain such ideas as the above on religion and morality; or that he could conscientiously become a member of a party pursuing such ideals and propagating through its current press and by its more permanent

² *Ib.*, p. 81.

³ *American Socialism of the Present Day*. Hughan, 1911, p. 160.

literature doctrines of the above type. Yet there are certainly honest Catholics who will tell you in all sincerity that they favor Socialism and see nothing in it contrary to Catholic faith. We have, for example, this view set forth very eloquently by Mr. Bliss, whose sincerity one may not question. Last summer, one of the most distinguished among English Catholic laymen, a learned judge, before a union of Catholic Young Men's Societies at which a bishop presided, vigorously expressed his conviction that Catholics are making a mistake in opposing Socialism on the grounds of religion and morality. The present writer has met more than one earnest intelligent Catholic wage-earner who gave it as his opinion that the movement has nothing to do with religion, nor with changing the character of marriage; and that the conditions aimed at by Socialism would affect the family relations only to place family life, among the working classes, on a worthier plane than the one it occupies today; the father would be in a position to provide decently for his family, and poverty or penury would cease to be the janitor to vice and degradation. "What," said a New York mechanic, who claimed to be a practical Catholic and to be strongly in favor of Socialism, "What danger to the faith of Catholics or to the Church would arise if the government were to take over all the coal mines, the cotton factories, the steel plants, the railways of the country?" This man might be taken as the type of a number of Catholics much more numerous than those who do not come into personal contact with wage earners are likely to imagine.

Here is a case to which wise old John's observation applies with its full force. In the mind of a Catholic who speaks in the strain quoted above the term Socialism stands for something quite different from its connotation in the text of Mr. Belfort Bax and the denunciation of Leo XIII and Pius X. The confusion rests mainly on the fact that, on one side, the economic theory of collectivism more or less restricted, and usually qualified with some provision for the indemnification of owners whose property would be socialized, is taken to be the be-all and the end-all of Socialism. On the other hand

it is assumed that the anti-religious Socialist philosophy and the economic theory are inseparably interwoven, and that this union, when we pass from the realm of abstract ideas, is a concrete reality in the Socialist party. As long as the Catholic merely favors Collectivism pure and simple, in what might be called dilettante fashion, no great harm can come to him. The danger begins when he comes to think that the Socialist party, its spirit, its aims and its tenets are completely embraced in the economic theory alone, and adequately reflected in its published programs. Now the important question, is, which of these two estimates, that of the Popes and Bax and a host of other Socialists, or that of some Socialists and some non-Socialists is the true one?

That the materialistic, anti-religious philosophy already outlined has been identified with the Socialist movement from its inception is undeniable. It was formulated by Marx and Engels as the basis on the strength of which they laid claim to the designation of "scientific" for their Socialism. We have noted Miss Hughan's testimony that it is, today, still recognized by the American Socialists as the keystone of their system. Take up the catalogue of Socialist works, large and small, issued by Chas. P. Kerr and Co., of Chicago, the official publishers of the Socialist party, and you will observe that if you eliminate the books and pamphlets which preach materialism, determinism, agnosticism, or atheism, the residuum will be negligible. The materialistic interpretation of history "is universally accepted among American Socialists, and is employed in all their literature, from the constructivist pages of Robert Hunter to the revolutionary pamphlets of Debs and Hanford."⁴

Evidently the Catholic who favors Socialism holds it guiltless of any distinct antagonism to religion; and he disregards as unsound the philosophic reasonings which infer that an established Collectivism would result in injury to our present family life. He reaches this mental attitude through two causes,—the first is, that he believes some drastic reform of

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

the present abuses has become imperative; the second, that this conviction prompts him to lend a friendly ear to any pleas that would exculpate Socialism, which seems to him to be the only movement that promises a radical remedy for the situation, from the charge of irreligion and immorality. And he finds a considerable volume of testimony to this effect, from within and without. Some Socialists, as for instance, Mr. Kirkup, protest that there is no necessary or essential connexion between Socialism and irreligion: "The connexion of Socialism with views of this nature is purely an accident; with regard to the prevalence of anti-Christian feeling in Socialist schools it should be remembered that Socialism has flourished chiefly on the continent where the defection of the mass of the people from the creeds and churches is much more pronounced than in this country. Continental socialists are not more anti-Christian than continental liberals"; "Is there," said somebody, dwelling on this point, "anything to choose between the individualist Clemenceau and the Socialist, Jaurès?" The opinion is frequently urged that Socialism is only now beginning to find itself, and that it is steadily disentangling itself from those radical anti-religious principles which its founders and the infidel groups which composed its early membership, and still constitute the majority in its ranks, associated with the purely economic theory. Your socialist-inclined Catholic quotes with an air of finality the statement of the Chicago Platform of 1910: "The Socialist Party is primarily an economic and political movement. It is not concerned with matters of religious belief." He has probably never perused the report of the convention which proves plainly just what that declaration, which was adopted as a mere piece of expediency, is worth. In like manner there abound statements from Socialists of note to the effect that the arraignment of Socialism as a foe to the family is false and preposterous. For instance, the following from Mr. Victor Berger: "The story that Socialism will destroy the family is one of the lies brought up against every reform movement." The platform of a party, however, is to be interpreted by the general

principles and policy of the party; and isolated expressions of this or that member weigh but little against a massive sustained body of testimony, official and individual, which expresses the convictions and aims that permeate the party as an organized movement. If the stories that the Socialist party stands for the destruction of religion and the abolition of the Christian family are lies, then the sons of Ananias who have industriously and persistently circulated these stories, through the press of every country are Marx, Bebel, Hyndman, Bax, Kautsky, Ferri and a host of other Socialists who have been and who are much more powerful in the shaping of Socialist ideals and directing Socialist activities than is the clever member of Congress from the fifth district of Wisconsin. The assertion that ultimately Socialism will be purged of its irreligious leaven and will abandon its traditional philosophy belongs to the realm of prophecy, and hence is not susceptible of proof or disproof. One, however, has but to peruse occasionally the various party organs to find ample reasons for the conviction that this process of expurgation will not be effected through the coöperation or with the consent of the present generation of Socialists.

What, above everything else, tends to throw the anti-religious element of organized Socialism into the background is the gradually increasing predominance in the party of the Constructivist type of thought over the Revolutionist; or the moderate over the Radical. These divisions do not, it seems, constitute two distinctly defined parties in the camp, for both agree on the basic principle of the socialization of capital. But they respectively advocate different lines of immediate procedure. The definitions presented by the Socialist writer already cited, will sufficiently indicate the two varieties. To condense the description, the Revolutionist, true to the mind of Marx, believes that the present capitalistic system must fall by the very evolution of things, and fall comparatively soon. Consequently he is but little concerned in trying to win through legislation various measures of amelioration for the benefit of the working classes; instead, he aims principally at obtaining wider political

rights and to create stronger self-consciousness in the working classes and otherwise to prepare them for the inevitable struggle that is to usher in the Socialistic régime. The Evolutionist, on the other hand, though the ultimate goal of his ambition and effort is the establishment of a Socialistic society on the basis of collective ownership, expects to reach that goal step by step. Consequently the program set forth is a series of legislative measures to be fought for at once by means of the legal and political weapons now available. The strength of this latter policy is perceived in the tendency to be silent on the anti-Christian tenets belonging to the party; and to make the official programs, after a formal proclamation of the collectivist doctrine, in somewhat qualified form, recognizing the right of ownership in goods of consumption to consist chiefly of measures that might all be advocated as steps of social reform on an individualistic basis. Consider, for example, the character of the last program of the Internationalist Socialist Party. Apart from some articles bearing on the party organization and administration, the main contents were: Coöperation, Arbitration, Disarmament, Unemployment, Capital Punishment, Labor Protective Legislation. The program of the American Socialists embraces various measures tending directly to improve the condition of the working classes, such as shortening the hours of labor, factory inspection, restrictions on child labor; political measures to establish a pure democracy, including universal suffrage, the initiative, the referendum and the recall; administrative measures like a graduated income tax and free administration of justice.

Naturally many Catholic wage-earners are attracted by this program and fully approve of it. Taking it as a comprehensive manifesto of the creed of Socialism they do not hesitate to call themselves Socialists, though they may not belong to the party at all. But they are in a fair way of being drawn into it; and when they begin to take an interest in Socialist literature they are in danger of losing their faith. Their pastors and other instructors must endeavor to convince them of the true character of the Socialist party; and denounce its

irreligious character. But these guides need also to point out how genuine Social Reform, embracing nearly if not all the above-mentioned measures might be realized without having recourse to Socialism at all. Harm rather than good may easily come of well-meant but misdirected denunciation. Here it is worth citing the caution given by an eminent priest who is conversant with the conditions that hold regarding controversy on this subject: "Such controversy has its uses, and the increase of Socialism no doubt calls for destructive criticism on the part of those capable of supplying it. Yet this criticism is not without its difficulties. It demands extreme caution and a wide range of knowledge. Mistakes (even in detail), exaggerations, or misrepresentations are apt to discredit the whole subject in the eyes of those who think they know better. Moreover our sources of information are not always reliable—or, if reliable, they may refer to conditions which prevail elsewhere or to systems which no longer find supporters."⁵ Especially the critic of Socialism must take care to gauge his man, so as to understand clearly whether he is a downright Socialist, accepting the whole sweep of the party's philosophical and economic theories, or is merely one who approves of drastic social reform. Against the former kind of opponent such books as *The Case against Socialism*, or *The Nation of Fatherless Children* are arsenals of serviceable citations, but persons of the other class, who frequently call themselves Socialists, occupy a position beyond the range of such ammunition. With these, denunciation of the materialistic interpretation of history and of the Socialist professions of free love are but a loss of time; they will usually be inclined to listen only to the economic criticism of Collectivism.

Even when attacking Collectivism apart from the philosophy, prudence requires that we select our arguments with discrimination from the abundance of literature that is published against Socialism. You address yourself to a socialistically inclined workingman, confident that you will completely cap-

⁵ *The Month*, February, 1908, p. 113.

ture him; for have you not at your fingers' ends the convincing exposition of So and So who shows how the Socialist State could not possibly solve practically any of the three great problems that it would have to face. Your adversary, if he is well up on his side of the question, will coolly inform you that you are knocking to pieces a man of straw which the enemies of Socialism have set up; that though some individual Socialists have sketched in detail the working machinery of the coöperative commonwealth, such plans have no official authority; that "it is contrary to Marxian principles to attempt to give detailed specifications of the coming state." Another pitfall to be avoided is the contradictory character of some of the reasonings which are advanced against the enemy. For example one writer who has recently published a sincere little book for the benefit of workmen declares that with the advent of Socialism the working classes would degenerate into armies of lazy idlers who would eat at the expense of the State; yet, another contemporary publication draws a picture of the slavery into which the wage-earners would be inevitably reduced under the tyranny of a Socialist bureaucracy. The Socialist scores a palpable hit by simply setting pairs of such arguments as these one against the other; and he finds no lack of such ineptitudes in our anti-Socialist literature. Again, you cite some Socialist who has declared that capital shall be socialized by confiscation pure and simple; you are answered by another statement of some other Socialist, equally competent, or incompetent, to speak for the party, who proposes some scheme of compensation for the present owner. And so the wrangle goes on with no satisfactory result; your adversary is probably all the more set in his opinions, and is very sure that he knows more about the matter than you do.

To retain the loyalty of the wage-earners among our Catholic people, we have one powerful resource which does not seem to be sufficiently utilized. That is, we can advocate consistently with Catholic moral principles a movement of social reform broad enough and deep enough to win and retain the sympathies of these Catholics who are drawn towards Socialism. To

put it tersely, we can, if we wish, take the wind out of the Socialist sails. The basic Socialist thought, which gives strength to the movement, is that the goods of the nation belong to the people as a whole; and that under the present system the people at large are deprived of their rights for the benefit of the few. Therefore the Socialist would overthrow the present organization of society to substitute another that might succeed if men were to become such perfectly good beings as was Rousseau's primeval man. The premises are true; the Socialist conclusion is a fallacy of *non sequitur*.

The true remedy which the Catholic Church, along with all sound conservatives, has to prescribe for the present evils is not merely or exclusively to preach the doctrine of Christian charity. That the teachings of Christ if put in practice by capitalists and employes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, would prove a panacea for the injustices of the present system, is an undisputable truth. But the prospect⁶ of the Spirit of Christ presiding over Wall Street, and the boards of directors of the great trusts and industries of all kinds, over the depart-

⁶The following excerpts from the official Report of the Hearings before the Committee on Investigation of the United States Steel Corporation (pp. 2246-2247) illustrates the consideration extended to the moral law in the world of finance and commerce:—

"Mr. BARTLETT. Is it your opinion that the men who engage in the monopoly and the combination ought not to have a conscience?

Mr. CARNEGIE. If there be no law—

Mr. BARTLETT (interposing). Statute law, you mean?

Mr. CARNEGIE. There, Judge, you come into another atmosphere. I do not know what the statute law is.

Mr. BARTLETT. You do not think, then, that there is any moral obligation on the part of men engaged in the manufacture and selling of products not to charge extortionate prices?

Mr. CARNEGIE. On the contrary, I think that when a man is appointed to run a business and has the interests of his shareholders at stake, it is his business to get the best return he can from the property he is managing; always provided he breaks no law.

Mr. BARTLETT. Provided he breaks no public law.

Mr. CARNEGIE. Yes.

Mr. BARTLETT. And there would be no limit to the extent to which trade and commerce would go in the way of extortionate prices or combinations or pools but for the restraining hand of the law?

ment stores and the sweat shops is, to say the least, somewhat remote. In the days of the Church's greatest influence, over Christendom, however, she did not entrust the observance of the precept *Thou shalt not kill*, or any other portion of the decalogue to charity alone. The *ought* of the Gospel was backed up by the *must* of the civil arm. Those who feel the pressure of the grievances arising from present day abuses and iniquities are not always inclined to listen patiently to exhortations addressed to them on the text of, "Blessed are those that suffer, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." The Socialist derides such advice and exhibits it to prove his calumny that the Church is the servant of the rich. We are all pleased when we hear that some magnate, like a recently deceased senator of the United States who was taken by the cartoonist as the symbol of the corporations, has patronisingly said that the Catholic Church is the great bulwark of the nation against Socialism. But we are perhaps not less pleased by such remarks from such sources than the Socialist who repeats them with a significant "I told you so."

If, along with the due inculcation of the precept of charity and the Church's teaching on the sacred rights of property, our labor organizations, workmen's clubs and our Catholic population generally heard more frequently than they do the complementary doctrine regarding the limitations of ownership they would be less likely to be imposed upon by Socialist misrepresentation. The theory which lies at the bottom of the present abuses of individualism is that the owner is absolute master

Mr. CARNEGIE. You say there would be no limit?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes.

Mr. CARNEGIE. That is too much to say.

Mr. BARTLETT. Would there be any limit?

Mr. CARNEGIE. Well, now, wait—

Mr. BARTLETT. I will wait.

Mr. CARNEGIE. I have stated that human nature is such that laws to prevent larceny are indispensable.

Mr. BARTLETT. That has been an old law that has come clear down from Sinai.

Mr. CARNEGIE. I think it has been revised several times since that time. [Laughter.] What are your lawyers worth if they can not improve a law that was given as far back as at Sinai?"

of his goods, to use them, or abuse them, as he pleases. This view has never been Catholic doctrine. It is in direct opposition to the latter, which is that as all men have a right to a living from the great storehouse provided by the Creator, this right is higher than, and antecedent to the right of private ownership. When in the case of some individuals this general right of theirs, by some positive fact, such as occupancy in a state of nature, or an enactment of social authority in an organized society, is converted into a definite right of ownership, this individual definite right does not extinguish the general right of all, and does not withdraw the acquired goods from the scope of that right. "The material goods," says St. Thomas, "which God commits to a man are his, certainly, as regards ownership; but with regard to use they are not his, but others' also who can be sustained by what is superfluous for him." When a great portion of the nation's property is so administered by its owners that a large proportion of the people are deprived of the opportunity of obtaining a decent living or a just remuneration for their labor, then the general right is violated and it becomes the duty of the State to protect the commonwealth by making such regulations and imposing such restrictions as will rectify the injustice. Practically, in the present system as it operates now, the man who has nothing but his hands or his brains to make a living for himself is not looked upon as having any rights at all to the goods of the country or nation. Even the right to work, as Fr. Kelleher puts it in his recent able little book on the subject of ownership, is denied them when men are driven to compulsory idleness. Nor is the case radically different when they are compelled, by grim necessity, to work for a wage inadequate to a decent livelihood. The doctrine that the entire community has a claim on the entire goods of the community is set forth in the following statement, without any whittling away. "All laws of property must stand upon the foot of the general advantage; for a country belongs to its inhabitants; and in what proportion and by what rules its inhabitants are to own its property must be settled by the law; and the moment a fragment of the people set up right as inherent within themselves

and not founded upon the public good, plain absurdities follow; for laws of property are, like all other laws, to be changed when the public good requires it." The next lines deserve to be put in italics,—“It would be well indeed that the owners of property in land or money from the largest to the smallest, should recognize that their title to enjoyment of it must rest upon the same foundation, and that the modes and means of their enjoyment of the common stock of the State, if it injures the State, can no more be defended and will no more be endured by a free people than any other public mischief or nuisance.” These are the words of no soap-box Socialist, but of a late Lord Chief Justice of England. If the aroused spirit of the working people which is set upon the abolition or reduction of the evils that permeate the present system is not to be permitted to swell the ranks of the Socialist party then it is incumbent on us to present an efficient alternative of social reform, based upon the above principle of common law and sound ethics, viz., the claim of all to a living from the total property of the nation and the right of the State to regulate production and industry with a view to safeguarding that claim. Mr. Chesterton—it is the fashion just now to quote Mr. Chesterton—has ventured to say some very plain words to his conservative fellow-countrymen on this point.—“If they want a domestic England they must ‘shell out,’ as the phrase goes, to a vastly greater extent than any radical politician has yet dared to suggest; they must endure burdens much heavier than the Budget and strokes much deadlier than the death duties; for the thing to be done is nothing more nor less than the destruction of the great fortunes and great estates. We can now only avoid Socialism by a change as vast as Socialism. If we are to save property we must distribute property almost as sternly as did the French Revolution. If we are to preserve the family we must revolutionize the nation.” Socialist ideas have not yet spread so widely in this country as to render the above estimate applicable to the situation here. But, twenty years ago in England Mr. Chesterton’s words would have been regarded as a symptom of lunacy.

JAMES J. FOX.

THE CLOUDS AROUND SHAKESPEARE.¹

In *The Catholic University Bulletin* for December, 1909, I devoted five pages to an analysis of Father O'Neill's pamphlet, *Could Bacon have written the Plays?* At the end of that review I penned the following paragraph:—

“One wonders whether Father O'Neill, having seemingly settled to his own satisfaction the point as to whether Bacon *could* have written the Shakespeare plays, will take the next obvious, though not necessarily logical, step, and essay to prove that he *did* write them. Should he do so, he will be a strong accession to the ranks of the Baconians.”

Well, if we are to draw inferences from his latest publication, the distinguished Professor of English Language and Philology in University College, Dublin, has made considerable progress in the anticipated direction. He is not yet an out-and-out Baconian: he professes in fact to hold a position somewhere between the contending Stratfordian and Baconian armies; but that position is no middle one, for he is evidently much nearer to the insurgents than he is to the standpatters or regulars.

That he has not definitely joined the Baconians may indeed be of some significance. In the pamphlets he has so far published he has attempted to prove two things, namely, (1) that Bacon could have written the plays, and (2) that Shakespeare could have written neither the plays nor the poems. Is he now seeking a *via media*? Will he, Warwick-like, set up yet another rival claimant to the literary throne? In a Postscript to his *Clouds* Father O'Neill quotes Professor Dowden thus:—

¹*The Clouds Around Shakespeare. A Lecture Delivered before the Royal Dublin Society, February 22nd, 1911.* By the Rev. George O'Neill, S. J., M. A., Author of “*Could Bacon have written the Plays?*” Dublin: E. Ponsonby, Ltd., 116 Grafton Street. Pp. 38. Price 6d.

"The Shakespeare of each portrait-painter resembles the Shakespeare of the rest with quite as close a resemblance as portraits commonly possess which are drawn from a real face at different points of view by artists 'indifferent honest,'"

and then goes on to say:—

"I am quite ready to accept this view. But what actual living Elizabethan personage do these consentient portraits fit? That is the question towards answering which the present lecture and its predecessor ('Could Bacon have written the Plays?') are intended to help."

It is possible that we are on the eve of a startling three-cornered controversy.

However that may be, what at present clearly emerges is that Father O'Neill, if not exactly pro-Bacon, is most emphatically anti-Shakespeare. With mingled feelings, but much more in sorrow than in anger, do I chronicle this fall from grace. We of the true Shakespeare faith can ill afford to lose so keen a contestant, for, as I pointed out on a former occasion, the Dublin Professor is a doughty champion, wielding the weapon of a pitiless and inexorable logic with a deftness and a skill that enable him with ease to pink an opponent who is even for a moment off his guard.

A perusal of his latest publication will make this plain. A piece of writing more destructive of Shakespeare's claims has never before been put together in so small a compass. To the mind of one unacquainted with the arguments *per contra* it could not fail to carry conviction: nay, even to one who was acquainted with those arguments, but who was not at the same time a skilled dialectician, it would probably give reason for pause and supply material for doubt. Father O'Neill produces his general effect by bringing together into a compact whole some of the strongest reasonings of the anti-Shakespeare school. He lays no claim to originality of research, he puts forward no discoveries of his own. What he does show is singular mastery in the art of submitting closely knit arguments, great ability in his method of presentation, and wonderful powers of lucidity and condensation.

Of necessity in a scheme like this we are brought over more or less familiar ground. The unreliability of the portraits of Shakespeare; the puzzling character of Ben Jonson's various references to him; the improbability that an uneducated man like Shakespeare, whose youth was so wild and erratic, whose later life was spent in sordid money-getting and in petty law-suits, who so far as records show never owned any books, should have written poems and plays that evince wide reading and an intimate acquaintance with practically all forms of ancient and modern learning; and the display of authorities on one side of the question or the other—these are the materials, handled with consummate skill, out of which Father O'Neill has constructed his really splendid mosaic of argumentation.

Beginning with the portraits, he discards them all but the engraving by Martin Droeshout which appeared on the title-page of the folio edition of the plays published in 1623. Concerning this picture he states the opinion that, although highly eulogised by Ben Jonson, it is "no representation of any human face whatever, but the portrait of a mere mask," and that it presents to us the front of one shoulder and the back of the other. This is nearly, if not quite, a restatement in another way of the declaration by Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence, whom Father O'Neill mentions among his authorities, that the Droeshout portrait is "cunningly composed of two left arms and a mask."²

Both Sir Edwin and Father O'Neill lay particular stress on Ben Jonson's lines printed on the fly-leaf opposite to this portrait in the folio of 1623. These lines, which are a sort of puff preliminary, written presumably to order and not under any feeling of inspiration, are very ordinary and display no special merit. They have the advantage, however, of appearing to most people to possess a particularly plain meaning and to be incapable of being twisted or tortured into any cabalistic symbol for the shrouding of deep mysteries. As I find they are not very well known, it may be useful to set them down here:—

² *Bacon is Shake-Speare*, by Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence, Bart. New York, 1910. Pp. viii + 286. See Chap. II., p. 23.

To the Reader.

This Figure, that thou here seeft put,
 It vvas for gentle Shakeſpeare cut;
 Wherein the Grauer had a trife
 With Nature, to out-doo the life:
 O, could he but haue dravvne his vvrit
 As vvell in braffe, as he hath hit
 His face; the Print would then furpaffe
 All, that vvas euer vvrit in braffe.
 But, ſince he cannot, Reader, looke
 Not on his Picture, but his Booke.

B. I.

Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence, by interpreting "hit" in line 6 to mean "hid" and "out-doo the life" in line 4 to mean "doo-out the life" and that again to mean "shut out the real face of the living man," draws the conclusion that the verses and portrait taken together "clearly reveal the true facts, that the author is writing left-handedly, that means secretly, in shadow, with his face hidden behind a mask or pseudonym," and that "the real face is hidden."³ Of a piece with this conclusion is Sir Edwin's further deduction that, because Ben Jonson's lines, from "To the Reader" to "B. I.," both inclusive, contain in all 287 letters—that is, if, with him, you count the two w's in line 8 as four letters but each other w as one letter—the "Great Author" meant to reveal himself to the world 287 years after 1623, namely, in 1910, the date of Sir Edwin's work, *Bacon is Shake-Speare*.⁴ That surely is argumentation run mad. Father O'Neill has the good sense not to commit himself to the acceptance of either of these fantastic conclusions, contenting himself with merely putting the following conundrums:—

"What is the meaning of this riddling effigy? Why does it show us a mask? Why does it face both ways at once? And what was Ben Jonson's real mind about it when he wrote those ambiguous laudatory verses?"

Obvious answers to his questions would be that the effigy is no riddling one at all, that it does not show a mask, that it

³ *Op. cit.*, Chap. II., p. 29.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Chap. II., pp. 29, 30.

does not face both ways at once, and that Ben Jonson's laudatory verses, whatever else they are, are by no means ambiguous. Droeshout was a very young man in 1623—about 22 years old—and he never attained to any great eminence in his art. The faults in his engraving, as pointed out and I think exaggerated by Father O'Neill—the "horizontal plane of collar, appalling to behold," the neck which "must be about a foot long behind," the chest suggesting "the last stages of consumption," the "bulging forehead," and the "wooden expression of the countenance"—may lawfully be attributed to the want of experience and skill of the engraver, who, in addition, may have been drawing from a poor picture or from a picture of Shakespeare made up for a part in some play. As for the shoulders, I lay no claim to being a sartorial expert, but at the same time I must say a careful examination of the plates printed by Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence in his book fails to convince me that this portion of the case has been made out. Is he, or is Father O'Neill, or is any of us sufficiently acquainted with the costume of the Elizabethan and Jacobean age to be able to dogmatise concerning its fine points and details? I could, if I chose, judging merely by the shape of the outer garment, raise exactly similar doubts about the portrait of Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, in the National Gallery, or the portrait of Ben Jonson in the Bodleian Library.

It is scarcely necessary to point out the extreme improbability of the existence of a conspiracy between Jonson, Droeshout, Heminge and Condell, Blount and Jaggard, and the Earls of Pembroke and Montgomery to foist upon the reading public so gross a deception as the Baconians must of necessity attribute to them in this whole matter of the folio of 1623; or the extreme difficulty of keeping secret a conspiracy which was shared by so many, if it did in reality exist.

Father O'Neill gets away from the subject by the statement that "Portraits, however, are, after all, of minor importance in so momentous an inquiry"; and perhaps, without further elaboration of the point, we may as well take him at his word.

Noting the general agreement that exists among Baconians

and Stratfordians alike that the bulk of the plays, *Venus and Adonis*, *The Rape of Lucrece*, and the Sonnets have proceeded from one and the same pen, Father O'Neill reminds us that Hallam expressed a wish that the Sonnets had never been written, and that there are still some who on ethical grounds eagerly question the identity of authorship, their doubts being crystallised in Mr. Lloyd Mifflin's sonnet:—

I will not do thy memory the wrong
Quite to believe that thou didst write these things.
Could the "sweet swan of Avon" soil his wings
With the green scum of these dark pools of song
Whose currents crawl that doubtful land along,
By newt and jewelled toad and snake that clings,
Through dank and rotting marshes, where upsprings
Seldom a lily, all those weeds among?
Words of great poets, pure as peaks of snow,
Should stand up through the ages. That hot strife
'Tween flesh and soul should still unwritten go.
Can we believe that thou, with evil rife,
Wast slave of grovelling passions, dark and low;
Thou!—in the mire and on the heights of life!

Father O'Neill, while reprobating the morals of the Sonnets and incidentally the doctrine of "Art for Art's sake," appears to hold the belief that they were composed by the man known as Shakespeare, whoever that Shakespeare was; and then through seven pages of close reasoning he devotes himself to the purpose of proving that the author who wrote such exquisite English, who showed cultured familiarity with the philosophic ideas of Plato, who appeared to know Greek well enough to give elegant paraphrases of epigrams from the Greek anthology, who was on terms of intimacy with persons of the highest rank and dignity, could not have been the illiterate scapegrace that fled from the country to London to escape the severities of the law, the money-grubber, the "rude groom," the "fourth-rate theatrical person," such as he maintains the real William Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon to have been.

In similar strain he deals with Shakespeare's claims to the authorship of *Venus and Adonis*, *The Rape of Lucrece*, and *Love's Labour's Lost*. The main feature of his argument is

that a person of no education or even of poor education could not have written these works because they are "steeped in the allusions, thought, and feelings of Latin and Greek poetry, enriched with spoils from the French *Pléiade* and the Italian *Seicentisti*," and because from many points of view they bear the ear-marks of the "literary aristocrat" and of one who knew foreign politics, court life, and great variety of books. Later on in the pamphlet the usual stress is laid on the encyclopedic knowledge possessed by the writer of the plays regarding law, medicine, falconry, hunting, navigation, agriculture, philosophy, and history, and the inference is drawn that such knowledge was beyond the range of the untutored youth from Stratford.

In all this it appears to me that sufficient account is not taken of the possibility or even probability that Shakespeare may have been a pupil at the free grammar school at Stratford, to which as the son of his father, Alderman Shakespeare, he would have been entitled to admission, and there acquired the foundation on which the superstructure of his literary attainments was afterwards raised; that he may have been a school-master in the country, as Aubrey says he was; and that Ben Jonson, in ascribing to him "small Latin and less Greek," seems to imply that he knew something of both languages. With regard to this last point I ought to say that what would seem small to Jonson, who was a very learned man, may have been relatively large; and, besides, the way one classicist has of belittling the attainments of another may be supposed to have been as well known and practised in the spacious days of great Elizabeth as it undoubtedly is in our own, for human nature is a constant quantity.

But, above all, what Father O'Neill, and with him all Baconians, leave out of account is the facility that genius has of overcoming difficulties: in fact, to overcome difficulties may be taken as one of the hall-marks of genius. It will be conceded by everyone as axiomatic that the writer of the poems and plays had unsurpassed genius; that writer was until quite modern times unhesitatingly recog-

nised to be William Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon and so recognised not only by the bulk of the people but by great poets, thinkers, and critics—by Milton, Dryden, Pope, Samuel Johnson, Voltaire, Lessing, Goethe, Coleridge, Victor Hugo—and why deny that Shakespeare alone of all world-geniuses was able to overcome the difficulties of his up-bringing, his youthful wildness, his sordid environment, and equip himself mentally for the outpouring of his spirit, the expression of his thoughts, in immortal verse? Sir Edward Sullivan puts the argument on this point so finely that I may be pardoned for quoting one of his paragraphs:—

“That it was possible,” he says, “for a man of more or less humble origin, and of deficient educational training, who happened to be endowed naturally with poetic gifts of a high order, coupled with an inborn instinct for the drama, to attain a great position in literature, is, unfortunately for the Baconians, a thing which we know could be accomplished. The manner in which it was accomplished, at least in one historical instance, deserves in this connection to be more widely known than it seems to be. I refer to the life of Plautus, the famous Roman playwright, the circumstances of whose origin, early struggles, and ultimate success so closely resemble what we know of Shakespeare’s career as to form one of the most striking parallels in the literary history of the world.”⁵

He then goes on to tell the life story of Plautus, a story which of itself ought to put the defamers of Shakespeare out of court for ever.

Father O’Neill’s zeal has led him, in dealing with this aspect of the Shakespearean question, into the I am sure unintentional unfairness of giving a garbled quotation, that is, a quotation away from its context. In endeavouring to confute Professor Saintsbury, who in Chapters VIII. and IX. of Volume V. of *The Cambridge History of English Literature* treats of Shakespeare’s life, plays, and poems, he tells us, first, that Mr. Saintsbury has discarded as valueless all but one of the traditional explanations as to Shakespeare’s learning or lack of

⁵ From article “The Defamers of Shakespeare” in *The Nineteenth Century* for March, 1909, Vol. LXV., p. 424.

learning—a thing, by the way, which a careful reading of the passage will show Mr. Saintsbury has not done—and then proceeds to demolish that one “rock” to which the Edinburgh professor clings. In order to do this he gives and comments on the following quotation from Chapter VIII.:—

“A lawyer of moderate intelligence and no extraordinary education will get up, on his brief, at a few days’ notice, more knowledge of an extremely technical kind than Shakespeare shows on any one point, and will repeat the process in regard to almost any subject. A journalist of no greater intelligence and education will, at a few hours’ or minutes’ notice, deceive the very elect in the same way.”

Now, the full paragraph from Mr. Saintsbury is as follows:—

“The difficulty comes from a surprising mixture of ignorance and innocence. A lawyer of moderate intelligence and no extraordinary education will get up, on his brief, at a few days’ notice, more knowledge of an extremely technical kind than Shakespeare shows on any one point, and will repeat the process in regard to almost any subject. A journalist of no greater intelligence and education will, at a few hours’ or minutes’ notice, deceive the very elect in the same way. Omniscience, no doubt, is divine; but *multiscience*—especially *multiscience* a little scratched and admitting through the scratches a sea-coast to Bohemia and knowledge of Aristotle in Ulysses—is quite human. What is wonderful is not what, in the book sense, Shakespeare knew, but what he did and was. And the man—whoever he was—who wrote what Shakespeare wrote would have had not the slightest difficulty in knowing what Shakespeare knew.”

I submit that Father O’Neill’s quotation is made to bear quite a different interpretation when read in conjunction with its context.

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I find that I have gone into more detail than I originally intended; but the subject is fascinating and lures one on. As it is, there are still many points that I must leave untouched. It will be seen that I agree with Father O’Neill in scarcely any of his conclusions; but that does not prevent me from

bearing willing testimony to the learning and ability and the dialectic skill he has displayed. I heartily commend his little book to the perusal of those who are interested in the Shakespeare question. Whether they accept or reject his reasoning, they will, I feel sure, agree with me when I say that he has provided a great sixpenceworth. There are but few who will not gain information from it, and there are scarcely any who will not have previous knowledge presented from a new angle. It is eminently a book to make one *think*: I need say no more in its praise.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF "THE HOUND OF HEAVEN."

Francis Thompson's life and work is yet another example of the principle of dying to live. The hard facts of the workaday world ground him as the outsider is ground who goes foolishly within reach of the factory wheel-web or the whirr of its mighty machinery. He had not the gift whereby we get things done: the gift whereby you and I see that a certain work is for to-day and that to-day must see that certain work through. The time he should have spent in earning sixpences and shillings he devoted to the seeing of visions and the dreaming of dreams. So much the worse for him, the singer; so much the better for us, the readers of his song. He had to go down into the depths that his song might live, but now his song goes on its way singing to you and to me, and to those who are to come after us forever.

Too much one side of his nature was stimulated, perhaps, so that he could not see the need of the passing hour. But in its stead, he saw the things that are shut out from duller minds. His spirit loved to soar in the sun, and even in the sun's unclouded rays, its eye was not abashed. The remorseless inquisition of each star came to him in the dark night of London, when he was alone, and the too, too powerful world was against him: and it tried him in its bitter tests, but, at the last, it gave him vision. So he saw what other men could see not, and his ear was keen to detect things to which the other ears were deaf:

Yea, in the night, my soul, my daughter,
Cry clinging heaven by the hems;
And lo, Christ walking on the waters,
Not of Gennesareth, but Thames.

The material world was a thin veil for such a one, to shut out the spirit world that lurks beyond, but that for most men, alas, too rarely peeps through. Arguments are for the philoso-

pher: syllogisms for the man of logic; tests and experiments for the scientist: but for the poet are feelings, emotions, and ardours, and of all these Francis Thompson had his fill. What we of to-day read in the pages of Billot and Satolli, and what long ago was written and fixed forever by the Angelic Doctor in spacious forms that at once satisfy our mind and allow room for the *obsequium rationale* of our faith came to him too, but clothed in quite other guise. Analyse it, and reduce it to its ultimate and you have but the same thing in "The Hound of Heaven" that heads an *articulus* or furnishes forth a *quaestio* in the "*Summa*"; but turn aside from your analysis, and meet the poet on his own terms, as he is entitled to be met, and all is different. Before you had the coal, meet indeed, for the furnace, but in dead lumps; now you have the vivid heat that glows and lightens your eyes by its rich reflections, while it warms your heart with its healthy flame. The ideas before were lying down in the sleep of cold logic: now they are abroad in the world, they march up the hillside, they feel the force of the breeze, they bound with vigour and they thrill with joy. Such life is contagious: the ideas are no longer dead: they go forth conquering and to conquer, for it is the voice of the Angel of the Schools, and it sings with the finest rapture of Shakespearean song.

Yet its idea is one that, to the unwitting reader, might seem old and merely earth-born. An Edinburgh Reviewer in a most appreciative article, when the poem was published, thought he found the same idea in Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and all the herd, who practiced the proud aloofness of the Stoic School. The things of the world lured them, they beckoned them with affectionate looks and called to them with appealing gestures to come; but the spirit of these men was strong, and their soul steeled against the charms of earth, and it was theirs to keep themselves unspotted by the world. Matthew Arnold has preached the panegyric of them all in his graceful quatrain:—

We do not ask who pined unseen,
Who were on action hurled,
Whose one boast is that all have been
Unspotted by the world.

These are a noble band as they stand, lonely, aside from the onward rush of history; the world is better, too, that such men as they have lived, for they with their mortifications and denials are a constant rebuke to the Epicurean tribe, whose one poor wish is to gather the rosebuds, while they may, and to suck the sweetness of the passing hour. Yet of that kind is not Francis Thompson: he will not walk in their company; his antecedents are different: in another school he learned his lesson, and the lesson itself is different far.

Still we should do wrong to blame this Reviewer, who has praised our poet. He saw the good that was in Francis Thompson, in so far as it fitted into his own world view, and, if he failed to see the other richer good, let us not ascribe to ill-will, what flowed but from the limits of the man's view-point. Both turned aside from the world: the Stoics and the mystics, such as Thompson. Both, day and night, lived their lives apart; the lust of the flesh, and lust of the eyes, and the pride of life failed to secure dominion over them. Along the radiant flow of "The Hound of Heaven" the reader's eye caught the flash of this doctrine of renunciation; he was charmed by the imagery, the wondrous power of metaphor; and the magic simile, in which the like and the likened-to so blended and so lit each other up, appealed to him; but he missed the full import of the poem. He saw the sun-starts on the surface of the poem; but he did not see the deep full rush of the waters down below. He is the scientist whose theory gives you the explanation of only a part of the facts. It explains in some way, the renunciation constraining him day and night of the first stanza; the turning from human love of the second; the rejection of nature's charms in the third; and it is on the strength of that, that Thompson is set down as some Stoic seeker after the inner light, some one who has but discovered once again the Ethic of these old pagans.

But, at once, that splendid and insistent refrain that ever sounds and resounds across the course of the poem rises to reject such a hypothesis and to refuse to fit into it. If Thompson were but proclaiming a gospel of denial, a mere asceticism, why

introduce the Hound? Why repeat the refrain at each pause, as it were, in the pursuit? Why labour so wisely and so well to convey the idea of a chase in which a quarry is being hounded down? Why but because the asceticism is less than half the story? It is an instrument, it is a means, it is a weapon, but it is handled, wielded and used by some higher power and to achieve some higher end.

The angels keep their ancient places:
Turn but a stone, and start a wing:
'Tis we, 'tis our estranged faces
That miss the many-splendoured thing.

It is because this poem does not present you with any mere attenuated theory of Ethics, any hand-to-mouth doctrine of day-by-day usefulness, but embraces in its scope the windswept "margent of the world," and thunders with its fists at the very "gateways of the stars" that such a view as that of the writer in the *Edinburgh Review* is too shallow to hold it, and leaves what is best and deepest and most original unexplained. The refrain on that Stoic view is a mere artificial and useless excrescence on the buildings: on the catholic view, it is almost the electricity, which illuminates its every inch. The visible shows of things had their call on Thompson: he loved them with the poet's love as he lingered over them with the poet's eye; but the visible things were to him a symbol, aye and far more than a symbol; for him they were as the lantern, into which he peered that he might see the light which it contained. The poet, in his own fine phrase, "saw through the lamp, Beauty, the light, God." With that light extinguished, the lamp would be to him a dark, forbidding thing that gave no brightness to the eye and no guidance to the footsteps. This idea of the omnipresence of God was to him worked into his childhood thought: it was sown as a seed, in that early mind, and it was to bloom and blossom into more splendid flower, for the fierce and glaring rays of adversity whereby it was ripened and matured. The child and the common person learns that idea and it goes into one compartment of the mind, to be retained, in truth, for reference, but to be only poorly realized in daily life; but, when

the poet and the mystic gets it, with it, he colors all his seeing, he uses it as a torch that throws light in the darkness, and he reinforces with it the dimness of daily sight. That is why in "The Hound of Heaven," we find every move of the world, every tress of nature's hair, made to be a sign as it is an action of that God "in whom," as St. Paul says, "we live and move and have our being." It is the hand of God that closes to the "little casement" of human affection, whose opening drew the poet's heart aside; it is God's angel that plucked the winsome children from him by the hair; it is God's claim on all the powers of nature that made them fall away from the poet when he would not allow them to lead him to God.

"Yea, faileth now even dream
 The dreamer, and the lute the lutanist,
 Even the linked fantasies in whose blossomy twist
 I swung the earth a trinket at my wrist,
 Are yielding; cords of all too weak account
 For earth with heavy griefs so overplussed."

That is the great idea that comes as a shock to the modern unbelieving mind; it is the spirit of the ages of Faith rising up in opposition to the corrupt and wicked generation that asks for a sign. It is a spiritual world-view over against a material world-view. It is theism, but theism not as it is compressed and withered and robbed of sap between the pages of a book, but theism as a fragrant flower in the garden of life shedding the odour of Sanctity over those who dwell therein.

We have said that the poet loved the universe, yea loved it as it is loved by little children. He loved the Dawn and the Eve, and he appealed to them, as kindred spirits; he knew "all the swift importings on the wilful face of the skies"; he knew how the young eyes of children grow "sudden fair." But none of these things could by themselves fill his hungry heart; one by one, they fell from him and left him in want and misery because he had looked to them alone.

Nature, poor stepdame, cannot slake my drouth;
 Let her, if she would owe me,
 Drop yon blue bosom-veil of sky, and show me
 The breasts o' her tenderness;
 Never did any milk of hers once bless
 My thirsting mouth.

Thompson, like all men who do not rest in mere words, but have gone down to the great ideas that are at the root of things, loves to come back to the same thoughts again and again, and to look at them from every angle. Thus the very idea of the above lines he puts into prose with great explicitness when he says in one of his essays; "O Titan nature! a pretty race, which has dwarfed its spirit in dwellings, and bounded it in selfish shallows of art, may find you too vast, may shrink from you into its earths; but though you be a very large thing, and my heart a very little thing, yet Titan as you are, my heart is too great for you. . . . Absolute Nature lives not in our life; nor yet is lifeless, but lives in the life of God; and in so far, and so far merely as man lives in that life, does he come into sympathy with Nature, and Nature with him. She is God's daughter, who stretches her hand only to her Father's friends. Not Shelley, not Wordsworth himself, ever drew so close to the heart of Nature as did the Seraph of Assisi, who was close to the heart of God." There is a void in man's spirit that Nature leaves yet empty; a void that brings the homesick wanderer home at last to God as, indeed, it is God's hand that step by step discloses to him the nothingness of Nature, His mere creature, when dependent on herself.

All which I took from thee I did but take,
Not for thy harms,
But just that thou might'st seek it in My arms.
All which thy child's mistake
Fancies as lost, I have stored for thee at home;
Rise, clasp My hand, and come.

The greater part of the poem whirls along in a mighty rush till it reaches the stately pause of reconciliation near the close, but there is resting. That part is the measured and ever recurrent beat of the refrain. The varied whirling part puts before our eyes the kaleidoscopic rush of earthly things; all is bright, attractive, shining, but all is transitory. The unvarying portion on the other hand shows the divine Lover who is ever insistent and ever present, and of whom the poet sings:—

"With thy young skiey blossoms heap me over
From this tremendous Lover!
Float thy vague veil about me, lest He see!"

In this way the poem may be looked on as a parable whereby the spiritual idea is bodied forth, and definite habitation and name given to some of the most ethereal truths of philosophy. As the Good Shepherd describes God's love and tenderness for the human soul, and the Prodigal son sets forth His forgiveness to the repentant sinner, so this poem brings out His omnipresence, on the one hand, and on the other, his immediate personal care for every human soul, for every individual man, by showing the constancy wherewith the hound pursues, and his tirelessness till at last his quarry is overtaken and yields.

This idea of a hound brings out, at one bold stroke, the continued and unfaltering love of God, which never brooks repulse. The reader finds that from this idea the poet departs from time to time, but departs from it only to return to it ever very soon again. Such a vision or image cannot fit with exact coincidence all the features of God's relations to the soul, and, when that happens, the poet lays it aside for a moment. But the great idea that you cannot elude, cannot get away from God, that God will overtake you, and that whithersoever you fly from Him, there He will be before you—that idea has a fitting image and parable in the hound that turns with every turn of the quarry which it pursues. "Fear wist not to evade," says the poet "as love wist to pursue." All this has a perfectly exact parallel in perhaps the greatest of the Psalms, Psalm cxxxviii, where the Psalmist, who is telling of God's watchfulness, says:—

"Domine probasti me, et cognovisti me: tu cognovisti sessionem meam et resurrectionem meam.

Quo ibo a spiritu tuo? Et quo a facie tua fugiam?

Si sumpsero pennas meas diluculo et habitavero in extremis maris:

Etenim illuc manus tua deducet me: et tenebit me dextera tua."

As the inspired psalmist would take his wings early in the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea to escape the watching and warding God, so the Thompson tells us:

Across the margent of the world I fled,

And troubled the gold gateways of the stars,

Smiting for shelter on their clanged bars.

Of course, as the "Hound of Heaven" was written in the fullness of the Catholic spirit and inspiration, it is not surprising that it bears resemblances and striking ones to other fruits of the same genius. The same God that watched over Saint Augustine in the days of his youth and tried him so that he turned at length to the light is praised and sung in "The Hound of Heaven" and, if the soul of Saint Augustine burst forth in protest against the Pelagianism of old, so did that of Francis Thompson against the naturalism, which is rife and rampant on all sides to-day. Thus, to be concrete, for these two endings of the refrain in the poem:—

Lo! nought contents thee, who content'st not me.
And thou dravest love from thee, who dravest Me.

We have two remarkable predecessors in those two familiar sentences from the "Confessions":—

"Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te."

"Nondum amabam et amare amabam: quaerebam quid amarem amans amare."

It is this splendid proclamation of the supernatural order that gives to Francis Thompson so noble a place in modern literature. He has seen into the world with deeper insight than other men. They have lived comfortably on the surface: he has sounded the depths. The universe to his faith is not dead; but the hand of God is everywhere. Every action and every atom speaks to him of the God that made them in the beginning and sustains them at every hour. We can say of him, but in a yet higher and fuller sense, what he has said of Carlyle: "In an age of the grossest materiality, no smug "Scientific" explanations could loosen his clutch on the perpetual Pentecostal miracle of Nature," for to Thompson, as to the prophets of old, all nature spoke in divers tongues the wonderful works of God. And more that he says of Carlyle is truer of himself, and particularly true of "The Hound of Heaven" for it was out of the abundance of his own heart that his mouth was praising another. Thus he goes on of Carlyle: "He saw and burningly proclaimed nature to be manifestly

wonderful and prophetic. No rationalism could shut from him the inwardness which was latent in all her outwardness: externality almost ceased for him in the miraculous light which permeated and emanated from it."

That big idea, God's omnipresence, which reaches out its arms so widely is supplemented and complemented by another which seems almost its antithesis, in one view. God is everywhere; He balances the planets in His hand; He measures the motions of the moon; He holds the Sun in its central place. Yet of every individual solitary soul is He mindful, and He regards with anxious eye the salvation of each. No individualism could emphasize more than Christianity the infinite worth of each and every human soul. God has numbered the hairs of man's head, and man has been bought at a great price. He has loved us with an everlasting love. It is of that manifold love that we catch the reflections mirrored in such parables of the New Testament as that of the Good Shepherd, and that of the Prodigal Son. All that, too, is put into "The Hound of Heaven" and makes up the background of its thought, without which it cannot be understood. So Thompson describes how, even though he be "of all man's clotted clay the dingiest clot," still God has a care for him:—

"Strange piteous futile thing!
Wherefore should any set thee love apart?
Seeing none but makes much of nought; (He said)
'And human love needs human meriting.'"

God watches always: in the busy hour of the day when we are distracted by cares and activities so that we heed not His presence: and in the dark hour of the night, when sleep has closed our eyes and sealed our mind, so that we reckon not, He is there. Yet it is only in special moments of light,—be they inspirations of the mind or be they outward incidents that try us and turn our thoughts to Him—it is only in such moments as these that God makes His presence and care manifest to the individual. It is such an incident at the close of the poem that brings the great culmination, that sums it all up, that unties all the knots and solves all the doubts of its course:

Halts by me that footfall!
Is my gloom, after all,
Shade of His hand, outstretched caressingly?
"Ah, fondest, blindest, weakest,
I am He Whom thou seekest!
Thou dravest love from thee, who dravest me."¹

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¹ It is strange that through like bitter courses, and by the same pathway of suffering, another poet, to whom Francis Thompson is very much akin in life and genius, came to learn the same lesson and to leave it to us enshrined in the greatest of his poems. Fortune buffeted poor Mangan too: destiny cast him down: the world found him wanting; and, even as Francis Thompson, he tells us how at length he came to light, and of himself he says:—

And till now trampled, derided, hated,
And worn by weakness, disease, and wrong,
He fled for shelter to God, who mated,
His soul with song.

ABELARD.

Abelard, who may well be selected as representing the twelfth century in the history of philosophy, represents only one phase of the mind of that century. It was a century of immense intellectual activity, of great intellectual unrest, of conflict and adjustment, and in all these Abelard was only one force. But by his originality of character, by the picturesque tragedy of his personal history and by the ideas and the method which he advocated, he stands out from among his contemporaries as the most conspicuous, versatile and influential, if not the most commendable or admirable figure in the history of the times. He lived through the Storm and Stress period of scholasticism, in an age of "dialectical madness," as it has been styled; and of all the fighters in the arena he was the most doughty; of all the dialecticians he was the most skillful and the most daring. John the Scot stood literally alone in the ninth century, Gerbert in the tenth had few rivals and no equal as a teacher, Anselm in the eleventh century dwelt in the peace and calm of the cloister, Abelard in the twelfth century was constantly in the midst of the fray, a fighter born, who loved above all things of the mind the clash of syllogistic argumentation. He had no respect for authority, no reverence for established reputation, no regard for the traditional order. He was always in a storm center of one kind or another, so that, in order to understand his career and his fate, it is necessary to know something of the problems which interested the minds of his day and generation.

These problems were two. One was a question of method, the other a question of logic. The question of method involved the use of reason in the discussion of higher themes in philosophy and in the elucidation of the mysteries of faith. On this point two schools were already formed. The mystics decried and condemned the use of reason in the effort to grasp

spiritual truth. They despised and abhorred logic as a weapon in the warfare of the spirit or even as an instrument in the quest of higher truth. It was not by dialectic, said St. Peter Damian, that God was pleased to save His people. Dialectic, said the Victorines, is the "devil's art": it makes men proud and self-sufficient; it leads to the knowledge which, as St. Paul says, "puffeth up." It has never yet saved a soul, nor made a man better in the eyes of God. Far more profitable than logic is the humble prayer, the devout meditation and the unquestioning acceptance of truth on the authority of God and of His Church. *Credo ut intelligam*, "I believe in order that I may understand," "Faith aids Reason," was the motto of the mystic group. The rationalists, on the other hand, adopted as their motto *Intelligo ut credam*, "I understand in order that I may believe," "Reason aids faith." They had great confidence in the power of reason, in logic and argumentation and discussion. They were a product of the spirit of the times, of the new medieval mind that was strong in the freshness of its youth, that would try all things and seek a reasonable explanation of all spiritual truth. It was therefore, authority for the mystics, reason for the rationalists. It was piety and humility against skill and self-confidence. It was conservatism against progress, if you wish to put it that way, though not necessarily orthodoxy against free thought. For the age was lusty in its youthful vigor, but also inexperienced in its immaturity. There were excesses on both sides. The mystics were sometimes obscurantists, and the rationalists often overstepped the bounds of moderation and reverence. It was only a century later that, under more favorable circumstances, and under the guidance of master-minds like that of St. Thomas, these perplexing problems were solved, and the claims of authority reconciled with the legitimate demands of reason. Meantime, the twelfth century struggled with the problem and seethed with the disturbance which it engendered. Abelard, as we shall see, was with the rationalists, and, while he did much to prejudice the cause which he advocated, it was his achievements that hastened the day when men could clearly see to

distinguish between what was excessive in his claims and what was moderate and justifiable.

The other question of the day was the problem of Universals. We learned long ago in grammar to distinguish two kinds of nouns, the singular, or proper, name and the general, or universal, name. Thus, "The highest mountain in the world" is a singular name, while "Mountain" is a universal, or general, name. The question is raised in logic whether there are, besides the universal names, ideas which correspond to them, and farther, if there are universal ideas, or concepts, whether there are outside the mind, *things* which may be called universal. There are, therefore, three schools. The Nominalists maintain that the name, and the name alone, is universal. The Conceptualists hold that we have in our minds universal ideas, or concepts. The Realists contend that not only are there universal names and universal ideas but also real things outside the mind, which are truly universal. Plato was a realist of the extreme type. He taught that in the intelligible world above us there are real universal forms, or prototypes, according to which particular things in the world of our experience are fashioned. This appealed to the naïve mind of the ninth and tenth centuries. To John the Scot it recommended itself because it suited his Platonic temperament and fitted into his scheme of divine emanation. To John's contemporaries it appealed because, in their intellectual innocence, as one may call it, they took every word to stand for a reality. Thus, Fredegis of Tours gravely maintained the real substantial nature of "darkness" and "nothing," because of the Scriptural use of those terms. In Abelard's day the old realism was found unsatisfactory. Roscelin of Compiègne had arisen and declared himself an outspoken Nominalist. "Universals," he said, "are merely the breath of the voice," a word and nothing more. Abelard threw himself into the conflict with reckless ardor. He fought with equal brilliancy and skill both the Realists and the Nominalists. What his own opinion was we shall see later. Here it is sufficient to remark that a great deal of his time and his labors was devoted to the discussion

of this topic. It is easy now for the critic to find fault and call the problem of universals a useless, even a frivolous dispute. But, to the minds of men in the twelfth century it was a question of paramount importance. It was "the question of the day," as evolution was some twenty years ago or pragmatism is at present. And it was by no means unimportant. If universals are mere names, and universal ideas, if there are any such, have no foundation outside the mind, then, to take merely one consequence, the principles of conduct, since they are universal, are merely a matter of words, or an affair of the mind, without any warrant in the nature of things; and the conclusions of science, for the same reason, have no relation to the world of reality. So, at least, it seemed to those twelfth century scholastics. They took up the question fearlessly, and discussed it with very great subtlety, the only drawback to their discussion being that they did not bring psychology to bear on the problem. All the more reason why Abelard should see here the opportunity to achieve success. He was a master of dialectical reasoning, and the problem of universals gave him the chance to display his extraordinary gifts.

Such were the problems which occupied the minds of philosophers in the twelfth century. Such was the intellectual milieu in which Abelard distinguished himself. His career has been touched by romance, in which, as in a golden light, he is seen and admired and somewhat idealized. The Abelard of romance does not interest us here, but rather the philosopher, the orator, the dialectician, whose biography has come down to us in documents dating from his own day and especially in the "Story of my Misfortunes," the pathetic title which he gave to the narrative of his own life.

He was born at Pallet, near Nantes, in Brittany in the year 1079. His parents, recognizing, perhaps, his talent for fighting, intended that he should adopt the military career. He himself was early inclined rather to that of scholarship, and so, as he tells us, he "deserted Mars for Minerva," without, we may add, entirely renouncing the god of battles. He was a disciple for a while of the celebrated Nominalist Roscelin,

and frequented also the schools of other teachers of rhetoric and dialectic. He was probably a wandering scholar, travelling on foot from town to town, seeking at the monasteries a hospitality which was always freely given, or earning a meal and a bed, sometimes by such menial service as sweeping or drawing water to the horses at the inn, or sometimes by playing the lute or singing. Abelard probably sang for his board and bed. He had, he tells us himself, the most beautiful voice in all France, and his songs later on made him famous among students all over Europe. After five or six years of this kind of life—"I went wherever dialectic flourished," he says—he went for the first time to Paris where the renown of many great teachers had already made the schools famous throughout Christendom. The date must have been about 1100. At that time, by far the most renowned of the Parisian teachers was William of Champeaux, a champion of ultra-realism. To him Abelard repaired, bent, not so much on learning as on criticising. The fame of the great teacher, far from overawing the stripling from Brittany, seemed rather to make him all the more desirous of meeting the master in a dialectical encounter. They met on the question of the day, the problem of Universals. With merciless skill, Abelard exposed the weakness of realism such as his master taught, and showed by a brilliant display of erudition as well as by keen logical contention that the Universal cannot exist outside the mind as a full-fledged universal. His victory was complete. The teacher first changed his formula, then abandoned it altogether, and finally, in confusion, gave up his chair at Paris and retired to the monastery of St. Victor. Thereupon Abelard decided to open a school of his own, not at Paris, for there the followers of the defeated Master were too numerous and too resentful, but nearby at Melun and afterwards at Corbeil. After a few years spent in his native Brittany, he returned to Paris, where, first having made it very uncomfortable for William's successor, he finally secured that chair for himself, and became the best known teacher in Christendom. He was not satisfied, however, with his triumph in logic. He desired new laurels,

and theology now seemed to claim his attention. He heard of the lessons given by Anselm of Laon, a disciple of St. Anselm of Canterbury, which were attracting very great attention. He went, therefore, as a student, apparently desirous of learning, but in reality impelled once more by his restless spirit of contention. In a short time he was as openly critical of his teacher in theology as he had been of his teacher in logic. It was the same story over again, and he was not happy until he had secured a complete victory. Having secured it, as he tells us himself, he returned to Paris and began his career as a teacher at Notre-Dame. This was the most brilliant and successful period of his life. Writing many years later, he sees the cause of all his subsequent misfortunes to have been his own pride and love of pleasure. "I knew," he says, "that I was the handsomest man in France, had the sweetest voice in all Christendom, and was the greatest philosopher in all the world." He was keenly conscious of his popularity and showed a most inordinate appetite for praise. If ever a head was turned by success, his was. To this period belongs the story of his love for Heloise and the tragedies to which it led. The story as he himself tells it—and he does not spare himself—is sordid enough. It was only later, when the separation came, and those wonderful letters were written by Heloise, the classical expression, they may be called, of womanly devotion, and passionate affection, that the episode begins to have the appearance of a romance.

The events that follow, in Abelard's own account of them, are full of interest for the historian, but have little to do with Abelard as a teacher. He had been a cleric in minor orders: this, at least, is probable. He now became a monk, first at the Monastery of St. Denis, near Paris, and afterwards at St. Gildas in Brittany. It was impossible for him, even in the cloister, to moderate his passion for contention or to set bounds to his impetuous zeal. At St. Denis he made himself unbearable to the monks by his claim that the Saint, their patron, was not and could not be the Dionysius mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles. Abelard, of course, was right. But

what are we to think of his tactfulness? As Abbot of St. Gildas he was zealous beyond all measure in his effort to restore discipline, but for his pains he was driven from the monastery and was obliged to seek peace and quiet in a desert place near Troyes, where he built the monastery afterwards known as the Paraclete. There with a very few friends and disciples he first built a few rude huts of reeds and mud, intending to spend there the remainder of his days. But his popularity was so great in the world of scholarship that pupils went flocking to him from every direction, begging him to resume his lessons. "More subtle and more learned than ever," as a contemporary admirer expresses it, he repeated his successes of former days and was finally persuaded to return to Paris and reopen his school there. During this period of his activity as a teacher he seems to have devoted his attention principally to theology, and to have delighted especially in provoking the follows of Anselm of Laon by his dangerous doctrine on the Trinity. Already as early as 1121 he had been cited before the Council of Soissons. It is not easy to determine exactly what took place at that council, though it is certain that Abelard was condemned to recite the Athanasian Creed and burn his book on the Trinity. Now, a most formidable foe enters on the scene, one who is to play a decisive rôle in the rest of Abelard's career, St. Bernard of Clairvaux. It is hard at this late date, even with the abundant materials that lie before us, to judge accurately the motives and states of mind of men who, so long ago, moved in the events that make the history of that time. St. Bernard has been accused of injustice, cruelty and harshness towards Abelard. He has been called a heresy-hunter. The sincerity of his professions has been questioned. In fact, he has been made the heavy villain of a tale in which Abelard appears as the innocent victim. What we know with certainty is that St. Bernard was a great saint, a man of singular tenderness and fine spiritual feeling. We can hardly reconcile with these traits the vindictiveness, the insincerity, the coarse and heartless cynicism that have been laid to his charge. He could not fail to come into conflict with Abelard.

He was the typical mystic: his opponent was the no less typical rationalist. He was steeped, so to speak, in reverence for authority, Abelard had not the least respect for established tradition. He was austere in his personal life, while the reputation of former misdeeds, though they were long since deplored and atoned for, still clung to the daring philosopher. St. Bernard had learned in the solitude of the cloister to value prayer, contemplation and meditation and to distrust the practices and devices of the dialecticians. He was thoroughly alarmed as well as shocked personally at the daring recklessness of a teacher who did not hesitate to apply the methods of the turbulent class hall to the discussion of the most sacred mysteries of Faith. In this, at least, he was perfectly sincere. And, after all, he had, at least, a right to his view as well as Abelard had to his. If he were another dialectical knight-errant, like his opponent, and sought nothing more than a personal victory, we could hardly sympathise with his zeal, as we do when we ascertain that his motive was unselfish, that alarm for the integrity of the Faith, and fear for the future of the Church's dogma inspired him to act. And, when he was once aroused, he was a formidable foe. Abelard felt at once that in Bernard he had to deal with no ordinary man. He knew the power of the monk of Clairvaux, as the whole Christian world knew it, to be almost limitless. Bernard by his personal sanctity and by his prestige as a preacher had acquired a unique position in the Church. Bishops, Cardinals and even Popes, were his personal friends: some of them had been his disciples in the spiritual life, and with them his word was almost law. But, though he knew this, the dialectician was undaunted. He met admonition with defiance and answered denunciation by a challenge to a public debate. He knew his strength. But Bernard at the same time, knew his own limitations. He declined the challenge. Finally, it seems it was Abelard who demanded that a council of bishops be assembled to hear both sides, and, accordingly, a council was held at Sens in the year 1141.

It should be borne in mind that it was not so much the

conclusions of Abelard's theology as his method and his manner that St. Bernard objected to. There was, indeed, a question of actual heresy. Abelard had already been accused of teaching that there is no distinction between the three persons of the Blessed Trinity except a modal one: in other words, that the Three Persons are merely three modal manifestations of the one divine essence. But, in the eyes of St. Bernard, it was the extreme rationalism of Abelard that was at fault, and his total lack of respect for authority in theology. St. Bernard prepared himself for the encounter by prayer, fasting and study, and was ready, when the day came, to produce the passages from Abelard's writings to which he objected. He went to the council surrounded by his monks, who shared with him a profound distrust of rationalistic methods. Abelard summoned his followers, and up to the last moment, boasted that the discomfiture of the Cistercian would be swift and complete.

This brings us to the eve of the day set for the Council. There is extant, from the pen of a pupil of Abelard's, an extraordinary story to the effect that, the evening before the assembly met, the bishops held a very informal meeting in which, at the instigation of St. Bernard, the case was all "framed up," as we say. No critical historian nowadays takes that story for a true narrative, and even the most ardent haters of St. Bernard say that "No one who reads it will take it literally." The day of the Council arrived, the fourth of June, 1141. There were present the most distinguished ecclesiastics and theologians of the kingdom, the king himself, surrounded by his nobles, and St. Bernard with his company of white-robed monks from Clairvaux. Into the Church walked Abelard, followed by his disciples, boisterous, scornful, defiant. But, as the Master of dialectic, the hero of many a brilliant logical encounter, advanced up the nave, he came at last face to face with his accuser, and when the moment arrived for the indictment to be read, he astonished friend and foe alike by declaring: "I will not hear the Cistercian, I appeal to Rome," and turning on his heel, left the Cathedral, not indeed, a victor

in the contest, but yet a free man; for now the majesty of the Papal authority hung like a mantle around him and, pending his appeal, no action could be taken against him. The Council, thereupon, drew up the statement to be forwarded to Rome. Abelard set out, after some delay, intending to present his own case, but had proceeded only as far as Cluny when the news reached him that Rome had confirmed the decision of the council and had decided against him.

And now the last years of his checkered life were spent in the friendship of a truly great man, in conditions of ideal quiet, in a peace which he had never before sought but which he now at last appreciated. It was the venerable Peter of Cluny who threw open to the exile the gates of that grand old monastery, and extended to the broken-hearted teacher a welcome so cordial, so tender and so warmhearted that he deserves for that alone the gratitude of all who sympathise with the wayward and know that kindness such as his often reaches farther than zeal like St. Bernard's. Abelard donned the habit of the monks of Cluny, and was treated with the utmost consideration by all the brethren. Through the good offices of the Abbot a reconciliation with St. Bernard was brought about, and the forlorn philosopher began to learn from the Venerable Peter the elementary lessons of humility and simplicity. The end soon came. In the spring of 1142 he died at Chalons-sur-Saone, in the mild valley of the Seine, whither the abbot of Cluny had sent him for the benefit of his health. His remains were sent to the Paraclete, which had for many years been a nunnery over which Heloise presided as Abbess. There, in the course of time the body of Heloise was interred in the same grave, and there both remained until they were transferred in recent times to the cemetery of Père Lachaise near Paris. The last act of kindness on the part of Peter of Cluny was to write to Heloise a letter full of tender Christian charity in which he describes the last year of Abelard's life. "Not a moment passed but he was either praying or teaching or writing or composing." He is "ever to be named with honor, the servant of Christ and verily Christ's philosopher." Thus, then, the


closing scene of that life so full of vicissitudes was the most beautiful. The last days were passed among friends who could appreciate him, and a real change had come over the once turbulent spirit.

The details of Abelard's biography have detained us so long because in his case it is preëminently true that the man is the key to the philosophy. Without a knowledge of his character it is hopeless to try and understand what he taught and how he taught. He was above all things a fighter, a *vir bellator ab adolescentia*, as St. Bernard said. He was the typical militant dialectician of the twelfth century, the Don Quixote of an age of dialectic knight-errantry. And his cause was that of rationalism. His temperament was overwhelmingly logical, not distinctively spiritual. He did not know what restraint meant in matters intellectual. He had not the least shadow of reverence, but was, on the contrary, impelled by his impetuosity to "rush in" where the mystics "feared to tread." His gifts of person, of manner and of intellect were undoubtedly great. His personal magnetism, his fearlessness, his brilliant talent for argumentation, his eloquence and his vein of poetry made success easy, and success was his greatest enemy. Even his most ardent admirers cannot deny that he had an inordinate love of display. He appears to us to have preferred victory to truth, and, though the verdict is severe, we think it is justified by the study of his works and by his own account of his exploits. Nevertheless, as we shall see, he did an inestimable service to scholastic philosophy, and though he lived to see the wreck of all his cherished hopes, we can now look back through the centuries and see that it was his method, if not his ideas, that finally succeeded, in the thirteenth century.

On the question of method in philosophy and theology Abelard, as has been said, was a rationalist. He had no sympathy with the mystic view emphasized by St. Anselm; for him the *Intelligo ut credam* was the only motto. He had no knowledge of the vast Platonic and Neo-platonic world of thought in which John the Scot habitually dwelt. He seems to have

just discovered the possibilities of dialectical reasoning, and he has no idea except to put those possibilities to the test. He does not say in so many words that reason can prove all truth, but he acts on that supposition, and never hesitates or stops. Thus, in practice, he obliterates the distinction between reason and revelation, between knowledge and faith, between philosophy and theology. St. Bernard was instinctively right when he felt that this was a dangerous attitude. But, the time had not yet come for a clear, definite formulation of principles: the man who was to do that was Thomas of Aquin, and his day had not yet dawned. No one stepped out of the crowd of mystics to say that Abelard was partly right, and none of Abelard's followers was clear-sighted or candid enough to admit that he was partly wrong. We see it all very distinctly now. We see that Abelard was right in principle: reason *does* aid faith, we try to know in order to believe. But, we see too that Abelard abused the principle when he set no bounds to its use. We should, indeed, try to understand what we believe, but should we refuse to believe what we cannot fully understand? Abelard does not say positively that we *should* refuse, but he acts on that supposition. St. Bernard sums up his charges in the sentence: "The faith of the righteous believes, it does not dispute; but *that man*, as if he suspected God, has no mind to believe what his reason has not positively proved by arguments."

It is vain now to attempt a prediction of what might have happened in the past, given such and such conditions. Yet it may be instructive to point out that *if* Abelard had been of a different temperament, if he had been more moderate, more tactful, more considerate of the convictions of others, he would undoubtedly have prevailed even against men like St. Bernard. His fate was that of many another intemperate reformer, that of Roger Bacon, for example, who in the thirteenth century could have inaugurated the discoveries of the fifteenth in astronomy and physics, if it were not for just such tactlessness, just such impetuosity, just such intolerance of opposition as characterized Abelard.



On the question of Universals Abelard, as has been said, took a determined stand both against the extreme nominalism of Roscelin on the one hand and against the extreme realism of William of Champeaux on the other. We have seen how he routed the Realist from his chair and forced him to modify his doctrine. He was equally uncompromising in opposition to Roscelin, his former teacher. It was a rough age, and one that did not mince words. "It was," he says, "as I recall it, the insane opinion of my teacher Roscelin that" the universals are mere words. The "insane opinion," and "crazy doctrine," how respectful on the part of a pupil referring to his professor! While, however, this is certain that Abelard was neither a nominalist nor a realist of the exaggerated type, it is not quite clear just what his doctrine was. Perhaps we are safe in saying that he prepared the way for moderate realism. But, neither he nor any of his contemporaries could quite give a satisfactory solution so long as they studied the question from the point of view of dialectic alone. It takes psychology to solve the problem, and they had not yet reached that point. They argued the matter dialectically, that is, they took a sentence such as "Socrates is a man" and studied out the logical consequences that would follow if the universality of the predicate is merely nominal, or if the predicate stands for a real, universal human nature. There was no attempt to study *how* the mind acquires universals or how knowledge in general is built up in the mind. The strength of that age was the use it made of dialectic; the weakness of the age was that it relied on dialectic alone.

One of Abelard's best known works is the *Sic et Non*, a title which we may translate *Yea and Nay*. It consists of a number of quotations from the writings of the Fathers arranged under different heads, or questions, and showing the affirmative and the negative. Thus under the heading "Is God Omnipotent?" would be placed first the affirmative passages from ancient Christian writers and then the negative passages in which the same writers or others seem to contradict the doctrine of omnipotence. The aim of the book is not sceptical: it is not

intended to undermine the reader's faith. It is intended rather to stimulate his efforts, to furnish materials on which to exercise his dialectical skill. The work is epoch-marking, if not epoch-making. In former centuries it was considered a laudable task to give excerpts from the writings of the ancients, and many books were made up exclusively of such excerpts. Venerable Bede, Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, Alcuin and others wrote works in which there is hardly a sentence that is original. It was a laudable task because books were scarce and often inaccessible, and the preservation of the heritage of the past was, indeed, important. But see how times have changed! Abelard reproduces the sayings of the ancients, and at the same time pits authority against authority in order to give the student a chance to use his logic. St. Thomas will do practically the same thing in the objections which he places in front of each thesis; but he will do more. He will answer every objection, neatly, clearly, definitely, so that there will be no unexplained contradictions, no real antinomies of thought. He will show in what sense one authority affirms what the other denies, and all will lead to harmony of authority as well as to greater clearness of grasp on the part of the student. Abelard's *Yea and Nay* stands, then, midway between the early medieval compendiums which merely recapitulated, and the thirteenth century *Summae* which subjected the tradition of the past to the full force of dialectical discipline. It is the forerunner of these *Summae*, and as such is a most valuable contribution to medieval literature.

Another treatise, which even more clearly than the *Yea and Nay* shows Abelard's attitude, is his *Dialogue between a Jew, a Christian and a Philosopher*. In it, the Jew argues, of course, from the authority of the Old Testament, the Christian from the authority of the New Testament, and of the Church, and the philosopher from the light of reason alone. That one should suit one's argument to the previous convictions of one's opponent seems perfectly fair and permissible to us. In arguing with one who admits the authority neither of the New Testament nor of the Old, one may rely on reason alone. So,

too, it seemed to St. Thomas who, in his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, written for the conversion of the Saracens, adopts this very policy. Yet Abelard's contemporaries found fault with him for doing that very thing. The reason, once more, for finding fault, is not in the use but in the abuse of the principle. Abelard tries, through the character of the philosopher, to prove all truth from reason alone, not excepting even the mysteries of Faith. He even goes so far as to assert that the mystery of the Trinity was known to the philosophers of pagan times.

Other doctrines of Abelard, exhibiting a similar humanistic tendency are contained in his ethical and theological writings. In regard to the origin of the universe and the question of optimism or pessimism he held a peculiar doctrine. God, he said, is all powerful, loves what is good, and is free from jealousy. Therefore, He made the best possible world, for to say that He refrained from creating anything that was good, or stinted, so to speak, the amount of good that He put in the world, is to accuse him of jealousy or of downright malice. Is it not curious to find this optimism of conviction triumphing over all the personal experiences of the man? Abelard's life was a tragedy long drawn out. His personal opinion of it is contained in the title of his autobiography, *The Story of My Misfortunes*. At one time, indeed, he was so embittered that he cried out: "I had rather seek happiness among the Turks than among those who call themselves Christians." And, yet, such is the force of logic, he rises above his personal impressions and, on abstract principles, maintains that this world is the best possible world. His attitude towards the pagan philosophy of the past was one of more than mere tolerance. The moral precepts of the Christian law, he said, are merely applications of a natural moral law, that was known to the philosophers of Greece and Rome. This sentiment gave offense at the time. The age was not yet ripe for a sympathetic study of pagan antiquity. There still hung over the Christian world the shadow of the days when Christian writers denounced the morals of their pagan contemporaries as thoroughly corrupt.

A century after Abelard's time, the moral treatises of Aristotle were known and studied in Christian Europe and a different view began to prevail. The shortcomings of pagan standards of conduct were acknowledged then, as always. But, the conviction grew that the wisest of the pagans discovered many moral truths which underlie the divine law of Christianity, that there is a natural law, written "in the fleshy tablets of the heart," which no human being can ignore, and by which conduct was directed before Christ's revelation was made. Abelard did not see this in the same light as St. Thomas did. His understanding of it was partial or onesided; his expressions were immature and inexact.

Shall we, then, throw the blame on fate and say that Abelard was born before his time? Shall we excuse his errors and condone his offenses by shifting the responsibility to that destiny which shapes the course of human history? It is undeniable that Abelard had a large and influential following among the most thoughtful as well as among the most daring of his contemporaries. Otto of Freising, John of Salisbury, Arnold of Brescia and Berenger of Poitiers were not the only ones influenced by him. The Great Peter, called the Lombard, author of the *Books of Sentences*, was his disciple. Pope Celestine II was also a disciple of his. And there can be no doubt that in the final struggle between rationalism and mysticism, it was the rationalistic tendency that triumphed, and its triumph is largely due to the methods which Abelard perfected. In the scholasticism of St. Thomas of Aquin there is mysticism as well as rationalism; but the rationalistic tendency predominates, and it is, in principle, the rationalism for which Abelard fought and suffered. In principle, but not in the detailed application. We cannot, then, overlook the faults into which Abelard fell. No matter in what age he lived, he would have come into conflict with the official Church. He set no bounds, apparently to the use of Dialectic. He recognized no limits to the use of reason in matters of faith. That would have been condemned in any century as well as in the twelfth. It seems, indeed, to be the fate

of many innovators that, while they themselves suffer and are condemned, their ideas ultimately triumph and are accepted. It is easy to grow sentimental over the ingratitude of the world to those to whom it owes most. But is it not more becoming in the critic to find a reason for this state of affairs? And, without generalizing too much, may not the reason in many cases be the personal faults of the innovator and his lack of moderation? It was so in Roger Bacon's case, and it seems to be so in the case of Abelard. His jaunty, defiant, flippant air of all-preparedness, with which he ventured into the lists against men of established reputation and teachers of world-wide renown is picturesque and, at long range, not unpleasing. The colossal vanity of the man, especially when it is a matter merely of good looks and musical voice, is also an element of attractiveness, the more so, that he confesses it so naïvely and so honestly. But behind these traits there was a pride and self-sufficiency that is nothing short of disgusting. Let me give an example of that pride. When he found peace at last in the cloister of Cluny and in the open heart of the Venerable Peter discovered a haven of rest, he became humble and docile, that is to say, as humble and docile as was possible for one of his nature. It was then that he wrote his confession of faith. In that confession he says "Everything, however well said, may be perverted. I myself, though I have composed but a few treatises, and those of small extent, have not been able to escape censure; though, in truth, in the things on account of which I have been violently attacked, I can (as God knows) see no fault whatsoever on my part; and if any such fault be discovered, I have no disposition to defend it obstinately. I have, perhaps, by mistake, written many things not after the right manner: but I call God to witness that in the things for which I am accused, I have maintained nothing out of an evil will or out of pride." This, I think, is a very singular confession. In it, the purpose of amendment is struggling hard with the old temperamental pride. How different was the case of St. Augustine, who, when he had to acknowledge his errors did so in a simple, straightforward, utterly candid manner.

And thus we take leave of this complex personality that had so profound an influence on medieval thought. Not in harshness, for while we point to his personal shortcomings and lay to his own faults the blame for his lack of success, we cannot refuse to pay him the tribute of our sympathy. In his case the saying may be reversed: The good which he did lived after him, the evil was interred with his bones. The good prevailed in the philosophy of the century that came after his, and the evil ended in the tragedy of his own life. The Abelard of the popular imagination is identified with neither one nor the other, neither with the evil that he did nor with the good that he accomplished. The romantic figure of the devoted lover, very different from the historic personage of the philosopher, lives on and will live on as long as there are poets and lovers in the world. The songs in which he celebrated the charms of Heloise are now, unfortunately, lost beyond anything but the mere possibility of recovery. There remain, however, the remarkable series of letters which passed between these lovers of so long ago. In them piety and passion, sense and sentiment, idealism and realism are mingled in true medieval fashion. The Abelard who wrote those letters and lived out the life-tragedy which they depict so graphically, would, had he never been a philosopher or a theologian, have lived for ever in popular literature and in the imagination of posterity.

WILLIAM TURNER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist. By Thomas Dwight, M. D., LL. D., Parkman Professor of Anatomy at Harvard. New York, 1911. Longmans, vii + 243 pp.

It is no disparagement of the services rendered to the cause of religion by the pens of our theologians and philosophers to say that, today, a piece of apologetic, however simple, embodying a belief in the supernatural, when it comes from anyone of acknowledged rank in the scientific world—that is, in the world of the physical sciences—is likely to exert more influence to unbelievers than the ablest systematic treatise from a professional defender of the faith. The Church is opposed to Science—with a capital! No Scientist can, now-a-days, believe in the supernatural. This commonplace has become axiomatic in the market-place as well as in the lecture-hall. No dialectic refutation of this calumny has half the convincing impact of one instance of a man who is at once an eminent scientist and a sincere Catholic. Such a man was the late Professor Dwight of Harvard University. The testimony that his life bore to truth was all the more forcible because the science in which he was a master belonged to the biological group, which to a greater extent even than that of the “brown stones” has been tortured to bear witness against the existence of the Creator. The influence which Dr. Dwight had over his students and his associates, by the mere fact that he was at once a scientist and a believer can scarcely be overstated. And the loss sustained by the Church in America through his death is correspondingly great. Happily, however, being dead, he yet speaketh in the pages of an admirable little book which survives him the modesty of whose title is characteristic of its author. It was composed, he informs the reader, for the purpose of showing those outside the Church, and, if need be, poorly instructed Catholics within, “how a Catholic can be a man of science, and conversely how a man of science can be a Catholic.”

The gist of the book is to answer in the negative the question, Has the evolution theory disproved the existence of a personal God?

After glancing at the extent to which doubt of the supernatural has invaded the modern atmosphere, the author briefly states the argument from causation as sufficient to prove the existence of God; then proceeds to dispose of the contention that religion is merely a matter of emotion; and afterwards points out that to acknowledge an intelligent Creator involves the acknowledgment of design in the universe. With this truth, evolution in a modified form is, he shows, quite compatible. But, he contends, no adequate scientific evidence is produced to prove the contention that there has been a gradual transition from the non-living to life; nor, furthermore, do any of the various theories proposed to explain the ascent of man from the brute, offer any plausible line of development from the lower forms to the human body. The language is remarkably free from scientific terminology, except where that is indispensable; and the author preserves a tone of kindly good temper and moderation in his discussion. If he becomes severe it is only when he comments on the exaggerations of "the *sans-culottes* of science," or the unblushing arrogance of those who adopt Weissman's line of argument to establish a faulty hypothesis: "It is inconceivable that there should yet be another capable of explaining the adaptation of organisms, *without assuming the help of a principle of design.*"

JAMES J. FOX.

Sermons and Lectures. By Monsignor Grosch, Rector of St. John the Evangelist, Islington, London. New York, Benzigers. vii + 394 pp.

The friends of Monsignor Grosch, who overcame his reluctance to putting into print this collection of sermons and lectures, were rightly inspired. There is not one of the discourses that does not deserve to be preserved in permanent form. They are seventeen in number. Four treat of religion with practical aspects. Three are upon the Church; the others treat of other doctrinal points, or are historical. The thought is simple, direct and forcible, the exposition clear and terse, in plain appropriate language—the right type of parochial sermon.

JAMES J. FOX.

The Supreme Problem. An Examination of Historical Christianity from the standpoint of human life and experience and in the light of psychical phenomena. By J. Godfrey Raupert. New York, Benzigers, xx + 324.

In his introduction to this, in some respects novel, contribution to the apologetic library, after glancing at the prevalence of doubt about religious truths in the world, and the inability of science to solve or even contribute any valuable evidence towards the solution of the Great Enigma, the author indicates the scope of his book. It is to show that the two great fundamental dogmas of the Catholic Church, which alone offer any final answer to the great question; the Fall of Man and the Restoration and Redemption through Jesus Christ, are approved by the experiences of life. As one reads this proposal the thought of Newman's great pages towards the end of the *Apologia* occur to the mind; and we are not surprised to find them quoted before we have proceeded very far in the first chapter. In fact this thought of Newman's is the dominant and unifying element of the entire book. It is well to keep this in mind as we follow Mr. Raupert through his argument; for, when discussing the Fall and the existence of the devil, he comes face to face with spiritism and the group of psychic phenomena related to that subject, he dilates very extensively indeed on his favorite subject. Upon it he has nothing to say that will be new to those who have read his other works that deal *ex professo* with it. Although this defense of Catholic fundamental doctrine treats the arguments—apart from the particular one just mentioned—in a rather trite fashion, yet, because it is really as it claims to be “a human document,” it may prove more convincing to some minds than would one of more systematic character.

JAMES J. FOX.

Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by James Hastings, M. A., D. D., and others. Vol. iv, Confirmation-Drama. New York, Scribners, 1912. Pp. xvi + 907.

This important work continues to maintain the standard of first class scholarship which it exhibited in the first three volumes.

"Religion" and "Ethics" are, of course, broad terms, and the title of the work permits the introduction of many articles which to some may seem but remotely connected with the practice and theory of religion or the science of human conduct. "Cross-roads," "Crystal-gazing," "Cuchulainn Cycle," "Dew," and many other topics, however interesting in themselves, and however interestingly treated, as they are in this volume, would be more appropriately included in a general cyclopedia, or in a cyclopedia of anthropology or folk-lore than in one which bears the title of the volume before us. This volume, so far as we have observed, is not objectionable in its treatment of Catholic topics. There is, however, running through the work a note of naturalism, which, while it does not render the *Encyclopedia* unsuitable as a work of reference for scholars, is enough to make it dangerous in the hands of those who are lacking in theological training.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Rule of St. Clare. By Paschal Robinson, of the Order of Friars Minor. Philadelphia, The Dolphin Press, 1912. Pp. 32.

An attractively printed pamphlet on the Rule of St. Clare and its observance, in the light of early documents, has just come from the Dolphin Press. All who are interested in early Franciscan literature, knowing the competence of Father Paschal in everything relating to St. Clare, will welcome this latest fruit of his diligent research. The *Bulletin* will publish in the June number an equally interesting study by the same author, entitled "The Personality of Saint Clare."

WILLIAM TURNER.

Studies. An Irish Theological Quarterly Review of Letters, Philosophy and Science. Vol. I, No. 1, March, 1912. Pp. 220.

This is the first number of a Quarterly Review conducted by some University Professors and Graduates of the National University of Ireland. It will appear in the months of March, June, September and December, and is under the editorial management

of a committee whose chairman is Rev. T. A. Fenlay, S. J., Professor of Political Economy, University College, Dublin. It will publish original Articles, Notes, Bulletins of recent publications and Book Reviews. The field to which it appeals ought to be a wide one: Modern Literature, Celtic, Classics and Oriental Literatures, History, Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Sciences are the branches which will be specially provided for in its issues. The spirit of the publication is indicated in the "Foreword" in which are read "The principles of treatment in these subjects (Philosophy, Sociology and Education) and in cognate branches will be based on the traditional philosophy of the Christian world, which has even in recent years, shown itself far superior to any of its temporary rivals in organizing the proved results of modern research, and in initiating the solution of pressing problems in the speculative, social and scientific field." The *Bulletin* wishes the new Irish Quarterly many years of usefulness and success.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Mustard Seed, An Argument on Behalf of the Divinity of Christ. By O. R. Vassall-Phillips, of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. New York, Benziger Bros, 1912. Pp. xxxii + 530.

The Mustard Seed is a valuable contribution to the literature of Catholic Apologetics. Popular, practical, direct, yet thoroughly sound in method, it will prove a useful aid to the priest or layman who is desirous of explaining our position, and, placed in the hands of a non-Catholic, should not fail to produce a profound impression. The volume has a Preface by Father Hugh Benson and an Epilogue by Mr. Hilaire Beloe.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Gadelica: a Journal of Modern-Irish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1.

The first number of a new quarterly with the above title, published by Hodges, Figgis & Co. for the Association of Modern-Irish Studies, under the editorship of Thomas F. Rahilly, appeared in March. This journal, in the words of the prefatory note, aims

"to do for Modern Irish what has been, and is being, done so successfully for the older forms of the language by such periodicals as *Erin*, the *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, and the *Revue Celtique*." It proposes to publish Modern Irish texts from MSS., both prose and verse, original articles and studies dealing with the Modern Irish language (from about 1600 to the present day), or with its literature, folk-songs, folk-tales, and the like. The need has long been felt for such a medium for the publication of a vast literature which has hitherto been hidden away in manuscript form in the stacks of Irish and other libraries. That this literature can with truth be called 'vast' is evident from the estimate made by O'Curry, that the manuscripts contained in the library of the Royal Irish Academy alone would, if published, fill a thousand volumes. The importance of the throwing open of such a treasury to the historian, the student of literature, the lexicographer and the philologist need not be pointed out.

The first number contains the opening articles of several series: one on the Life and Works of Owen O'Keefe, a poet-priest of the early eighteenth century, by Tadhg O'Donoghue; another on a prose satire on the upstart aristocracy and unlettered peasants of the middle of the seventeenth century, called the "Parliament of the Children of Thomas," by Professor Osborn Bergin; a third presenting the diary of Humphrey O'Sullivan of Callan, Kilkenny, of the year 1827. Other articles are entitled: Mid-Eighteenth Century Conversation, by J. H. Loyd; a Poem by Bonaventure O'Hussey, O.S.F., being a farewell to Ireland on leaving it for the continent, by Miss Eleanor Knott; a "Vision" dealing with the Repeal Movement, by Father Dinneen; an Elegy on the Death of Tadhg "Gaedhealach" O'Sullivan, a favorite Gaelic poet of the sixteenth century, by James Cassidy. There are also some interesting lexicographical notes on certain Gaelic words and expressions, and a review of a new edition of Bishop Gallagher's Irish sermons (Maynooth Sermons, Vol. iv.)

The contributors to "Gadelica" are well-known Irish scholars, and to judge by the opening number, this journal bids fair to accomplish its aim. The field it has marked out for itself has up to this time been barely touched, and thus it serves to round out the circle of Gaelic studies. It deserves success as filling a long-felt want; the beginning it has made augurs well for that success. The interest already aroused in the Gaelic Revival assures us that

the efforts of the promoters of its latest exponent will meet with the support they well merit.

JAMES A. GEARY.

Le Missel Romain. Ses Origines, son histoire. Par Dom J. Bandot, O. S. B. 1 vol. in-16 de la Collection *Science et Religion* (Série Liturgie, no. 631-632). Bloud et Cie. Paris, 1912. Pp. 128.

While it would not be reasonable to expect that the entire process by which the Roman Missal has reached its present form could be described in such small compass, and while the materials for a complete work on that subject are not yet available, it is nevertheless an advantage to have the main lines of such an undertaking clearly laid down. As a work for the general reader and even for advanced students of Liturgy this pamphlet offers many features of excellence. One point in particular cannot be overlooked. The Mass is the centre of the Liturgical life of the Church, and in studying the formation of the Missal we have a clue leading through the entire range of liturgical activity in the past. This brochure forms one of a large series dealing with liturgical subjects which have come from the pen of Dom Bandot, and which are published under the general editorship of his learned colleague Dom Cabrol.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Enchiridion Patristicum. Locos SS. Patrum, Doctorum, Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum in usum Scholarum collegit M. J. Rouët de Journal, S. J. Herder. Freiburg, 1911. 8vo. Pp. xxiv + 887.

Three useful manuals uniform in scope and size are now available for Catholic students of the theological sciences—the present work, Denziger's *Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum* and Kirch's *Enchiridium Fontium Historiae Ecclesiasticae*. This compilation is intended to obviate unnecessary labor in constructing the "traditionis quod vocant argumentum," and to present the principal Patristic texts on which that argument is based. It goes without

saying that the choice of documents will not meet with universal approval; but no better method could have been devised for the purpose than that which is described by the author in his Introduction. Some characteristics are worthy of note. No texts are taken from authors later than St. John Damascene. A Latin translation accompanies all Greek texts. In some cases the extracts are printed in extenso, in others merely a few lines are given. A series of cross references and four separate Indices make it easy to control and utilize all the material. While it was undesirable that some, in fact many, texts which are found in Kirch should be reprinted here, the aim and purpose of the two works are so different that repetition does not deprive either of its usefulness or distinctive character. The author wisely warns his readers that such a compilation does not dispense students from a more detailed study of Patristic writings. As a matter of fact the full usefulness of the compilation will be apparent only to those who have made such studies.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

La Loi et La Foi. Etude sur St. Paul et les Judaisants. Par A. de Boysson, Directeur au Séminaire de Saint Sulpice. Paris. Bloud et Cie., 1912. 12mo. Pp. viii + 339.

A question of prime importance in the days of the apostles was that regarding the "vocation of the Gentiles." St. Paul insisted that the faith should not be restricted to those within the law, and triumphed over his "Judaizing" opponents. The history of this controversy, and an exposition of the teaching of St. Paul on the subject form the subject of this work. Two important results have been obtained by M. de Boysson in this erudite study. In the first place he has dealt successfully with a difficult matter of exegesis and history, and in the second place by accurately recounting what the conflict against the "Judaizers" was in reality, he has done much to clear up the hazy and erroneous views which still survive in some quarters as a result of the widespread circulation of the Pauline and Petrean theories of the Tübingen writers. The work is expository and constructive, and though the opportunity presented itself, the author has wisely refrained from unnecessary polemics.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

La Séparation des Églises et de l'État. Par J. de Narfon. Felix Alcan. Paris, 1912. Pp. iv + 317.

The views of M. de Narfon on the separation of Church and State in France are too well-known to need any comment. In this book he has simply collected and summarized a number of articles which appeared in various publications, *La Grande Revue*, *Figaro*, *France Catholique*, etc. In his discussion of the causes which led to the separation and of the manner in which it was accomplished, M. de Narfon shows himself a warm defender of the French Government and an equally hostile critic of the ecclesiastical authorities. After reading his account of the results of the separation it is hard to find the reasons on which he bases his hope that the French church will ultimately emerge from the conflict with greater strength, unity, and influence.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Credibility of the Gospel. ("Orpheus" et l'Évangile). By Monseigneur Pierre Batiffol. Translated by Rev. G. C. H. Pollen, S. J. Longmans, Green and Co. London and New York. 1912. 8vo. Pp. xx + 220.

The burden of the attacks on Christianity nowadays may be summed up as Christianity without Christ. Various philosophies, evolutionary, monistic, materialistic, idealistic, or combinations of these systems seek a formula to explain all historical occurrences, and incidentally to account for the existence of the Christian religion without postulating for it a supernatural origin. This is no easy task. As time goes on the difficulties seem to increase rather than to diminish. A great mass of traditional belief surrounds the central facts in the Christian religion. This belief entered into the consciousness of the church, though the proofs on which it rested were frequently lost sight of. Under the stress of conflict the vanished proofs and reasons are reappearing. The manner of their reappearance forms the special merit of such works as this of Batiffol. It may be asserted without exaggeration that, from whatever point Christianity is attacked today, the purpose underlying the attack is the same, viz., to show that at heart

the religion of the Gospel contains nothing which may not be looked on as a product of purely natural forces, and that these forces operate independently of any Providential intervention. The credibility of the Gospel is a general reply to such assaults. Special emphasis, however, is laid throughout the book on points connected with the position taken by Solomon Reinach in his work *Orpheus*, regarding the origin and early history of Christianity. The work, which appeared in 1909, was immediately translated into many other languages, but because it attracted no special attention in the English speaking world, the translator entitled Batiffol's work, "The Credibility of the Gospel" rather than call it by its French title, 'Orpheus et l'Evangile.' One result of the publication of Reinach's work was the searching analysis of his theory of the origin of religion and other theories allied to it, to which it led. The central thesis of *Orpheus* was explicit enough; but judging by the numerous detailed criticisms of the work which followed, it is hardly too much to say that it contained few accurate statements of fact, and no correct interpretations. Irrespective of Reinach's abortive offering, Batiffol's work is admirably suited to present needs. The great mass of humanity know practically nothing of the intense struggle which is being constantly carried on among students of the New Testament and early Christian history. Statements bearing the authority of a great name filter down to the minds of those who have no capacity to judge of their value, most frequently after they have been discarded in scientific circles, and often weaken, if they do not destroy, faith. It was for the needs of such people that these lectures were written and to meet the demands of a time "when error is forcing its way into all stages of public teaching and when even Catholic consciences though not darkened, may still be moved by a vague apprehension, often more to be feared than any definite objections."

As it stands Batiffol's work contains the substance of eight lectures delivered at Versailles in a Course of Higher Religious Instruction instituted by some of the leading Catholics of that place. Without technicalities, and without appealing to feeling or prejudice, the main thesis of the work is consistently expounded and defended. The Gospel of history is the gospel of tradition; the Christ of the Church is the Christ of the Gospel and of history. The method pursued is not new. Because of the wealth of new material which is introduced, however, and because of the manner

in which the results of the labors of other workers, Catholic and non-Catholic, are laid under contribution, each chapter has a special point and significance. There are eight of these chapters. The silence of Flavius Josephus; Rabbis and Romans; The Catholic Canon; Saint Paul; The Author of the Acts; The Gospels; The Authenticity of the Discourses of Jesus; The Historic Certainty of the Gospel Story. What the plan and purpose of the book are, is clearly shown by these titles. The first two chapters deal with the evidence for the historic truth of the Gospels found in non-Christian sources: the other with the evidence of the inspired Word in New Testament documents. Or stated differently the author assumes the burden of finding an answer to the question:—What are the critical proofs of the general history of Our Lord? The apologetic and polemical value of such a work can hardly be overestimated. Though the limits imposed on the author did not allow him to give more than a mere outline or bare skeleton of the historical argument for the Credibility of the Gospels, he nevertheless brings together the essentials and expresses them in a way fully within the comprehension of the least technically minded. The fact that the statements of Solomon Reinach were kept in view in the composition of this work does not detract from its general value and utility. In establishing the fact that the traditional view of the Gospel and its contents is the correct one against an author who finds the source of all religion in “*un ensemble de scrupules, c'est-à-dire de tabous*,” a result is attained, which is equally valid against monism—idealistic or materialistic—and equally opposed to the views of such men as Paul Drews or Simon Patton.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Commentaire Français Littéral de la Somme Théologique de S.

Th. d'Aquin. Par R. P. Thomas Pègues, O. P. T. VI, Toulouse, 1911 (Ed. Privat, 14 Rue des Arts).

The five preceding volumes of this valuable work completed Fr. Pègues' translation and commentary on the First Part (Ia Pars) of the Summa (see *Catholic University Bulletin*, Jan., 1908, Jan., 1909, Apr., 1910, Mar., 1911). The sixth volume deals with the first twenty-one Questions of the *Prima-Secundae*, containing the treatise on the *End of Man* and on *Human Acts*, by which man

attains to his end or deviates from it. These titles show how important and fundamental are the subjects dealt with. Man's eternal destiny is in his own hands: it is determined by his own deliberate acts. To the consideration of these acts St. Thomas devotes 108 Questions of the Ia 2ae (on Human Acts *in genere*) and 189 Questions of the 2a 2ae (on Human Acts *in specie*). Positive laws, civil or ecclesiastical, may change: the fundamental principles of morality, so accurately and so luminously expounded by the Angelic Doctor in the Second Part of his Summa, are immutable. In no other portion of his writings, remarks Fr. Pègues (Introd. to Q. vi), does the genius of St. Thomas appear "more powerful, more original, more analytic and synthetic." The first twenty-one Questions of the Second Part contain the quintessence and the necessary foundation of all Moral Theology. Nothing to surpass, and most probably nothing to equal, St. Thomas' treatise on these fundamental questions, has been written by the hand of man. For a perfect specimen of observant and rational psychology readers are referred to his analysis and classification of the acts of the human mind and will. Faithful to the plan announced in the first volume Fr. Pègues continues to give a literal translation, which is remarkably clear and concise, together with a commentary neither too long nor too short—just enough to elucidate the text and to show its bearing on important questions. Commenting on the fifth and sixth articles of the nineteenth Question, where St. Thomas lays down the principle, that the morality of a man's acts depends on his conscience, *i. e.*, on the judgment of the reason pronouncing the act good or bad, the translator introduces the question of Probabilism, which he answers in the sense of a Probabiliorist. His solution will not be accepted by all; some of his own brethren will dissent; but his arguments must receive consideration, especially when he shows that, according to St. Thomas, the will can not be right when it decides to act against the judgment of the mind. Whilst this is true, one might well say: The judgment of my mind is that I am free when the reasons are evenly balanced on the side of liberty and in favor of the law. The writer of these lines is one amongst many to whom it seems impossible, as Fr. Pègues justly remarks, to form a final judgment in favor of liberty when the stronger (more probable) reasons are on the side of the law.

MISCELLANEOUS.

A Bibliography of Pragmatism.¹

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¹This tentative bibliography of pragmatism (humanism) was prepared by a member of the 1911-12 philosophy seminar given by Doctors Pace and Turner at this University. Some of the articles are included only because they were occasionally referred to in the exegetical and polemic literature of pragmatism, or for reference to popularized expositions. On the other hand articles, such as the greater number of Professor Dewey's, have been omitted as they deal with problems foreign to pragmatism, albeit treated from a pragmatic standpoint.

The compiler takes this opportunity to express the thanks of the students of the philosophy seminar of 1911-12 to Doctor Edward Pace and Doctor William Turner for their kind instruction during the seminar, and his thanks to Doctor Turner and Mr. Joseph Schneider, Librarians of the Catholic University, for their assistance in the preparation of this paper.

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NOXON TOOMEY.

An Irish Homily on the Holy Eucharist: Text and Translation.

The present Homily is perhaps the most creditable of those here published from the Rennes ms. It is clearly divided into three parts, developing in turn the reality of the change of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, the necessity of cleansing the conscience from sin as a preparation for Holy Communion, and the obligation of keeping oneself free from sin subsequently. This doctrine, the practising of which is the corner-stone of Catholic morality, is in the main effectively presented.

In the first part we do not find a detailed account of the philosophical side of Transubstantiation, as might be expected if the author drew on Saint Thomas or other scholastics of his age. There is no direct reference to the Angelic Doctor. Though the quotations from "the Author" may be from him, they may with equal probability be from another, as the expressions quoted are commonplaces of Catholic thought. We can draw no conclusions, therefore, as to the probable date of the composition. Some of the expressions used are hazardous or at least inaccurate. For instance, we find in the second paragraph (of the translation) the expression that Christ could "change His own Body into bread and wine for us," and again, "Christ formed His own Body and Blood in bread and wine." This is clearly a slip on the part of the author, for the true statement of the change of bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ is found in the same paragraph, and even in the opening paragraph. The author might perhaps be charged with holding the heretical doctrine known as "companionation," that is, the doctrine that the bread and wine continue to exist after the consecration, but that the Body and Blood of Christ are really present along with them. The opening sentence lends color to this view. But we cannot be certain that by "bread and wine" he did not mean simply the appearances of bread and wine, for he does not mention the distinction between substance and accident, nor discuss in detail the doctrine of

Transubstantiation. We are not in a position, therefore, to say just what he did mean. We can say, however, that there is a strange alternation of exact and inexact statements of the mystery.

The first paragraph appears to be incomplete or garbled. The sentence containing the quotation "Verbum caro factum est" should naturally give a translation of the Latin words. Only a slight play of imagination is necessary in order to see in what follows immediately a distorted rendering of the quotation. It appears to me that it was originally a translation, and that there has been omitted a sentence or two in which was shown the connection between the dogmas of the Incarnation and the Holy Eucharist. As it stands, the sentence makes no sense whatever.

No fault can be found with the presentation of the remaining points of the Homily on the ground of doctrine. The usual parallels are drawn between various miracles of the Old and New Testaments and this, the most wonderful of the works of God, to show its possibility and to draw practical conclusions as to the proper preparation for Communion. The most striking point is the frequency with which the Old Testament is quoted, a point, however, in which this Homily does not differ greatly from the others. Certainly the author does not appear to have neglected the reading of the Bible, though he lived before the Reformation. We must admit, however, that he is guilty in many cases of serious inaccuracies both in expressing his own thoughts and in his quotations from others. Several references to books of the Old Testament are manifestly mistakes. Job, especially, is quoted for passages which may perhaps come from Saint Gregory's *De Moralibus*, which is a commentary on that book.

It remains to be noted that there are two authorities quoted in the present Homily who have not been identified. They are referred to as *Elariensis* and *Nenuensis*. Their identification may throw some light on the literary relations of Ireland with the continent in the Middle Ages.

TEXT.

(Fo 29b, l. 18) Do chorp Crist and so óir atat tri ní ré-tuicsin ann. an *céd* ní dib .i. creidem a-substaint cuirp Crist do-beith an-aran 7 a-fín in-tan adeir an-sacart na-briatra so hoc *est corpus meus*¹ 7 *cetera* .i. is é so mo-corp-sa fein 7 intaigi ant-aran an-tan sin a-corp Christ 7 an-fín an-a-fuil 7 do subachus na-bretri sin an-tan adeir sé *Verbum caro factum est* 7 *habitabit in-nobis* 7 *cetera* 7 doniter corp dia-di an-tan sin 7 indtaighi indaindi 7 na-h-ergett lucht an-t-seacrain ar-immugadh a-timcill-na-bretri so oir do bí each uile ní ullamh mar-is-luaithe adubairt sé he.

Óir do-rindi carrace tsalaind do-mnaí loich an a eisimplair so tri tuillemh feirgi día in-tan-tuc an dighaltus ar soduma 7 argomorra 7 do claechlaigh sé slat móisi a colibar .i. a-nathair nemi 7 do claechlaigh mar an *cedna* topair 7 srotha na h-egipti a-fuil 7 a-n-uisceda a-neim 7 re guidi elias mar an *cedna* tuc sé tene do-neim do indeachadh ar-na-dæinib Mas-eadh cad hé ant-adbar nach claechlochadh sé a-corp fein an-arán 7 a-fín duinne oir is mó na-cumachta ní do cruthugadh can-adbar na-adbar do cruthugadh a-ní ele óir do cruthuigh Crist corp adaim can-adbar 7 do aisic spiratt lasarais ar-mor-grad a-cuirp a-talmain 7 ní-mothuigtech resúnta do cruthugadh do-n-talmain mítuicsi mírésunta. Mas-eadh creittid co-fétann Crist a-corp fein do denam do-n aran 7 a-fuil do-n-fín. Oir do ní duine an-æn-ló amain iarann do-n-talmain 7 glaine do-n lúaithe. Mas-eadh creidigh o-sa-mó cumachta día na cumachta an-duine co-fétann a-corp fein do denam d-áran mar adbar 7 a-fuil do-fín 7 cidhed adubradar na-heritici eindus do creitfimis do corp Crist 7 nach-faicmit hé 7 do-fregar elariencis iad 7 do fíarfaidh an-faicidi na-bethadhaigh cruthuigter i-sin-talmain o cumachtaib día co-h-aimserda nemfollas díb-si 7 o atait mar sin cret do-bir oraind can-a-creidem cur cruthuigh Crist a-corp 7 a-fuil fein an-arán 7 a-fín óir ní leir día 7 a-cumachta acht tri-sgathán a-diachta 7 do fíarfaidh ant-eritice eindus marus corp Crist an-cach-æn aimsir óir da-ma-commór re slíab hé do caithfidhe hé fada búadha 7 is-í a eisimplair sin .i. gur sás Crist na V mile do dæinib le V aranaib 7 le da iasc 7 cur mó a-fuighill na iatt fein ar-tus 7 is mar sin fétus día an-eclais do-sasadh d-a-corp fein. Oir fétaidh dellramh na-greine 7 tes na-teined 7 baladh an-rósa 7 ecna an duine tarba

¹ Sic, ms.

TRANSLATION.

Of the body of Christ here: for there are three things to understand in it. The first of them, namely, to believe that the substance of the Body of Christ is in [the] bread and wine when the priest says these words, "*Hoc est corpus meum, et cetera*," that is, "This is my own Body." And the bread changes at that time into the Body of Christ, and the wine into His Blood. And by virtue¹ of these words, when he says, "*Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, et cetera*," it is made the Body of God at that time and changes into us. And let not those who are in error arise contending about these words; for everything was finished as soon as He said it.

For He made a rock of salt of Lot's wife as an example of this, through deserving the anger of God when He brought vengeance on Sodom and Gomorrha. And He changed the rod of Moses into a serpent, namely, into a viper. And in the same way He changed the wells and streams of Egypt into blood, and their waters into poison. And through the prayer of Elias in the same way He sent fire from heaven through displeasure at the people. What therefore is the reason that He would not change His own Body into bread and wine for us? For it is [a manifestation of] greater power to form a thing without matter than to form matter into another thing; for Christ formed the body of Adam without matter, and brought back the spirit of Lazarus for His great love of his body on earth, and [consider that it was] a sentient reasonable thing He formed from the earth which has no understanding nor reason. Therefore believe that Christ can make His own Body of the bread, and His Blood of the wine. For a man makes iron of the earth in one single day, and glass of ashes. Therefore believe, since the powers of God are greater than the powers of man, that He can make His own Body of bread as material, and His Blood of wine. And yet the heretics said:—"How could we believe in the Body of Christ when we do not see it?" And Elariensis answered them, and asked them:—"Do you see the animals that are formed in the earth by the power of God in their own times, unknown to you? And as they are so, what prevents

¹Text has "joy," which can hardly be correct.

do-denam can-digbail doib fein 7 fetaidh an-en-coindill morán coinnill do lasad cin díghbail di fein curab-amlaid sin fétus an-eclais corp Crist do comáin can-digbail 7 mar fétus an eclais .i. an seanmontaidhi an-uimir eistes a-seanmoir do-sásad can-digbail d-a-ecna is mar sin fétus an eclais corp Crist do comáinechadh da cach æn duine can-digbail do-n corp acht cid do rindetar lucht an-mícreidim amarus ar corp Crist do beith imlán i-sin (fo 29d) ablaind mbice 7 do fegair ant-údar dóib 7 adubairt corp Christ do beith co-h-implán an cach æn-rand do-n ablaind can-digbail 7 tuic a-eisimplair so i-sin [s]pecláir an-tan fechair dealb aisti co-faictar hí co-h-implán 7 da-roindter an-specláir a-rannaib imda ní lughaidi do-cíter an-delb in cach-rand di can digbail do-n deilb 7 is mar sin nach lugaidi corp Crist a-roind a-rannaib imda oir caithter an-corp-sa an-cach inad 7 mairid sé an æn-inad 7 cid caithter o-dæinib nemglana hé mairid sé co-glan 7 cid fada o do-rindidh hé mairidh co-núa 7 cid b-é gabus co-mídingmala hé is cintach hé a-fuil 7 a-feoil Crist do-reir na-canona coiserca oir cidh b-é cendcas lietauaire uasal fechtar an suightech an-a-cuirfer hé an-glan hé no an-nemglan nó an-slán hé no an-easlán 7 is-mar sin dlighes an-[n]ech gabus sacramint cuirp Christ cuigi amail adeir ant-apstol an-duine d-a-derbadh fein an-tan gebus ant-sacramint so cuigi oir is docraidh do-n tsacart dol do caithem a-chodach corpda can-a-lama da glanad. Mas-eadh is ro-deacra dol do gabail na-sacraminti spiratalta can-an-cogubus do-glanad. Oir adubairt an-salm do comtidlaic día grasa dam fa indracus mo craidhi 7 fa-glaine oibrigti mo-lam Óir is mór do-na-dæinib bis ac-ullmughad an bíd corparda o-maidin co-ró an tres uair do ló 7 curab ar-ecin do-b-ail léo anamain leth-uair ac-a-n-ullmugadh do cum an-bíd spiratalta. oir scribtar modh ullmuigti an-cined dænna i-sin dara caibidil X an-exodus do chum gabala na-sacraminnti spiratalta can an-tuan cascda do-gabail amh acht a-gabail ar-n-a-róstad a-tene grada dia Mas-eadh (fo 30a) bith a-fis acat curab amh caithitt na-dæine nach fadoghann gradh dia an-a-craidhib ant-sacramint so .i. lucht graduigti an tsægail 7 curab-ar na-róstad co-glan o-tenidh gabann an-lucht congumus césad Crist an-a-craidedaib hé óir lasann a-tenid gradha día ma[d]-duthtrachtach a-toil óir mar gabtar lactuca ar-a-seirbi do leighes na-n-eslainti corpda is-amlaid sin gabtar corp Crist maille re toirrsi craidhi ac-cuimniugadh césta Crist do leighes na-pecach 7 adeir lebar na hecna co curtar manna re-tes na-greine d-a-tirmugadh 7 nach curtar do-cum na-tene hé ar ecla a-cruaduigti gurab-amlaid sin

us from believing that Christ formed His own Body and Blood in bread and in wine?" For God and His powers do not appear except by the reflection of His divinity.

And the heretic asked:—"How does the Body of Christ live in every age, for if it were as large as a mountain, it would be consumed long ago?" And this is the explanation of that, namely, that Christ satisfied five thousand people with five loaves and two fishes, and that the remnants were greater than they themselves at first. And it is thus that God can satisfy the Church with His own Body. For the radiance of the sun, and the heat of fire and the perfume of the rose, and the wisdom of man can produce fruit without diminution of themselves; and one candle can light many candles without diminishing itself. So that thus the Church can receive in communion the Body of Christ without diminution. And as the Church, that is, the preacher, can satisfy the number who listen to his sermon without diminishing his wisdom, so it is the Church can communicate the Body of Christ to everyone without diminution of the Body.

Yet unbelievers have doubted that the Body of Christ is entire in a little host. And the Author answered them and said that the Body of Christ is entire in every portion of the host, undiminished. And understand the exemplar of this in the mirror. When you look at an image in it, it is seen entire; and if the mirror is divided into many parts the image is seen no less in each part of it without diminution of the image. And so the Body of Christ is not less in one of many parts. For this Body is received in every place and it remains in one place. And although it is received by impure persons, it remains pure; and though it be long since it was made [present in the host], it remains new.

And whosoever partakes of it unworthily is guilty of the Blood and of the Body of Christ, according to the Blessed Canon.² For whosoever purchases a precious remedy considers the condition in which he is placed, whether he is clean or unclean, or whether he is healthy or unhealthy. And thus the one who partakes of the sacrament of the Body of Christ should do, as the Apostle says³ that a man should prove himself when he receives this sacrament. For it is unseemly for the priest [of the old law] to go to partake of bodily food without cleansing his hands. Therefore it is very

² That is, the Scripture. *I Cor. xi, 27.*

³ *I Cor. xi, 28.*

samlaigter corp Crist re manna a-figar a-gabala oir an-tan gabus duine corp Crist cuiridh re tes na-greine hé .i. re grad dia d-a daingningadh in-a craidhi indus nach-scailter hé o-na-graduib examla ele Oir scribtar a-candicorum co-ndubairt an fáid o-tá m-anam ar-n-a-daingniugadh a-ngrad dia curab inill cach uile ní dam óir an-tan gabtar corp Christ maille re-tes na-tined .i. re saint an tsægail cruadaighi sé 7 loiseter an craidhi in-a-teitt sé maille re damnad an-digaltais. Mas-eadh derbad an duine hé fein a-tirmach na greine .i. i-sa-deirc an-tan gabus hé 7 seachnad teas na-tene .i. an tsaint óir is-a-h-eisleine glain is-ingabta an corp so .i. a-sroll mar ar-cuiredh hé do reir fidhrach an-ainsir a-césta gurab amlaid sin dlige an cristaidhi an corp so do gabail sa sroll glau .i. sa-craidhi-nach fuil peacach a-cosmailes an-adlaici an-ar-cuired corp Crist nar cuiredh neach riam roime. Mas-eadh na cuired nech ar bith corp Crist san-inad as nach seristar an-diabal óir ní bí comprait etara oir mar do braithedh Crist do-na-h-iubalaib le poice iudais is mar sin braithitt lucht (fo 30b) gabala cuirp Christ co-mídingmala do-n díabal hé an-tan cuiritt a-cend cumacht an-diabail hé .i. sa corp pecach amail adubairt Crist lá na mandala .i. atá lámh mo braithti maille rium ar-an mbord so 7 Adeir Augustin curab mó pecaigitt na-dæine do-bir corp Christ do-na-pecachaibh .i. ballaibh an-diabail anaid na-dæine do thídlaic hé d-a-crochadh do-na-h-iubalaib curab aire sin nach fétann neach andligned do denam d-a-tigerna ní-is-mó na-a-cur sa prisún is cumga 7 is-sailchi do-geba amail atat lucht gabala cuirp Christ co-mídingmala 7 adeir Corentios i-sin IX caibidil X curab cintach a-fuil 7 a-feoil Christ lucht a-caithme co-mídingmala oir do-beiritt pían dó mar fuair an céd lá 7 adeir ambrosius cid b-é gabus hé co-mídingmala curab-inann dó hé 7 a-césad oir dligit na-dæine a-n-ullmugadh ar cind cuirp Christ 7 d-a-eis óir cid b-é do cuirfed brentus 7 salchar a-comraid coimetta cuirp Christ do bo eisindraic do hé curab aire sin is-eisindraic an-nech gabus corp Christ maille re droch-smúained craidhi 7 re droch-briatraib beil 7 re droch-oibrigtib cuirp

Adeir Prouerbia i-sin VII caibidil XX an-nech coimétus a tigerna do geba anoir a tigerna 7 is-docraid do-n nech diúltus a tigerna fa ædaigecht 7 is docraidhi na-sin do nech a-tarraing amach d-eis a-leicti astech 7 adeir maigistir na-riagla curab docraidhi nech re-tarraing amach d-eis a-leicti astech na-re congmail amuich ar-tus oir is-ann do-berar tarcaisne ar-an-tigerna an-tan gabtar

grievous to go to receive the spiritual sacrament without cleansing the conscience. For the Psalm ⁴ said:—"God has rendered to me according to the uprightness of my heart and according to the purity of the work of my hands." For there are many people who are preparing food for the body from morning till it is the third hour of the day, and who are hardly willing to remain a half-hour preparing themselves for the spiritual food. For there is written in the twelfth chapter of Exodus ⁵ the manner of preparing the human race for receiving the spiritual sacrament, namely, not to eat the paschal lamb raw, but to partake of it roasted by the fire of the love of God. Know, therefore, that they partake of this sacrament raw who do not kindle the love of God in their hearts, those, namely, who love the world; and that those receive it roasted completely by fire who keep the crucifixion of Christ in their hearts. For they are inflamed with the fire of the love of God if their will is earnest; for as chicory, although bitter, is taken to cure bodily ailments, so the Body of Christ is received along with sorrow of the heart, through remembrance of the crucifixion of Christ, to heal sins.

And the Book of Wisdom says ⁶ that manna is put in the heat of the sun to dry, and that is it not put to the fire for fear of hardening it; hence the Body of Christ is like to manna in the way in which we partake of it. For when one receives the Body of Christ, he puts it in the warmth of the sun, namely, in the love of God, to strengthen it in his heart, so that he may not be divided by the other diverse loves. For it is written in the Canticle of Canticles ⁷ that the prophet said:—"Since my soul has been strengthened in the love of God, everything is secure to me." For when the Body of Christ is received with the heat of fire, that is, with coveting of the world, it hardens, and the heart into which it goes is burned, with the condemnation of vengeance. Therefore let a man prove himself in the drying of the sun, namely, in charity, when he receives it, and let him avoid the heat of fire, namely covetousness. For it is in a clean shroud that this Body is to be received, namely, in linen, as He was buried according to testimony ⁸ at the time of His crucifixion. So that it is thus

⁴ Ps. xvii, 21 (Vulgate).

⁵ Ex. xii, 9.

⁶ Wisdom, xvi, 27 (?)

⁷ I have not found the passage in the book mentioned nor in any other.

⁸ Matt. xxvii, 59. This shows that *scroll* means sometimes 'linen,' but it is rare in that sense.

neach is-mesa na hé n-a-inad 7 diúltar eisin amail is-follus a-ndiúltad 7 a-ngabail Christ Oir adeir ant-udarras cur-ferr can-slidi na-fírinde do aithne na-a-treicen d-eis a-h-aithne Oir adubairt ant-udarras gur (fo 30c) ab mó do-maith do-ní mead día do-na-sodumachaibh lá na-breithi na-do-n droing do creitt dó 7 do diúlt hé 7 adeir eoin *soscélaidhe* sa *céd caibidil* co-tanice an-mac an-a-persain dilis 7 nar-gabadar a-muintear fein *cuca* he 7 is cosmail an-muinter so re iúdás noch do chaith biad ar-bord an-tigerna 7 do braith d-a-naimdib hé 7 adeir *ecclesiastic* i-sin VI *caibidil* *combítt* caraitt 7 companaig ar-an-mbord in aimsir an-tsólais 7 nach-cuimnigitt beith amlaid an-aimsir na h-eicne 7 is cosmail an-drong so ris na-h-iubalaibh do imchur an-pailm co-h-anorach domnach na pailme do cum Christ 7 tar-a-eisi sin do chuireadar co-h-as-anorach as-an-tempul amach hé 7 do braithettar do chum a-césta hé corab-amlaid sin is mór in asanoir an-tigerna do-leicen *astech* co-n-anoir 7 a-brath dí-a-naimdib fa-deoigh dí-a césadh 7 is amlaid sin do-n lucht gabus corp Christ a-fidar i-sin-eclais 7 do-bir a-namaitt an-a-cend sa-corp *cedna* .i. in diabal. Oir adeir *nenuensis* curab ingnad do-n-anam daenna nach-feoghaighenn sé an-tan *dicuires* a-fer pósta .i. Crist 7 gabus *cerrmach* 7 adaltrach in-a-inad .i. an-diabal. Oir adubairt eoin sa VI *caibidil* co-ndubairt Crist tanac chucaib a *dæine* an-ainm m-athar 7 nir-gababar chucaibh mé 7 tainic an-diabal an-a-ainm fein 7 do-gababar hé ac-denam an-pecaidh ar a furalam Oir cid b-é gabus corp Crist co-dingmala cuigi 7 coimétus hé do-geba an-flathamnus neamda 7 cid b-é gabus co-midingmala hé 7 nach coimetann co-duthrachtach do-geba ifirnn FINIT AMEN

the Christian should receive this Body, namely, in clean linen, that is in a heart which is not sinful, in the likeness of the tomb in which was placed the Body of Christ, in which no one had ever before been placed. Therefore let no one put the Body of Christ in a place from which the devil has not been banished. For there is no association between them; for as Christ was betrayed to the Jews with the kiss of Judas, so those who receive the Body of Christ unworthily betray Him to the devil, since they put Him in the power of the devil, that is in the sinful body, as Christ said the day of the Mandatum:—"The hand of my betrayal is with me at this table." And Augustine says that they sin more who give the Body of Christ to sinners, that is, to the members of the devil, than those who delivered Him to the Jews to be crucified. One cannot therefore do a greater injustice to His Lord than to put Him in the narrowest and filthiest prison he finds, namely, those who receive the Body of Christ unworthily. And Corinthians says in the nineteenth⁹ chapter that those who receive Him unworthily are guilty of the Blood and the Body of Christ, for they cause Him suffering such as He received the first day. And Ambrose says that whosoever receives Him unworthily, it is the same for him as to crucify Him. For people ought to prepare themselves before the Body of Christ and after it. For whoever would associate rottenness and filth with the keeping of the Body of Christ, it would be wrongful for him. So that he is unrighteous who receives the Body of Christ with evil thoughts of the heart, and with evil words of the lips, and with evil deeds of the body.

Proverbs says in the twenty-seventh chapter:—¹⁰ "He who keepeth his Lord shall receive the honor of his Lord." And it is a grievous thing for him who refuses to entertain his Lord, and it is still more grievous for him who draws out after being let in. And the Master of Rules ¹¹ says that it is more grievous that one should draw out after being admitted than remain out at first. For it is by this that contempt is shown to the Lord, when one worse than He is received in His place and He is refused, as is evident in the denial and reception of Christ. For the Authority ¹²

⁹ *Recte* 'eleventh'; *I Cor.* xi, 27. *Aonmad* has been taken for *naomad* in the text.

¹⁰ *Prov.* xxvii, 18.

¹¹ *Magister Sententiarum* (?)

¹² Cf. *Luke* ix, 62; xii, 48; *Eccles.* v, 4.

says that it is better not to know the way of truth than to abandon it after knowing it. For the Authority¹³ said that the scales of God are more favorable to the men of Sodom on the day of judgment than to those who have believed in Him and denied Him. And John the Evangelist says in the first chapter¹⁴ that the Son came in His own person, and that His own people did not receive Him; and this people is like Judas who ate food at the Lord's table and betrayed Him to His enemies. And Ecclesiasticus says in the sixth chapter¹⁵ that there are friends and companions at one's table in the time of good fortune, and that they do not remember that they are friends in the time of need. And this sort of people are like the Jews who bore palms as a mark of honor on Palm Sunday to meet Christ, and after that put Him contumeliously out of the temple, and betrayed Him to be crucified. Therefore is it a great dishonor to admit the Lord with honor and finally to betray Him to His enemies to be crucified. And it is thus with those who receive the Body of Christ for appearance in the Church, and bring His enemy the devil, against Him in the same body. For Nenuensis says that it is a wonder that the human soul does not wither when she banishes her spouse, that is, Christ, and receives a gamester and an adulterer in His place, namely, the devil. For John said in the sixth chapter¹⁶ that Christ said:—"I came to you, O men, in the name of my Father, and you did not receive me; and the devil came in his own name, and you received him, committing sin at his bidding." For whosoever receives the Body of Christ worthily and keeps Him, will obtain heaven, and whosoever receives Him unworthily and does not keep him faithfully, will merit hell. FINIT. AMEN.

NOTES ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE HOMILIES.

The following paragraphs give some of the characteristics of the spelling employed in these treatises, loosely grouped as Homilies, and summarize the verb-forms, without any attempt at completeness. The forms found in the Homily on the Passion published with translation by Rev. George W. Hoey in the *Bulletin* of May and June of last year, have been included. References

¹³ *Matt.* x, 15; xi, 22, 24.

¹⁵ *V.* 10.

¹⁴ *V.* 11.

¹⁶ *Cf.* vv. 36, 38; but rather *V.* 43.

are to folio, column and line of the MS. (The discovery of the words will be aided if it is borne in mind that there are about forty lines in each column). The vocabulary does not pretend to be complete, but to give only the rarer words, and those showing some peculiarity of form or meaning.

The spelling of these Homilies is fairly consistent when compared with that of other Middle Irish texts. Aspiration, however, is not consistently marked, and there is frequent confusion of *d* and *g*, and of *m* and *b*, when aspirated. This gives us four different forms for the genitive singular and nominative-accusative plural of *pecadh*, 'sin,'—*pecaid*, *pecaidh*, *pecaig*, and *pecaigh*. Similarly *m* is frequently put for *b*, especially in compounds, with aspiration unmarked. Examples appear in the vocabulary. As regards the digraphs, we may note that *a* is sometimes written for *ai*; but on the whole there is little difference between the spelling of these Homilies and the modern spelling, except that *i* is always written for *io*, and frequently *e* for *ea* and *ei*. With this reservation, the rule of "*Caol le caol agus leathan le leathan*," is fairly well observed. When *e* stands for *ei*, we generally find an *e* or an *i* inserted after the consonant which follows. Thus the termination *-each* and *-eadh* are usually distinguished from *-ach* and *-adh* by the insertion of an *e* or an *i*. Some examples of a distinctly modern spelling are the following: *fiarfaidh*, *peacach*, *feoghaighenn*, *firindeach*, *bochtaineachta breitheamnaí*, *maitheam*. The indifferent use of *t*, *tt*, and *d* is found in the third person plural of verbs, mentioned below, and elsewhere. Similarly *c*, *cc*, and *g* are found where Modern Irish has *g*. The combination *gc*, final, is found in *fergc*, and *leisgc*, (fo 36d, 9 and 19 respectively). Eclipsis is usually indicated in words beginning with vowels, *b* and *d*, and occasionally, *f*. The metathesis of consonants, especially of *c* and *l*, is frequent, as in *fuaíslacadh* (31a, 12) beside *fuaísladh* (31a, 14); *oslaicedh* (31b, 10) *oslacadh* (31c, 12), and *oslaicter* (31c, 11), beside *oscail* (35a, 28). *Espaloid* (37d, 17), shows this common phenomenon in a loan-word. *Ecaílsi* (36b, 3), beside the regular *eclaísi*; *coisrica* (33c, 36), beside *coiserca* (29d, 16; 32d, 27), show a somewhat similar transposition of a liquid.

The verb-forms agree rather closely with the modern paradigms, with some survivals of older forms. In the present indicative, the first person singular in *-im*, *-aim*, is very frequent. The second person, ending in *-ir*, occurs perhaps once, in *fechair*, (29d, 5); but per-

haps this should be read as a passive form *fechar* or *fechtar*. There seems to be a rare instance of the old ending in -i in *faici*, (33a, 27). In the third person are found the short forms *tic*, (*ticc*), *ric*, *tét*, (*teitt*), *do-ni*, *adeir*, and *do-beir* (more frequently *do-bir*); and also the long forms, like *beirid*, *mairid*, (-*idh*). In the two forms *cruadaighi* and *intaighi*, -*dh* has not been written. In the first person plural we find *dligmit* and *dlighomitt* side by side. The various spellings of the termination of the second person are shown by *faicidi*, *fetaidhi*, *teighti*, and *ataithi*. The third person has most frequently -*itt*, with -*at*, -*it*, (-*ait*), -*att*, and -*id* next in order of frequency. In the passive, -*ar* is found in *do-berar*, *abarak*, *aderar* and *dlegar*, (and possibly *fechar*). Elsewhere -*tar* and -*ter* are found. The relative form ends in -*us*, (mostly abbreviated), but also in -*as*, -*es*, and -*is*. The habitual form in -*ann* and -*enn* is frequent, but is not found in the so-called irregular verbs. The following appear to be present subjunctive forms: *nó co ndenaim*, *gen co mbim*, *nó co n-ícair*, *acht co n-indisir*, *da coim-línair*, *da cuimnidi*[*dh*] and the passive *índus nach scaílter*, showing the same endings as the indicative for the three persons of the singular number.

In the imperfect we have -*ad* or -*ed* as the termination of the 3rd s., except in *bíd* and *níd*, which represent the modern forms *bíodh* and *gníodh*. In the 1st pl. *leanmais* occurs, and in the 3rd pl., *tairrngidis*. The forms *fétaind*, (1st. s.), *tucta*, and *cuim-nightea*, (2nd s.), and *dendais*, (3rd pl.), are probably subjunctive, but the endings agree with those of the indicative. In the passive voice, out of fourteen examples, eleven end in -*i*, as *ardaighi*, and three in -*e*, as *cruindidhe*. But seven have *t* or *th* inserted, as *tinoilti*, and three of these have a long ending in -*idi*, -*ide*, or -*idhi*, as *curtaidi*, *estide*, *derntaidhi*.

In the preterite, besides forms like *adubart*, *tanac*, *derna*, the endings of the first singular are -*us* and -*es* (- *eas*). For the 2nd s., we have -*is* and -*ais*. The plural has -*mar*, -*bar*, and -*dar*, (-*tar*, -*ttar*). In the third person, nineteen cases out of twenty-six show -*dar*, and six cases -*tar*. In the verb *do-gnám*, we find 1st s., *rindes* and *ronus*; 3rd s., *rindi*, *rinde*, *roine* and *roinne*; 3rd pl., *rindetar*. The passive voice has -*edh* and -*adh*, the aspiration being indicated in the majority of cases. The verb *do-gnám* has the form *ronad* in the passive.

In the future, besides *ader* and *do-bér*, *bett* and *cuimneochat* are

found in the first person singular. In the 2nd s., *do-gebair* is found, all the rest having *-fir*, *-fair*, except denominatives like *fíarfócair* and *cuimneochair*. In the 3rd s., we have *do-geba*, *béraidh* and *goidfidhi*. The 3rd pl. appears in *do-gebatt*, *tiucfatt*, and *teisteochait*. The passive occurs twice, in *slaineocar* and *cuirfer*.

In the conditional the ending of the first person singular is *-find* or *-faind*. In the 2nd s., we have *coimetfa* and *dlighfedhte*. The 3rd s. ends in *-fadh*, *-fedh*, except when the preceding vowel is lengthened, where it ends in *-adh* (*-ad*). In the 1st pl. we find *creitfimis* and *bemaís*. The passive has *-fidhe* *-faidhti*, once each, and twice *-thaidhi* after vowel-lengthening.

The following forms of the copula and verbum existentiae are found: Pres. Indic., 1st s., *ataim*, *ní fuilim*; 3rd s., *atá*, *má tá*, *ní* (*nach*, *ar-a*, etc.) *fuil*, *muna bfuil*, *gurab* (*curab*), *cid-b*, *ler-b*, *le-n-a-b*, *in-a-b*, *ní* (*nach*) *bí*, *ní bía*, (once only); *mad*, *mas masa*, *ó-sa*; 2nd pl., *ataithi*; 3rd pl., *atat* (four times), *atait* (twice), *ó tát*, *nach* (*co*) *fuilitt*, *co mbitt*. Relative form, *bías*, *bís*. Present Subjunctive, 3rd s., *na-rab*, *muna-rab*, *da-rab*, *co-ró* (?), *co mbía*, *da mbía*; *co-ma* and *da-ma* may be either pres. subj. or conditional. Imperfect, 3rd s., *roibi*, *roibe*, *raibi*, *bíd*. Preterite, 3rd s., *bí*; 3rd pl., *batar*. Future, 1st s., *bett*. Conditional, 3rd s., *be[i]th*, *do bo*, *do-b*, *do bod*, *ní* (*mar*) *bud*, *ní budh*; 1st pl. *bemaís*. No passive (autonomous) forms appear in this text.

INDEX VERBORUM RARIORUM.

- aigéit*, 32a, 7, *vinegar*; g. s. *aigéte*, 33b, 17.
ainmfesacha, 37c, 27, = *ainbhfesacha*, *ignorant*.
aithfirindaib, 37c, 32, = *aifirindaib*, *Masses*.
an, 33a, 26 *to repeat* *da*(?),—*da cuimnidi*[dh] *sé césad* Christ
 7 *an faici* . . . *riut*; or = O. Ir. *an*, *when*, *while* (?).
anmaind, 37c, 30, = *anbhfainn*, *weak*.
anmfandugad, 32b, 27, = *anbhfundugad*, *weakening*.
anmuain, 31a, 4, = *anbhuaín*, *for anbhuaíne*, *anxiety*, *solicitude*.
anaid, 30b, 7, = *ioná*, *than*.
anas, 34b, 32, = *ioná*, *than*.
baindi, 33a, 13, *stream*, *spurt* (of blood), Mod. Ir. *buinne*.
beus, 36c, 12, *further*.
broitti, 31a, 18, *for broidhdi*, *captives*.

- cair, 37a, 26, *fault, ein*;—do na hocht cairib collaidhi (?)
 catærib, 37a, 6, *for cathaisib (caithrisib), vigils.*
 cerrmach, 30c, 21, = cearrbhach, *a professional gambler.*
 colibar, 29b, 33, *a serpent, L. coluber.*
 co-ró, 29d, 31, *for co-robh, till it is (?)*.
 cosaidech, 36c, 1, = casaoideach, *complaining.*
 cosaird, 36a, 4, *openly, publicly, (= co-ós-árd?)*
 deimbrig, 35a, 2, = dímbriigh, *weakness.*
 deiscribidech, 35d, 6, *discreet.*
 deiscribidi, 35d, 6,—is í is deiscribidi di, *discretion consists in this*; 31d, 9, deiscribidi ana spiradaib, *discernment of spirits*; 31d, 12, a sáirsi deiscribidi, *freely according to discretion.*
 deisdingtio, 35b, 30, *testinzione, 35b, 32, L. distinctio.*
 derlaitech, 31d, 13, *beneficent, bounteous, free.*
 domblas aói, 32a, 8, d. æi, 33b, 17, *gall.*
 druith, 37a, 12, *lustful.*
 eritice, 29c, 22, pl. -i, 29b, 14, *a heretic.*
 espalóid, 37d, 17, *for apsalóid, L. absolutio.*
 fæisidi, reg. gen; but dat. 36c, 8, and acc. 36c, 16. The usual dat. and acc. form is fæisidin.
 fidar, 30c, 17, *appearance, show*; fidair, 33c, 37, *type, figure*; figar, 32a, 24, fidar, 32a, 25, *image*; figar, 30a, 13, *manner.*
 fidrach, 30a, 29, cf. fiodradh, *written testimony, (O'R), (the Gospel).*
 foibred, 32c, 16, pret. pass. of fóbairim, *attack, assail.*
 fuidir, 36a, 25, *gain, profit, advantage, (O'R).*
 grasa, 29d, 28; 35a, 38; b, 21, *reward.*
 innugadh, 29b, 27, *contending.*
 inaitt, 37b, 37, inait, 37a, 21, = ná, *nor; elsewhere always na.*
 inellus, 33d, 33, *security, safety.*
 inill, 30a, 19, *secure.*
 insealmus, 33c, 31, *perh. for Anselmus (?)*
 lactuca, 30a, 7, *chicory, Late L. lactucella (Du Cange).*
 leth-fiadni, 37c, 6, *false witness.*
 a leth re dia, 37b, 5, *on the side of God, as pertains to God.*
 lietauaire, 29d, 17; 33c, 12, *remedy, L. electuarium.*
 mád, 35c, 1, 36a, 32, = má-s.
 maindechtaidhi, 37b, 20, 36c, 21, *negligence.*
 masa, 36a, 4, = má-s.

mas-seadh, *freq. for ma-s-eadh*, which also occurs.

mead, 30c, 1, dat. meidh, 32a, 22, *scales, weighing*.

medhaighecht, 30d, 27, *measurement, weight*.

co midingmala, usually *unworthily*, but in 37c, 12; d, 2, *infrequently, inconstantly*.

na, always for ioná, *than*, except *anaid* and *anas* (once each).

na, always for ná, *nor*, except *inait* and *inaitt* (once each).

neimfní, 34a, 21, = neimhní, *nothing*.

righed, 33a, 34, *lacerating, crucifixion*.

ruaimred, 33c, 22, pret. pass. of ruamharaim, *dig, pierce*.

seilegar, 33b, 19, *spittle*.

seirgi, 34d, 1, *charity, hospitality*, (abstr. from séireach).

simind, 36b, 23, 25, *a rush, reed*.

slanícid[e], 32c, 33, *Savior*.

snimchi, 37a, 28, *grief*.

sroll, 30a, 28, 31, *linen*, (L. *byssus*, Ir. Gl. 577).

subachus, 29b, 24, *possibly to be read subacilius, for subailceas, (in the sense of subailchi, power, virtue?)*

subailchi, 31d, 6,—grasa na subailchi, *lege slanaighti(?)*, *graces of healing*.

suibiscelaidhe, 33b, 29, *Evangelist*.

teagais, 34c, 37, *mansion, habitation*.

teigim, 37c, 36, *I warm, cherish, foster*.

toícti, 34c, 35, *for toicthi, or toicci, wealth*.

uarbarta, (urbarta?), 33d, 25, 26, cf. airbert, (Kuno Meyer, Contrib.) *dwelling*.

JAMES A. GEARY.

CORRIGENDA.

P. 178, l. 10, *for mar-tanaig, read martanaig*.

P. 182, l. 6, *for adeirtheidhi, read aderthaidhi*.

P. 182, ll. 27, 29, 34, *for cathraig, read cathair*.

P. 270, l. 37, *for gebann, read geba*.

P. 272, l. 1, *for nderntadhi, read nderntaidhi*.

P. 270, l. 35, *for meic, read muintire, and delete the note*.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Visiting Committee. The Visiting Committee consisting of Cardinal Farley, Archbishop Glennon of St. Louis, Bishop Harkins of Providence, Mr. Walter George Smith of Philadelphia and the Rector of the University, have completed their annual visit and prepared the questions to be discussed at the Meeting of the Board of Trustees, April 17.

Forthcoming Publication. Professor Joseph Dunn, Professor of Celtic languages and literatures, is preparing for publication a translation of the famous Irish Epic, the "Cooley Cattle Raid" (*Tain Bo Cualgne*). This is the longest and the most original composition of the Old-Irish epic cycle and probably the oldest epic tale of Western Europe. In spite of the interest which it possesses on this account and in spite of its importance in the study of comparative literature it has not yet received nearly so much attention as has been given to other primitive poems, the Norse sagas, for example. Dr. Dunn aims at giving a thoroughly reliable translation for the benefit of scholars who are not able to make use of the Old-Irish original.

Lecture on Pragmatism. On Saturday, April 20, Rev. Dr. Turner, Professor of the History of Philosophy, lectured to the students of the Sacred Heart Academy, Manhattanville, New York, on "Pragmatism, the Newest Philosophy."

Knights of Columbus. Preparations have already been begun at the University to entertain the visiting Knights of Columbus who are expected in Washington, June 8, for the ceremony of unveiling the statue of Christopher Columbus. The latest official report states that of the \$500,000 to be collected for the "Knights of Columbus Endowment Fund"

\$400,000 has already been received. The full amount will be collected, it is hoped, by October of this year and will then be invested for the benefit of the University.

Meeting of the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees at their semi-annual meeting held April 17 approved the plan submitted to them by the University for the voluntary affiliation of Catholic High Schools and Colleges throughout the country. They also approved the completion of Gibbons Hall at a total estimated cost of \$240,000. The entire Hall will be ready for occupancy by October 1.

Shahan Debating Society. One of the most interesting meetings of the year was held by the Shahan Debating Society on Thursday evening, April 18th. There was a large number present to hear the debate which was:—*Resolved:* That Governor Harmon of Ohio is better fitted to accept the presidential nomination than Champ Clark. The large attendance was due no doubt to the superior powers of the debaters, Mr. William C. Walsh, of Cumberland, Md., for the affirmative and Mr. Robert Silk, of Memphis, Tenn., for the negative. From the arguments presented by the speakers it was apparent that their papers had been carefully prepared. The members present decided by vote of twenty-six to twenty-four that Governor Harmon was the better fitted to accept the nomination. Mr. John Russell of Waterbury, Conn., spoke in favor of Champ Clark's candidacy. A challenge was read and accepted from the Leo XIII Lyceum to a joint debate to take place about the first of May. Dr. Paul Gleis, professor of German, was present at the meeting and gave the members an interesting talk on the benefits of modern language. Dr. Hemelt, associate professor of English, spoke at length on "Constructive criticism." Mr. Daniel Cronin of Glens Falls, N. Y., gave the critic's report and at the close of the meeting Rev. J. L. Tierney, representing the Rector of the University, commended the society for the work that had been done during the past year.

Freshmen Dance. A very delightful dancing party was given by the Freshman Class of the Catholic University at Washington, D. C., on the evening of Wednesday, April 17, in the University Auditorium. The affair was one of the prettiest of its kind ever given by the University students, and great credit is due the Class of 1915 for the successful promotion of their first College event. The hall was tastily decorated under the able supervision of Wm. J. Ryan, Dover, N. J., Chairman of the Decorating Committee, and presented a charming appearance. The walls were adorned with college pennants of every color, the beams and lights were draped with the class colors of green and white, and this with the many flowers and palms added a distinctive color scheme to the huge hall which was typically collegian. Over 60 couples participated in the event, which takes front rank in the social functions held during the year in the University life of Washington.

Among the Patronesses were: Mrs. P. J. Lennox, Mrs. A. E. Landry, Mrs. F. K. Merriman, Mrs. C. H. McCarthy, Mrs. C. F. Borden, and Mrs. Vincent L. Toomey. The guests included in their number: Rt. Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the University, Rev. Dr. George A. Dougherty, Vice-Rector, Rev. Dr. John Spensley, Rev. Fr. Tierney, Mr. C. F. Borden, Registrar, and Dr. Carrigan, Dean of the Law School.

Lectures on the Peace Movement. A course of lectures entitled "The Constructive Peace Movement," based upon the Pontifical letter of June 11, 1911, of His Holiness Pope Pius X, addressed to the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, His Eminence Cardinal Falconio, was begun April 23rd, 1912, at 4.30 p. m., in McMahon Hall.

The lectures specially prepared for this occasion will be delivered by the Honorable James Brown Scott, Technical Delegate of the United States to the Second Hague Peace Conference, Counsel of the United States in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, and Professor of International Law, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

Tuesday, April 23rd, 4.30 P. M.	Saturday, May 4th, 4.30 P. M.
Thursday, April 25th, 4.30 P. M.	Tuesday, May 7th, 4.30 P. M.
Tuesday, April 30th, 4.30 P. M.	Wednesday, May 8th, 4.30 P. M.
Wednesday, May 1st, 4.30 P. M.	Thursday, May 9th, 4.30 P. M.
Thursday, May 2nd, 4.30 P. M.	Friday, May 10th, 4.30 P. M.
Friday, May 3rd, 4.30 P. M.	Saturday, May 11th, 4.30 P. M.

These lectures will present in historical and analytical form the various projects which have been proposed to remove the causes of war, to maintain and to bring about international peace, thus making a logical commentary upon the Pontifical Brief and indicating the means by which its purposes may be realized.



The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII.

June, 1912.

No. 6.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

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THE PERSONALITY OF ST. CLARE.

In view of the seventh centenary of the Poor Clares which occurs this year, the history of St. Clare is being made the subject of fresh researches by students of the Franciscan Legend. Although those who venture upon this well-trodden field in the hope that therein they may unearth some new material incur considerable risk of failure, yet the discovery of any document which did but wrest a fact or two more from the past about this most elusive of the Saints would be a distinct asset. For I think all whose opinion is worth noticing will grant that if the life story of St. Clare is in some respects one of the most interesting and inspiring in medieval history it is, at the same time, one of the most perplexing.¹ Large as her figure looms in the Franciscan legend, the personality behind it remains vague and shadowy. Indeed the annals of the Order are full of other lives that, less outstanding, are yet better known to us than that of St. Clare. This however, is partly accounted for by the fact that not all the contemporary records bearing upon her life have come down to us. We can only lament the silence of history concerning these records. Without doubt some of them perished along with other early Franciscan documents as a result of the decree

¹ See Lucien Roure: "Sainte Claire d'Assise" in *Etudes* (Paris, 1910); t. CXXIV, pp. 297-316.

of the Chapter General of the Friars Minor in 1266.² Others disappeared during times of warfare when the monasteries of the Clares were sacked and the nuns dispersed. However this may be, Prof. Vincenzo Locatelli made a fruitless search for these missing documents more than half a century ago.³ My own recent efforts to gain any clue to their whereabouts, if they still exist, have been equally unsuccessful.⁴

In default of additional material being brought to light it is impracticable to give anything more than a general sketch of the life of St. Clare. All the information we have about her derives from three principal sources, namely:—I. The Saint's own writings. II. Some Pontifical documents bearing upon her life. III. A contemporary Legend or biography written soon after her death.⁵ Unhappily we are far from possessing anything like all the writings of St. Clare. Only very few of her letters have escaped the ravages of time; only five in fact. While no one would venture to hold up these letters as models of classical Latinity, yet they witness to the readiness with which the Saint wrote and, what is more important, they bear the impress of her rare personality. They possess, therefore, an interest above the purely historical—the

² The text of the Decree in question is as follows: "Praecipit Generale Capitulum per obedientiam quod omnes legendae de beato Francisco olim factae deleantur et, ubi inveniri poterunt extra ordinem, ipsas fratres studeant amovere," etc. See Ehrle: "Die ältesten Redactionen der Generalconstitutionen des Franziskanerordens" in *Archiv. für Litt. und Kirchengeschichte* (1892), p. 39; also Little: "Decrees of the Chapters General of the Friars Minor 1260-1282" in *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, t. XIII, pp. 704-8. On the effect of this edict see Van Ortoy, in *Anal. Boll.*, t. XVIII, p. 174; Lemmens, *Doc. Ant. Franciscana*, pars II, p. 11; Ed. d'Alençon in *Etudes Franciscaines*, t. I, p. 656; and Faloci in *Misc. Franc.*, t. VII, p. 159.

³ Cf. Locatelli: *Vita di S. Chiara* (Assisi, 1854), p. 131.

⁴ Cf. *Arch. Franc. Hist.*, t. I (1908), pp. 413-432, and my "Life of St. Clare" (1910), pp. xvi-xx.

⁵ In addition to these Sources, properly so called, there is a certain number of later works of secondary importance referring to the life of St. Clare. The writers of these works borrowed freely from the earlier ones, making additions or omissions at pleasure. The fact that they sometimes had access to original documents which have not come down to us gives their work a value it would not otherwise possess, but they do not add anything essential to the main lines of the story of St. Clare.

interest called human.⁶ The same is true to a certain extent of the Testament ascribed to St. Clare and which is in some sort the complement of her letters. This document is historically so important that I lately attempted to open up the question of its authenticity.⁷ The views I ventured to express on this subject have called forth not a little comment, and the point to which most of this comment has been directed is that I sought to defend on intrinsic grounds the authenticity of the Testament ascribed to St. Clare. It is quite impossible here to enter at any length into the question of the genuineness of this document since the points at issue are too technical for concise treatment. I shall therefore content myself by remarking that, owing to the obscurity which surrounds the earliest text of the Testament we possess, it is very difficult to adduce any extrinsic arguments in its favor. Indeed, the main reason why its authenticity has been questioned is that it did not become generally known until the middle of the sixteenth century.⁸ But it may well be the case, as a recent writer remarks, that the late appearance of the Testament of St. Clare is due to the fact "that the majority of the Clares were Urbanists living under dispensations from the Rule of Most High Poverty, and that many Clares even of the Strict Observance were under the guidance of Conventuals to whom the doctrine was decidedly unacceptable."⁹ Herein perhaps is matter for further enquiry. Meanwhile I am happy to note that the eminent Bollandist Fr. Van Ortroy, who not so very long ago was decidedly sceptical about the authenticity of this

*The text of St. Clare's letters to Princess Agnes of Bohemia is given by the Bollandists, *ASS. Martii* I, pp. 505-507. Unfortunately the originals do not appear to have survived; at all events nothing is known of their whereabouts.

⁷See "The Writings of St. Clare," in *Arch. Francis. Hist.* III (1910), pp. 442-447.

⁸The text seems to have first appeared in the Chronicle of Mark of Lisbon (1556-1562), from which it was put into Latin by Wadding. Both give the same vague source. Cf. Lisbona-Diola, *Croniche degli Ordini di S. Francesco* (Venice, 1585), lib. VIII, p. 213, and Wadding: *Annales ad an.* 1253, n. 5.

⁹Cf. *Saturday Review*, London, July 23, 1910, p. 117.

Testament,¹⁰ has so far modified his views as to endorse the conclusions in favor of it lately advanced by the present writer.¹¹

Besides the writings of St. Clare there are, as we have seen, a certain number of early Bulls bearing upon her life which form the second source of her history. Although these Papal documents are all characterized by the same grayness and lack of literary excitement, yet they throw illuminating side lights upon the origin and evolution of the Rule of the Poor Ladies.¹² But save for the witness they bear to St. Clare's life-long struggle for the "privilege" of Most High Poverty, they tell us nothing directly of Clare the woman. Nor does the contemporary Legend which forms the third source of her history give anything like an adequate presentation of her personality.¹³ There is about it a want of visualization which brings a feeling of disappointment; we might reasonably have expected much more in view of the sources of information then within reach. Happily we are not now called upon to determine the question of the authorship of this Legend, but the modern attribution of it to Thomas of Celano is probably correct, though it cannot yet be scientifically proved as Goetz wisely reminds us.¹⁴ Perhaps it is well to recall that Papini, after concluding in 1822 for the Celanensian authorship of the Legend,¹⁵ afterwards retracted this opinion.¹⁶ M. Sabatier,

¹⁰ See *Analecta Bollandiana*, t. xxii, p. 360.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, t. xxx, p. 490-491.

¹² They are given by Sbaralea: *Bull. Fran.* I and II *passim* and form the basis of an article on the Rule of St. Clare by the present writer in the *Ecclesiastical Review*, April, 1912, p. 398-414.

¹³ This Legend has recently been edited by Prof. Pennacchi. Cf. *Legenda S. Clarae Virginis* tratta dal mss. 338 della Bibl. Comunale de Assisi; Tip. Metastasio, 1910. There is an English translation by the present writer made from the same codex—"The Life of St. Clare" (Philadelphia, 1910).

¹⁴ Cf. *Die Quellen*, etc. (Gotha, 1904), pp. 240-243. Jørgensen tells us—on what authority, it is impossible to discover—that the Legend of St. Clare was written by Messer Bartholomew, Bishop of Spoleto, in collaboration with Brother Leo and Brother Angelo of Rieti, and revised by Thomas of Celano. See his "S. Francis of Assisi," translated by T. O'Connor Sloane (Longmans, 1912), p. 123.

¹⁵ *Notizie Sicure*, etc. (Ed. Florence, 1822), p. 137.

¹⁶ *Storia di S. Francesco* (Foligno, 1827), lib. II, p. 236.

who favors the claims of Thomas of Celano, on the strength of Papini's earlier opinion,¹⁷ has apparently quite overlooked the subsequent retraction of the great Conventual critic; nor is there any Latin codex in the Laurenziana Library of the kind the French writer mentions. As for the Magliabecchian ms. of which the Prologue, published by Cozza-Luzi,¹⁸ ascribes our Legend to Thomas of Celano, this codex is, in all likelihood, the work of a seventeenth century scribe, as I have elsewhere shown.¹⁹

But even if Thomas of Celano wrote this Legend of St. Clare—a point not yet satisfactorily cleared up—its lack of symmetry and patchwork character go to show that it is a composite work. The compiler found various accounts to hand and these he put together, worked over and welded into one. This fact is borne in upon the observant reader by the feeling that he cannot find the St. Clare he meets in one page moving about in the events described in another. And further the figure of the real St. Clare of which we get a glimpse in some incidents is completely lost sight of throughout whole chapters amid the conventional commonplaces of mediæval hagiography. For, in common with most of the hagiographical records of the Middle Ages, the present Legend is strangely silent about what might be termed the personal side of the Saint's life. Very few facts of merely biographical interest light up its pages; the exquisitely human and instinctive side of St. Clare's character is almost overlooked—as if St. Clare was not a woman as well as a Saint; the more a Saint because so much a woman.

Taken as a whole then, the limited number of documents at our disposal for the life of St. Clare are not intimate enough to make her live as St. Francis lives in the pages of his biographers. At best they are scrappy with long silences and deep *lacunæ*. To realize this let anyone try to trace even the main lines in the history of St. Clare from the cradle to the grave by the light of these documents, and it will soon

¹⁷ *Spec. Perf.*, p. lxxv.

¹⁸ *Chiara di Assisi secondo alcune nuove scoperte*, ecc. (Rome, 1895).

¹⁹ *Arch. Francis. Hist.* III (1910), p. 447.

appear how unilluminating they are about many points on which we most need enlightenment. At the outset we are met with the difficulty that no information is available as to the parents of St. Clare. Her contemporary biographer was so far preoccupied with the splendor that radiated from her sanctity that he did not concern himself about her family. According to the account generally given, Clare was a daughter of Count Favorino Scifi, an Assisian noble. We are not able to verify this by documents. It would, however, be very short-sighted for that reason alone to dismiss such a tradition as of no historical value, although it must be admitted that the exaggerations of later biographers of the Saint based upon it deserve to awaken suspicion. Beyond doubt Clare was of noble lineage,²⁰ but the most ardent out-and-out defender of local traditions will probably admit that no great reliance can be placed upon the elaborate pedigree of St. Clare furnished by Père de Chérancé²¹ and others. Again it is impossible to discover the exact date of the Saint's birth; the year 1194, which is usually fixed on, is guesswork but good guesswork and probably correct. We cannot help feeling that the marvels which are recorded to have attended Clare's birth are leading up, however remotely, to her canonization. Certain it is that she was suckled on piety by her saintly mother Hortulana, and that the precocious child assimilated not a little of the atmosphere of religion in which she was brought up. It is a pretty picture, that of the tiny maid counting out her childish prayers by means of a heap of pebbles and depriving herself of delicacies that she might send them out secretly to the orphans. Naturally a child like that would grow up into something unusual. And so she did. Her father wished to make a fine match for his daughter, but her meeting with St. Francis changed the outlook of her life and turned it to a serious and set purpose. And the change gave fixity to her natural enthusiasm and courage. Had events not thrown her in relation with the *Poverello*, Clare

²⁰ See *Chron. xxiv Gen. in Anal. Fran.* III, p. 48: "Frater Rufinus Cipii . . . de nobilioribus civibus Assisi, consanguineus S. Clarae, etc."

²¹ *Sainte Claire d'Assise* (Paris, 1902), p. 9.

would not have become an historical character. As it is, the main thread of her life begins with that meeting, which took place during the Lent of 1212 when she was about eighteen. From that time forth her story, in so far as we are able to reconstruct it, takes on not a little the character of romance. A romance it was in a way from the day she first heard St. Francis preach, through varying scenes until forty-one years later she was laid to rest in the very chapel where his sermons had brought about her "conversion." Perhaps the picture that will live longest in the memory of those who have followed St. Clare's life through those four decades will be that of the young girl's midnight flight from her father's house to an unknown future—which was destined to result in the foundation of the Poor Clares. There is nothing else quite like it in the Lives of the Saints.

Clare seemed at once to spring into spiritual maturity. By far the most attractive pages in her Legend are those in which we read of the beginnings of her religious life. For in the events of St. Clare's life up to her installation at S. Damiano, we feel more or less in touch with the woman. Later she seems to die slowly out of the pages of her contemporary biographer in the hands of its author. This is owing, perhaps, to the fact that to outward seeming her life was similar to that led by the other nuns at S. Damiano and that it presented few striking features to the eye of the world. Once only is she said to have quitted her monastery and that was to eat with St. Francis and his companions at the Porziuncola, when the two Saints were so rapt in things divine that an unearthly light shone round the little company at their untasted repast. Because I ventured to express the opinion that the charming chapter in the *Actus Fioretti*²² which records this incident was wholly devoid of historical foundation,²³ I have laid myself open to attack from various quarters. "Father Paschal Robinson goes too far," says Professor Little, "in declaring the

²² Cf. *Actus XV Fioretti XIV*; also *Liber Conformit.* (Ed. Quaracchi), *Anal. Fran.* iv, p. 353.

²³ Cf. Robinson: *Life of St. Clare* (1910), p. 127.

Portiuncula story wholly devoid of historical foundation." ²⁴ Be it so. I do not mean to argue the point now; I hope to return to it before long in another place and at some length. Meanwhile the anonymous editor of a recent volume entitled "St. Clare and Her Order" has remarked something to the effect, if I mistake not, that I have been more cautious than courageous in rejecting this incident, and implies that I was led to do so because it involves a breach of the *clausura* at S. Damiano.²⁵ In answer to this criticism it must suffice to say that, far from being worried by any fear of such a breach, the existence of the law of enclosure never even occurred to me in this connection, for the simple reason that my own researches in this matter, whatever they may be worth, have convinced me that it is well-nigh impossible to say whether or not definitive enclosure had yet been imposed upon the Clares at the time the repast at the Porziuncola is supposed to have taken place. An adequate conception of the difficulties surrounding the whole question can only be had from a careful study of the original documents bearing upon it. Might I venture to add that the study of these documents is much to be recommended as a corrective to limited views and one-sided enthusiasm. So far as concerns the incident narrated in the *Fioretti*, it is entirely true to the Franciscan Spirit and is redolent of the true *Umbria Mystica*, as I have elsewhere insisted.²⁶ It is far otherwise, however, with the so-called "legend of the roses" which the editor of "St. Clare and Her Order" has borrowed from Mrs. De Selincourt's "Homes of the First Franciscans."²⁷ With this sort of sentimental nonsense we have no truce.

But to return to what more immediately concerns our present purpose, St. Clare appears on the scene in another chapter of the *Fioretti*, where we find her counselling St. Francis to con-

²⁴ *English Historical Review*, No. C (October, 1910), p. 766.

²⁵ See *St. Clare and Her Order*, edited by the author of "The Enclosed Nun." (London: Mills and Boon Ltd., 1912), p. 22 ff.

²⁶ In the article on "St. Clare" in *Franciscan Essays* (1912), p. 38.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

tinue his mission to the people rather than to devote himself to a life of contemplation.²⁸ We get fortunately some other few glimpses of her in some of the early documents concerning St. Francis. Thus for instance, the *Speculum Perfectionis* tells us how Clare built a little hut of reeds in the garden at S. Damiano for St. Francis during his last visit there,²⁹ and Thomas of Celano describes her grief over the dead body of the *Poverello*.³⁰ But after rare glimpses such as these the figure of St. Clare drops entirely out of view, only to emerge into beauty and vitality in 1228 when Gregory IX came to Assisi for the canonization of St. Francis. The venerable Pontiff visited S. Damiano and pressed St. Clare to make some provision for the unforeseen wants of her community. "If it be thy vow that hindreth thee," said the Pope, "we dispense thee from it." "Holy Father," was Clare's reply, "absolve me from my sins if thou wilt, but I desire not to be absolved from following Christ forever." This interview discloses the moral strength and earnestness of the woman which underlay all she did and which gave her a striking personality and character of her own.

The Saint's contemporary biographer has put on record another incident which also goes to show that she was the most independent yet most submissive of women. It seems that Gregory IX forbade any of the friars to visit the monasteries of the Clares or preach there without his permission, whereupon St. Clare at once sent away even the brother questors who provided bodily sustenance for her community, saying: "He might as well take all the friars from us now that he has taken those who furnished us with the food of the soul."

We see, too, in Clare's repulse of the Saracen archers of Frederick II. who had sought to force an entry into S. Damiano, what mettle her heart was made of. In her conduct on that occasion there was the quiet heroism, quite devoid of any

²⁸ Cf. *Fioretti* xv; also Bonaventure, *Legenda Major* (Ed. Quaracchi), XII, 2.

²⁹ *Spec. Perf.* (Ed. Sabatier), p. xxxv.

³⁰ II Celano, II (Ed. d'Alençon), 10.

feminine fussiness, which imposes itself upon men and women alike and creates an atmosphere. Nor was that the first time Clare had faced armed men without flinching and had routed them. Of weak health, always in pain, she lived upon her spirit, the courage of which was indestructible. Witness her long struggle under every possible disadvantage for the "Privilege" of Most High Poverty. The story of that struggle is a revelation in character as beautiful as it is pathetic. But we may not dwell upon it now. Enough to recall how the gentle Abbess, who "out of weakness was made strong," held steadfastly to her way, unwearied and fearless, never swerving from the path St. Francis had marked out for her. The sense that she was called on to uphold his ideals gave to her character an indomitableness, a calm determination, a still enthusiasm, a sheer defiance of all hindrances that never left her to the end. And in the end she got all she wanted because she would not take a nay, and because before getting or giving anything she gave first and wholly herself.

It has been said that only a man could have understood and appreciated Clare and, for this reason, that from some points of view she may be said to have had a man's heart in a woman's breast. Be this as it may, other aspects of her life show that the man's heart in the woman's breast had something also of the woman's heart about it. Her letters to the Princess Agnes of Bohemia and what we know of her relations with the community of S. Damiano strengthened this view of her, for in them she is revealed as the most affectionate of friends and the tenderest of guides. It was not a life of visionary or speculative meditation that she taught her nuns to pursue, but one of activity and operative occupation. She herself set the example and even in her last illness had herself propped up in bed so that she might be able to keep on spinning fine altar linen for the poor churches of the Umbrian countryside. Assuredly then Clare merits a high place among the heroines of suffering and of service. In the best sense of the word she was a valiant woman. That all through. No characteristic is more strikingly marked in her life than her fortitude; even

on her death bed she strengthened in the service of Christ all who came to her. For one and all she had a word of encouragement. Thus, once when Cardinal Rainaldo was exhorting her to patience during an access of suffering, Clare said: "Believe me, dearest brother, that ever since the day I received the grace of vocation from our Lord through his servant Francis, no suffering hath troubled me, no penance been too hard, no infirmity too great." Up to the end she clung with pathetic devotion to the memory of St. Francis which had scored itself indelibly on the tablets of her very soul.

Something of the old charm, which is singularly absent in other chapters, comes back in the closing pages of Clare's contemporary Legend, which tell us of the presence at her death-bed of Leo, Angelo and Juniper, three of the favorite early companions of the *Poverello*. Only one who was present could have furnished the intimate details recorded of Clare's last days. It may easily be that we owe them to Leo, who was a lifelong friend of Clare, and who was said to have collaborated to some extent in writing her life. Had Leo's writings come down to us in their entirety, they might furnish materials for a more complete picture of St. Clare than we now possess. As it is, only a partial view of her is obtained. It is needless to say that any biographies of the Saint which seek to supply what is wanting by drawing on late sources of doubtful origin only serve to increase the obscurity which hangs over so much of the life of St. Clare.

It seems desirable in conclusion to add a word as to the personal appearance of St. Clare. What manner of woman was she to look upon? In connection with this question a writer in the *Athenæum* apropos of Miss Gurney Salter's admirable volume: "Franciscan Legends in Italian Art," has this to say: "In discussing St. Clare and giving pictures of her in youth and age, the writer does not seem to allude to the fact that we have an unquestionable check upon them as her body is intact and the shape of her face absolutely preserved."³¹ Unfortunately for this assertion the facts do not

³¹ *Athenæum*, No. 4090 (March 17, 1906), p. 335.

bear it out. For it will hardly be pretended by anyone who has had an opportunity to venerate the mortal remains of St. Clare, that "her body is intact and the shape of her face absolutely preserved."³² In point of fact the mummy-like skeleton of the Saint enshrined in the crypt of S. Chiara at Assisi affords us only the very haziest idea of what St. Clare looked like in the days of her flesh. Assuredly it has nothing or next to nothing in common with the pen picture of St. Clare which an early chronicler has left us. "Her face was oval," he says, "her forehead spacious, her complexion brilliant and hair very fair. A celestial smile played in her eyes and around her mouth; her nose was well proportioned and slightly aquiline; of good stature, she was rather inclined to stoutness but not to excess."

We may take it for granted I suppose that St. Clare was never painted in her lifetime. The oldest known picture of her extant is preserved at S. Chiara at Assisi, and hangs in the Chapel dedicated to Clare's younger sister St. Agnes. According to its own inscription this picture dates from 1283, that is about thirty years after the death of St. Clare. It is a full-length figure painted on wood and is mainly in two colors—red and black. Tradition tells us that it is the work of Cimabue. However that may be, the original painting has been retouched not a little and seems somewhat stiff and expressionless.³³ Although the picture is in no way remarkable for beauty yet it has the appearance of being a faithful record;

³² See *Cath. Ency.* iv, 6, St. Clare. And here are the words of one who was present when the Saint's coffin was opened in 1850. "To our pious disappointment, the sweet virgin Saint was not found entire. The skull was perfect, but lay at one side, as if the coffin had been too short, and detached from the bones of the neck. The chest had fallen in and I could not discover many rib bones. On her breast was a laurel branch and a crown of flowers." From a letter of Canon Chadwick of Ushaw to the Poor Clares at Scorton (Eng.), quoted in *The Princess of Poverty* (1900), p. 197.

³³ See *Franciscan Legends in Italian Art* (1905), p. 191. It is a matter of regret that Miss Salter has told us so little about the early pictures of St. Clare. Indeed the monograph of the Saint has never received any but the most cursory treatment.

it is clearly an attempt at individual portraiture—no mere stereotype of a conventional saint. Even if it does not embody the actual features of St. Clare, this ancient picture is the only painting known to us which can lay any claim to be considered a portrait. In it the Saint is portrayed as a tall, middle-aged woman with a thin, worn face; she wears a heavy brown habit and mantle with a black veil, her waist is girt with a thick cord, her feet are bare and she holds a four fold cross in her left hand. The figure of St. Clare is enhanced by a series of small scenes from her Legend painted on either side. Commencing with the lowest panel on the left side they are as follows: (1) St. Clare receives the palm branch from the Bishop of Assisi on Palm Sunday 1212; (2) St. Francis and the friars at the Porziuncola advance to meet her on the night of her flight from her father's house; (3) St. Francis cuts off her hair before the altar; (4) her parents seek to force her to return home. Then, beginning with the highest one on the right side, they continue thus: (5) St. Clare is joined by her sister Agnes; (6) she blesses some loaves at the command of the Pope; (7) death of the Saint; (8) translation of her remains from San Damiano to San Giorgio in Assisi.

It may be well that this ancient picture of St. Clare is an *imagine commemorativa*, painted perhaps from memory under the direction of those who had known her during her lifetime. In any event it is of the utmost value as showing the concept of her formed by a contemporary or almost contemporary painter. And if the likeness was satisfactory to Clare's contemporaries it ought surely to be so to anybody else; still it must be owned that it falls sadly short of our idea of Clare and seems most unsatisfying beside the more charming concepts of later painters of the Sienese and Umbrian schools. But that is another question which, be it ever so interesting, may not be dwelt on here.

FR. PASCIAL ROBINSON, O. F. M.

ST. THOMAS OF AQUIN.

Scholastic philosophy is the effort of human reason to think out the truths of nature in conformity with the truth which Revelation has put within our reach. Let us deal, for a moment, with fundamentals, so that later on finer and more subtle matters of definition may be more intelligible. Christians from the beginning were convinced that both in the Old Testament and in the New Dispensation, God has taught mankind various truths which are to be believed on His authority. This body of truth is called revelation, or revealed truth. It is contained in the Bible; for Catholics, it is contained also in the authoritative teaching of the Church in matters of Faith and morals. Besides truth of this kind, there is truth which the human mind itself discovers, the truths of science and of philosophy, in a word, natural truth. These two kinds of truth are the terms of an age-long problem, and it is important to understand them clearly: on the one side revealed truth, revelation, faith, theology; on the other, science, reason, philosophy. Many solutions of the problem are possible and every possible solution has been tried at one time or another.

First, it is possible to deny one term of the problem, and assert that there is no revealed truth, that there is no revelation, that all truth is the truth of reason, that so-called divine truth is man-made and man-given. This is Rationalism, and it was, in effect, adopted by the early Gnostic heretics, who put their own philosophy above the authority of the Church and of the Gospels, though they claimed that that philosophy had come to them by secret transmission as the hidden doctrine of Christ. That is the solution (if solution it may be called, for it really evades the problem as stated) of theological skepticism in every age.

Secondly, it is possible, in practice, at least, to deny the other term of the problem, and say that only revealed truth avails,

that it is enough for any Christian to *believe*, that reasoning will not save his soul, that it will more probably lead him away from God and spiritual truth. This is obscurantist mysticism of the extreme type, and one may doubt whether any sane Christian ever held it, though extravagant statements are to be found which would, literally, bear that interpretation.

Thirdly, most popular of all solutions and most common, I think, among modern philosophers, is to keep the two kinds of truth entirely apart. "Keep your theology out of your philosophy" is the advice we constantly receive. Believe what your Church teaches you, take the Bible, or the lessons of the Sunday-School, or the doctrine that is preached to you from the pulpit, and if you act up to that belief, you are a consistent Christian. But when you study science and philosophy, do so without any regard to what you believe. This policy, if one may so style it, was formulated in medieval times by the Arabian philosophers who justified their attitude towards the Korân and towards philosophy by the principle that "What is true in philosophy may be false in theology, and vice versa."

A fourth solution is that the two kinds of truth must agree, that there cannot be any contradiction between Faith and Reason, between revealed truth and natural truth. This conviction was in the minds of the earliest Christian thinkers. To justify it in regard to pagan philosophy, the only philosophy they knew of, they had recourse to a theory which was ingenious. They said that the same Wisdom of God which had inspired the Scriptures in a supernatural way had inspired the pagan philosophers, especially Plato, in a natural way, so that, in the designs of Providence Plato was a precursor of Christ in things natural, as John the Baptist was in things spiritual. The same thought recommended itself to St. Augustine. But, after him that peculiar phase of the principle disappeared, though the principle itself remained: that reason and revelation must agree. It was out of this that Scholasticism sprang. Scholasticism, then, was inspired in all its efforts by the one purpose, to show the accord that exists between the two orders of truth, between Faith and Reason.

The circumstances amid which Scholasticism arose further determined its understanding of this purpose. The ninth and tenth centuries were busy with the task of arranging and classifying the heritage of the past. They did this by means of logic, or dialectic. That was the only portion of philosophy to which they gave any attention. When, therefore, the eleventh and the following centuries took up the task of showing the harmony of faith and reason they used the means at hand, the dialectic which had been developed in the schools. To show by dialectical reasoning the agreement of natural with supernatural truth was then the programme, so to speak, of the Scholastics. Besides, events which it would too long to describe here, had put Aristotle in the place of Plato, and the character of the times was such that Aristotle responded to their intellectual needs better than Plato would have done. Another trait, therefore, of later Scholasticism, is the adoption of the Aristotelian point of view, an adoption which was almost universal and almost entirely exclusive of the Platonic view.

Of the philosophers whom we have studied so far, Gerbert was a conservator of the past, a teacher content with putting order and meaning into what the past had bequeathed. John the Scot, St. Anselm and Abelard mark different stages in the progress of the Scholastic idea. St. Thomas of Aquin comes at a time when that idea is fully developed, and to him is due the final formulation of it in adequate terminology.

John the Scot taught that theology and philosophy agree to the extent of being one and the same science. He saw no distinction between them; because all true knowledge, even in philosophy, is a matter of divine illumination. We speak of genius as "God-given": he considered that all knowledge is from God, and that without the Light that God sheds on the mind, man would grope in eternal darkness, incapable of seeing anything. Thus John the Scot may be said to have elevated philosophy to the rank of theology.

Abelard did the very opposite of this. He identified the two sciences, but in the opposite direction, by, apparently, at least, bringing theology down to the level of philosophy. He seemed

to acknowledge no truth that reason could not prove, and he placed no limits to the application of dialectic to the highest spiritual truths. On this account he was reprimanded and censured in his own day, although it was the same method, kept within the bounds of moderation, that afterwards was approved.

St. Anselm took the orthodox medieval view of the relation between Faith and reason. But, his understanding of the task of philosophy was partial. Moreover, he failed to give formal, technical expression to his principles of method. One may say of him that he was right as far as he went, but he did not go far enough. What is more important, one may say that, while he took up the weapons of reason in order to fight the battles of Faith, he did not formulate the rules of the contest or determine how far the use of reason was legitimate. Hence, he lived to see the struggle between the dialecticians, who set no bounds to the use of logic, and the mystics, who condemned the use of logic in matters of Faith. For mysticism was a reaction, an inevitable revulsion of Christian feeling, against the recklessness of the rationalists.

St. Thomas came after all these. Of John the Scot he knew nothing, so far as we can now determine. Of Abelard personally he knew very little, but with the method used by Abelard he was quite familiar, and he knew its limitations. He was well read in the mystics, but he realized also that they, like all controversialists, exaggerated. He knew of St. Anselm's argument and of his theory of atonement. But he conceived the task of philosophy in a broader spirit than Anselm did, and laid down very clearly, very definitely and in technical language, which the Christian Church has accepted as final, the principles of method which St. Anselm understood only partially and did not formulate in technical language at all.

Let us then, as briefly as may be, outline this central doctrine of Scholasticism as formulated by St. Thomas. His first principle is that philosophy and theology are distinct sciences. There are, indeed, truths such as the mysteries of Faith, which

belong to theology alone, with which philosophy has nothing to do. There are truths which belong to philosophy alone, such as the rotundity of the earth or the number of material elements, and with these theology does not concern itself. And there are truths which belong to both sciences, such as the existence of God or the immortality of the soul. But, although in regard to this third class of truths the two sciences overlap and share to some extent the same territory, they are always and everywhere distinct, because theology studies truth from the point of view of revelation, and philosophy studies it from the point of view of rational evidence: theology uses the scriptures as authority, philosophy relies on reason alone. This is the first principle, the distinction between Faith and Reason, between revelation and science, between theology and philosophy. It is important to understand it before we go farther. St. Thomas does not identify the two: he does not obliterate the lines which separate them. He does not bring philosophy up to the level of theology, as John the Scot did. Nor does he bring theology down to the level of philosophy, as Abelard did. Each, he says, has its own method, its own source of proof, its own point of view. In philosophy St. Thomas will not use arguments from scripture or from ecclesiastical decisions; when he is discussing the immortality of the soul in philosophy he proceeds as if there were no revelation, as if the Scriptures and the Councils of the Church and the decrees of the Popes did not exist; he argues as Plato or Aristotle would argue, resting all his reasons on the natural evidence for immortality. If, in theology, he renders to God the things that are God's, in philosophy, he renders to reason the things that are reason's. He is not, it need hardly be said, a freethinker. Yet, in philosophy he advocates freedom of discussion and excludes the compulsion of authority. The two sciences are distinct.

The second principle is that they are in complete and perfect harmony with each other. God, says St. Thomas, is the author of all truth, natural as well as supernatural. Not only has He given us a supernatural message in the Bible; He has also given us the Book of Nature, and when we turn over its pages

it is He Who is our Teacher. He put the truth there, He gave us the mind that reads the truth, He illumines the mind so that we may understand. Therefore, all truth is the truth of God. It is impossible that He should contradict Himself. There can, therefore, be no contradiction between truth of the natural order and supernatural truth, between Reason and Faith.

In one sentence, then, we may sum up the first two principles: Revelation and Reason *are distinct, yet not discordant*. There follow now two other principles bearing directly on the question of method. First, Faith aids Reason. As the mystics and St. Augustine said, *Credo ut intelligam*. Faith opens up to us a new world, the supernatural world, which is like the intelligible world of Plato, except that that was a dream, whereas this is a reality. It is a strange world into which Faith introduces us; there are many things in it which we cannot comprehend. And yet it is a logical world, for in it an Intelligent Ruler reigns and the laws of logic apply there as well as elsewhere. Faith thus broadens the horizon of our knowledge, gives new material for thought, throws open new pastures for the mind to feed on, gives larger play to our reasoning faculty, and in this way helps us to understand natural truth. For, if the mind is improved by exercise, if, as we say, it grows by what it feeds on, then the man who believes has a richer, a fuller, a better disciplined and a more resourceful mind to bring to the problems of science than the unbeliever has. Far from cramping or hindering the activity of the human reason, Faith stimulates and strengthens it. Newman has this thought in mind when he says that Faith is "seeing things as God sees them."

The second principle of method is that Reason aids Faith. It aids it in many ways. It proves the credentials of authority on which Faith rests, it answers the objections of unbelievers, removes the apparent contradictions in revealed truth and furnishes analogies and illustrations which make assent easier.

I have taken pains to detail these points of method in the teaching of St. Thomas because I consider that here we have

the heart of scholasticism, and because I believe that the clear formulation of these principles is St. Thomas' greatest achievement. In these principles he crystallized a thought that lay in solution in every Christian philosophy before his time, and in doing that he made clear once for all the truth and the error both of rationalism and of mysticism. Rationalism was right in advocating the use of reason, because reason aids the understanding of spiritual truth, even of supernatural truth; but rationalism erred in setting no limits to the use of reason. Mysticism was right in proclaiming that Faith aids Reason, that he who believes will be better able to understand; but it erred in condemning the use of reason, as if that use were a profanation of spiritual truth or a denial of the authority of God. "Faith is reasonable and reason itself is divine"—these are not the words of St. Thomas, but they express his thought with admirable succinctness. "Faith is reasonable"; therefore it is allowed to apply dialectic to matters of Faith. "Reason is divine," therefore the truth that is above us is part of our spiritual inheritance by Grace, as truth that is around us is our inheritance by nature.

All this sets the medieval Christian attitude in a clear light. But it would be a mistake to imagine that it all belongs to the department of apologetics, and interests only the controversialist on one side or the other. It is of eternal human interest, this attempt to bring unity and harmony into the aspirations of the human spirit. As a recent writer says: "The scholastics were men and so are we. Our humanity is one with theirs. Men are still under the necessity of reflecting upon their own existence and the world without, and still feel the need to reach conclusions and the impulse to formulate consistently what seem to them vital propositions. Herein we are blood kin to Gerbert and Anselm, to Abelard and Hugo of St. Victor, to Thomas Aquinas as well as to Róger Bacon: and our highest nature is one with theirs in the intellectual fellowship of human endeavor to think and present that which shall appease the mind. Because of this kinship with the scholastics, and the sympathy which we feel for the struggle which is the same in

us and in them, their intellectual endeavors, their achieved conclusions, although now appearing as but apt or necessitated phrases, may have for us the immortal interest of the eternal human.”¹ What is of permanent human interest in the principles of method that have just been described is that they represent an attempt of the human mind to achieve harmony and construct a synthesis for which our nature craves. The greatest achievement of the Greeks was their synthetic effort to harmonize matter and spirit, or body and soul. The problem for the scholastics was the same, except that instead of matter and spirit they had to deal with the natural and the supernatural, instead of body and soul, they had as terms of the problem Reason and Faith. That is why St. Thomas was no mere apologist for the Catholic Faith, but a philosopher who claims rank among the very greatest.

There is one more point of method to which I beg to direct your attention for a moment. Everyone knows that the scholastics are accused of undue subservience to authority, and nothing is more frequently met with in histories of philosophy than the assertion that there was no true philosophy in medieval times, because everything was decided by the authority of the teaching Church. It is admitted freely and even gladly that the “first general quality of medieval philosophy” was “deference to authority.” The ninth and tenth centuries deferred to the authority of antiquity. The twelfth and thirteenth century deferred to the authority of the Church, and the thirteenth especially to the authority of Aristotle. But, deference to authority is one thing and undue subservience is another. It was not a scholastic but a mystical opponent of scholasticism who styled philosophy “the handmaid of theology,” and when the scholastics accepted the designation they explained that it should be understood in no unworthy sense. For philosophy has for its task, not to walk behind theology as a trainbearer or a menial servant, but to go before theology and perform the honorable service of bearing the torch to light theology’s foot-

¹ Taylor, *The Medieval Mind*, II, 285.

steps. There were mystics in medieval times who condemned the use of reason. The scholastics, on the contrary, advocated the use of reason, and, far from being unduly subservient to authority, were more in danger of going too far in the advocacy of reason. It should never be forgotten that, while Scholasticism sprang from many tendencies, it was influenced more by rationalism than by mysticism. The justification of all its tremendous activity—for it was tremendous, witness the quantity of its literary output, no matter what we may think of the quality—was the need of exercising the rational faculty. It is a singular instance of historical injustice to accuse the scholastics of subjecting their reason to authority when, in fact, they tried to turn everything, so to speak, into grist for the logical mill of the mind.

Amor che nella mente mi ragiona,

sang Dante at the end of the thirteenth century. Love itself, every spiritual emotion, every sentiment, every experience, every interest, was grasped on its rational side and subjected to the discipline of dialectic. If the critic, instead of saying that the schoolmen did not *think*, said that they *thought too much*, there would be at least a shadow of justice in the accusation.

What has been said of the scholastics in general has reference in a particular way to St. Thomas of Aquin, who, "all-balancing, all-considering," sums up what his predecessors taught, gives it definite expression and orderly arrangement, and fixes for the rest of the Middle Ages the method, and largely the content, of philosophy.

Thomas of Aquin was by genius an Italian with all the Latin love of order and clearness of arrangement. He was, by race, of mingled Suabian and Norman blood, with all the German appreciation of thoroughness and all the Norman spirit of enterprise and originality. He was born at Aquino, not far from Monte Cassino, probably in the year 1225. His life was an uneventful one, unless we judge it from the point of view of intellectual activity and spiritual experience. At Monte

Cassino, while he was yet a child, at Naples and later on at Cologne and Paris, he was a diligent and retentive student. His entry into the Order of St. Dominic when he was in his eighteenth year not only determined his religious vocation in opposition to the wishes of his family, but also influenced his intellectual career in the most decisive manner. It brought him into contact with the most renowned Aristotelian teacher of that age, Albert the Great. It also threw him, contrary, we think, to his own inclination and tastes, into the most violent controversy in the Academic world of that age, at the University of Paris. The young University was working out its rights and its obligations in circumstances of unusual confusion and turmoil. The so-called "seculars" were defending what they considered to be University privilege against the newly established "regulars," or members of the mendicant orders, who were accused of upsetting the traditions of the University. It is not necessary to enter, here, into the merits of the dispute, nor into a detailed description of the unseemly conflicts to which it led. It is sufficient to call attention to the fact that, though Thomas was an ardent and an able champion of the cause of the Mendicant Friars, it was his ability as a scholar and a teacher that did most to disarm opposition. For more than three years, though qualified to teach with the authority of a University Master, he was prevented by the violence of the opposing faction from holding his inaugural lesson. At last, however, his preëminence was acknowledged, and his personal superiority to factionism won over all but the most bitter of the "seculars." This was characteristic of the man. His heroic spirit was superior to all the pettiness of party strife, and enabled him to possess his soul in calmness in the midst of turmoil. Always courteous, serene, self-possessed, he was an ideal Christian Stoic. If the world were to fall shattered about him, the ruins would strike him unafraid, as the Roman poet said of the perfect philosopher. He calmly ignored all the recent controversy about the writings of Aristotle, frankly adopted the Aristotelian point of view and constantly referred to Aristotle as *the* philosopher. He makes no apology for borrowing even from the Arabians who were still held in abhor-

rence. According to his truly enlightened view, truth, wherever it is found, is the truth of God, and needs no recommendation except that of its truth. This was an innovation, but an innovation that disarmed opposition, because it was not proclaimed with a blare of trumpets, but quietly taken for granted. There was some surprise, in some quarters, no doubt. The staid old biographer William of Tocco harps on the novelty of Thomas' method: "He introduced *new* topics, invented a *new* and clear way of drawing conclusions, and brought *new* reasons into them, so that no one who had heard him teach *new* doubts and answer them by *new* arguments would have doubted that God had illumined him with *new* light . . . so that he did not hesitate to teach and write *new* opinions which God had deigned *newly* to inspire." This novelty was tacitly accepted by the majority of his contemporaries during his lifetime. That it was not universally accepted is clear from what happened after his death in 1274. Within three years, the two greatest universities of Christendom put themselves on record as opposed to some of his novel doctrines. But, the opposition was temporary. Paris and Oxford soon fell in line with the rest of the learned world, and Thomas was everywhere recognized as the most authoritative exponent of scholastic intellectualism. The Scotists, it is true, continued to criticize and find fault with his conclusions. For scholasticism in spite of what is so often said to the contrary, was not one man's way of thinking. It was essentially a philosophy of discussion, and the Scotists differed fundamentally from the Thomists in their view of the question of intellect and will. Thomas was an intellectualist: all along the line he placed intellect above will. Scotus was a Voluntarist: he placed will above intellect. And thus, though Scholasticism, as a system, was perfected by St. Thomas, it was not made a "closed system," so far as his successors were concerned.

The writings of St. Thomas are many and voluminous. The greatest of them is the *Summa Theologica*, which is a marvel of order, completeness and lucidity. We are inclined to take sober thought, nowadays, at the introductory remarks in which St. Thomas tells us that the work was intended for beginners

in the sacred science. There are many of its articles which are deep enough for the most advanced student. But "there were giants in those days," and perhaps the average student then was capable of more sustained effort than we should expect in the average student of to-day. The *Summa* is a text-book, resuming in concise and systematic exposition the whole subject of philosophy and theology. Its symmetry, its completeness, its thoroughness and its perfect balance have been admired by all who have taken the trouble to examine it. To its construction all those who went before contributed the material. Albert, especially, labored with Titanic strength and true German perseverance, to bring together the brick and stone that were to go into the edifice, but it was the master mind of Thomas that arranged the materials, drew the plan and put every piece into its proper place in the finished building. The Cathedral of Cologne, that other great medieval achievement, is the only work to which the *Summa Theologica* may be properly compared. Like the Gothic structure the *Summa* is vast, complicated, and yet unified in the heaven-pointing plan, by which vault and arch, turret and pinnacle all conspire to the one general effect of lifting our thoughts from the earth beneath us to the supernatural world above us. Nature and Grace, reason and faith, natural truth and revealed truth are there articulated and subordinated and coördinated in such a way that Dante had only to put it in verse to make it a harmony in expression as it is already intrinsically a harmony of thought. For, though it is a summary of theology, it is also a summary of philosophy, treating of man, his origin, his nature, his destiny, of conduct, of law, of the family, of political organization and of social relations.

Next to the *Summa Theologica* is the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, a work undertaken for the specific purpose of furnishing arguments from reason which may be used in discussion with those who do not admit the argument from revelation. In style it is less concise, in manner less didactic, in design less complete than the other work. In a sense it is more popular, although not so frequently cited nor so often consulted. Besides these

two great works we have the special treatises on particular topics of philosophy. Among these are the curiously entitled *Quodlibeta*. In them are discussed the so-called futile questions, such as "Can an angel pass from one point to another without passing through the intermediate points?" "Can two angels be in one place at the same time?" "Does a Crusader who dies on the way to the Holy Land deserve as much credit as one who dies on his way home?" etc. We have all heard of these and similar silly questions, which cause the injudicious to smile. The injudicious, because when we examine the circumstances, we shall be more inclined, perhaps, to admire than to condemn the man who discussed them. In those days there were no newspapers with their department set aside for answering inquiries. But there were then, as there are now, those who ask silly questions. When a teacher like St. Thomas had attained fame throughout Europe, questions came pouring in on him from far and near. There were, first of all the pupils of his own classes—any professor who has had experience with beginners in philosophy will know that it is best to take such questions more seriously than the questions deserve. And then, all over Christendom, when scholars met anywhere in debate and raised a hare of controversy which they could not run down, or when a group of monks gathered in their garden after dinner and began to discuss some curious problem which they found that they could not solve, the end very often would be the suggestion to write to Brother Thomas at Paris and find out what he says. Brother Thomas did not believe in "answering a fool according to his folly." It seems to us now, as we look back, that he showed wonderful patience and extraordinary courtesy when he took such questions seriously and, after a formal discussion, gave such an answer as would satisfy the mind of the enquirer without hurting his feelings. The medieval mind was curious. It was prone to discussion. But, it had also a passion for clearness and definiteness. It slighted no question however minute; it tried to settle every question, and fit the answer into a system. In this, again, we are reminded of a peculiarity of Gothic architecture, the care and conscientiousness with

which it worked out a detail, and the equally minute pains that it took to keep the detail "in style," as we say, with the rest of the structure. It is easy to laugh at the silly questions of the scholastics, but who, once he has understood the medieval mind, would laugh at the grotesqueness of a gargoye or other similar detail in a Gothic building?

This account of the writings of St. Thomas would be incomplete without some reference to his work as a liturgical poet. He was not, indeed, a poet of the first order. He was too reflective, perhaps, to rank with St. Francis in tenderness of feeling or with the authors of the *Dies Irae* and the *Stabat Mater* in directness of expression. But his hymns have a merit all their own. The *Lauda Sion* especially, and the *Pange Lingua*, with a portion of which Catholics are familiar as the *Tantum Ergo*, excel in the clearness with which they express definite, technical, theological thought, and are characterized by a depth of spiritual feeling that is rare in a professed philosopher. But, we should not forget that Thomas was a saint as well as a scholar. And, if in his didactic works he uses the impersonal, clear, cold, reasoning of the dialecticians, he was in heart and soul a mystic as well, and could feel as deeply as a St. Bernard the delights of mystic love and contemplation.

We had best describe him perhaps as a blending of the Christian rationalist and the Christian mystic. He had all Abelard's love of dialectic without any of Abelard's contentiousness or his lack of reverence. He delighted in the clash of argument and the thrust and parry of disputation, but had none of the vain confidence in his own powers which led Abelard into all kinds of intellectual extravagances. His reliance on the power of human reason was as wholehearted and spontaneous as that of any rationalist, but he clearly recognized that human reason has limits beyond which it cannot go. These limits he defined in reference to the highest spiritual truths, and thus formulated the principle of Christian Agnosticism. For there is a Christian Agnosticism, a limitation set by all reverential minds to our power of understanding divine things. "Who hath known the mind of God?", asked St. Paul. And

St. Augustine is emphatic in declaring that our words fall far short of our ideas about God, and our ideas are but an inadequate representation of the reality of God. St. Thomas takes the same sane view of the powers of the human mind. At the same time, he, like all other Christian thinkers, disagrees fundamentally with the modern agnostic when he holds that at the point where Reason reaches the end of its effort, Faith begins, and Faith, like Reason, is reasonable. The bird that rises on its wings through the air must come at last to a region where the rarified condition of the medium prevents its rising any higher. So it is with the mind of man. But, for St. Thomas, the region beyond the point where reason must stay its flight is not the region of nescience but the region of Faith. Thus, he is a rationalist, but a rationalist who acknowledges the limits of reason's power.

On the other hand he is a mystic. He has all St. Bernard's love of contemplation and meditation without any of his distrust of human reason. He shares with the School of St. Victor the appreciation of piety and holiness as a means of acquiring a knowledge of God, without agreeing with the Victorines in their condemnation of dialectic, or logic, as "the devil's art." In his mysticism, as in his rationalism, there is poise, balance, moderation and wholesomeness. "To love God above all things," he says, "is, in a certain way, natural to man and also to every creature, not only rational, but irrational, and even inanimate, according to the kind of love, of which the creature is capable."² Here we have the expression of the moderate mystic view of nature. Of St. Bernard it is related that he rode down the passes of the Alps along the shores of the Swiss lakes without once lifting his eyes to look upon scenes which may well be called the most beautiful in all the world. St. Francis of Assisi would not have done that. He considered that the beautiful things of the natural world are God's creatures, our brothers and our sisters who praise God, each in its own way, and sometimes are our superiors in the

² *Sum. Theol.*, I, II, CIX, 3.

fidelity with which they serve Him. Such was the opinion of St. Thomas, though expressed more reflectively, if one may say so, less spontaneously and less poetically. "Every creature loves God according to the love of which its nature is capable." It is the destiny of each of them, and it is the destiny of man to love God both here and hereafter. This principle furnishes the supreme test of the value of a life, and supplies a standard by which knowledge itself is to be judged useful or harmful. Like all the mystics, then, he distinguishes a knowledge that is unto salvation, and a knowledge that is injurious to the soul, since it prejudices the destiny of the soul. This, again, is mysticism, but mysticism restrained within the bounds of moderation, and saved from extravagance by the counterpoise of moderate rationalism.

Which of these tendencies predominated in St. Thomas, rationalism or mysticism? If we were to consider the man, the monk, the saint, we should say the mystic tendency. But, if we consider the scholar, the teacher, the writer, we should say the rationalistic tendency. His writings show him to be closer to Abelard than to Abelard's great opponent, St. Bernard. For, he is, as has been said, an intellectualist. The love of God, he thinks, is the destiny of man as it is the destiny of all creatures, but the love of God is conditioned, so to speak, by a knowledge of God, and finds its fruition in that contemplation of God wherein consists the Beatific Vision. All his emotionalism is tempered by intellectual insight and rational analysis. It is no smouldering fire that gives warmth without light; it glows to the point where it diffuses light as well as heat. This is best expressed, perhaps, by saying that in his philosophy he is the Christian Aristotle. The broad outlines of his metaphysics, his psychology, and his ethics are Aristotelian; the detailed points of doctrine are often Aristotelian also. He is no slavish follower of the Stagyrte, although he has been described as such. "The argument from authority," he says, "is the weakest of all arguments" in philosophy.³ He follows

³ I, 1, 8 ad 2.

Aristotle because he thinks that Aristotle is right. He follows him in the general view of the value of knowledge, and in the question of the value of life. Contemplation, he says, is to be placed above action; thought is superior to will and to emotion; man's crowning glory is his reason. His philosophy is, thus, the last classic expression of the Aristotelian view. What St. Augustine was to Plato he is to Aristotle. Even in the discussion of the highest spiritual truths he is the calm, cold, impersonal scientist, with the scientific passion for clearness of definition and systematic completeness of development. He does not condemn the Platonic way of philosophising; at least, he does not discard it entirely. For he borrowed much by way of inspiration, if not from Plato, at least from St. Augustine and the other Christian Platonists. However, he transformed what he borrowed, and like a true Aristotelian, submitted it to the discipline of definition and of logical proof. This determines his place in the history of human thought. He was no mere apologist for Christianity. He was no mere defender of orthodoxy within the limits of mental activity set around him by a Church jealous of her dogmas and her institutions. He contributed an appreciable addition to philosophy by developing, rounding out and perfecting the Aristotelian system. He has, in fact, been accused of reading into Aristotle more than Aristotle ever meant to say. It has been said that he attempts to "baptize" the Stagyrte and read Christianity into a pagan philosophy. But, we should remember that he was not a historian, nor a textual critic. He was a disciple, and may be allowed the freedom of interpretation accorded to a disciple. The charge, at least, proves that there is more in Thomas than there is in Aristotle. There is a fullness, a richness, a completeness of content in many of his philosophical doctrines that are lacking in him whom he calls "*the philosopher.*" As in the case of St. Augustine and Plato, one would not dare to say that he was greater than his master. That, however, does not prevent him from improving on the doctrines of his master. Heir to all the thought and feeling of twelve centuries of Christianity, he is wiser with the wisdom of ex-

perience. Possessing, as he believes, the truth of revelation, which developes the natural powers of the mind, he carries Aristotelianism into new applications, and throws new light especially on the regions of thought in which paganism groped in the dark or followed the feeble light of reason. At the very least, he freed the philosophy of Aristotle from the false interpretations that had grown up around it in the Arabian schools and in the sects of medieval or early Christian heresy. He did more. Of Plato and Aristotle, a medieval writer says: "The former looked to the things above, the latter considered the things below"⁴—and it is thus that Raphael represents them in the School of Athens. What St. Thomas did was to show the Aristotelians how, while adhering to the method of the master and remaining true to his spirit, they may rise from the consideration of the "things below" to a contemplation of the "things above."

WILLIAM TURNER.

⁴ St. Bonaventure, Sermo IV.

HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT.

In the new science of eugenics is to be discovered, we are told, a remedy for the social ills arising from the propagation of the unfit and parasitic members of society. Education, hailed so long as a panacea for these and other menacing evils, has, it is declared, been tried and found wanting. Says Professor Charles Richmond Henderson in his late work, *Preventive Agencies and Methods*: "For a long time in the United States skepticism as to the omnipotence of education of the abnormal and degenerate has gained in extent and influence. The cheerful optimism of Horace Mann has yielded to a more discriminating and cautious mood. Discussions in the National Conference of Charities and Correction and in the American Prison Association reveal a clear comprehension of the peril of trusting too far to education alone for social protection and we note a more decided and frequent advocacy of methods which promise to reduce the propagation of the unfit, the vicious and the habitual criminal included."¹ We gather that the Professor here takes education in the more restricted sense of mental training and equipment. But the word admits of a wider acceptance. It can be used to denote the entire body of influences that make for "guidance of growth," and hence to comprehend the pressure of environment.

Even thus broadly understood the comparative impotency of education as compared with heredity is maintained by the student of eugenics; and this too without restriction to the extreme types of degeneracy referred to in the quotation just given. "So far as our investigations have gone," says Ethel M. Edgerton, Galton research scholar, "they show that improvement in social conditions will not compensate for a bad

¹ Charles Richmond Henderson, *Preventive Agencies and Methods*, New York Charities Publication, 1910, p. 40.

heredity influence.”² We shall consider later the validity of such conclusions. In the meantime it is necessary that we have correct and clear ideas of the two terms of the comparison here instituted. For this it is sufficient that we gain an adequate notion of heredity, since all other contrasting forces we may reckon as comprehended under the general agency—environment.

According to Ribot “Heredity is that biological law by which all beings endowed with life tend to repeat themselves in their descendants. It is for the species what personal identity is for the individual. By it a groundwork remains unchanged amid incessant variations; by it nature ever copies and imitates herself.”³

It is seen that in its first and most obvious sense, heredity means the transmission of those characteristics that distinguish species from species. By it like tends to beget like. Men do not gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles. The offspring of fish is fish, of eagles, eagles. But its operation knows a more extended scope. It is the means by which qualities recognized as racial are perpetuated. The child of the Indian is clearly marked off from the issue of the Norwegian, and the descendant of the Negro will, we know, inevitably show forth the distinctive traits of his race.

All this is accepted as commonplace. But what is to be said of the transmissibility of purely family characteristics? Clearly it is only with the inheritance of such traits that the eugenist is concerned. And that there are many instances in which a particular quality of ancestors is bequeathed to offspring we cannot doubt. We recall as striking examples of this the aquiline noses of the Bourbons and the thick lips of the Hapsburgs. But does this transmission operate in every instance with anything like a calculable certainty. As an overshadowing and compelling fate, the idea of heredity, is an

² Ethel M. Edgerton, *The Relative Strength of Nurture and Nature*, London, 1909.

³ Ribot, *Heredity*, p. 1.

engaging one for the moralist and playwright. As a force breaking forth, like a second personality, at critical junctures, in a manner irresistible, lighting up with searching rays the dark vistas of an ancestral past, it allows of dramatic handling. So it has been employed by Robert Hitchens in his "Call of the Blood" and by Henrik Ibsen in his "Ghosts." For a different purpose, we hear appeal to it very often made by the morally weak and depraved. It is the refuge behind which the debauchee often seeks to hide his shame and folly, representing it as a compulsion to evil against which all the battling of his better self is vain and hopeless. "This is the excellent foppery of the world," says Edmund in *King Lear*, "that, when we are sick in fortune, (often the surfeit of our behaviour), we make guilty of our disaster, the sun, the moon, and the stars; as if we were villains by necessity; fools by heavenly compulsion; knaves, thieves, and treachers by spherical predominance, and all that we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on."

To assert and theorize, however, is a more serious matter for the scientist. For this he must have a sufficient basis of facts. And such a basis we make bold to say is, as yet, too meagre for a science of eugenics. This will appear evident we think from even a cursory consideration of the two principal generalizations regarding the measure and course of heredity. The first of these is the law of ancestral inheritance, enunciated by Sir Francis Galton, the acclaimed father of eugenics. From the study of the pedigree records of the Basset Hounds Club and the genealogical tables of the British peerage, Galton drew the conclusion that "every organism of bi-sexual parentage draws one-half of its inherited qualities from its parents, (one-fourth from each parent), one-fourth from its grandparents; one-eighth from its great-grandparents and so on." This surely looks like bringing order out of chaos. Indeed, it is so simple that it arouses suspicion. And the suspicion upon investigation is discovered to be well founded.

It is seen that according to Galton's law the characteristics of offspring are a blend or fusion of parental traits. In the

case of a tall father and short mother this blending could be discernible enough in the stature of their child. So too could it be with regard to many physical characteristics such as span, eye-color, hair-color and head measurements. Even regarding psychic qualities, supposing their transmissibility by heredity, there could be easily discovered a resultant fusion. A child of an extremely ill-tempered father and extremely amiable mother could be seen possessed of a disposition somewhere between these wide opposites. But to announce a law which would declare the exact or approximate ratio according to which the traits of parents combine in offspring, while possible quite for physical qualities, is, in the case of psychical characteristics, nothing short of gratuitous assumption. To declare, for instance, in our present state of biological and psychological knowledge, that the determination of purpose observed in a given child is in one-fourth measure due to its father, in one-fourth to its mother, in one-fourth to its grandparents, and in one-eighth to its great-grandparents is not setting forth a law. It is simply making a statement that is possessed of about as much scientific character as a formula in alchemy.

It is evident, moreover, that this law fails to cover the case of reversions or reappearances of characteristics possessed by ancestors more remote than the immediate forbears. We are all familiar with the phenomenon known as "skipping a generation," though a longer period of intervening time than this is supposed by reversion understood in its stricter sense. Tennyson, in his *Locksley Hall Sixty Years After*, refers to:

"Evolution ever climbing after some ideal good
And Reversion ever dragging Evolution in the Mud."

But this is only one kind of reversion. There is a form that saves from the mud. And although the phenomenon is hardly as frequent as the poet would lead us to believe, it was known and reckoned with before the time of Plutarch.⁵

⁵ This writer tells us of a Greek woman who when accused of adultery after having given birth to a black child, alleged in defense that she had an Ethiopian ancestor four generations back. See also the case referred to by Flint in his *Text-book of Human Physiology*, New York, 1882, p. 895.

Again, in the view of evolutionists the law is radically defective in that it fails to reckon with the presence of variations. And variation, in the evolutionary doctrine, is not a whit less important than heredity. Indeed it is the co-factor with heredity, making for development. For if organic transmission be something undeviating, of mechanical exactness, if offspring be but the double of its parents, selection finds no place for lack of material upon which to operate, and without selection there can be no evolution. It is needless to point out that the fluctuating modifications of which Galton's law takes cognizance are quite distinct from the mutations here supposed.

Of course it is to be borne in mind that Galton's law is not for individual application. It is statistical. It is a generalization based upon numbers, and therefore, only strikes a general average. It cannot foretell just what will be the effect of heredity in this or that instance. But this for working purposes is a fatal inadequacy, giving it no more of a compelling force than is contained in the vital statistics of our insurance companies. The individual can not bring himself to think that as a social unit only he will fall under its operations. Now eugenics, as its name implies, aims at being a preëminently practical science. It proposes some very particular and even drastic legislation. But for this it furnishes a poor sanction when one of its recognized basic principles can present for individual cases mere probabilities.

Quite distinct in quality from the law we have been considering is that discovered about the year 1865 by Gregor Johann Mendel, an Augustinian monk of the village of Brünn in Austria. Studying the transmissibility of some characteristics of edible peas in his cloister garden Mendel came to the knowledge of certain principles of heredity, the establishment of which, in the words of Professor Vernon L. Kellogg of Leland Stanford University, marks "the greatest advance toward a rational explanation of inheritance that has been made since the beginning of the scientific study of the problem."⁶

⁶Vernon L. Kellogg, "Heredity and its Laws," *Independent*, August 24, 1911.

Revolutionary as was the character of Mendel's work it failed at the time to make any kind of an impression upon the scientific world. Dr. Saleeby has probably hit upon what undoubtedly is a large reason for this failure. Says this last named writer: "The pacific Darwin had at least one champion who was a master of polemics—and his work was soon noised abroad. But the Abbé Gregor Mendel had no Huxley; and there was nothing particularly sensational about his leisurely but scrupulously honest and scientific observations on the mating of different kinds of peas. Dogmatic systems did not worry themselves about peas, and Mendel did not stagger humanity with any assertions as to the origin of our kind. Hence it was that for just thirty years—and these years violently agitated about the very questions which Mendel had helped to solve—scarcely anyone had heard of his name or his work." ⁷ In 1900 the Dutch botanist De Vries, following along lines anticipated by Mendel, rediscovered the latter's work, and since then Mendelism has found a number of able exponents principal among whom is Professor William Bateson of Cambridge.⁸

The last named writer gives us an excellent account of Mendel's experiments from which we quote:

"Large numbers of crosses were made between peas differing in respect of one of each of these pairs of characters. It was found that in each case the offspring of the cross exhibited the character of one of the parents in almost undiminished intensity, and intermediates which could not be at once referred to one or other of the parental forms were not found.

"In the case of each pair of characters there is thus one which in the first cross prevails to the exclusion of the other. This prevailing character Mendel calls the dominant character; the other, the recessive character.

"By letting the cross-breds fertilize themselves Mendel next raised another generation. In this generation were individuals

⁷ C. W. Saleeby, *Heredity*, New York, p. 61.

⁸ We are surprised to find in the recent ambitious work, *The Inheritance of Acquired Characters*, by Eugenio Rignano, translated by Basil C. H. Harvey, Assistant Professor of Anatomy, University of Chicago, Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., no account taken of Mendelism. The author does not seem to have heard of Mendel.

which showed the dominant character but also individuals which presented the recessive character. But Mendel discovered that in this generation the numerical proportion of dominants to recessives is on an average of cases approximately constant, being in fact as three to one. There are thus in the first generation raised from the cross-breds 75 per cent. dominants and 25 per cent. recessive.

"These plants were again self-fertilized and the offspring of each plant separately sown. It next appeared that the offspring of the recessive remained pure recessive and in subsequent generations never produced the dominant again.

"But when the seeds obtained by self-fertilizing the dominants were examined and sown it was found that the dominants were not at all alike, but consisted of two classes, (1) those which gave rise to pure dominants and (2) others which gave a mixed offspring, composed partly of recessive, partly of dominants. Here also it was found that the average numerical proportions were constant, those with pure dominant offspring being to those with mixed offspring as one to two.

"To resume, then, it was found that by self-fertilizing the original cross-breds the same proportion was always approached, namely—

"25 dominants, 50 cross-breds, 25 recessives.

"Like the pure recessives the pure dominants are thenceforth pure and only give rise to dominants in all succeeding generations.

"On the contrary the fifty cross-breds as stated above have mixed offspring. But these offspring again in their numerical proportions, follow the same law, namely, that there are three dominants to one recessive. The process of breaking up into the parent forms is thus continued in each successive generation, the same numerical law being followed, so far as has yet been observed."⁹

It is unnecessary to give here the explanation offered by Mendel for this manner of inheritance. Suffice it to say that it is generally regarded as highly satisfactory. His work is pre-eminently more scientific than Galton's, not only because his facts unlike the latter's are established, but because, unlike the latter again, he furnishes a fundamental reason for his facts.

It will be observed from the foregoing resumé that in the findings of Mendel there were no blends, no proportionate admixture resulting from cross-mating. They evidently do not cover the cases in which the offspring presents to all appearances, a combination of the qualities of ancestors, as for instance, the Mulatto. They apply rather to the mode of inheritance

⁹ William Bateson, *Mendel's Principles of Heredity*, New York, 1909.

in which the child bears a likeness to one or other of its forbears exclusively, as in the matter of sex. Whether Mendelian principles will be ever seen to find place in the first mentioned form of heredity is highly problematical.

Again only "unit characters"—characters irreducible to simpler elements—Mendelize, complex qualities not coming within the scope of the law. This it would appear allows but a comparatively narrow field for the operation of Mendelian principles. True, some of the traits we now think composite in nature may hereafter in the magic alembic of advanced biological and psychological science be factored into simpler constituents. But for this there does not appear encouraging prospects. We know that some qualities apparently simple are indeed complex. Thus Davenport tells us that the white coat color of a horse is due to several elements that are inheritable.¹⁰ Nevertheless the Mendelian principles of heredity have been proven to operate quite extensively in vegetative life. And the practical advantages to which a knowledge of them has been turned in this order we know from the experiments of Professor Biffin with English wheats. The use to which they may be put in animal breeding recognized for some time has lately been well illustrated by Professor Castle of Harvard in the account of his experiments mostly made with guinea pigs, rabbits, mice and rats.¹¹

But what of the bearing of Mendelian principles upon human heredity. Do human characteristics Mendelize? It must be said that as yet we have no convincing evidence of the transmissibility according to these laws of normal traits. It would appear, however, that certain defects or multiplicities, such as color-blindness, night-blindness, short-sightedness, brachydactylism (two joints only in fingers and toes) syndactylism (union of certain fingers and toes) polydactylism (additional fingers

¹⁰ C. B. Davenport, *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*, New York, 1911, p. 24.

¹¹ William E. Castle, *Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal Breeding*, New York, 1911.

and toes) as also predispositions to certain diseases are passed on after this mode of inheritance.

“One of the present objects of the student of heredity,” says Professor Kellicott,¹² “is to be able to state the facts of human heredity in Mendelian terms reducing many of the complex traits to their simpler elements.” But there is danger that the Mendelian formula will be used without the due warrant of facts, that it will be adduced when there is only a basis of mass statistics. We submit that it has been thus employed more than once by Mr. Davenport of the Carnegie Institution of Washington in his *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*. Again the task of factoring complex human qualities into their component elements is not one calculated to give the eugenicist a sense of easy assurance. The analytical process that can discover the constituent parts of distinctively human traits is not yet discovered. And until Mendelian principles have been shown to apply to complex characteristics or human qualities can be resolved into their simpler elements we must recognize the general inadequacy of the laws of Mendel to declare the method and measure of inheritance in mankind.

Mendel did not address himself to the question of human heredity. Sir Francis Galton's work, however, as we have seen, is more comprehensive. For he has endeavored not only to show that human qualities are inheritable but also to set forth the proportion according to which such transmission in the by and large takes place. We have already offered a very broad criticism of his law. We now propose in the same general way to consider the validity of his conclusions regarding the inheritance of ability. From his study of the British peerage, the “Master of all Eugenists” discovered that the men who have distinguished themselves pretty frequently, “either by purely original work, or as leaders of opinion” are about two hundred and fifty in a million, one in four thousand, or one-fortieth of one per cent. On this basis it was found that Fellows of the Royal Society had fathers who attained to the

¹² Wm. E. Kellicott, *The Social Direction of Human Evolution*, New York, 1911, p. 141.

eminence above described with twenty-four times the frequency, eminent brothers with thirty-one times the frequency, and eminent grandfathers with twelve times the frequency, to be looked for in cases where heredity did not find play.

The mathematical precision with which this formula is put forth gives it an assuring appearance. But appearances here do not consist with facts. And this for the good reason that heredity is assumed to be the only cause operating to bring about the eminence possessed and shown by the above mentioned Fellows of the Royal Society.

That striking ability is the particular portion of some families cannot be denied. Two classical instances of this are seen in the Bach and Darwin families. Through eight generations the Bachs exhibited high musical skill while the descendants of Erasmus Darwin constituted a veritable aristocracy of science. The ability in these and similar cases is, of course, either native or acquired. The fact that it is seen to be of the same particular character in the sons as in the fathers, and of such pronounced quality would seem clearly to indicate that it was something inherent. Again, in the modern biological doctrine each child begins as it were at the beginning, just as his ancestors did before him. The Lamarckian idea that acquired characters or powers are passed on by heredity, while still numbering some adherents in France and America, is now quite generally abandoned. The notion that "my father's environment will be my heredity" can no longer be accepted. It might appear then that the ability exhibited in the persons referred to by Galton was the issue of inheritance, since the limited power of education could hardly accomplish such striking results.

Nevertheless the exclusive potency here claimed for heredity is not at all established. Education, though it cannot indeed contribute the content of a natural inheritance, is by no means a negligible element in true eugenics. Its task has been called a Sisyphean one. But such it assuredly is not. For besides an internal there is an external heritage made up of the traditions and institutions, the laws and customs of the

social organism about us. These are the legacy of education augmented and enriched by each succeeding generation. Our dependence upon this form of inheritance we are apt to underestimate. So unconsciously do we come under its sway that its pressure upon us, like that of the atmosphere we breathe, is quite overlooked. As evidence of this we need but recall the failure so frequently made on the part of irreligionists to recognize the body of traditions and customs and ideals that go so far to make up what we call Christian civilization. Disregarding and disowning these, the opponents of Christianity would claim as fruits and achievements simply of the natural law what is owing solely to the long and pervasive influence of revealed religion. Again, that which is gained from the accumulated accomplishments of the social organism of which we become a part, we would often attribute to our own inherent gifts. Thus, as Mr. Benjamin Kidd points out, we too frequently arrogate to ourselves a superiority over ruder peoples which we would describe as natural, whereas such superiority is merely due to the fact that we have fallen heirs to the equipment of a civilization of which these peoples are strangers.¹³

We may, in a measure, gauge the compelling force of this external heritage if we but observe the consequences inevitably ensuing upon the lessening or temporary stopping of its pressure upon the community about us. For just let the ordinary machinery of law and order by some cataclysm, such as war or earthquake, be interfered with even for a brief period and cruelty, rapacity and lust spring out like wild beasts from hidden and unsuspected lairs. Truly the ape and tiger, as Browning would say, have not died out in us, but are held in leash by the organism built up by a beneficent nurture.

And as of the power of this general and large form of environment so also may we in proportionate measure speak of the potency exercised by environments of a more particular and restricted kind. Take, for instance, the case of the infants of the slums. Speaking of the early mortality among these children, Dr. Caleb Williams Saleeby says: "This is one of

¹³ Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*, pp. 268 and ff.


the cardinal truths which emerge from the study of infant mortality, and it may be perhaps permitted to warn some students of race culture of the errors into which they are bound to fall if they do not reckon with what the student of infant mortality is constantly asserting; viz., that the babies of the slums, seen early and before ignorance and neglect have had their way with them, are physically vigorous and promising in certainly not less than ninety per cent. of cases."¹⁴ While evidencing the sustaining though circumscribed power of heredity, no more telling example than that just given could be adduced to show the effect of what is called social heritage.

But the influences that make for destruction always gain and hold our attention better than those that upbuild and save, and there is an environment than can work just as effectively though less noticeably to ends diametrically opposite to the issues felt by the children of the slums. Of such a character was the environment to which the scholars spoken of by Galton were born and bred. This influence was clearly something more than education in the restricted sense in which this term is ordinarily used. It was an inspiring, stimulating nurture. The Bach and Darwin children, for instance, breathed an atmosphere of music and science. It was the alphabet of their earliest training, and it would be a child of poor talents indeed that would fail in such encompassing conditions to give evidence of special skill.

In ignoring this agency the distinguished eugenist has disregarded an essential element to be reckoned with in any formula that would describe the quality or measure of hereditary influence. "Not only are a large portion of Galton's men mediocrities," says Nisbet,¹⁵ "but in his mistaken zeal for making out a case, that writer seems to have ignored the influence of family patronage and other fortuitous sources of social or official distinction." The author just quoted sees a good evidence of this fatal oversight in the statistics regarding statesmen as compared with those relating to poets and artists.

¹⁴ Caleb Williams Saleeby, *Parenthood and Race Culture*, 1909, p. 118.

¹⁵ J. F. Nisbet, *Marriage and Heredity*, London, 1910, p. 192.



According to Galton a statesman's chances of having a distinguished grandparent is 28 per cent., while the chances of such for a poet are only 5 per cent., and for an artist 7 per cent. Clearly these figures would show that heredity is not the agency to which we must look for an explanation of the facts here set forth. For what more natural than that a boy should seek to follow in the footsteps of a successful ancestor. And that many a son of an eminent father has been effectively helped to high position by the name and patronage of his immediate forbear, is a fact that may not be denied. This is palpably true in the case of statesmen. The disparity between the figures referring to statesmen and those relative to poets and artists presents no difficulty. For with the latter the elements that go to secure distinction are quite different from those that are conducive to station in the political world. Yet even in the case of poets and artists the help coming from a father's fame cannot be overlooked.

We may not conclude from the foregoing criticism of Galton's law that ability is not inherited. No such contention is here intended. For groups of more or less extent such inheritance can be established statistically. It has not, however, been demonstrated as an agency inevitably finding expression in this or that individual case. And even statistically there is clearly lacking evidence for its operation according to the formula we have been considering.

One of the most important problems for the eugenicist is to differentiate heredity from environment. Yet in their present zeal to establish a case for the prepotency of the former as contrasted with the latter, a fair and judicial comparison is too generally lacking. As illustrative of this bias we may instance the manner in which the well-known story of "The Jukes" is ordinarily set forth. From the founder of this family, who lived in the first half of the eighteenth century, there sprang 1200 descendants, of whom 280 were pauperized adults, 140 criminal offenders, 60 habitual thieves and 50 common prostitutes.

The history of this wretched house, we are told, affords a

classical example of the irresistible force of heredity. Yet if it does, a more telling instance of the power of environment also could hardly be presented. For in all the cases cited by Mr. Dugdale in his sociological study of this family, there is ever felt the pressure of a most pernicious environment. Indeed, in the three pronounced instances of amended lives which he records, the reformation has been to all appearances, brought about by a change of environment, while in the one case in which heredity seems more clearly prepotent, it is admitted that "very little reliable information has been gathered about the environment." Allowing that there was in the original members of this family a strong inherent propensity to evil, the extent and continuance of the lawlessness seen in the succeeding generations can in largest measure be accounted for by environing influences. To have risen above such influences would have been for any of these creatures nothing short of the heroic.

The conclusions of Mr. Dugdale, if we suppose the qualification called for by the fundamental truth of the absolute freedom of the will, are clearly consistent with the facts discovered by his study. Says this writer, "From the above considerations the logical induction seems to be that environment is the ultimate controlling factor in determining careers, placing heredity itself as an organized result of invariable environment." And again, "The permanence of ancestral types is only another demonstration of the fixity of the environment within limits which necessitates the development of typical characteristics."¹⁶ We may say that the same general lesson is to be gathered from the account given of the two anti-social groups known as the "Tribe of Ismael"¹⁷ and the "Smoky Pilgrims."¹⁸

We know of only one work which attempts a study of the comparative influence of heredity and environment, that of

¹⁶ R. L. Dugdale, *The Jukes, A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease and Heredity*, New York, 1889, p. 66.

¹⁷ Rev. Oscar C. McCulloch, "The Tribe of Ismael, A Study in Social Degradation," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1888, p. 154.

¹⁸ Frank W. Blackmar, "The Smoky Pilgrims," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1897, p. 485.

Barrington and Pearson on the relation of home conditions to keenness and strength of vision in the case of fourteen hundred school children of Edinburgh. The result of this investigation showed, we are told, that normal vision is on the whole slightly associated with overcrowding, bad economic conditions and morally defective parentage.¹⁹ This is not very startling information for the simple reason that the conditions above described constitute only a part and that the lesser part of the environment of these children. The authors themselves suspect this, for they ask: "Can it be that these bad home conditions keep the children in the streets and so relatively away from the bad environment and in relatively fresher air." There can be no doubt about it. The "bad physical and moral conditions of the parents" force these little ones out into the open air—Nature's own health-giving spring, to gain a vigor that all the eider-down indulgence of wealth could never give. It is different, as we have seen, with the children of the slums. There the havoc is produced, because there evil environment is offered no check or hindrance. Again in a quantitative study of this kind the element of time cannot be overlooked. Environment, such as above described can only show appreciable results upon vision after a protracted period. The eyesight of Europeans is far below that of the American Indian, though this disparity is the consequence of the slow workings of environing conditions. Such a process obviously will be more prolonged the greater is the resisting capacity of the subject affected. We can hardly look for its early fruit therefore in young school children with their wonderfully recuperative powers.

We have further evidence of the indiscriminate claims made for the prepotency of heredity in much that is put forth by eugenists with regard to the effects of alcoholism. Alcohol has been styled a racial poison and many figures have been adduced to show this. Thus Dr. W. C. Sullivan in his *Alcoholism, a Chapter in Social Pathology*, tells us that "of six hundred

¹⁹ Amy Barrington and Karl Pearson, *A First Study of the Inheritance of Vision and of the Relative Influence of Heredity and Environment on Sight*, London, 1909, p. 55.

children born of one hundred and twenty drunken mothers three hundred and thirty-five (55.8 per cent.) died in infancy or were still born, and that several of the survivors were mentally defective and as many as 4.1 per cent. were epileptic. Many of these women had female relatives, sisters or daughters of sober habits, and married to sober husbands; on comparing the death-rate amongst the children of the sober mothers with that amongst the children of the drunken women of the same stock, the former was found to be 23.9 per cent. the latter 55.2 per cent., or nearly two and a half times as much." From these and other statistics Dr. Saleeby does not hesitate to conclude: "Therefore the chronic inebriate must not become a parent. Let it be said that these people are wicked or have no self-control, drink for fun or love of degradation, then become drunkards, and prejudicially affect their children. The conclusion is the same. Have any theory of heredity you please—Lamareckian, Darwin's pangenesis, Weismannism, Mendelism, it matters not a straw. Look at the thing from the uncharitable religious point of view which realizes, in the case of these women, that to know all is to pardon all—the conclusion is still the same."

The case would seem to be clear. But it isn't. For over against this testimony must be placed that of the Galton research scholar, Miss Ethel M. Elderton, and Mr. Karl Pearson, F. R. S. From a study of the report of the Edinburgh Charity Organization Society and of an account of the children in the special schools of Manchester, these investigators were forced to the conclusion that:

"The general health of the children of alcoholic parents appears on the whole slightly better than that of the children of sober parents. There are fewer delicate children and in a most marked way cases of tuberculosis and epilepsy are less frequent than among children of sober parents.

"Parental alcoholism is not the source of mental defect in offspring.

"The relationship, if any, between parental alcoholism and filial intelligence is so slight that even its sign cannot be determined from the present material.

"The frequency of diseases of the eye and eyelids which might

well be attributed to parental neglect, was found to have little, if any, relation to parental alcoholism.

"To sum up then, no marked relation has been found between the intelligence, physique or disease of the offspring and parental alcoholism in any of the categories investigated."²⁰

It must be remarked that the validity of the foregoing conclusions has been vigorously impugned and by none more vigorously than by Dr. Saleeby, but we think the objections of their critics have been fully answered by Mr. Pearson and Miss Elderton.²¹

Nevertheless the figures given by Dr. Sullivan can hardly be said to show mere coincidences. They clearly discover a casual relation. They appear, however, to exhibit instances in which the child was poisoned by a drunken mother before it was born. But this is not heredity in the biological sense of the word, it is infection, just as the evil received by the unborn child from a syphilitic mother is not a case of heredity but of infection.

The general conclusion of Mr. Pearson and Miss Elderton is that "back of extreme alcoholic excess will be found a want of will power, of self-control that is a mental defect." They should have said, of course, a moral defect. But as these authors would admit, the same must be recognized as back of all grave excesses. And until a more specific relationship is established between this antecedent weakness and alcoholism, there is no call to our sane temperance reformers to change radically their estimate of the potency, in their cause, of environing conditions.

Finally, the dependence of education upon heredity is so presented as unduly to accentuate the potency of the former. Certain it is that education can educate only what Nature gives. It is consequently of paramount importance for the

²⁰ Ethel M. Elderton and Karl Pearson, *A First Study of the Influences of Parental Alcoholism on the Physique and Ability of Offspring*, London, 1910, p. 31-32.

²¹ Karl Pearson and Edith M. Elderton, *A Second Study of the Influence of Parental Alcoholism on Physique and Ability of Offspring. Being a reply to certain medical critics of the First Memoir and an explanation of the Rebutting Evidence cited by them*. London, 1910.

educator to know the character and capacity of the material with which he has to deal. For it remains forever true that we cannot get out of a child what does not exist in it potentially. We cannot get blood out of a turnip. But if education is thus dependent upon Nature, it devolves upon education to discover the capability and perfectibility of Nature: "Two children," says Ruskin, "go to school, hand in hand, and spell for half an hour over the same page. Through all their lives never will they spell from the same page more. One is presently a page ahead, two pages, ten pages, and evermore, though each toils equally, the interval enlarges—at birth nothing, at death infinite."²² The difference here marked is ultimately owing indeed to disparity of native powers, but it is realized and made evident by education. As has been well said, no amount of cutting and polishing will ever be able to make a common pebble into a diamond, nevertheless it is just this cutting and polishing that makes the diamond clearly distinguishable from the pebble.

If education is dependent upon heredity, it is here seen that heredity is in no small measure dependent upon education. For the latter, like the proper soil, can alone enable the seed of native ability to know the bloom and fruitage that otherwise were impossible. And if our social reformers have heretofore given rise to the suspicion that they have been too much taken up with the soil to the neglect of the seed, there is no doubt but that the danger today lies in the tendency to reckon only with the seed to the disregard of the indispensable influence of the soil.²³

In the pessimism ever gaining increasing ground, regarding the moral value of much of our education, we frankly share. But this precisely because of the present neglect of the essential moral content of that Nature which must necessarily condition all effective education. This, however, it must be observed, discovers no inherent and radical defect in the power of education as such, nor its impotency to effect the results rightly desired by social reformers.

²² John Ruskin, *Time and Tide*, Par. 172.

²³ Havelock Ellis, *The Problem of Race-Regeneration*, New York, 1911, p. 22.

After all the mental capacity of society is for the most part latent and undeveloped. It has been calculated that only 10 per cent. of the resources that human society possesses have been brought into play. And it develops upon education largely, but also upon all those environmental factors generally described as opportunity, to elicit and direct these latent powers. "Where opportunity shows itself," says Scott Nearing, "genius springs into life, while a dearth of opportunity means inevitably a dearth of genius. In the cities of France thirteen times as much ability is produced, in proportion to the population, as is produced in rural districts, while in Paris the proportion of genius is thirty-five times that of the rural districts. In the cities, and in Paris especially, there is opportunity for stimulus."²⁴

Education, however, is but one of the elements that go to make up environment. And despite the pessimism of the laboratory workers in eugenics, there is no danger of bankruptcy for the plans and methods of the reformers who seek to uplift their fellows by bettering social and economic conditions. Ever since Hector Gavin published in 1848 his report on the unsanitary streets and dwellings of Bethnal Green, these methods have not failed to make vast and comprehensive improvement. One need but read the *Bulletin of the Committee of One Hundred on National Health*, published under the direction and authorization of our government, to be convinced of this.²⁵ We quote but a sentence of this report: "When we consider that the average duration of life in India is scarcely more than one-half that of France, and less than one-half that of Sweden, we must conclude that the length of human life is dependent on definite conditions and can be increased or diminished by a modification of these conditions." And the external agencies that are thus seen to affect so largely the duration of life, cannot but as a consequence influence in no less measure the manner of life.

²⁴ Scott Nearing, *Social Adjustment*, New York, 1911, p. 19.

²⁵ *Bulletin of the Committee of One Hundred on National Health; being a Report on National Vitality, its Wastes and Conservation*. By Professor Irving Fisher, Senate Doc. 419, Washington, D. C.

It will doubtless be objected that even though the results of our advanced medicine and sanitation were known to the swarming hordes of India, the quality of their life would be but slightly bettered, just as the quality of life has been but slightly improved among the Western peoples mentioned despite the advance of Occidental civilization. Says Havelock Ellis: "Here have we been expending enormous enthusiasm, labour, and money in improving the conditions of life . . . and after seventy years we find no convincing proof that the quality of our people is one whit better than it was when for a large part they lived in filth, were ravaged by disease, bred at random, soaked themselves in alcohol and took no thought of the morrow. Our boasted social reform we are thus tempted to think has been a matter of bricks and mortar—a piling up of hospitals, asylums, prisons and workhouses—while our comparatively sober habits may be merely a sign of the quietly valetudinarian way of life imposed on a race which no longer possesses the stamina to withstand excess."²⁶

That we lack the physical hardness and vigor of our ancestors of a century back is pretty certain. But this does not spell the failure of the reform that seeks its ends through improvement of environmental factors. This reform has not been, as the writer just quoted would have us believe, a matter of bricks and mortar. It has markedly lessened the ravages wrought by the ancient enemies war, famine and pestilence. And it is not without power to overcome the evil that more than anything else is at present sapping the vitality of the race. This evil, as Dr. Max G. Schlapp has lately pointed out, is the tension of our modern life. "It is that commercial ogre, our industrial system, which is sapping the strength of the race. The results of it are newly born criminals or newly born imbeciles in every grade of life high and low, irrespective of environment. Explicitly the human race is breaking itself down."²⁷ But the remedy for all this is not to be found in the elimination of the unfit and the multiplication of the best stock through

²⁶ Havelock Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 26-27.

²⁷ Max C. Schlapp, "The Enemy at the Gate," *Outlook*, April 6, 1912.

the methods of eugenics. For the cause of the evil is external to us. And the improved stock would only enter upon the gruelling strain and stress to the same inevitable undoing. It is to be found in the greater husbanding of our physical and mental resources, in the simpler life more attuned to the environment with which nature would encompass us, and from which the environment, we have created in our modern industrialism, would estrange us.

We set it down therefore in conclusion that the accredited findings of biological science have not as yet the certain definite and individual character necessary to afford adequate sanction for the drastic practical reforms which our eugenists would introduce as part and parcel of their program looking to selection for parenthood, and that, moreover, in their zeal to establish the potency of heredity, these social reformers too generally disregard or obscure the true potency and extent of the factor of environment.

JOHN WEBSTER MELODY.

DR. BOLLING'S REPLY.

I have today (March 26) received Dr. Bolling's reply to my reply, but unluckily I have no copy of my own answer to his original article nor of that article itself. However, I think that Dr. Bolling has on some points the better of this fresh argument. The truth is that, in my reply, I seem to have been rather confused between my two books (1906 — 1910); Dr. Bolling had not seen the second. Perhaps I also intermixed my opinions at the moment when I was writing.

(1) As to Dr. Bolling's opinion that I "made an effort to appeal the Homeric Question from expert to popular judgment," and addressed "the general English-speaking public," in 1906; it is true that I spoke a word of comfort to "the general reader." It *might* catch his eye! But as I do not suppose that 1200 copies of any book of mine on Homer have been sold, I really could not be so sanguine as to fancy that I could influence "the general English speaking public"! The statistics of the sale of my book of 1906 were quite "disillusioning." I could not hope than any book of mine on Homer could, like Mr. Leaf's very valuable edition,—an indispensable work—appear "on the shelves of every Homeric student," but I did hope to reach some of them, and even some sixth-form boys. I did reach some eminent American and Continental experts, and British archaeologists, and was gratified by the warmth of their welcome. Dr. Bolling was not addressing an audience of experts, and his plan was to crush me by the authority of Dr. Cauer, who "waved me aside." I was all the more pleased to find Continental and American scholars, and British archaeologists, receiving my work with approbation. It is quite true that I wished to reach "the less learned readers of Homer," people like myself who am no scholar and philologist; but a student of ancient poetry, heroic manners, and of archaeology. But "the less learned readers of Homer," are not "the general

English-speaking public." They are "few," and have got nothing to do with the decision of the Homeric Question. But MM. Dörpfeld and Valeton and Drerup have a voice in that matter; and they are on my side to a considerable extent.

(2) It is true that my archaeological sources in 1906 were prior in knowledge to 1901. Dr. Bolling has me there. In 1910 I think I made novel uses of Red and Black Figure vases, previously well known, but not, I think, employed much in this controversy. The vases proved that, whatever the armour pictured by Homer may be, it is certainly not the Ionian, at least not consistently so; but rather resembles the armour of the Red Figure vases: the shield not included.

(3) As to the Haghia Triade sealings, not known in 1901, I must be content to differ from Dr. Bolling's interpretation, and to agree with Sir Arthur Evans where Dr. Bolling differs from him.

(4) About Robert I know next to nothing; he seems to have very few disciples, *in this matter*, among the learned. But did I not give, in my reply, a list of very considerable authorities whom Dr. Bolling did not even mention? Far from being "reluctant to concede" that round shields occur in Homer, I wrote, in 1906, that "we do not pretend to be certain" as to whether Homer "saw shields of various types, including the round shape, in use,"—or not.¹

(5) As to the Dipylon shields; those from Boeotia, published by Lippold, were unknown to me even in 1910,—and to most people. I could only speak of such Dipylon shields as were known to me, and they were un-Homeric.

(6) I can only assure Dr. Bolling that when translating the Iliad, thirty years ago, I, at least, felt no "incongruity" as to the line about the corslet of Patroclus. Had I felt an incongruity, and wished to dissemble it by a dodge in the printing, my two colleagues, Mr. Leaf and Mr. Myers, would not have permitted the artifice. I am unable to imagine how anybody can suppose that, to "minimise" an incongruity which

¹ *Homer and his Age*, p. 114.

I "felt," I "separated the incongruous elements so as to bring them in different paragraphs." As far as I can see this proceeding would only make the incongruity more apparent. The line (xvi, 804), if a late insertion by a late amateur of corslets, is put in the wrong place: it ought to follow lines 791-792. In these, Apollo smites Patroclus on the shoulders, an action apt to undo the corslet-clasps. One thing the readers of *The Catholic University Bulletin* may have learned from our "gentle and joyous passage of arms," namely, that I am not an isolated adventurer in the lists of the Homeric Question, but that some famous Continental scholars, and perhaps all of our archaeologists and learned excavators, are, like Dr. Dörpfeld, in the main, on my side in the dispute, as is, notably, Professor John Scott in your own country.

It will be seen that on (1) my "appeal to the general English-speaking public," I cannot agree with Dr. Bolling. The extent of my hope was to prevent "less learned readers of Homer" from accepting the idea that the question is settled by Science. I had also a desire that specialists might consider my views, (though I did not expect many of them to look at my work) and this desire was gratified beyond my hope.

As to (2) I grant that Dr. Bolling is right.

As to (3) I differ from him, but the question is one of personal impressions; and probably fresh evidence may solve the problem.

As to (4) *do manus*, I confess that I was lazy about Robert, and most of his critics appeared to be unpersuaded.

(5) Lippold's Boeotian shields, and his admirable paper, were a new light to me.

As to (6) really it was *impossible* for me, had I wished it, to play a trick with the paragraphs in the translation; my friends, infinitely my superiors in scholarship, would have permitted no such *supercherie*; and I am surprized that such an artifice should be charged against us.

A. LANG.

May I add one word? I had never the slightest wish to bring against Mr. Lang or his collaborators a charge of *supercherie* with regard to the translation of the line relating to the corslet of Patroklos. On the contrary my interest in the translation arose from the very fact that there could not possibly have been in it any ulterior motive. It seemed to me perfectly unconscious—and as such valuable—testimony that the line does not harmonize with the preceding lines and I endeavored to employ it as such. I distinctly said that I regarded Mr. Lang's procedure as "the best thing possible thirty years ago," meaning by the restriction of the last phrase merely that in the light of more recent discoveries I consider it now better to bracket the line. When I wrote I thought that my meaning could be readily and easily understood, and I can now only express my sincere and deep regret that I did not succeed in making it impossible for any one to take from my writings the meaning that Mr. Lang has taken.

GEORGE MELVILLE BOLLING.

BOOK REVIEWS.

La Théologie de Saint Paul. F. Prat, S. J. Deuxieme Partie.
Paris, Beauchesne, 1912. Pp. 579.

Biblical theology, as a science distinct from dogmatic, is not yet a hundred years old. It has taken on a renewed interest among Catholics since the present supreme pontiff bespoke for it a larger measure of consideration. The volume to hand, forming part of the library of historical theology published under the direction of the professors of theology in the Catholic Institute of Paris, fills, with its companion volume, a want long and keenly felt. The inherent difficulty attending the composition of a work of this kind is condensation. This difficulty the author has successfully overcome by a series of notes in fine print, which allow of a more detailed consideration of important points, the fuller treatment of which would otherwise have to be sacrificed to the exigencies of method.

The first part of the work is taken up with a searching critical review of the modern conceptions of Paulinism—evolutionary, subjective, and radical—and the various attempts—all of them too simple—to define the doctrine of Saint Paul or to discover the centre of his thought. The phrase “theology of Saint Paul” is a misnomer, but it is in possession, as the author well says, and may rightly be understood as “the sum of the divine revelations handed down through the instrumentality of the Doctor of the Gentiles.” He disavows all responsibility for any other implications read into the phrase by interested parties. It has long been the fashion to seek for a central thought in the teachings of Saint Paul, and this tendency has mislead many critics into the formulation of ideas too simple altogether to hold the bursting thought of the many-sided genius they were studying. The Protestants imagined that Saint Paul was defining justification in the first five chapters of his epistle to the Romans, whereas he was refuting the Pharisees and the Judaizing party. It is this fact which Luther did not understand; hence his false theory of salvation by faith alone. Our author discusses and rejects all the mis-

guided attempts of the modern simplifiers to reduce the thought of St. Paul to a simple metaphysical formula. The thought of the Apostle to the Gentiles is neither theocentric, nor anthropocentric; it is Christocentric, and consequently his theology is a soteriology. The only comprehensive formula capable of expressing Saint Paul's mind fully, is, according to the author, the following: *Le Christ Sauveur associe tout croyant à sa mort et à sa vie*. Calvary is the true centre of Saint Paul's thought.

Is there, strictly speaking, a psychology of Saint Paul? The author decries the attempts of critics to reduce the Apostle to the level of the philosophers. A systematic psychology is no more to be found in his writings than a systematic philosophy. In fact, his psychology is biblical, and his conception of man is especially so, as may be seen in his employment of the word "heart" to designate the centre of all intellectual, moral, and sensible life, the seat of all the affections and passions. He shows some influence of the prevailing Greek culture, in the use of the terms "conscience" and "reason," but he is no crude dualist; rather is he an eclectic, who pressed into service the language of his time to express ideas personal and proper to himself, which did not come from words then in usage among the pagans, but sought these as vehicles of expression. It is vain to seek in his language the influence of Greek dualism or Asiatic pantheism, for the simple reason that it is not his psychology which inspires and dominates his theology, but the reverse. All this is brought out by the author with a wealth of detail and analysis truly admirable.

Then follow in order critical reconstructions of the doctrine of Saint Paul on the prehistory of the redemption, the person of the redeemer, and the fruits of the redemption, in which the many and varied teachings of the great Doctor are set forth in all their bearings, with an ease and grace which disposes of false interpretations, at the same time that the true meaning is made to shine forth clearly and convincingly, in the light of contemporary ideas for its setting and background, but with the distinct light of revelation made unmistakably evident all the while.

It is impossible, in the limited space allotted for this review, to give anything like an adequate idea of the precious contents of this volume. The great mistake of critics all along in reading Saint Paul has been their conspicuous neglect of the primarily spiritual, religious and moral character of his writings. He has been read in the false light of contemporary systems and made

to stand sponsor for the vagaries of modern rationalism. It is good to have this unscientific procedure rebuked and laid bare in all its naked sophistry. The whole tendency of our times is to simplify everything, to find what is called a master idea, which will explain all. The result is that liberty is taken with everything under the sun, as if forsooth a simple formula could be found for what is by nature complex. The author has dealt this method a mortal blow throughout, and in so doing has revealed the essential shortcomings of modern methods based on the systems of Kant and Hegel or on the pietism of Ritschl.

The life-size portrait of the Apostle to the Gentiles has been restored, and the caricatures drawn by critics have been revealed in all their prodigious deficiency, by the author of this scholarly volume, who attempts no composite photograph after the manner of his times, but seeks to paint true to life the distinct personality of Saint Paul. One impression which the modern critics should receive from a reading of this work of Father Prat is *breadth* of method and sympathy of treatment. Instead of running round in search of literary and philosophical ancestors to explain the genesis of his illustrious subject, Father Prat first tries to grasp the mind of Saint Paul in its complex fulness, and once he has succeeded in this, he has on his hands and before his eyes a problem of originality and distinctiveness to explain, and not one of dependence or reducibility. There is so much partial criticism now in vogue, so much of this habit of comparing detached phrases of one man with detached phrases of another, that it is a relief to see a criticism that aims at being integral and complete. The total effect of the employment of such a just method is to accentuate the smallness of prejudice and the greatness of truth.

Bibliographies, a philological and topical index, extensive notes, all the scientific apparatus of the best works of this kind, abound. In matter and manner, the volume is masterly. It ought, with its companion volume, to be on the shelf of every professor as a most welcome addition to his library; for it is a work which we have long needed from a Catholic source, and now have at last, to set over against the volumes of Stevens and others. *Si monumentum quaeris, circumspice!*

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Tractatus de Deo Creatore. G. Van Noort. Van Langenhuysen, Amsterdam, 1912. Pp. 204.

This is as clear a presentation of the subject-matter of this tract as the reviewer has ever seen. In fact, the clearness is remarkable both in thought and language. One is not surprised that a second edition has followed so fast on the heels of the first, the reason therefor being all too apparent. It would be invidious to single out one part of the treatment for special commendation; nevertheless we venture to say that the chapters on creation, the supernatural, and the effects of original sin are exceptionally well done. The criticism of evolution is cogent and incisive, the author manifesting a thorough grasp of his subject on its scientific and theological sides. The question of the supernatural is treated with a rare discrimination, and the student must be dull indeed who would not profit by the exposition. We think, however, that the author would have made his point better, on the vexed question of what St. Thomas meant by the naturalness of man's desire to see God, if, instead of trying to reduce the texts to logical consistency, as he does, a more satisfactory solution had been sought in the mental development of Saint Thomas himself. At the time that Saint Thomas wrote the statements which he afterwards corrected, he was still under the influence of Saint Augustine's historical point of view, and had not yet clearly formulated the distinction between actual and possible man. Hence it is only reasonable to suppose that his language should have been inconsistent, because of the change in the angle of view. This psychological way of settling the discrepancy in the texts seems more convincing than any attempt at a logical explanation of the difficulty. But this is a minor matter, made much of only by modernists in their grasping at straws, and detracts in no wise from the solidity of the exposition.

The reviewer also thinks that the "middle theory" of the divine motion is deserving of more than a passing mention in a foot-note (p. 37). The conception of an intrinsically efficacious motion which is not predetermining in character, or in any sense temporally prior to the creature's action, rids the problem of many conceptual difficulties. By conceiving the divine motion as identical with the operation of the creature, and by regarding the free mode of this motion as within it rather than without, the mul-

tiplication of the "concurus divini" is rendered unnecessary and superfluous. "Unicus motus nostrae operationi identicus" sufficit. This motion, efficacious in itself, is objectively conditioned by the consent of the creature if the latter be free. In other words, God does by one all-inclusive motion, containing both the motion and its mode, what in the other theories He does successively and not simultaneously. This theory of Cajetan, Pecci, Satolli, and others shows its worth by the consistent light it throws on the problems of foreknowledge, grace, and predestination. We feel quite sure that, on looking into the matter, the author will agree with the reviewer as to the title of this middle theory to a more detailed recognition. It avoids predeterminism and the "scientia media," and in doing this it makes a contribution to simplicity and clearness, which will appeal to the author's sense of these two virtues.

We are glad to see that the author rejects as insufficient explanations of original sin the theories of pact and inclusion, which increase rather than diminish the difficulty of accounting for its transmission to posterity. We are also impressed with his good sound reasoning on the meaning of the axiom, "vulneratus in naturalibus," which he rightly understands to imply a privative and not a positive intrinsic deterioration. Throughout, the impression is constant that every point has been well weighed in a good Catholic balance, and that the author has been most judicious in selecting both the matter and the manner of his presentation.

An alphabetical index, abundant notes, references, citations, and sagacious reflections make the volume still more valuable to the student. The former professor at Warmund is publishing his course, and this is the eighth volume that has appeared, or rather the second edition of the fifth volume in the series. We wish it and its companion volumes every success, and we recommend them to students and professors as models of clear and judicious presentation. The present work maintains the reputation established by its predecessors.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Lehrbuch der Dogmatik. Dr. Bernhard Hartmann. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1911. Pp. 861.

This manual of theology is out of the ordinary in many respects. It follows the thesis form of presentation, as all works of the kind

naturally should. But it strikes at modern errors directly and puts each thesis in a modern setting, with the result that the student sees Catholic truth in its bearings on the agitated problems of the day. Observing the true scholastic principle that scriptural, positive, and rational theology are distinct but not separate parts of one organic whole, the author presents all three unitedly, thus showing in a convincing manner that Catholic theology has its roots struck deep in revelation and is not the purely human product which modernists claim. This method of presentation equips the student to cope with modern thought directly, and sharpens his wits as well as his weapons for the adversaries with whom he is destined to deal. Each thesis has what is of faith clearly indicated right after the statement of the thesis itself. Then follow the Scripture proofs, the history, the proofs from reason, and the errors opposed to the doctrine. There is an orderliness about the whole volume which makes it of great value to the student.

The author seems to have everybody in view, student, teacher, adversary, and preacher. All may dip into this volume with profit. Special attention is paid to the Scripture proofs of doctrine, and thus one gap which modern adversaries try to open up between theology and Holy Writ is effectively closed. This is a most commendable feature of the work. Formerly the claim was put forth that dogmas were let down ready made from the skies. Then the modernists gave currency to the false idea that dogmas were nothing more than the product of man's reflection. To combat these two false conceptions it is necessary to show the supernatural origin of each dogma and to accentuate its agreement with revelation. This the author does most clearly and commendably, showing the initial statement and subsequent phases of the development of each dogma, and always insisting on the connection and agreement of each phase with revelation. The supernatural premisses of all the dogmas are pointed out and the logical consequences laid bare. It is a timely piece of work, and we wish it all success. A fine topical index crowns the usefulness of the volume.

It is good to see the actuality of treatment which characterizes this manual, especially the decisive word which the author has to say on current biblical problems connected with dogma. The work was first printed in manuscript form for his students at Paderborn. It is now sent forth to a larger public in the hope of accomplishing a larger good.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

La Paroisse. Discours choisis de nos orateurs, par le Chanoine Jean Vaudon. Tome I. L'Installation, La Prise de Possession. Les Prêtres de la Paroisse. Paris, Bloud & Cie, 1911. 4 frs.

Canon Vaudon has rendered a genuine service to the clergy in the publication of this collection of sermons by various authors on the priest and his relations to his parish, to the Church and to society. Its first purpose is to offer help and suggestion to the preacher, but it will also appeal to many as a book holding forth a high and correct ideal of the priestly vocation. *La Paroisse* is the first volume of a series which is to comprise discourses on religious subjects by some of the best modern pulpit orators of France, England, Belgium and Italy, and which will also, according to the promise of the compiler, enable us "entendre des voix laïques, ardentes, excitantes, généreuses."

JOHN T. CREAGH.

A Practical Handbook for the Study of the Bible, by Dr. Michael Seisenberger. Translated by Buchanan and Gerrard. New York, Joseph F. Wagner, 1911. 8vo., 491 pp. \$2.00 net.

This book of introduction to the study of the Bible contains in a succinct form a large amount of useful information. In the first 150 pages the author describes the geography, history, and sacred antiquities of the Holy Land, the tabernacle and its final substitute, the temple, the priesthood, the sacred rites, customs and festivals. The next hundred pages contain the General Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures, embracing the important subjects of Inspiration, the Canonical Books, the Original Texts, and the Ancient Versions. Then follows the Special Introduction of about 200 pages, in which the date, authorship, and synopsis of contents of the several books of the Old and New Testament are summarily treated. This part is characterized by a careful conservatism, kept well within the limits prescribed by the recent papal instructions and the decisions of the Biblical Commission. It offers a safe and rapid survey, suited to the seminarian as a textbook, and to the busy priest as a book of reference, but leaves untouched some of the difficulties raised by the serious study of

biblical questions. The rest of the book sets forth the principles of biblical interpretation. The works of reference are with but few exceptions German. As a bibliography, even for German readers, it makes no mention of some works of first rate importance. The translators could have made the list, even as it stands, more useful for English readers, had they indicated those which may be found in an English translation. The book has a useful series of maps, but the names of places are those, not of the Douay but of the King James' version.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Our Priesthood, by the Reverend Joseph Bruneau, S. S., D. D.
St. Louis, B. Herder, 1911. 12mo., 133 pp. 90 cents net.

A good book for spiritual refreshment is always welcome. Such is the book under review. The author, respected alike for his piety and learning, presents to the reader the series of conferences which he delivered to his seminary students in preparation for the various grades of Holy Orders. It is an admirable and highly edifying exposition of each rite of ordination, from tonsure to the holy priesthood, using the Latin text as the basis, and setting forth each grade in its meaning, its end, its dignity, its demand for special priestly virtues. Its style is easy, simple, direct, well suited to the matter in hand. As an exhortation to sacerdotal perfection it deserves great praise and widespread recognition.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Lourdes ; les Apparitions, par le Cte Jean de Beaucorps. Paris,
Bloud et Cie., 1911. 12mo., 300 pp.

The purpose of this little volume is to set forth the story of the life of Bernadette Soubirous and the apparitions which she had of the Blessed Mother of God above the famous grotto of Lourdes. It is not a new story, having been told with fulness of detail by Cros, d'Estrade, and retold in more succinct form by Bertrin, Boisserie, and others. To this more than twice told tale the present author has sought to give a certain freshness by supplementing the account with minor information obtained from personal inter-

views with some of those who knew Bernadette and were in part witnesses of her extraordinary experiences,—her brother, her aunt, and her companions Mlles. Ribettes, Moura, and Abadie. The first three parts of the volume describe the apparitions, tell how they were received by the common folk, the civil authorities, the clergy, and relate the edifying life of the simple peasant girl, particularly her last years in the convent of Nevers. The last part is devoted to a vindication of the reality of the apparitions.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

The Utopia of Sir Thomas More. Edited with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, by William Dallam Armes, M. L., Associate Professor of American Literature, University of California. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1912. Price 60 cts., net. Pp. lxi + 346.

Professor Armes has deserved well of all who are engaged in teaching advanced English, and his compact edition of More's *Utopia* is certain of a hearty welcome. The Introduction, to which much care has obviously been given, is in six parts. First there is a beautifully sympathetic life of More, containing all the principal incidents in his chequered but glorious career, and a detailed and affecting presentation of the dramatic scene enacted on the scaffold before the martyr's head was struck off. Then follows an account of the early editions of the *Utopia*, with an appreciation of the work as a first-fruit of the Renaissance in England. Two very illuminative short articles are devoted to More's literary art and the purpose of his book. Finally there is a satisfying account of Ralph Robynson and his translation of More's work from the original Latin into English. The text followed is in the main that used by Robynson in his first edition (1551), but the spelling and the paragraphing have been modernised. In an Appendix there are given certain matters that appeared for the first time in the second edition (1556) of Robynson's translation. There are 78 pages of scholarly notes, a glossary, and an analytical index.

The editor is to be warmly congratulated on the result of his labours, and the publishers have done their part by turning out

the book in clear type and in a handsome cover. I have rarely seen a better all-round edition of an English classic.

P. J. LENNOX.

An Unnatural Mother. By Slieve Foy. London, Lynwood and Co., Ltd., 12 Paternoster Row. 1911. Price 3s. 6d. Pp. 246.

Slieve Foy is a pseudonym which thinly veils the identity of a new Irish writer, whose real name is entirely racy of her native soil and of her Catholic creed, and who among a wide circle of friends and acquaintances is highly esteemed not only for her intellectual gifts but for the geniality and kindliness of her disposition. We who know her know that Slieve Foy has a heart of gold. For a long time past I have been looking out for her first novel, and as the years sped by I was somewhat disappointed when it came not. Hence I welcome with joy the evidence given by the book now before me that its author has not abandoned her earlier aspirations.

An Unnatural Mother shows that Slieve Foy possesses one essential gift of her craft: she knows how to tell a story of such interest that, in the words of Sir Philip Sidney, it "holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimney corner." Her plot construction is skilful, and the gently-touched but deftly-handled incidents on which she rests the pivotal points of her narrative are so natural as to give no clue to their consequences until the end is reached and one looks back, in a lingering and admiring review, on the artistic symmetry of the whole story. In character drawing she is also strong. Jane Mudie, Dr. Kingslake, and Alona are fine types. I think, however, that the author errs somewhat in following too closely the example of Mr. Charles Garvice, who has secured his popularity by depicting deep-dyed villains and smug-faced hypocritical rogues on the one hand, and on the other, unspotted, pure-souled, almost angelic mortals endowed, like Berkeley, with every virtue under heaven. Practice makes perfect, and I feel confident that Slieve Foy will in future novels prove that she realises the value of restraint in this important department of her work.

One other defect I ought also to point out. It is obvious that considerable difficulty was experienced in disposing of the beautiful but fiendish Mrs. Angleson, for while we are vaguely told that Nemesis with unsheathed sword is on her track, she remains in actual fact the wife of an American millionaire. Most women at all events will agree that this is scarcely poetic justice, and that there are worse punishments in the world than such a rôle necessarily implies. It may be, however, that the unnatural mother is being reserved for future service, and that we are to have a further instalment of her fate and fortunes when she leaves Paris with Mr. Jefferson and reaches her new Chicago home.

P. J. LENNOX.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Plan for the Affiliation of Colleges and High Schools to the University.

Pope Leo XIII, the founder of the Catholic University, says in his Apostolic Letter, "Magna Nobis Gaudia," of March 7, 1887: "We exhort you all that you shall take care to affiliate with your university, your seminaries, colleges, and other Catholic institutions according to the plan suggested in the Constitutions, in such a manner as not to destroy their autonomy."

The Pope in these words seems to have realized what has since become an urgent need in our educational system and to have anticipated a movement that is now quite general among our teaching communities. The establishment of the Schools of Philosophy, Letters and Science, offering courses of special interest and utility to lay students, naturally suggested some sort of articulation between the University and the colleges. On the other hand, the Sisters who attended the first session of the University Summer School in 1911, have frequently expressed their desire for affiliation with the University in preference to any arrangement that might be offered by other Universities, and some of our institutions have already applied for affiliation.

In view of these facts, and in order to establish a standard for our colleges and schools, as well as to secure due recognition for the institutions that are doing good work, the Trustees of the University, at their meeting on April 17, prescribed the following conditions for affiliation:

AFFILIATION OF COLLEGES

Any Catholic college may be affiliated to the University on these conditions:

1. The college must include at least seven chairs or departments and each chair or department must be under the separate direction of at least one professor or instructor.
2. Every instructor in the faculty must have at least the A. B. degree from a college of recognized standing and every head

of a department must have at least an M. A. degree from a college in good standing.

3. The equipment of the college in libraries and laboratories must be sufficient to secure effective work in the branches offered.
4. The college must require for entrance the completion of a four years' successful course in an accredited secondary school (high school), or the passing of entrance examinations on the subjects required in the curriculum of accredited secondary schools.
5. The college course must include 2,160 hours of class work distributed over four years. Two hours of laboratory work are to be regarded as equivalent to one hour of class work.

AFFILIATION OF HIGH SCHOOLS

Any Catholic high school may be affiliated on the following conditions:

1. The high school must give a course extending over four years and including a total of 15 units, of which at least three must be devoted to English and three to some other one subject.
Meaning of unit. A subject, *e. g.*, English, pursued four or five hours a week for a school year of from 36 to 40 weeks, constitutes a unit.
2. The subjects required with their respective values are: Religion, 2 units; English, 3 units; some other language, 2 units; mathematics, 2 units; social science (including history), 1 unit; natural science, 1 unit. Four units to be elective. They must be selected in such a way, however, as to give another course of 3 units; *i. e.*, one or more units must be advanced work in one of the subjects, other than English, enumerated above. Where Latin is to be pursued in college, at least 2 units of Latin must be taken in the high school.
3. Reasons for this curriculum.
 - (a) The high school has two functions: one is to give an education to students who will not go beyond the high school, the other is to give a proper preparation to students who will go to college. Hence some subjects are necessary for both classes of students, while other subjects are

necessary for only the one or the other class. All students need: Religion, English, mathematics, and a second language in addition to English. The student going to college with a view to theology, or law will need Latin, Greek and modern languages, together with social science; if he contemplates the study of medicine he will need more in the line of natural science, *e. g.*, biology and chemistry. The student who goes no farther than the high school will need more in the way of mathematics, modern languages, economics and the vocational subjects.

- (b) The proposed curriculum, by requiring advanced work in at least two subjects, prevents the smattering which gives the student a little of many things and not much of any thing.
- (c) At the same time sufficient latitude is allowed to enable the student to determine his vocation and to begin his preparation for it before he leaves the high school.
- (d) The curriculum does not prescribe Latin for four years; hence a student, who after one or two years in the high school, may discover a vocation for a career in which Latin is specially required, *e. g.*, the priesthood, can, without loss of time, take up Latin, say in the third and fourth years, and complete his study of that language during his four years at college.

EXECUTION OF THE PLAN OF AFFILIATION

With these standards of high school and college in view, the University will proceed as follows in affiliating any institution:

1. The school or college applying for affiliation shall submit to the University, on blanks supplied by the University, a detailed statement of its curriculum and equipment and of the qualifications of its professors or instructors.
2. If this statement is satisfactory it shall be verified by personal inspection through some person delegated by the University for that purpose.
3. Should this report be favorable, the institution in question shall be placed on the list of affiliated institutions.
4. The University shall then send to the institution an assignment of the matter for each subject offered in the curriculum of

- the institution and, at the end of the year, a set of examination questions sealed and to be opened in the class when assembled for examination. The papers are then to be sealed in the presence of the class and forwarded to the University, where they will be examined and marked according to a certain scale.
5. All students who successfully pass the examinations held during the four years in the high school shall be admitted without further examination to any college affiliated by the University. All students who successfully pass the examinations held during the four years in college shall be admitted, without further examination, into the courses in the University leading to the higher degrees. They must, however, reside in colleges approved by the University.
 6. If it should appear, either from the statement submitted or from inspection, that some modification is needed in order to comply with the requirements, the institution shall be placed on the list of tentative affiliation and, when the requirement is fulfilled, the institution shall be placed on the list of permanent affiliation.
 7. In all cases, either of permanent or of tentative affiliation, a record, as shown by examination papers, shall be kept by the University of the work done each year by each student in each affiliated institution, and a copy of this record shall be sent to the institution in which the student resides and to the high school or college from which the student graduated. Should it appear from such records that the work of an institution is unsatisfactory, the University shall endeavor to discover the cause of the defect and to indicate the remedy.
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The Sisters College Building Fund.

The Board of Trustees at their meeting on April 17 ratified the purchase of the property for the Sisters College and took the necessary steps to realize the project at the earliest possible date. Several Sisterhoods have already selected sites for their future homes on the grounds assigned for the community residences. They are having plans and specifications drawn up and

it is hoped that they will begin building operations in a very short time. In fact, they are only waiting for permission to break ground. This, however, can not be given to them until there is sufficient funds on hand to have the grounds prepared, the drainage taken care of and a heating conduit built from the University power house. Moreover, one of the academic buildings, at least, will be necessary in order to give room for the lectures and laboratory work. These various items will entail considerable outlay, \$100,000 at the least.

A few friends of Catholic education have already contributed or pledged \$14,225, and it is believed that the remainder of the sum will not be long withheld from so worthy a cause.

The Sisters College will unify the Catholic school system of the United States; its beneficent effects will be felt in every parochial school as well as in the academies and colleges conducted by our teaching Sisterhoods.

The following are the contributions and pledges thus far received:

Mrs. Samuel Hill.....	\$3,000
Mr. and Mrs. Cabot Ward.....	3,000
Rt. Rev. John Nilan, D. D.....	1,000
Rt. Rev. Mgr. Shahan, Rector.....	1,000
Miss Kate Jackson.....	1,000
Mrs. Cutting.....	1,000
Mrs. Robbins.....	1,000
A Friend.....	1,000
P. J. Gormley.....	500
T. E. Shields.....	500
A Friend.....	500
A Friend.....	200
John J. Early.....	100
P. J. Clark.....	100
A Friend.....	100
Mrs. Helen Morton.....	100
Mr. D. Sullivan.....	100
George Walker.....	50
Barber & Ross.....	50
P. J. Nee.....	50
Mrs. Gahan.....	25

Summer Session of the Sisters College.

The second summer session of the Sisters College of the Catholic University of America will be held from July 1 to August 9, 1912. The office of the Registrar will be open for the registration of Summer School pupils from 9 A. M. to 6 P. M. on Saturday, June 30.

SCOPE OF THE SUMMER SESSION

The summer session of the Sisters College has been organized to give Catholic teachers an opportunity to profit by the facilities which are offered by the University and to obtain under Catholic auspices whatever may be helpful to them in their work. The courses include both the professional subjects which are of vital importance to every teacher and the academic subjects which are found in the usual school curriculum. Each subject is treated with a view both to content and method, and the aim throughout is to base educational theory and practice on Catholic principles.

The high character of the work done by the students at the summer session last year and the indications pointing to a large increase in the number of students who will attend the coming session have made it seem advisable to widen the scope of the work. The courses given last year, with few exceptions, will be repeated and new courses will be organized to continue the work from the point reached in the courses of last summer. These continuation courses are marked by an asterisk and are open to all students who successfully completed the work in the preliminary course in 1911, or who pass a successful examination at the beginning of this session in the matter covered by last year's course. However, where the nature of the work is such as not to demand continuity of treatment, *e. g.*, history, the work of last year will not be repeated this year, as all students wishing to follow the course may take up the work of this year.

ACADEMIC CREDIT

- I. All the courses offered in the summer session are of collegiate grade. Each lecture course extends over 30 hours and if a successful examination be passed at the end of the session, will be credited towards a degree on the basis of 30 class hours taken at this University during any other portion of the school year. Laboratory courses cover ten

hours a week and will count as half that number of hours towards a degree.

- II. A student may not take more than four credit courses, but may attend occasional lectures in such other courses as she may see fit.
- III. Credits earned in other colleges of approved standing, when filed with the Registrar, will count towards degrees in this University.
- IV. Credits gained through correspondence courses, when duly certified and filed with the Registrar, will count towards degrees.
- V. Students may take examinations for advanced standing in any of the courses in the summer session, but notice of such intention should be sent to the Dean of the summer school before June 30. Examinations for advanced standing will take place on July 1.
- VI. Credits will also be allowed for successful experience in teaching. Application for such credit must be made to the Dean.
- VII. Two years of college work, or one-half of the total credit for the A. B. degree must be earned by courses taken in residence at colleges of approved standing. One year's college work, or one-fourth of the total credit earned, must represent work done in residence at this University.
- VIII. Degrees may be taken by the pupils of the summer session under the faculties of Science, Letters, or Philosophy by complying with the conditions set forth in the year-book of the University. The following group has been organized by the Department of Education with a view to the special needs of teachers. It will be noted that the courses are arranged in a schedule of two hours a week throughout the school year. Each of these courses may be covered in two summer sessions.

Courses Leading to the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

Subject:	<i>First Year</i>	<i>Hours per week.</i>
Religion	1	
Science and Art of Study, $\frac{1}{2}$ year, Primary		
Methods, $\frac{1}{2}$ year.....	2	
English	2	
Latin or Greek.....	2	
French or German.....	2	

Subject: *Hours per week.*

Chemistry, Physics or Biology (with laboratory)	4
Mathematics	2
History	2
	<hr/>
	17

Second Year

Religion	1
Philosophy of Education	2
Philosophy	2
English	2
Latin or Greek	2
French or German	2
Drawing (with 2 lectures, 4 hrs. practice) ..	4
Elective	2
	<hr/>
	17

Third Year

Religion	1
Psychology of Education	2
History of Education	2
School Management	2
Sociology	2
Music	2
Electives	6
	<hr/>
	17

Fourth Year

Religion	1
General Methods	2
History of Education	2
History of Philosophy	2
General Psychology	2
Ethics (1st Session) }	2
History (2d Session) }	
Electives	6
	<hr/>
	17

ADMISSION

Students are not required to pass an entrance examination, but if academic credit be desired the student should consult the Dean and present to him sufficient evidence to entitle her to matriculate as a college student. Registration and matriculation should be attended to as soon as possible after arrival at the University.

LOCATION

Students of the summer school arriving at the Union Station, Washington, should purchase tickets to University Station, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and have their trunks rechecked. The most convenient way to reach the University is by the electric car marked "Brookland" going north on North Capitol St., one square west of the station. On arriving at the University grounds, the student should go directly to the Registrar's office in McMahon Hall, where they will be assigned to the rooms reserved for them. Students who expect to arrive in Washington later than 6 P. M. should notify the Registrar in advance by letter or by telegram of the time of their arrival so that arrangements may be made to receive them.

EXPENSES

The tuition fee is \$25, which entitles the student to enter such courses as she may desire. No student, however, will be allowed to earn credits in more than four courses. An additional fee of \$5 will be charged for materials used in laboratory courses. All tuition fees should be paid to the Registrar at the time of registration. No reduction will be allowed in board or tuition for late entrance or for withdrawal before the end of the session.

ACCOMMODATIONS

Accommodations will be provided on the university grounds for as many Sisters as possible. For board and rooms a uniform charge of \$40 will be made for the six weeks of the summer school. An additional charge of \$10 will be made for Sisters who remain for the retreat. No Sisters will be allowed to board in private families; they must reside on the university grounds or in some convent. Special provision, however, may be made for temporary convents in furnished houses in Brookland. Application for accommodations should be made as early as possible. The more desirable rooms will be assigned to those first applying. No Sister should come to the University without previously having ascertained that suitable accommodations have been secured.

UNIVERSITY POST OFFICE

The university post office in McMahon Hall will be open during the summer session. To avoid confusion the address should include the title of the community as well as the Sister's name.

TEXT-BOOKS

Text-books used in the various courses may be obtained at the university book store, but it would be well wherever possible to forward a list of the text-books desired a few weeks before the opening of the summer school, so that a sufficient supply may be on hand.

SPIRITUAL RETREAT

At the close of the summer session an eight-day spiritual retreat will be conducted by the Very Reverend Paschal Robinson, O. F. M.

COURSES OF INSTRUCTION

Education

1. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION. A discussion of the facts, principles and theories which serve to determine the nature of the educative process and the aims and ideals of Catholic education. The course will be a continuation of that given last year under the title "The Principles of Education," and will complete the work called for in the second year of the Educational group. 9 A. M. daily.—*Thomas Edward Shields.*
2. PRIMARY METHODS. The general rules of method will be illustrated in the work of the first three grades. Special emphasis will be laid on the method of *teaching religion to little children.* 8 A. M. daily.—*Thomas Edward Shields.*
3. CATHOLIC SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT. Organization of Catholic schools; their relation to ecclesiastical authority; supervision; certification of teachers; standardization; curricula and text-books; details of school construction, equipment and maintenance; classroom management. 8 A. M. daily.—*Patrick J. McCormick.*
4. HISTORY OF EDUCATION. Renaissance and Reformation Period, continued. 9 A. M. daily.—*Patrick Joseph McCormick.*
5. METHODS OF TEACHING RELIGION. Historical outline of the subject; Christ's manner of teaching; the principles applied

by the Church; recent developments of method. 12 noon daily.—*Edward A. Pace.*

Philosophy

6. GENETIC AND COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY. A survey of the more important theories concerning mental development and the lower forms of consciousness. 10 A. M. daily.—*Edward A. Pace.*
- 6a. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION. An account of the mental processes and psychological laws upon which the theory and practice of education should be based. Particular attention is given in this course to the discussion and refutation of prevalent errors that tend to undermine Catholic faith and morals. 5 P. M. daily.—*Leo L. McVay.*
7. PSYCHOLOGY I. A general course, including historical outline, discussion of methods and current theories with special reference to problems bearing on the philosophy of mind.—*Charles A. Dubray.*
8. INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. A survey of the field of Philosophy; its divisions, methods and principal problems; the more important philosophical systems. 4 P. M. daily.—*Thomas V. Moore.*
9. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. Ancient Philosophy. Development of philosophic methods, systems and terminologies in the Oriental, Greek and Roman schools; influence on Patristic and Scholastic philosophy. 8 A. M. daily.—*William Turner.*
10. LOGIC I. Analysis of mental processes from the point of view of clearness, consistency and validity; examination of arguments; rules of reasoning; estimation of evidence; logic of the sciences. 10 A. M.—*William Turner.*
11. LOGIC II.* The course in Logic begun last year will be completed. The course is open to all students who took the work at the last summer session or who pass an examination in the matter covered last year. 12 noon daily.—*James J. Fox.*
12. ETHICS. 1. Character and scope of Ethics—various systems of Ethics; criticism of chief erroneous systems. 2. Conduct—human acts and their end; principles regarding responsibility. 3. Morality of human acts—on what it depends. 4. The norm of right conduct—the objective norm; the interpretative norm; the obligatory norm—ultimate, God; immediate consequences. 5. Natural law and its properties—the eternal law. 6. The nature and origin of right—right and duty are correlatives; the nature and origin of society—civil authority. 10 A. M. daily.—*James J. Fox.*

13. **SOCIOLOGY.** The course in sociology is designed as a general introduction to the science, laying the foundation for intensive study of special problems. During the session of 1912 endeavor will be made to explain the nature and scope of sociology, to analyse social groups, showing their physical and psychical bases, the forms and functions of association, the factors preserving social order and those making for change, and to outline the principal present-day problems and efforts at social reform. As far as possible, the work will be coördinated with the sciences of psychology, ethics and economics. Attention will be directed to the practical bearing of social theory. 5 P. M. daily.—*Francis P. Lyons.*
14. **ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.** Examination of the basic facts of economic life. The principles underlying production, consumption and valuation of goods and of services. 4 P. M. daily.—*Frank O'Hara.*

Mathematics

15. **ALGEBRA.** Selected topics in elementary algebra—factoring, fractions, linear equations and problems, theory of exponents, radicals, quadratics, simultaneous quadratics—with special reference throughout to graphical representation. 10 A. M. daily.—*James F. Connor.*
16. **ADVANCED ALGEBRA.*** Graphs of linear and quadratic expressions; progressions; logarithms; theory of equations: determinants. 10 A. M. daily.—*Aubrey E. Landry.*
17. **PLANE GEOMETRY.** Review of theorems in Books I and II, followed by a more extended treatment of the later books. Solution of originals will be insisted on throughout the course. 9 A. M. daily.—*Alfred Doolittle.*
18. **GEOMETRY.*** The first part of this course will be devoted largely to drill in the solution of originals in plane geometry. It is expected that from one-third to one-half of the time will be spent on solid geometry. 11 A. M. daily.—*James F. Connor.*
19. **PLANE TRIGONOMETRY.** Functions of acute angles; the right triangle; extension of formulæ to angles of any magnitude; functions of the sum and difference of two angles, and allied formulæ; the oblique triangle. The theory and use of logarithms will be treated in connection with the solution of triangles. 11 A. M. daily.—*Alfred Doolittle.*
20. **PLANE ANALYTIC GEOMETRY.*** Rectangular and polar coördinates; the straight line and circle; transformation of coördinates; tangents and normals; loci; conic sections. 11 A. M. daily.—*Aubrey E. Landry.*

Science

21. PHYSICS I. Mechanics, Sound, Light. 3 P. M. daily.—*Louis H. Crook.*

22. PHYSICS II.* Heat, Magnetism, Electricity. 5 P. M. daily.—*Louis H. Crook.*

Laboratory work to accompany both courses in Physics will be taken under Louis H. Crook with the assistance of John Joseph Widmayer and John J. Greer. The experiments will familiarize the students with all of the instruments used in the accurate quantitative measurement of the most important magnitudes in the subjects studied. Two hours daily.

23. CHEMISTRY I. Elementary Chemistry. The matter covered will be that usually treated in elementary text-books on chemistry. In the laboratory work McPherson and Henderson's Laboratory Manual will be supplemented and varied by the Instructor's notes. Five lectures a week, one written quiz, and ten hours laboratory. 3 to 6 P. M. daily.—*Ignatius A. Wagner.*

24. CHEMISTRY II.* The heavy metals; procedure of quantitative analysis; three lectures a week with daily written exercises in balancing equations. The laboratory work will deal with practical qualitative analysis. Twelve hours a week. 3 to 6 P. M.—*H. B. Froning.*

25. BIOLOGY I. In this course the student will study in the laboratory type forms ranging among animals from the amoeba to the insects and among plants from the unicellular forms to the mosses. As far as possible such types will be selected as have been found suitable for work in Biology in secondary schools. The lectures will be based upon the laboratory work. The course will consist of one lecture and two laboratory hours per day and is open to students beginning the work in Biology.

26. BIOLOGY II. In this course the number of hours and general plan of the work will be the same as for course I. The types for study will be selected among the animals from the mollusks and the vertebrates and among the plants from the ferns and the seed plants. This course is open to those who completed the course given last year or who have had the equivalent of Course I. 3 to 6 P. M., daily.—*J. B. Parker and James A. Geary.*

Languages

27. ENGLISH I. RHETORIC IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. The principles of rhetoric and the forms of discourse; the fundamentals of English Prose Composition; frequent practice in theme writing, illustrating narration, description,

- exposition, and argumentation; private criticism and correction. 11 A. M. daily.—*Sarah Devlin.*
28. ENGLISH II. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. STUDY OF SELECTED WORKS. (a) Outline History of English Literature from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century. (b) Study of the following works: (1) Pope: Satires and Epistles. (2) Shelley: Prometheus Unbound. (3) Macaulay: Essay on Addison. 11 A. M. daily.—*Francis J. Hemelt.*
29. ENGLISH III. ADVANCED ENGLISH PROSE COMPOSITION. The Technique of English Style; frequent practice in the writing of the Essay and the Short Story; private criticism and correction. 12 noon daily.—*Francis J. Hemelt.*
30. ENGLISH IV. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. STUDY OF SELECTED WORKS. (a) Outline History of English Literature from the Seventh to the Seventeenth Century. (b) Study of the following works: (1) Chaucer: Prologue to the Canterbury Tales. (2) Sidney: Defence of Poesie. (3) Shakespeare: Macbeth. 10 A. M. daily.—*Patrick J. Lennox.*
31. ENGLISH V. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. Intensive study of the Elizabethan and Jacobean Period, with Comparative Literature. 11 A. M. daily.—*Patrick J. Lennox.*
32. ENGLISH VI. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. Intensive study of the Pre-Shakespearean English Drama, with Comparative Literature, and the Technique of the Drama. 12 noon daily.—*Sigourney W. P. Fay.*
33. LATIN I. For beginners. Pearson's "The Essentials of Latin." 3 P. M. daily.—*James J. O'Connor.*
34. LATIN II. Caesar's Gallic War—Interpretation. Three hours per week. Historical outline of Latin literature, two hours per week. 4 P. M. daily.—*James J. O'Connor.*
35. LATIN III. Cicero's *Orations Against Catiline* or Essay on Old Age. Two hours per week. Versification with applications to Vergil, Ovid and Horace. One hour per week. Outline of the syntax of the noun. One hour per week. Prose composition based on Bradley's *Arnold's Latin Prose Composition*. One hour per week. 3 P. M. daily.—*Herbert F. Wright.*
36. LATIN IV. Livy's *Orations*—Analysis and interpretation. 4 P. M. daily.—*Herbert F. Wright.*
37. LATIN V. Cicero "Pro Lege Manilia": analysis and interpretation. *Latin Composition* based on "Pro Lege Manilia." Virgil "Georgics" extracts from II and IV. Grammar: *Syntax of Nouns and Pronouns*. Information on Text-Books and Methods. *History of Latin Literature*. I. General Outline. II. Special study of Principal Writers. 12 noon daily.—*B. Marcetteau.*
38. GREEK I. For beginners. 8 A. M. daily.—*George W. Hoey.*

39. GREEK II. Advanced; matter will be arranged to meet needs of pupils. 9 A. M. daily.—*George W. Hoey.*
40. GREEK III. Literature. 11 A. M. daily.—*George W. Hoey.*
41. GERMAN I. For beginners. 9 A. M. daily.—*Paul Gleis.*
42. GERMAN II. Advanced course; matter will be arranged to meet students' needs. 10 A. M. daily.—*Paul Gleis.*
43. FRENCH I. French sounds; elements of grammar; drill in verbs; translation of French into English and of English into French. 11 A. M. daily.—*Xavier Teillard.*
44. FRENCH II. Study of Idioms; reading of classical and modern writers; composition; conversation. 12 noon daily.—*Xavier Teillard.*
45. SPANISH LANGUAGE. Orthography and syntax combined; grammar; reading; translations; dialogues and their analysis; selections from *Don Quixote* with analysis; conversation; instructions for private study. 10 A. M. daily.—*Charles W. Currier.*
46. SPANISH LITERATURE. Origin of Romance languages; the Troubadours and Troveres; dialects of the Spanish peninsula; dawn of Castilian literature; secondary epoch of Spanish poetry with the original meters; the Cid ballads; the Dance of Death and other songs; the miracle plays and the early Spanish drama; romances of Chivalry; history of the 14th and 15th centuries; the romance, Juan Boscam, Garcilaso de la Vega; the Italian meter, the sonnet; Diego Hurtado de Mendoza; history of the 16th century; the great literary triumvirate; Cervantes; prose in the 16th and 17th centuries; Lopez de Vega; Calderon de la Barca; the mystics in prose and poetry; dramatic school of Cervantes; other eminent dramatists; poets of note in both hemispheres; the Araucana; the decline of literature in the 17th and 18th centuries; prose writers in Spain in the 19th century; poetry in the 19th century; changes in language and literature since the 17th century; general review of the history of Spanish literature. 11 A. M. daily.—*Charles W. Currier.*

History

47. CHURCH HISTORY. The modern period of the history of the Church will be considered. Special attention will be paid to the causes and results of such important movements as the Reformation and the French Revolution, the work and influence of the Council of Trent and the success of the counter-reformation. The problems which confront the teacher in the teaching of Church History will be discussed. 3 P. M. daily.—*Nicholas A. Weber.*
48. GENERAL HISTORY. This course will consider the period extending from 1273 to 1517. It will not be confined to the

general presentation of the civil history of the various states, but will devote special attention to the great intellectual movement of the time and state its influence on the eventful history of the subsequent period. Frequent occasion will present itself to discuss the methods of historical instruction. 4 p. m. daily.—*Nicholas A. Weber.*

49. AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY. This course includes a brief synopsis of the progress of geographical science from the era of the Phœnicians to the discovery of America. The exploration and settlement of the New World is treated more fully. A careful examination is made of the development of England's North American colonies. An account of the principal events of the era of American independence will complete the course. 11 a. m. daily.—*Charles H. McCarthy.*
50. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY. The purpose of these lectures is to enable the student to read with profit the treatises on political science and constitutional law. In fact, they give a sufficient outline of the elements of both sciences and simplify very much the teaching of civil government. The course will be similar to that given during the summer of 1911. 12 noon daily.—*Charles H. McCarthy.*

Art

51. FREEHAND DRAWING. Drawing of simple geometrical solids and casts from the antique; the representation of form in line, light and shade; the composition of simple masses and linear perspective. 8 a. m. daily.—*Frederick V. Murphy.*
52. DECORATIVE ART. The study of Historic Ornament and the theory and use of color as a medium of expression, supplemented by exercises in out-door sketching. 9 a. m. daily.—*Frederick V. Murphy.*
53. MECHANICAL DRAWING. Use of instruments; line shading; problems in geometrical drawing—orthographic and isometric projection; sketching and lettering. 3 p. m. daily.—*Fred K. Merriman.*

Music

54. MUSIC I. Harmony, counterpoint, musical composition. 8 a. m. daily.—*A. L. Gabert.*
55. MUSIC II. Gregorian Chant—History, theory, practice, accompaniment. 11 a. m. daily.—*A. L. Gabert.*
56. MUSIC III. METHOD. The relation of school music to the public in general; the purpose of teaching music in schools; the treatment of monotones; the major scale, with studies and songs in step-wise progressions; the extended scale;

skips, the tonic, sub-dominant and dominant chords; rhythm in undivided beats; wider skips as found in the inversion of the chords; sharps approached step-wise from above; flats approached step-wise from below; the evenly divided beat; two-voice music; the assignment of parts; the unevenly divided beat; accidentals by skips; four sounds to the beat; three-voice music; the assignment of parts, etc. 5 P. M. daily.—*Samuel W. Cole.*

56a. MUSIC IV. SIGHT SINGING AND RECOGNITION OF PITCH. 4 P. M. daily.—*Samuel W. Cole.*

Library Science

57. Study of standard works of reference, bibliography, principal schemes of classification, codes of cataloguing rules, various forms of cataloguing, charging systems, accession methods, book buying, book binding, indexing, library organization. This course will include the following five lectures of general interest, on dates to be announced later:

1. History of Printing.
 2. Bibliography.
 3. Standard works of reference.
 4. Copyright law in the United States, International copyright law.
 5. Organization of library.
- 10 A. M. daily.—*Joseph Schneider.*

SCHEDULE OF COURSES

A. M.

8	2	Primary Methods.....	<i>Shields</i>
	3	Catholic School Administration.....	<i>McCormick</i>
	9	History of Philosophy.....	<i>Turner</i>
38		Greek I.....	<i>Hoey</i>
51		Freehand Drawing.....	<i>Murphy</i>
54		Music I.....	<i>Gabert</i>

9	1	Philosophy of Education.....	<i>Shields</i>
	4	History of Education.....	<i>McCormick</i>
17		Geometry I.....	<i>Doolittle</i>
39		Greek II.....	<i>Hoey</i>
41		German I.....	<i>Gleis</i>
52		Decorative Art.....	<i>Murphy</i>

A. M.

10	6	Genetic Psychology.....	<i>Pace</i>
	10	Logic I.....	<i>Turner</i>
	12	Ethics	<i>Fox</i>
	15	Algebra	<i>Connor</i>
	16	Advanced Algebra.....	<i>Landry</i>
	30	English IV.....	<i>Lennox</i>
	42	German II.....	<i>Gleis</i>
	45	Spanish I.....	<i>Currier</i>

11	18	Geometry II.....	<i>Connor</i>
	19	Trigonometry	<i>Doolittle</i>
	20	Analytic Geometry.....	<i>Landry</i>
	27	English I	<i>Devlin</i>
	28	English II.....	<i>Hemelt</i>
	31	English V.....	<i>Lennox</i>
	40	Greek III.....	<i>Hoey</i>
	43	French I	<i>Teillard</i>
	46	Spanish II.....	<i>Currier</i>
	49	American Political History.....	<i>McCarthy</i>
	55	Music II.....	<i>Gabert</i>

12	5	Methods of Teaching Religion.....	<i>Pace</i>
	11	Logic II.....	<i>Fox</i>
	29	English III.....	<i>Hemelt</i>
	32	English VI.....	<i>Fay</i>
	37	Latin V.....	<i>Marcetteau</i>
	44	French II.....	<i>Teillard</i>
	50	American Constitutional History.....	<i>McCarthy</i>

P. M.

3	7	General Psychology.....	<i>Dubray</i>
	21	Physics I.....	<i>Crook</i>
		Physics (Laboratory)	
	23	Chemistry I.....	<i>Wagner</i>
	24	Chemistry II.....	<i>Froning</i>
	25	Biology I.....	<i>Parker</i>
		Biology (Laboratory)	
	33	Latin I.....	<i>O'Connor</i>
	35	Latin III.....	<i>Wright</i>
	47	Church History	<i>Weber</i>
	53	Mechanical Drawing.....	<i>Merriman</i>

P. M.

4	8	Introduction to Philosophy.....	<i>Moore</i>
14		Political Economy.....	<i>O'Hara</i>
		Physics (Laboratory)	
		Chemistry (Laboratory)	
		Biology (Laboratory)	
34		Latin II.....	<i>O'Connor</i>
36		Latin IV.....	<i>Wright</i>
48		General History.....	<i>Weber</i>
56a		Music IV.....	<i>Cole</i>
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5	13	Sociology	<i>Lyons</i>
22		Physics II.....	<i>Crook</i>
		Physics (Laboratory)	
		Chemistry (Laboratory)	
26		Biology II.....	<i>Parker</i>
		Biology (Laboratory)	
56		Music III.....	<i>Cole</i>
57		Library Science.....	<i>Schneider</i>
6a		Psychology of Education.....	<i>McVay</i>

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Visit of Cardinal Farley. On March 27, His Eminence, Cardinal Farley of New York, Chairman of the Visiting Committee of the Board of Trustees of the University, paid his first visit to the University since his elevation to the Cardinalate. He was formally welcomed by Rt. Rev. Rector of the University at a dinner given in his honor. In his address, the Rector paid a notable tribute to the Cardinal as an educator and patron of learning, recounting his labors in behalf of Catholic schools in the archdiocese of New York and in behalf of the Catholic University on whose Board of Trustees he has served from the beginning. In his response Cardinal Farley expressed his great pleasure in witnessing the days of prosperity of the University, and pledged his continued interest in its welfare. After the dinner a reception was held at which the Presidents of the affiliated colleges and the members of the University faculties were presented to the Cardinal.

Knights of Columbus Fund. At the meeting of the national Board of Directors of the Knights of Columbus held in Washington, D. C., on April 2, it was announced that the Catholic University fund had reached the sum of \$385,000 and that the remaining \$115,000, necessary to complete the endowment, would be collected before the end of the year. This endowment which the order is endeavoring to establish will provide for the board and tuition of fifty students at the University.

Extension of School Year. At the recent meeting of the Board of Trustees the school-year was extended to thirty-two and a half weeks by adding one week at the beginning and one at the end of each year.

Gibbons Hall. The Trustees also authorized the completion of Gibbons Hall, at a total cost of \$240,000. The Hall

will be ready for occupancy by October 1, and will accommodate 130 students. The basement of the East wing will contain a costly chapel capable of seating 250.

Summer School. The prospectus of the Summer School has just been issued. It offers 70 courses in professional and academic subjects, and will employ 36 professors and instructors.

Athletics. The baseball season is now in full swing, and as the subjoined list of games shows, it has been an unusually successful one for the University team.

March 23, Baltimore Polytechnic 1, Cath. Univ. 7; March 25, Swarthmore 2, Cath. Univ. 3; March 26, Swarthmore 6, Cath. Univ. 3; March 30, Johns Hopkins 2, Cath. Univ. 18; April 2, Holy Cross 2, Cath. Univ. 4; April 6, Univ. of Vermont 8, Cath. Univ. 1; April 8, Amherst 0, Cath. Univ. 5; April 9, Trinity College (Conn.) 6, Cath. Univ. 12; April 10, William and Mary 2, Cath. Univ. 15; April 13, Maryland Agricultural College 3, Cath. Univ. 9; April 15, Harvard 15, Cath. Univ. 1; April 19, Washington and Lee 2, Cath. Univ. 1; April 20, Va. Military Academy 0, Cath. Univ. 3; April 22, Villanova College 0, Cath. Univ. 12; April 24, A. and M. of North Carolina 2, Cath. Univ. 1; April 27, Gallaudet 2, Cath. Univ. 8; May 4, Trinity College (N. C.) 1; Cath. Univ. 23; May 14, Villanova College 5, Cath. Univ. 8; May 16, Notre Dame 2, Cath. Univ. 8; May 18, Navy 0, Cath. Univ. 1.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII.

October, 1912.

No. 7.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

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No. 7.

THE METAPHYSICS OF PRAGMATISM.

"Say that by it I hoped to round out my system, which now is too much like an arch built only on one side," wrote Prof. James in a memorandum a short while before his death in August, 1910, directing the publication of this volume,¹ in which he exposes the metaphysics of Pragmatism, and which, unfortunately, he was never able to complete.

For years James had cherished the purpose of stating coherently and systematically his views on the fundamental problems of metaphysics. He realized the fragmentariness of his empirical descriptive studies of mental phenomena, the importance of many problems suggested but not usually amplified there. He saw the inevitable demand which the science of psychology makes for a further philosophical discussion of these questions. At the same time, his former works, with their statements of facts and laws scientifically established, offered a basis to which this special discussion could constantly refer for its own grounds in experience.

As occasion offered, it is true, Prof. James had gone more deeply into some of these questions, *e. g.*, in his volumes on: *Pragmatism*, and *A Pluralistic Universe*. But their interconnection and their bearing upon other problems remained

¹ *Some Principles of Philosophy*, by William James, Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1911.

to be established. And this he undertakes to do in the present volume, and carries out with a systematic conciseness and clarity begotten of long meditation and deepening insight. As the most mature expression of his thought it is of special value to the student of philosophy.

It is the study of the universe at large, not so much the description of its details, that we aim at in a consideration of these larger problems. If such a study meets at times with decided hostility in certain quarters; if the earnest seekers after elusive solutions have to suffer not infrequently "from man's native rudeness of mind which maliciously enjoys deriding long words and abstractions," and the philosopher is likened to "a blind man in a dark room, looking for a black hat that is not there," James' genial attitude towards all such "deriders of wise men" is well calculated to take the edge off their pointed shafts.

Philosophy in the full sense is only "man thinking,"² thinking about generalities rather than about particulars; and if he find matter for puzzle and astonishment where no one else does, it can scarcely be denied that it is an essential part of a liberal education to know the chief rival attitudes towards life, as the history of human thinking has developed them, and to have heard some of the reasons they can give for themselves. "At a technical school a man may grow into a first-rate instrument for doing a certain job, but he may miss all the graciousness of mind suggested by the term liberal culture. He may remain a cad and not a gentleman, intellectually pinned down to his one narrow subject, literal, unable to suppose anything different from what he has seen, without imagination, atmosphere, or mental perspective."³

And as to the first whence and the last whither of the cosmic process, men will always eagerly inquire. Besides, how many metaphysical problems confront us, lying as it were, midway between those two extremes? What is thought, and what are

² *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

things? How are they connected? What do we mean when we say truth? How can there be a world at all, and might it as well not have been? What is God? How are mind and body joined? Do they act on each other? How does anything act on anything else? How can anything change, or grow out of another thing?

Or we may summarize all these questions and many others like them, with Kant, thus: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?

I.

It is on the answer to the first of these three questions that depend the answers that have been given in the past, and shall be given in the future, to the others. The limits and validity of our knowledge have thus become the foundation of all metaphysics.

James' metaphysics accordingly may be summed up in two words: the limits and validity of our knowledge are established by the pragmatic rule; and this in turn leads us in the end to conceive the cosmos as a pluralistic universe.

Rationalism and empiricism, according to James, have filled the history of metaphysics with their warfare. Rationalists are the men of principles; empiricists the men of acts. Rationalist thinking proceeds most willingly by going from wholes to parts, deducing facts from principles; while empiricist thinking proceeds by going from parts to wholes, and explains principles as inductions from facts.⁴ Thus Plato, the arch-rationalist, explained the details of nature by their participation in "ideas," which all depended on the supreme idea of the "good."

Rationalist theories are usually optimistic, supplementing the experienced world by clean and pure ideal constructions, and claiming absolute finality for their system. Aristotle and Plato, the scholastics, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant and Hegel, are examples of this.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

The temper of finality is foreign to empiricist minds. They aim at accuracy of detail rather than at completeness and are contented to be fragmentary. If they are dogmatic about their method of building "on hard facts," they are willing to be sceptical about the conclusions reached by the method at a given time. Socrates, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, the two Mills, F. A. Lange, J. Dewey, F. C. S. Schiller, Bergson, and other contemporaries, are specimens of this type.⁵

If this classification seems rather arbitrary to us, suffering as it does, from overgeneralization, it is in the latter camp that James himself takes his stand. His psychological theory of cognition hinges on the distinction between percept and concept. "Things" are known to us by our senses and are called "presentations," to distinguish them from the "ideas" or "representations," which we may have without the help of our senses. The former may also be called sensations or percepts, feelings, intuition, the immediate flux of conscious life. The latter may be called concepts or thoughts. Sensation and thought in man are mingled; concepts flow out of percepts and into them again. Percepts are continuous, concepts are discrete; not in their being, for conception as an act is part of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each other in their several meanings. Each concept means just what it singly means, and nothing else. The perceptual flux as such, on the contrary, *means* nothing, and is but what it immediately *is*, a much-at-once, with no distinct boundaries, but showing duration, intensity, complexity or simplicity, interestingness, excitingness, pleasantness or their opposites.

Out of the aboriginal sensible muchness attention carves out objects, which conception then names and identifies forever: in the sky "constellations," on the earth, "beach," "sea," "cliff," "bushes"; out of time we cut "days and nights"; we say *what* each part of the sensible continuum is, and all these abstract *whats* are concepts. The intellectual life of man consist almost wholly in this substitution of the concept-

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

ual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally comes.⁶

The expression of the unvarying relations which the mind discovers between abstract concepts, and the combination of them, gave rise to various sciences. The value of these rests chiefly on the immutable character of the propositions they are composed of, as it raises them above the mere particular, transient facts.

This, according to James, is the rationalistic view; and because under this appellation he has included such widely divergent thinkers as Aristotle and Kant, he accuses rationalists of admitting that it is impossible to explain such concepts as God, perfection, eternity, infinity, immutability, identity, absolute beauty, truth, justice, freedom, necessity, duty, worth, as results of practical experience, as having their origin in sensible perception.

The empiricist view, he claims, holds that they do result from practical experience. And truly, Aristotle and the schoolmen would willingly subscribe to this particular dogma of James' empirical creed. *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, was their oft-repeated slogan. And it is strange that James should have been unaware of this point, or should have failed to grasp its full meaning.

But a more important question than that of the psychological origin of our concepts is that of their functional use and value,—the epistemological question of their truth.

In a concept, James holds, we must distinguish its *function* and its *content*. The concept "man" is three things: 1. the word itself; 2. a vague picture of the human form which has its own value in the way of beauty or not; 3. an instrument for symbolizing certain objects from which we may expect human treatment when occasion arises. Similarly, of triangle, cosine,—they have their *substantive* value, both as words and as images suggested; but they also have a *functional* value whenever they lead us elsewhere in discourse.⁷ Whatever its sub-

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

stantive value may be, the more important part of a concept's significance consists in the consequences to which it leads. And these may either lie in the way of *making us think* or, in the way of *making us act*. Hence the use of the *pragmatic rule* in the interpretation of concepts. The Pragmatic Rule is: test every concept by the question: what sensible difference to anybody will its truth make; and you are in the best possible position for understanding what it means, and for discussing its importance. If questioning whether a certain concept be true or false, you can think of absolutely nothing that would practically differ in the two cases, you may assume that the alternative is meaningless, or that your concept is no distinct idea.

This rule applies to concepts of every order of complexity, from simple terms to propositions uniting many terms. "Particular consequences are the only criterions of a concept's meaning, and the only test of its truth";⁸ in other words, the significance of concepts consists always in their relation to perceptual particulars;⁹ their essential office is to coalesce with percepts again, to bring us back to the fulness of original reality: the perceptual flux from which they have been originally distilled, and which is self-sufficing, as all lower creatures, in whom conscious life goes on by reflex action, sufficiently show.

The ascribing of causes to events and the uniform conditions that regulate those causes, as is done in physical science; the establishment of comparisons and identifications, as is done in mathematics; in short, the substitution of concepts and their connections for the immediate perceptual flow, widens enormously our mental panorama. Had we no concepts, we should live simply, "getting" each successive moment of experience, as the sessile sea-anemone on its rock receives whatever nourishment the wash of the waves may bring. But with concepts we go in quest of the absent, meet the remote, actively turn

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

this way or that, bend our experience and make it tell us whither it is bound. We change its order, run it backwards, bring far bits together and separate near bits, jump about over its surface instead of plowing through its continuity, string its items on as many ideal diagrams as our mind can frame. All these are ways of *handling* the perceptual flux, and *meeting* distant parts of it; and as far as this primary function of conception goes, we can only conclude it to be a faculty superadded to our barely perceptual consciousness for its use in practically adapting us to a larger environment than that of which brutes take account. We *harness* perceptual reality in concepts in order to drive it better to our ends.¹⁰ But these concepts must never be treated as if they gave a deeper quality of truth. The deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual experience; here alone do we acquaint ourselves with continuity or the immersion of one thing in another; here alone with self, with substance, with qualities, with activity in its various modes, with time, with cause, with change, with novelty, with tendency and with freedom.¹¹

How this return to the primitive flux of life, to the flow of feeling "proves the essential identity of philosophy with science."¹² is indeed hard to understand. For science is nothing if not a carefully built-up system of fixed and immutable laws, far removed from the uncritical flow of the perceptions that come and go unceasingly in our daily life, and do not wholly leave us when we are asleep. It is also fallacious to think that this brings us in a closer contact with reality, with things as they are, unless we admit James' *a priori* idealistic assumption: that things are nothing but our percepts: "Certain grouped sensations are all that corporeal substances are known as; therefore the only meaning which the word 'matter' can claim is that it denotes such sensations and their groupings."¹³ But this seems merely the supreme effort of idealism *aux abois* to bring us in contact with things at any

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 122-123.

price whatever, even if it be at the sacrifice of reason. As for the Pragmatic Rule, that practical consequences are the only test of a concept's truth, that we must value doctrine according to its result in conduct, James himself shows how arbitrary the application of it is in the examples he adduces.¹⁴ Thus, he says, when we apply the Pragmatic Rule to the concept "God," we find that it means that "you can dismiss certain kinds of fear." But can we? That alternative supposition that God may exist, that consequently we may not dismiss certain kinds of fear, would be a truth "that makes some particular difference in the course of human experience." Again, to take another example of Prof. James: the application of the Pragmatic Rule to the concept "cause," means, he says, "that you may expect certain sequences." But what allows you to assert that they are merely "sequences" and not "products"? You are once more merely begging the question at issue by using the Pragmatic Rule. These examples go to show that the Pragmatic Rule is not what it is claimed to be: an ultimate criterion of truth, that "puts us in the best possible condition for understanding what a concept means, and for discussing its importance." On the contrary, it presupposes in the one using it, assent to a well-defined philosophical system with all its specific tenets and their consequences.

James' theory of "faith and the right to believe" stands in close relation to his pragmatic doctrine.

In most emergencies we have to act on probability and incur the risk of error. "Probability and possibility" are terms applied to things of the conditions of whose coming we are (to some degree at least) ignorant. If we are entirely ignorant of the conditions that make a thing come, we call it a bare possibility. If we know that some of the conditions already exist, it is for us in so far forth a "grounded possibility." It is in that case "probable" just in proportion as the said conditions are numerous, and few hindering conditions are in sight.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

When the conditions are so numerous and confused that we can hardly follow them, we treat a thing as probable in proportion to the frequency with which things of that kind occur.¹⁵ Now, the metaphysical and religious alternatives are largely of this kind. We have but this one life to make up our attitude towards them; no insurance company is there to cover us, and if we are wrong, our error, even though it be not as great as the old hell-fire theology pretended, may yet be momentous. In such questions as that of the *character* of the world, of life being moral in its essential meaning, of our playing a vital part therein, etc., it would seem as if a certain *wholeness* in our faith were necessary. To calculate the probabilities and act fractionally, and treat life one day as a farce, and another day as very serious business, would be to make the worst possible mess of it.¹⁶ But is it not a fact made clear by psychological introspection, that faith is more than a question of mere probabilities? And does not experience confirm the fact that of many important truths we admit on faith—and we speak here of mere human faith—we are absolutely certain? If we were not,—if we were not certain of the existence of the city of Peking, which we have never seen, of the existence of King George, whom we have never met—innumerable beliefs would be immediately wiped out of our lives as having no truth-value whatever. But human faith does give us certainty, derived from the testimony of others who know from empirical *evidence*. It ultimately rests on as firm a foundation as any one of that small body of truths which we have demonstrated and made evident to our own satisfaction.

Without thrusting in here any discussion of the supernatural—which would be disclaimed *a priori* as non-existent,—we may add that religious faith, in the same way, gives rise to an absolute certainty, which also ultimately rests on the authority of those who have seen and heard.

The Pragmatic Rule therefore falls very much short of all the advantages claimed for it as a criterion of truth.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 226.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 227-228.

II.

We must, however, investigate further the use Prof. James makes of it when he endeavors to ascertain the ultimate nature of reality.

Monism contends that there is only one being, an all-inclusive absolute, of which all other reality, whether facts or beings, are manifestations, a universe of "each in all and all in each."

To this conception James opposes his theory of "a pluralistic universe," holding that the entire cosmos, instead of being "a genuine unit," is but "a mass."

That this claim is most germane to experience no one will deny. As James well says: "the irreducible outness of *any* thing, however infinitesimal, from *any* thing else, in any respect would be enough, if it were solidly established, to ruin the monistic doctrine. And to say that there is no disconnection, that the separations we uncritically accept are illusory,—that reality does not exist in the shape of *eaches*, *everys*, *anys*, *either*s, but only in the shape of an *all* or a *whole*, is on the face of it simply silly, for we find practical disconnections without number. My pocket is disconnected with Mr. Morgan's bank account, and King Edward's mind is disconnected with this book." ¹⁷

And James very pointedly punctures those vague hankerings after a "unity that is indescribable," after that wonderful, mystical "One," as exemplified not only in Plotinus and in Hindooism, but also in many modern pantheists.¹⁸

Scholasticism as he properly remarks, always stood for the doctrine that the universe forms a pluralism from the substance-point-of-view.¹⁹ But, he says, its doctrine was too uncritical; for what does the use of the Pragmatic Rule tell us about the concept "substance"? What difference in practical experience is it supposed to make that we have each a personal

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 114-115.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 116 ff., 138 ff.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

substantial principle? This difference, that we can remember and appropriate our past, calling it "mine." What difference that in this book there is a substantial principle? This, that certain optical and tactical sensations cling permanently together in a cluster. The fact that certain perceptual experiences do seem to *belong together* is thus all that the word "substance" means.²⁰

In the same manner the "oneness" affirmed of the world is merely a name, like "substance," descriptive of the fact that certain *specific and verifiable connections* are found among the parts of the experiential flux. All the oneness in the universe is a "cognitional oneness," or as James puts it, through conceptual abstraction we get "what the oneness of the world is known-as."²¹

Things do not *belong* together, but are merely connected by the bare conjunctions "with" or "and."

Does this not jeopardize the world's rationality, and invalidate all formulation of scientific laws? No, "for it is sufficient that when oneness is predicated, it shall mean definitely ascertainable conjunctive forms."²² This leaves room for "possibility," "novelty," "freedom," notions so native to our common sense. "Free will means nothing but real novelty; so pluralism accepts the notion of free will."²³ As a consequence pluralism is neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but melioristic. While monism is a more emotional and religious view of the world, admitting that the world is saved already by its union with the divine absolute, pluralism is a more moral view, in this sense that it puts morality more in the foreground, and "thinks that the world may be saved on condition that its parts shall do their best."²⁴

And it solves the problem of evil which remains a puzzle for monism; for if the absolute be the all-good, if Perfection be the source of all things, how should there be imperfection?

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 132.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 143.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 140.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

For pluralism the problem of imperfection presents only the practical problem of how to get rid of it.²⁵

Still, the question recurs: if free will exists, if "novelty" may be freely introduced in the world, are we not driven to the conclusion that "what comes, may have to be treated as a matter of chance," thus again defeating all our aims at scientific accuracy? We are led then to ask: in what manner does new being come? Is it through and thorough the consequence of older being, or is it a matter of chance so far as other being goes?

"So far as physical nature goes, few of us experience any real temptation to postulate any real novelty. The notion of eternal elements and their mixture serves us in so many ways, that we unhesitatingly adopt the theory that primordial being is unalterable in its attributes as well as in its quantity, and that the laws by which we describe its habits are uniform in the strictest mathematical sense."²⁶

"It is when we come to human lives that our point of view changes. It is hard to imagine that "really" our own subjective experiences are only molecular arrangements, even though the molecules be conceived as beings of a psychic kind. A material fact may indeed be different from what we feel it to be; but what sense is there in saying that a feeling, which has no other reality than to be felt, is not as it is felt"?²⁷

Thus again, while chance happenings are banished from the physical universe, liberty is assured to man.

One more difficulty remains to be removed. "The classic obstacle to pluralism has always been what is known as the principle of causality. This principle has been taken to mean that the effect in some way already exists in the cause. If this be so, the effect cannot be absolutely novel, and in no radical sense can pluralism be true."²⁸ Aristotle who made the first definite inquiry into causes, held that the "why" of anything is furnished by four principles: the material, formal,

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 138.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

efficient and final cause. But what one generally means by the cause of anything is its "efficient" cause. It is scholastically defined as "that which produces something else by a real activity proceeding from itself." This is unquestionably the view of common sense, and scholasticism is only common sense grown quite articulate."²⁹

The scholastic doctrine certainly obviated the difficulties of monism, for which causation is merely a deducing of the identical from the identical. Scholasticism allows of effects that are really "products," that are really new, and yet not "chance products," for, "quidquid est in effectu debet esse prius aliquo modo in causa." Scholasticism always respected common sense, and escaped the frank denial of all genuine novelty by the vague qualification "aliquo modo." This allowed the effect to differ aliquo modo from its cause.³⁰ Yet, after acknowledging this much, James, under the pressure of an idealism from which he sees no escape, goes on to stultify this concept of causality because it is incomplete, because it does not include the essential note of activity.

This concept being an abstraction, it evidently does not include the note of activity as something immediately real, immediately experienced. In order then to get causality in all its completeness, James reduces it to a mere subjective feeling as experienced in the flux of life: "there is doubtless somewhere an original perceptual experience of the kind of thing we mean by causation. Where is this typical experience originally got? Evidently it is got in our own personal activity-situations. In all of these what we feel is that a previous field of "consciousness," containing (in the midst of its complexity) the idea of a result, develops gradually into another field in which that result either appears as accomplished, or else is prevented by obstacles against which we still feel ourselves to press. As I now write I am in one of those activity-situations. I "strive" after words, which I only half prefigure, but which, when they shall have come,

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

must satisfactorily complete the nascent sense I have of what they ought to be. Some of the words come wrong, and then I feel a resistance, not muscular but mental, which instigates a new instalment of my activity, accompanied by more or less feeling of exertion.”³¹ In such a continuously developing experiential series our concrete perception of causality is found in operation. If the word have any meaning at all, it must mean what we there live through. “The *percipi* in these original experiences is the *esse*. If there is anything hiding in the background, it ought not to be called causal agency, but should get itself another name.”³²

The fact remains, however, that these “perceptual experiences of causality” would mean nothing to us, “would make no difference in our lives,” to apply the Pragmatic Rule,—if they were not conceptually apprehended, seized upon abstractedly from the here and now. The search for real causes in science and philosophy would dwindle to an enumeration of phenomenal antecedents; there would not even be a “search,” for the word would have no meaning for a being not endowed with the power of abstraction.³³

Moreover, this conception of causality is narrow and fragmentary in that it arbitrarily refuses to go beyond self, to be verified in the external world.

For, granted that this is a pluralistic universe, whence is it? The question harrasses the mind even more than it does in a monistic system whose absolute is eternal, and is continuously evolving phenomenal realities.

In a “piecemeal universe,” where causation plays a real part, where the mind is constantly pursuing effects until it discovers the ultimate why, the thinker cannot escape the problem of an ultimate Being. Here James’ philosophy falls lamentably short; all his subtle powers of reasoning seem to abandon him, and he agrees that there is no answer whatever to the

³¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 210-211.

³² *Op. cit.*, p. 213.

³³ It may be seen from the foregoing that James’ ideas are closely connected with those of Bergson; and indeed, he himself claims intellectual kinship with this writer.

question. "No one has intelligibly banished the mystery of *fact*. Whether the original nothing burst into God and vanished, as night vanishes in day, while God thereupon became the creative principle of all lesser beings; or, whether all things have foisted and shaped themselves imperceptibly into existence, the same amount of existence has in the end to be begged by the philosopher. . . . For all of us *fact* forms a datum, a gift, or *Vorgefundenes*, which we cannot burrow under, explain or get behind. It makes itself somehow, and our business is far more with its what than with its whence or why." ³⁴

That this is one of the weakest spots in James' metaphysics, no one will deny, and James himself is well aware of it. There being no infinite primal cause,—which would be absurd, he says, since infinity connects with number,—James is finally driven to admit that "reality must in the end be begged piecemeal, not everlastingly deduced from other reality." ³⁵ All concepts of the infinite he considers as inwardly absurd and contradictory, and "it is better to accept the opaquely given data of perception according to which additions to reality come in finite and perceptible changes like the successive drops by which a cask of water is filled, when whole drops fall into it or nothing." ³⁶

As an argument against the monistic hypothesis James' criticism of the infinite is final: a total is made up of parts, and parts are numerable, if not actually, at least potentially; if not by the imagination, then at least by the mind. But it is of no value when directed against an infinite *a se*, a being that is outside of space and time, and consequently does not fall within the categories of a standing or a growing infinite.

That a finite mind cannot know such an infinite is indeed "but a pseudo-problem." As the infinite is of a kind that transcends all being we have any immediate knowledge of, it can be conceived only by a process of analogy and negation, based however on perceptual experience.

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

³⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 172.

In the last analysis then the pluralistic universe is one to which there is no whence, no whither. Even the most biased thinker will hardly be satisfied with this arbitrary assumption and this truncated metaphysics. For it means the complete abdication of reason, which must no longer seek for an *explanation*; which must no longer seek to know things in general by their *ultimate* causes in so far as natural reason can attain to such knowledge; but must confine itself to a mere *description* of the universe in its details,—the very task that James himself deprecates as outside the scope of metaphysics. Moreover, if conduct is the most important thing in life, as Pragmatism holds, the whence and the whither of the cosmos and of man make so great a difference in our existence that Pragmatism falls doubly short in failing to take account of them.

J. B. CEULEMANS.

ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON'S TREATMENT OF CATHOLICS.

In his *Memories and Portraits* Stevenson has set down a few passages which go far towards acquainting us with the why and the wherefore of the injustice generally meted out to Catholics by representative British Protestant authors. "Ignorance of his neighbors," he writes, "is the character of the typical John Bull. His is a domineering nature, steady in fight, imperious to command, but neither curious nor quick about the life of others. In French colonies, and still more in the Dutch, I have read that there is an immediate and lively contact between the dominant and the dominated race, that a certain sympathy is begotten, or at the least a transfusion of prejudices, making life easier for both. But the Englishman sits apart, bursting with pride and ignorance. He figures among his vassals in the hour of peace with the same disdainful air that led him on to victory. A passing enthusiasm for some foreign art or fashion may deceive the world; it cannot impose upon his intimates. He may be amused by a foreigner as by a monkey, but he will never condescend to study him with any patience. Miss Bird, an authoress with whom I profess myself in love, declares all the viands of Japan to be uneatable—a staggering pretension. So, when the Prince of Wales' marriage was celebrated at Mentone, by a dinner to the Mentonese, it was proposed to give them solid English fare—roast beef and plum pudding, and no tom-foolery. Here we have either pole of the Britannic folly. We will not eat the food of any foreigner; nor, when we have the chance, will we suffer him to eat of it himself."

That things have not changed very materially since these words were penned is evident from an English woman's recently published account of her trip into the interior of Africa (a work lately reviewed in the *New York Sun*), in which she

contrasts the sympathetic attitude of the French and Germans towards their wards with the Briton's indifference, pride and aloofness.

Long before his eyes had lighted on the above-quoted passages, the present writer said, in commenting upon Thackeray's *Irish Sketch Book*: "With all his great natural gifts, and with all the added helps of travel, Thackeray never wholly succeeded in shaking off his characteristically English insularity, narrow-mindedness, conceit, and one-sided way of looking at things. It seems to be an ineradicable feature of the Anglo-Saxon race. I am frank enough to admit that Thackeray was better than most of his fellow-countrymen in this respect; better far than Dickens, for instance, whose *Pictures from Italy* is little more than a vile caricature of the people whom he pretends to portray. Dickens didn't even take the trouble to *try* to understand the Italians. He entered Italy with a prejudiced mind; with nothing but contempt for its people and their ways. With the average Briton's smug self-complacency and abomination for everything that isn't British, he didn't want to be disillusioned. He judged the Italians by purely English standards; and if they failed to come up (or get down?) to his ideal—the British exemplar and beau-ideal—they didn't amount to much.

"I wouldn't dare to say this of Thackeray. I am convinced that he was guilty of no conscious injustice to the Irish. He meant to be fair and tried to be fair; and on a number of occasions, such as the one with which I am now concerned, he does the people ample justice. But I don't think it is any exaggeration to say that he really never got in touch with the common people—with the rank and file—and consequently never really understood the Irish as a people.

"For example, he speaks of the poverty of the Irish as though it were due, purely and simply, to their thriftlessness; seemingly forgetting that the tyranny and injustice of his own compatriots is responsible for their wretched condition. What a rich country! How fertile in resources! Why don't

the peasants till it? Why don't they engage in agriculture instead of begging and starving? Why, forsooth? Because England won't allow them. Because she has stolen from them the best portion of the soil which rightfully belongs to them, and turned it over to her own worthless minions, to be used as pleasure parks and hunting grounds.

"He writes, too, as though poverty and beggary were something peculiar to Ireland and practically unknown in his beloved Albion. Every one who has dipped into Booth's *In Darkest England* knows better than that. There is probably as much misery in the one city of London as in all Ireland put together. There may not be quite as many beggars, but there are certainly many more thieves.

"If the Irish beggar makes his request for alms in the Name of God, and accompanies it with a prayer, the cockney chronicler immediately scents rank hypocrisy. Does the gentle nun, leading a life of heroic self-denial, which to him seems intolerable, come to greet him with a happy, artless smile, instant he suspects that her cheerful manner is merely assumed to hide her discontent. Let an old woman stumble in the midst of the Lord's Prayer; at once he sets it down to ignorance, never stopping to reflect that, in all likelihood, she is wont to recite her prayers in the Gaelic tongue. But of what use is it to heap up instances? It is the same all through the chapter. As a rule, the average Briton's sketches of Erin and Erin's people are little more than tissues of misrepresentations from start to finish. Let there be a half dozen sides to a picture, John Bull is always pretty sure to choose the darkest and worst. We Americans have gotten a taste of this kind of medicine ourselves in Dickens' *Martin Chuzzlewit* and *American Notes*."

It is no slander to say that, even after the typical John Bull has been intellectually convinced of the weakness of his position, it is exceedingly difficult to make him recede from it. Perhaps there is no other nation under Heaven in which prejudice is so deeply rooted as it is in the English. Cardinal

Newman shows this clearly enough in *The Present Position of Catholics in England*. And even the eminently fair and sincere Newman himself admits that he was not altogether free from this taint: "Simultaneously with Milner I read Newton on the Prophecies, and in consequence became most firmly convinced that the Pope was the Antichrist predicted by Daniel, St. Paul and St. John. My imagination was stained by the effects of this doctrine up to the year 1843; it had been obliterated from my reason and judgment at an earlier date; but the thought remained upon me as a sort of false conscience." (*Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, p. 7.)

But the strangest part of it all is that Robert Louis Stevenson, the Scotchman, should have been guilty time and again of the same identical fault which he was so quick to observe, and so justly condemned, in the typical Englishman. From one like Stevenson, a sort of latitudinarian, a man so generally broadminded and free from religious bigotry, we naturally expect a juster judgment than we could hope from one blinded by passion and prejudice; and from this point of view, Stevenson's strictures on Catholic persons and practices are more hurtful and more reprehensible than the criticisms of a Dickens, for instance.

I want to say, at the outset, that I intend to put down naught in malice to the brilliant Scotsman. If I should, I would be guilty of the very thing which he reprehends in John Bull and which I reprehend in him. Besides, there are few authors in the whole range of literature for whom I have a more genuine admiration, awe and even affection, than I have for this same Stevenson. Even apart from his literary works, he was a most lovable character; and it has been his good fortune to make friends, not only of those who came in contact with him during his lifetime, but of all the readers of his books; and we grasp with eagerness each and every detail that will throw a little more light on his all-too-short and useful life. Of many of the books which give us pleasure, we know but little of the authors and care less. The book

and the author are things apart. Not so with Robert Louis Stevenson. His books are clearly a reflection of himself. His thoughts and character, his tender sympathies, his child-nature with its poetic outlook on life and its perfect candor, shine forth behind the printed word on every page.

We may say of him with truth what Dr. Johnson said of Goldsmith: "Nihil quod tetigit non ornavit." As finished a stylist as ever wielded the pen, and a most versatile writer, he handled with perfect ease and success whatever he undertook. Whether it was the poem, the novel, or the essay, biography or history, the detective story or the drama, he was always seemingly in his element. And the wonder of it all is that one so afflicted through life should have been able to do anything at all worthy of note, let alone the heavy task which he set himself and accomplished so well.

Perhaps the most charming thing about Stevenson is his absolute frankness and lack of reserve, and I think we may safely apply to himself what he says of the Scotch peasant in the following passage from *Memories and Portraits*: "The speech of Englishmen is too often lacking in generous ardor, the better part of the man is too often withheld from the social commerce, and the contact of mind with mind evaded as with terror. A Scotch peasant will talk more liberally out of his own experience. He will not put you by with conversational counters and small jests; he will give you the best of himself, like one interested in life and man's chief end." And he adds a comment which serves both to illustrate further his own frankness, and to confirm what he and we have already said of the average Briton's prejudice and self-sufficiency: "The egoism of the Englishman is self-contained. He does not seek to proselyte. He takes no interest in Scotland or the Scotch, and, what is the unkindest cut of all, he does not care to justify his indifference. Give him the wages of going on and being an Englishman, that is all he asks; and in the meantime, while you associate with him, he would rather not be reminded of your baser origin. Compared with the grand,

tree-like self-sufficiency of his demeanor, the vanity and curiosity of the Scot seem uneasy, vulgar and immodest. That you should continually try to establish human and serious relations, that you should actually feel an interest in John Bull, and desire and invite a return of interest from him, may argue something more awake and lively in your mind, but it still puts you in the attitude of a suitor and a poor relation."

And yet this same man wrote in 1877—in his first published book, *An Inland Voyage*—"Independent America is still the cross of my existence; I cannot think of Farmer George without abhorrence; and I never feel more warmly toward my own land than when I see the stars and stripes, and remember what our empire might have been."

Liking Stevenson as we do, it is with pain and regret that we stumble, now and then, on the little slurs, and jests and witticisms upon people and things Catholic in the course of his earlier works. I say "in the course of his earlier works," for, as I hope to show in the sequel, his judgment underwent a happy evolution in this respect as he advanced in years and experience.

His first two books, *An Inland Voyage* and *Travels with a Donkey in the Cevennes* (published respectively in 1878 and 1879), contain quite a number of the painful and rather unjust criticisms to which I refer. In fact the parts that touch on Catholic matters are so like Dickens that, were it not for the difference in style, the reader might think they were penned by the author of the *Pictures from Italy*. Thus, in describing a service which he attended in the Cathedral of Noyon, he writes in a most flippant and irreverent strain, even going so far as to compare the service to a cheap comedy. Here is the account in his own words: "I was not averse, liking the theater so well, to sit out an act or two of the play, but I could never rightly make out the nature of the service I beheld. Four or five priests and as many choristers were singing *Misere* before the high altar when I went in. There was no congregation but a few old women on chairs and old men

kneeling on the pavement. After a while a long train of young girls, walking two and two, began to descend the nave—the four first carrying a Virgin and child upon a table The priest who seemed of most consequence was a strange, down-looking old man. He kept mumbling prayers with his lips; but, as he looked upon me darkling, it did not seem as if prayer were uppermost in his heart. Two others, who bore the burden of the chant, were stout, brutal, military-looking men of forty, with bold, overfed eyes; they sang with some lustiness, and trolled forth 'Ave Mary' like a garrison catch. . . . As they (the girls) slowly footed up the aisle, each one took a moment's glance at the Englishman; and the big nun who played marshal fairly stared him out of countenance. As for the choristers, from first to last they misbehaved as only boys can misbehave, and cruelly marred the performance with their antics. . . . Indeed it would be difficult not to understand the Miserere, which I take to be the composition of an atheist. If it ever be a good thing to take such despondency to heart, the Miserere is the right music and a cathedral a fit scene. So far I am at one with the Catholics,—an odd name for them, after all? But why, in God's name, these holiday choristers? Why these priests, who steal wandering looks about the congregation while they feign to be at prayer? Why this fat nun who rudely arranges her procession and shakes delinquent virgins by the elbow? Why this spitting, and snuffing and forgetting of keys, and the thousand and one little misadventures that disturb a mind, laboriously edified with chants and organings? In any playhouse reverend fathers may see what can be done with a little art, and how, to move high sentiments, it is necessary to drill the supernumeraries and have every stool in its proper place."

It goes without saying that there is no excuse whatsoever for that kind of ranting; and even the author's most devoted admirers—of whom I count myself one—can but charitably opine that this flippancy, and gross irreverence, and comic opera indignation, must have been due to the fact that his

dinner sadly disagreed with him on that particular day. Evidently he came prepared to carp and criticise. Even supposing that things were as he paints them—and worse—we should think that charity, or even common sense, would induce him to make some allowance for the distractions incident to such an occasion, and would prevent him from forgetting that the participants were human beings, not angels. The long and the short of the matter is that Stevenson deliberately set himself to find fault with everything he saw and heard, and, consciously or unconsciously, magnified all the little human defects of the ceremony. His criticism is not even good-natured ridicule; it is rather the out-pouring of a sour and bilious stomach. Most ridiculous incidents occur frequently at Methodist revivals; yet I believe it is rare to find intelligent and reputable Catholic writers or speakers holding such happenings up to the scorn and contempt of their readers.

In the following passages Robert Louis goes even farther, if possible, in his bilious, splenetic hostility to Catholic practices. He is writing of something he saw at Pont St. Maxence, near Compiègne: "I found my way to the church, for there is always something to see about a church, whether living worshippers or dead men's tombs; you find there the deadliest earnest, and the hollowest deceit; and even where it is not a piece of history, it will be certain to leak out some contemporary gossip. It was scarcely so cold in the church as it was without, but it looked colder. The white nave was positively arctic to the eye; and the tawdriness of a Continental altar looked more forlorn than usual in the solitude and the bleak air. Two priests sat in the chancel reading and waiting penitents; and out in the nave one old woman was engaged in her devotions. It was a wonder how she was able to pass her beads when healthy young people were breathing in their palms and slapping their chests; but though this concerned me, I was yet more dispirited by the nature of her exercises. She went from chair to chair, from altar to altar, circumnavigating the church. To each shrine she dedicated an equal

number of beads and an equal length of time. Like a prudent capitalist with a somewhat cynical view of the commercial prospect, she desired to place her supplications in a great variety of heavenly securities. She would risk nothing on the credit of any single intercessor. Out of the whole company of saints and angels, not one but was to suppose himself her champion elect against the Great Assizes. I could only think of it as a dull, transparent jugglery, based upon unconscious unbelief.

"She was as dead an old woman as I ever saw; no more than bone and parchment, curiously put together. Her eyes, with which she interrogated mine, were vacant of sense. . . . But now that was all gone by, and had left her neither happier nor wiser; and the best she could do with her mornings was to come up here, into the cold church, and juggle for a slice of Heaven." And more to the same effect—*usque ad nauseam*. Even apart from the irreverent, we might almost say blasphemous, tone of these lines, and the disdainful conceit, and sense of superiority, and abnormal enlargement of cranium which they manifest, this is about as mean and as unprovoked a tirade as I have ever read. One would think the old woman had done him a mortal injury.

In this wise he continues his bitter and savage comments anent things of which he admits his utter ignorance; doing with a vengeance the very thing for which (in the opening passages of this article) he so severely censures the typical Englishman, out-bulling John Bull himself. "But there was something worse than foolishness placarded in the church of Creil. The 'Association of the Living Rosary' is responsible for that. . . . Indulgences, plenary and partial, follow on the performance of the duties of the association. . . . Where people serve the kingdom of heaven with a pass-book in their hands, I should be afraid lest they should carry the same commercial spirit into their dealings with their fellow-men, which would make a sad and sordid business of this life.

"There is one more article, however, of happier import.

'All these indulgences,' it appeared, 'are applicable to the souls in Purgatory.' For God's sake, ye ladies of Creil, apply them all to the souls in Purgatory without delay! Burns would take no hire for his last songs, preferring to serve his country out of unmixed love. Suppose you were to imitate the exciseman, mesdames, and even if the souls in Purgatory were not greatly bettered, some souls in Creil upon the Oise would find themselves none the worse either here or hereafter.

"I cannot help wondering, as I transcribe these notes, whether a Protestant, born and bred, is in a fit state to understand these signs, and do them what justice they deserve; and I cannot help answering that he is not. They cannot look so merely ugly and mean to the faithful as they do to me. I see that as clearly as a proposition in Euclid. For these believers are neither weak nor wicked. They can put up their tablet commending St. Joseph for his despatch as if he were still a village carpenter; they can recite the required dizaine, and metaphorically pocket the indulgences as if they had done a job for heaven. . . . I see it as plainly, I say, as a proposition in Euclid, that my Protestant mind has missed the point, and that there goes with these deformities some higher and more religious spirit than I dream."

No, my dear Robert Louis, a Protestant born and bred is not in a fit state to understand these signs and do them what justice they deserve, and you do well in answering that he is not. For once at least, you are right, and your ignorant and hyper-flippant comments are the best proof of it. Your "Protestant mind" has missed the point most assuredly. It really looks as though your "Protestant mind" might have undergone a change between the first rough draft of your impressions and the transcribing of them for publication. But doubtless you had taken such pains with them, and they looked so well on paper, and you were so pleased with your comic opera wrath and your superior knowledge both of this world and the next, that you couldn't resist the temptation to jot them down just as they were, with an apology at the end.

In his remarks anent the monks and the monastery of Our Lady of the Snows, near Vivarais or Ardeche (*Travels in the Cevennes*), while giving a truthful and accurate account of the industry and unworldliness of the brethren, he takes advantage of every occasion to "throw cold water" on themselves and their mode of life. It is not admiration, but pity, he has for these misguided men. The John Bull-ish narrow-mindedness and conceit, and the carping disposition, and the unsympathetic sneer, are clearly in evidence throughout his description. Thus, when "the good deacon had a permission to ask of them (the fathers and brothers) it was granted by a peculiar movement of the hands, almost like that of a dog's paws in swimming, or refused by the usual negative signs, and in either case with lowered eyelids and a certain air of contrition, as of a man who was steering very close to evil." (The evil in this case presumably Stevenson himself.)

However, in justice to Stevenson, it should be said that his description contains some compliments well worth quoting; and I quote them gladly, with much more pleasure than I have found in setting down his unjust and ignorant criticisms. "I am astonished, as I look back, at the freshness of face and cheerfulness of manner of all whom I beheld. A happier nor a healthier company I should scarcely suppose that I have ever seen. . . . But if they die easily, they must live healthily in the meantime, for they seemed all firm of flesh and high in color. . . . Those with whom I spoke were singularly sweet-tempered, with what I can only call a holy cheerfulness in air and conversation. There is a note, in the direction to visitors, telling them not to be offended at the curt speech of those who wait upon them, as it is proper to monks to speak little. The note might have been spared; to a man the hospitallers were all brimming with innocent talk and, in my experience of the monastery, it was easier to begin than to break off a conversation. With the exception of Father Michael, who was a man of the world, they showed themselves full of kind and healthy interest in all sorts of subjects—and not without a

certain pleasure in the sound of their own voices. . . . A long novitiate and every proof of constancy of mind and strength of body is required before admission to the order; but I could not find that many were discouraged. . . . This austere rule entitles a man to heaven as by right. When the Trappist sickens he quits not his habit; he lies in the bed of death as he has prayed and labored in his frugal and silent existence; and when the Liberator comes . . . joy bells break forth as for a marriage . . . and proclaim throughout the neighborhood that another soul has gone to God.

“At night I took my place in the gallery to hear *Compline* and *Salve Regina*. There were none of those circumstances which strike the Protestant as childish or tawdry in the public offices of Rome. A stern simplicity, heightened by the romance of the surroundings, spoke directly to the heart. I recall the whitewashed chapel, the hooded figures in the choir, the strong, manly singing, the silence that ensued, the sight of cowed heads bowed in prayer, etc.”

Doubtless some of my readers will opine, after perusing these tributes, that I do Stevenson an injustice when I say that his description is tainted throughout with a miserable spirit of fault-finding. But if they will read the account for themselves, they may find that I am not far wrong. Besides, and unfortunately, his real opinion of the life of these good brethren—expressed later, in his poem on *Our Lady of the Snows*—is nothing short of the rankest materialism.

Aloof, unhelpful and unkind,
The prisoners of the iron mind,
Where nothing speaks except the hell
The unfraternal brothers dwell.
Poor, passionate men, still clothed afresh
With agonizing folds of flesh;
Whom the clear eyes solicit still
To some bold output of the will,
While fairy fancy far before
And musing Memory-Hold-the-door
Now to heroic death invite
And now uncurtain fresh delight:
O, little boots it thus to dwell

On the remote unneighbored hill.
O, to be up and doing, O
Unfearing and unshamed to go
In all the uproar and the press
About my human business.

And ye, O brethren, what if God,
When from heav'n's top he spies abroad,
And sees on this tormented stage
The noble war of mankind rage:
What if his vivifying eye,
O monks, should pass your corner by?

But ye?—O ye who linger still,
Here in your fortress on the hill,
With placid face, with tranquil breath,
The unsought volunteers of death,
Our cheerful General on high
With careless looks may pass you by.

It would require something more than genius to reconcile this with his previous admission of the Trappist's energy and usefulness even from a material point of view. In fact his poetic balderdash is so glaringly unjust that it makes us hesitate to give Robert Louis credit, at least in this one instance, for common sincerity.

The only priest whom Stevenson introduces into his novels (if I remember rightly) is Sir Oliver in *The Black Arrow*, and he is a criminal. Speaking of Du Chayla, Inspector of Missions in the Cevennes during the Huguenot troubles, Stevenson informs us that he was "a conscientious person who seems to have been intended by nature for a pirate. A missionary in his youth in China, he there suffered martyrdom, was left for dead, and only succored and brought back to life by the charity of a pariah. [And he adds, by way of comment] We must suppose the pariah devoid of second sight, and not purposely malicious in this act."

The only thing that can be said in extenuation of his unjust treatment of Catholics (if that can be termed a mitigating circumstance—for it seems to increase rather than diminish his guilt) is the candid admission which he makes, now and

then, that he *is* unfair and unjust. "I could hold more free communication with the Protestants, and judge them more justly than the Catholics. Father Apollinaris may pair off with my mountain Plymouth Brother as two guileless and devout old men; yet I ask myself if I had as ready a feeling for the virtues of the Trappist; or had I been a Catholic, if I should have felt so warmly to the dissenter."

Fully aware, as he was, of his utter inability to judge Catholics fairly and justly, why, in God's Name, did he attempt to judge them at all? Is that the part of an honorable and a broad-minded man? Is that the sort of treatment we should naturally expect from the man who berates the Englishman for his cocksureness and self-conceit? It may be said in answer to this that Stevenson's was "the spear that knows no brother," that he was every whit as severe on the foibles of his own co-religionists as he was on ours; and this statement is quite true. The truth is, Stevenson was but little, if any, more enamored of the Presbyterian church than he was of the Catholic; he was not even an orthodox Christian, in spite of the beautiful and touching prayers that issued from his pen. The tenets and practices of the church of his birth and rearing were utterly abhorrent to him, and no doubt if he had to choose between Presbyterianism and Catholicity, he would have found the latter far more congenial.

In his essay on Edinburgh, after telling us about the two sisters at their hideous twin devotions, thumbing their bibles, or praying aloud for each other's penitence with marrowy emphasis, and all the time hating each other like two devils, he remarks: "We are wonderful patient haters for conscience' sake up here in the North. . . . There is but a street between them in space, but a shadow between them in principle; and yet there they sit enchanted, and in damnatory accents pray for each other's growth in grace. . . . Indeed there are not many uproars in this world more dismal than that of the Sabbath bells in Edinburgh; the outcry of incongruous orthodoxies, calling on every separate conventicler to put up a pro-

test, each in his own synagogue, against 'right-hand extremes and left-hand defections.' And surely there are few worse extremes than this extremity of zeal, and few more deplorable defections than this disloyalty to Christian love."

"Here are a few samples of his Presbyterian leanings, taken from his Scotch dialect poems:

(THE PREACHER.)

Himsel', meanwhile, frae whaur he cocks
 An' bobs belaw the soundin'-box,
 The treesures of his words unlocks
 Wi' prodigality,
 An' deals some unco dingin' knocks
 To infidelity.

Wi' sappy unction hoo he burkes
 The hopes o' men that trust in works,
 Expounds the fauts o' ither kirks,
 An shaws the best o' them
 No muckle better than mere Turks,
 When a's confessed o' them.

(From "EMBRO HIE KIRK.")

While thus the lave o' mankind's lost
 O' Scotland God still makes his boast—
 Puir Scotland, on whase barren coast
 A score or twa
 Auld wives wi' mutches an' a hoast
 Still keep his law.

In Scotland a wheen canty, plain,
 Douce kintry-leevin' folk retain
 The Truth—or did so aince—alane
 Of a' men leevin';
 An' noo just twa o' them remain—
 Just Begg an' Niven.

(THE SCOT ABROAD.)

An' still in ilka age an' station
 Saw naething but abomination.
 In thir uncovenantit lands
 The gangrel Scot uplifts his hands
 At lack of a' sectarian fush'n,
 An' could releegious destitution.

He rins, puir man, frae place to place,
 Tries a' their graceless means o' grace,
 Preacher on preacher, kirk on kirk—
 This yin a stot an' thon a stirk—
 A bletherin' clan, no warth a preen,
 As bad as Smith of Aiberdeen.

O what a gale was on my speerit
 Tae hear the p'int o' doctrine clearit,
 An' a' the horrors o' damnation
 Set furth wi' faithfu' ministration!
 Nae shauchlin testimony here—
 We were a' damned, an' that was clear.
 I owned, wi' gratitude an' wonder,
 He was a pleasure to sit under.

Now turn we, with pleasure, to the bright side of the picture—for a truly bright side there is. If Stevenson did us great injustice in the beginning of his literary career, it may almost be said that he made ample amends for it as he grew in years and experience. In fact some of the finest and most heartfelt tributes ever paid to Catholic missionaries by outsiders have issued from his pen. I shall not dwell at any length on his noble and courageous defense of Father Damien against the mean, cowardly, un-Christian charges of the infamous Hyde. for it is a production so widely known as to need little or no comment, and one which will endear Stevenson to the heart of every Catholic, aye and to every lover of justice and fair play, as long as English literature shall last.

A more withering invective than this letter to the low-down, foul-mouthed and foul-minded Presbyterian preacher has rarely, if ever, been penned by the hand of man. And remember, Hyde was a co-religionist of Stevenson, a personal acquaintance, a man, moreover, from whom the author had received several marks of courtesy. But so deep and so genuine was Robert Louis' sense of truth and justice and fairness that it rose superior to every merely human consideration. "But there are duties," he writes, "which come before gratitude, and offences which justly divide friends, far more acquaintances. Your letter to the Rev. H. B. Gage is a document which, in my sight,

if you had filled me with bread when I was starving, if you had sat up to nurse my father when he lay a-dying, would yet absolve me from the bonds of gratitude. You know enough, doubtless, of the process of canonization to be aware that, a hundred years after the death of Damien, there will appear a man charged with the painful office of the Devil's Advocate. After that noble brother of mine, and of all frail clay, shall have lain a century at rest, one shall accuse, one defend him. The circumstance is unusual that the devil's advocate should be a volunteer, should be a member of a sect immediately rival, and should make haste to take upon himself his ugly office ere the bones are cold. . . . If I have at all learned the trade of using words to convey truth and to arouse emotion, you have at last furnished me with a subject. For it is in the interest of all mankind and the cause of public decency in every quarter of the world, not only that Damien should be righted, but that you and your letter should be displayed at length, in their true colors, to the public eye.

"To do this properly, I must begin by quoting you at large: I shall then proceed to criticise your utterance from several points of view, divine and human, in the course of which I shall attempt to draw again and with more specification the character of the dead saint whom it has pleased you to vilify: so much being done, I shall say farewell to you forever."

As those who have read the letter know full well, this is but a sample of the vigor which he brought to the complete overthrow of the mean little structure of the mean little skulking preacher. It speaks volumes for the nobleness and generosity of Stevenson's mind and heart, and shows clearly the mental evolution regarding things Catholic which had been going on in him with the passing of the years. So notable, in fact, is this gradual change of viewpoint, that we were half-minded to style the present article "The Catholic Evolution of Robert Louis Stevenson" instead of the caption which we finally pitched upon.

"With you, at last," he writes to Hyde, "I rejoice to feel

the button off the foil and to plunge home." And verily he did plunge home with a vengeance. In the whole realm of literature you will not find a more generous or a more complete act of justice than this letter of Robert Louis Stevenson—justice to the saintly Damien, justice, too, to his vile accuser lolling comfortably in his pretty house on Beretania St. "You belong, sir, to a sect—I believe my sect, and that in which my ancestors labored—which has enjoyed, and partly failed to utilise, an exceptional advantage in the islands of Hawaii. . . . This is not the place to enter into the degree or causes of their failure. One element alone is pertinent, and must be here plainly dealt with. In the course of their evangelical calling, they—or too many of them—grew rich. It may be news to you that the houses of missionaries are a cause of mocking on the streets of Honolulu. It will be news to you, at least, that when I returned your civil visit, the driver of my cab commented on the size, the taste and the comfort of your home. . . . But you see, sir, how you degrade better men to your own level; and it is needful that those who are to judge betwixt you and me, betwixt Damien and the devil's advocate, should understand your letter to have been penned in a house which could raise, and that very justly, the envy and the comments of the passers-by.

"Your sect (and remember, as far as any sect avows me, it is mine) has not done ill, in a worldly sense, in the Hawaiian kingdom. When calamity befell their innocent parishioners . . . a quid pro quo was to be looked for. . . . I know I am touching here upon a nerve acutely sensitive. I know that others of your colleagues look back on the inertia of your church, and the intrusive and decisive heroism of Damien, with something almost to be called remorse. But, sir, when we have failed, and another has succeeded; when we have stood by and another has stepped in; when we sit and grow bulky in our charming mansions, and a plain, uncouth peasant steps into the battle, under the eyes of God, and succors the afflicted, and consoles the dying, and is himself afflicted in his turn, and

dies upon the field of honor—the battle cannot be retrieved as your unhappy irritation has suggested. It is a lost battle and lost forever. One thing remained to you in your defeat—some rags of common honor; and these you have made haste to cast away.”

No Catholic in the whole of the wide world could possibly have done better than that; few Catholics, in fact, could bring themselves to speak so plainly, and the few who could would have been set down as slanderers—filled with rabid prejudice and partisanship. Not one of them could have gotten the hearing accorded to Stevenson, or produced anything like the same conviction in his hearers. By this one act alone, I think Stevenson has fully atoned for previous slurs and slights, and made every Catholic, and every lover of fair play, his debtor; and I doubt not that this noble defense of Damien stood him in good stead when he appeared before the great white throne to render his account.

In the same spirit of justice and fair play, and with the self-same vigor, did he defend the cause of Mataafa, the deposed Catholic King of Samoa. All who have read his *Letters from Samoa* (1889-94) will recall the vehemence of his protests against the sometimes petty, and sometimes great, injustices inflicted upon this dusky Catholic chief by the civilized representatives of the Powers. Some who were in a position to know the inside history of this wretched affair, have said that the opposition to Mataafa was due, in a large measure, to his religious faith, and that a good deal of it was stirred up by American Bible, or proselytising, societies, probably the same sect to which our friend Hyde, the slanderer of the saintly Damien, belonged—the sect which Stevenson excoriates for devoting itself to the acquisition of filthy lucre in Hawaii, instead of trying to save the souls of the natives.

Now, of course, I am perfectly willing to grant that Stevenson's conduct in this matter was due to personal friendship for Mataafa, to admiration for the fine qualities of the Samoan ruler, and to that same sense of justice and fair play and

hatred of injustice which led him to right the wrongs of Damien. I am willing to grant that religion did not enter into the consideration at all, and that Stevenson would have done just as much for Mataafa had the latter been a pagan. Nevertheless, one thing is perfectly clear, to wit: that if Mataafa's religious faith did not induce our author to defend him, neither did it dissuade him from his noble, self-assumed task. It shows at least that there was not a shadow of bigotry in Stevenson's make-up, and it is another item on our bill of indebtedness to Robert Louis.

The following brief account of the ruined Mission of Carmel in California (*Across the Plains*), contrasting the former glory of Carmel with its present forlorn condition, and voicing his regret that the Mission is a thing of the past, could scarcely be more touching or sympathetic if penned by the hand of the most fervent Catholic: "The roof has fallen; the ground squirrel scampers on the graves; the holy bell of St. Charles is long dismounted; yet one day in every year the church awakens from silence, and the Indians return to worship in the church of their converted fathers. I have seen them trooping thither, young and old, in their clean print dresses, with those strange, handsome, melancholy features which seem predestined to be a national calamity, and it was notable to hear the old Latin words and old Gregorian music sung, with nasal fervor, and in a swift staccato style, by a trained chorus of Red Indian men and women. In the huts of the Rancherie they have ancient European Mass-books in which they study together to be perfect. An old blind man was their leader. With his eyes bandaged, and leaning on a staff, he was led into his place in church by a little grandchild. He had seen changes in the world since first he sang that music sixty years ago, when there was no gold and no Yankees, and he and his people lived in plenty under the wing of the kind priests. The mission church is in ruins; the Rancherie, they tell me, encroached upon by Yankee newcomers; the little age of gold is over for the Indian; but he has had a breathing space in

Carmel valley before he goes down to the dust with his red fathers."

Writing in much the same strain a little later, in his sketch of Monterey, he says: "In a comparison between what was and what is in California, the praisers of times past will fix upon the Indians of Carmello. The day of the Jesuit has gone by, the day of the Yankee has succeeded, and there is no one left to care for the converted savage. The mission church is roofless and ruinous; sea breezes and sea fogs, and the alternation of the rain and sunshine, daily widening the breaches and casting the crockets from the wall. As an antiquity in this new land, a quaint specimen of missionary architecture, and a memorial of good deeds, it had a triple claim to preservation from all thinking people; but neglect and abuse have been its portion. There is no sign of American interference save where a headboard has been torn from a grave to be a mark for pistol bullets. So it is with the Indians for whom it was erected. Their lands, I was told, are being yearly encroached upon by the neighboring American proprietor, and with that exception no man troubles his head of the Indians of Carmel. Only one day in the year, the day before our Guy Faux, the padre drives over the hill from Monterey; the little sacristy, which is the only covered portion of the church, is filled with seats and decorated for the service; the Indians troop together, their bright dresses contrasting with their dark and melancholy faces; and there, among a crowd of somewhat unsympathetic holiday-makers, you may hear God served with perhaps more touching circumstances than in any other temple under heaven. An Indian, stone blind and about eighty years of age, conducts the singing; other Indians compose the choir; yet they have the Gregorian music at their fingers' ends, and pronounce the Latin so correctly that I could follow the meaning as they sang. . . . I have never seen faces more vividly lit up with joy than the faces of those Indian singers. It was to them, not only the worship of God, nor an act by which they recalled and commemorated better days, but was besides

an exercise of culture, where all they knew of art and letters was united and expressed. And it made a man's heart sorry for the good fathers of yore who had taught them to dig and to reap, to read and to sing, who had given them European Mass-books which they still preserve and study in their cottages, and who had now passed away from all authority and influence in that land—to be succeeded by greedy land thieves and sacrilegious pistol-shots. So ugly a thing our Anglo-Saxon Protestantism may appear beside the doings of the Society of Jesus."

Such, in brief, are the two sides of the picture of Catholic life and people and influences given us by Robert Louis Stevenson; the one—the dark and unfair side—the crude and hasty judgment of a mind youthful, raw and callow, and (in spite of his better self and even unknown to himself) tainted with the unreasoning prejudices of his Presbyterian training; the other—the bright and fairer side—the ripe judgment and just verdict of his maturer years. When all is said—when his praise and his blame, his tributes and his censures, are weighed in the balance—I think we are safe in maintaining that the good outweighs the evil he has done us. If Stevenson erred—as he frequently did—in his earlier estimates of us, his errors must be attributed to thoughtlessness or unconscious prejudice, never to malice. His latest accounts of us certainly go a great way towards atoning for the faults and injustices of his earlier days, and after a deliberate survey of the field, we freely pardon the wrong he did us unwittingly and strain him to our embrace as *our* friend and the friend of truth everywhere as God gave him the light to see it.

JOHN E. GRAHAM.

THE PRINCIPLES OF GOSPEL-HARMONY.

It is sometimes urged that it is impossible, with the materials at our disposal, to construct any really satisfactory harmony of the Gospels. Whether this conclusion is a justifiable one or not is a moot question; certain it is, however, that from the very earliest days of the Church down to the present time men have endeavored—and presumably always will endeavor—to construct one harmonious and consecutive whole out of the four narratives handed down to us. We need only mention Tatian, Victor of Capua and St. Augustine in the earlier ages; Stroud, Father Coleridge, Rushebrooke and Wright in more recent days.¹

And of all these harmonists no one absolutely endorses the views of his predecessors—a fact which lends countenance to the declaration that such an attempt is pre-ordained to failure. But of late years so much work has been done, both in England and on the Continent, for the settlement of what is known as the ‘Synoptic Problem’ that, in the minds of many, a solution of this vexed question is—if not imminent—at least not impossible. Whether we agree with this or not, it is at least certain that no satisfactory harmony can be constructed until a clear idea of the relations of the Synoptic Gospels to one another has been obtained. We are not here concerned, however, save indirectly, with the Synoptic Problem. Our object is rather the examination of the principles which should guide us in our endeavors to construct such a harmony of the three Synoptic narratives—for we may leave the Fourth Gospel out of consideration for the present—as shall satisfy the demands of modern scholarship while abating no jot or tittle of sound doctrine regarding inspiration.

Harmonists may be conveniently divided into two classes: those who take inspiration into account, and those who do not.

¹ A long list of such attempts will be found in Tischendorf's *Synopsis Evangelica*, pp. xii-xvi.

The latter class regard the question simply from the literary point of view and maintain that the fact that the narrative is inspired is no real factor in the case. There is a great deal to be said for this view. Whether inspired or not, the Gospels are a literary product and the problems they present to the student of literature are not affected by the fact that they are inspired. But on the other hand no final solution of a problem can be arrived at which fails to take into account *all* the factors of the case. Hence, while approaching the problem from the literary point of view, the Catholic exegete can never formulate a conclusion which conflicts with the doctrine of inspiration. For inspiration is the determining factor, any view which runs counter to it is of necessity false, though not every view which does full justice to the doctrine of inspiration is therefore true.

We have been careful to say that inspiration *must be taken into account* in arriving at any solution whether of the Synoptic Problem or of harmonistic difficulties. It is to be *taken into account*, it is not a *prime factor* in the case. In other words while the claims of an inspired document are a *conditio sine qua non* of an acceptable solution, they are not a determining principle by the aid of which we arrive at a solution. It is possible that neglect of this principle will explain the failure of many systems of harmonisation put forth in the past.

And another fertile source of failure has been the tacit identification of inspiration with revelation.

Thus, to take a few well-known examples of difficulties which have to be faced in all attempts at harmonisation:

Matth. xx. 30-34, tells us of *two* blind men whom Our Lord healed as He went out from Jericho. Mark, however, x. 46-52, and Luke xviii. 35-43, mention only *one*—Mark actually names him, Bartimaeus,—and they both tell us that the event took place as Our Lord was *entering into Jericho*.²

² Note Cajetan: 'Apud Matthaeum duo scribuntur caeci hoc in loco: quorum alterius tantum meminit Marcus, forte quia notior, et magis clamabat.'

Matth. viii. 28, tells us of *two* demoniacs at Gerasa; Mark v. 2, and Luke viii. 27, mention only *one* and their whole recital is colored by the fact that he was but one individual.³

These cases are familiar. How is a harmonist to treat them? The accounts are not revealed, if they were so we should have perforce to treat them as referring to distinct incidents; and this, as far as we are aware, no harmonist has attempted to do. But though not revealed the accounts are inspired, and divergences such as they present must be taken into account in arriving at an estimate of the real meaning of inspiration. We have a very similar case in the appeal made, according to Matth. xx. 20-23, by the *mother* of the sons of Zebedee, according to Mark x. 35-40, by the *sons themselves*. Now in the case of St. Peter's denials the apparent conflict between the questions and answers given us by the three Evangelists may be explained by supposing a chorus of voices, one said one thing, another another; but it is surely impossible to take refuge in such an explanation in the case of this appeal to sit at Our Lord's right hand. Can we suppose that mother and sons simultaneously put forward the petition? The whole character of the narrative is against such a supposition.

The above are patent instances of want of agreement; there are others which are not so evident but which on examination present perhaps greater difficulties. It will, however, be evident from the three instances given that we have to face an exceedingly delicate question: the Evangelists are inspired, how far did the gift of inspiration carry with it that of inerrancy? Were they always exact? Did their memories never play them false? In other words—and in the terms of the question immediately before us—can the Gospel narratives be completely harmonised? It is a common axiom among non-Catholic writers that we have not to take the inspiration of the Bible for granted, but have to prove it for ourselves by

³ Cajetan: 'Marcus tamen tacens unum, non contradicit, saevioris enim creditur mentionem facere.'

study of each Book (see Bishop Welldon's paper in the *Nineteenth Century* for December, 1908). How this feat is to be accomplished we are never told—for obvious reasons! But the proposition might with truth be stated as follows: we must take the inspiration of the Gospels for granted since the Church tells us to do so; but nothing save examination of the Gospels themselves will tell us what was the *effect* of inspiration upon the Gospel-writers.

We are not here treating of inspiration in itself but it may be as well to state briefly what we hold with regard to it. In the first place, then, its *existence* has been defined repeatedly by the Church; its *nature* never. Following, however, on the lines laid down by the declarations of the Vatican Council, Sess. iii, cap. ii. de Revel., repeated by Leo XIII in the Encyclical 'Providentissimus Deus,' and taught expressly by St. Thomas (Quodl. vii. qu: vi, i, ad 5m; 2da, 2dae, 173.4, etc.), we hold that the inspired writer is the instrument of God; that his relations to Him are the same as those which hold good between all instrumental and principal causes; that just as nothing flows from an instrument save as moved by the principal agent, so in the case of the inspired writer. And further; just as in every effect which flows from a series of subordinated causes there is something which is due to each of the causes which have combined to the production of that effect—they would not else have been applied—so in the case of inspiration. And lastly; just as in the above series of causes and effects there is always something produced by the immediate cause as well as something due to the cause which set that latter in motion, so in the case of an inspired writing, there is something which is due to the intermediate causes, but beyond that there is always something which is due solely to the first cause working for the production of the ultimate effect. This is not the place in which to develop these points, we have stated them succinctly in order to show that we allow no such thing as partial inspiration; there is no room in the Thomistic view for 'obiter dicta' or portions of the Gospel-narrative which are outside the influence of inspiration.

All is inspired or nothing. And all is equally inspired; there is no room for degrees of inspiration.

Hence, to return to the instances given above, when Matthew says there were *two* blind men and *two* demoniacs while Mark and Luke say there were only one of each, both are equally inspired. Similarly, when Matthew says Salome asked the question about her sons' place at Our Lord's right hand while Mark says that the sons themselves put the question—both are equally inspired. But can both be right? Are we not compelled to allow a lapse of memory somewhere? ⁴

We are well aware that for many the fourfold or threefold narrative of Our Lord's life is regarded as a kind of childrens' puzzle in which all the disintegrated parts *can* be fitted together *if only you know the secret*. But when we ask for some proof of this, we never get beyond the angry insistence that the Gospels are *inspired!* But if we go further and ask: *why* should inspiration make for such an absolute harmony in the fourfold narrative? Either no answer is forthcoming, or—if one is attempted—it is only one which shows that inspiration has been taken for revelation and that the fundamental difference between these two concepts has never been realized.⁵ Now there can be no doubt that these *à priori* views do an immense

⁴ St. Augustine had no scruples: thus, apropos of the Commission to the Twelve as narrated in Mt. x, Mk. x, and Lk. x, he remarks that the context varies in all three narratives: "Sed utrum eum ex ordine Matthaeus subjunxerit, an ei ordo narrandi *recordatio* sua fuerit . . . non apparet." A little later he says: "Itaque incertum est, utrum hoc quod agitur in ejus patria, Matthaeus omisum revocaverit; an Marcus recordatum anticipaverit; quisnam eorum ordinem *rei gestae*, et quis *recordationis* suae tenuerit."—*De Consensu*, II, 70, cp. 87.

Similarly: *Quaestionum Septemdecim in Matthaeum*, Qu. xv. "Nonnunquam sane alius Evangelista contexit, quod alius diversis temporibus dictum indicat. Non enim omnimodo secundum rerum gestarum ordinem, sed secundum suae quisque *recordationis facultatem*, narrationem quam exorsus est ordinavit."

⁵ Note how careful Cajetan is to distinguish these two concepts; apropos of Luke, i, 2, he says: "Unde clare apparet Lucam scripsisse ex auditu ab Apostolis, et non ex divina revelatione sibi immediate facta; divina tamen gratia dirigente et servante ne in aliquo erraret."

deal of harm. For they give a rigidity to our views regarding the Bible which is in no sense justified by the facts. And the facts! How many who dogmatise about inspiration have a first-hand knowledge of the facts? Yet discussion is plainly impossible as long as the facts are not clearly grasped. It is not easy in the space at our disposal to present the facts in anything approaching a satisfactory manner and we must content ourselves with a selection.

In Matth. xix Our Lord is presented as taking His final leave of Galilee and He passes over into Perea.⁶ Two chapters here, and one in Mark, cover the whole of this journey, and after leaving Jericho Our Lord makes His way into Jerusalem for the day of the Palms. The events as presented to us in these chapters may be tabulated as follows:

a) Answer to the Pharisees on the indissolubility of marriage. Matth. xix, 1-12; Mark, x, 1-12.

b) Little children are brought to Him. Matth. xix, 13-15; Mark, x, 13-16.

c) The rich young man goes sorrowfully away. Matth. xix, 16-22; Mark, x, 17-22.

d) Resulting lessons regarding the danger of riches. Matth. xix, 23-26; Mark, x, 23-27.

e) Peter's consequent request to know what reward they should have since they actually had done what the rich young man had failed to do, viz., leave all and follow Him. Matth. xix, 27-30; Mark, x, 28-31.

Matthew follows this up by the parable of the laborers in the vineyard as an enforcement of the promise that the last shall be first.

f) The last prediction of the coming Passion. Matth. xx. 17-19; Mark, 32-34.

g) The petition of the sons of Zebedee—or of their mother for them. Matth. xx, 20-24; Mark, x, 35-40.

Then comes the final journey from Jericho to the Holy

⁶ The actual text is disputed—cf. the parallel in Mark x,—but that need not concern us here.

City. All this is straightforward and if we had only the two first Gospels there would be no difficulty. But St. Luke's treatment of this period of Our Lord's ministry is entirely different. As is well known he makes the final departure from Galilee coincide with a period shortly after the Transfiguration and devotes a very long section, ix, 52-xix, 27 to this last journey. This section is the crux of all harmonists. Is the scene laid in Samaria, or in Perea, or in both? Does St. Luke mean that it was one long journey or has he grouped together the events of several journeys? Are the events narrated merely the same as those given by Matthew and Mark or are they repetitions due to the new environment in which Our Lord found Himself? Are, for example, the parables of the hundred sheep, the mustard seed, and the leaven the same as those given us by Matthew and Mark, or are they repetitions due to Our Lord Himself? These are the obvious difficulties which suggest themselves as we read; but there are others which, though not so obvious, are yet of even greater importance, thus:

In Luke, xvi, 14-18, we have a passage, or series of passages, which merit careful study. They follow immediately upon the parable of the Unjust Steward and are followed in turn by that of Dives and Lazarus. We give them in full.

14 Now the Pharisees who were covetous, heard all these things: and they derided him.

15 And he said to them: You are they who justify yourselves before men, but God knoweth your hearts; for that which is high to men, is an abomination before God.

16 The law and the prophets were until John; from that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every one useth violence towards it.

17 And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail.

18 Every one that putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth her that is put away from her husband, committeth adultery.

What is the connection between these verses and the preceding and following parables? Is there any at all? We may

say at once that vv. 14-15 do clearly follow upon the preceding parable and find their echo both in it and in that of Dives and Lazarus. But what about vv. 17-18? Is it possible, without unduly forcing the text, to establish any valid connection between these verses and the rest? Cajetan certainly does so and so also does Plummer in the *International Critical Commentary*. According to them the train of thought will be as follows: the Pharisees trusted in the Law but it is now replaced by the preaching of the Kingdom, v. 16; yet the Law shall not pass away as far as its moral teaching goes, v. 17; and one special example of this is presented in the statement regarding the indissolubility of marriage, a point on which the Pharisees seem to have been particularly lax. The parable of Dives and Lazarus then follows—perhaps as an example of the fate of a Pharisee who gloried in the sonship of Abraham but did not practise the Law in its true spirit.

Now we are far from denying that this train of thought may be discovered in the verses in question. It is probably precisely what St. Luke meant us to see in the verses; but there is a more serious difficulty. Is it conceivable that Our Lord spoke those four verses as they stand? The thought is so condensed as to be really obscure and we can never believe that Our Lord was obscure. But if the condensed form of expression is not due to Our Lord it must be due to St. Luke, and we must suppose that he has given us in an abbreviated form only the barest outline of the discourse actually spoken. We remember that we are in Perea—for it is the commoner view that these parables are to be referred to a trans-Jordanic circuit,—if we now turn to Matth. xix and Mark x we find that in the course of this Perean ministry Our Lord did treat at considerable length of the indissolubility of marriage and that the words which St. Luke gives us in xvi, 16, are but the *conclusion* of that discourse and have been torn from their context. In other words the pictures and the parables are what interest the artist and for their sake he has sacrificed the discourse. This may seem startling but it is not an isolated

instance. If we turn to the next chapter, xvii, 1-4, we find ourselves in presence of a similar phenomenon.

And he said to his disciples: It is impossible that scandals should not come: but wo to him through whom they come.

2 It were better for him, that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea, than that he should scandalize one of these little ones.

3 Take heed to yourselves. If thy brother sin against thee, reprove him: and if he do penance, forgive him.

4 And if he sin against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day be converted unto thee, saying, I repent: forgive him.

These words follow immediately upon the parable of Dives and Lazarus. The first two verses treat of scandal, the next two of forgiveness of offences. It is impossible for even the most conservative exegesis to establish any connexion between them. Nor indeed is there the remotest need for doing so. An examination of the two sections will show that they, too, like the preceding one, have been torn from their context. This is particularly noticeable in the first of the two. For what is the meaning of the words: '*these* little ones'? No '*little ones*' have so far been mentioned. We turn to the parallel in Matthew and Mark, and the reason for the insertion of the words is at once apparent: they are the *conclusion* of the discourses about humility which Jesus had illustrated by putting a little child in their midst, cf. Matth. xviii, 1-14, Mark, ix, 33-41, where it should be noted in addition that according to the two former Evangelists this event happened *before* the departure from Galilee. When we turn now to the second section, that regarding forgiveness, we find that it also is but an echo of words in the same chapter of St. Matthew, xviii, 21-22, words which Matthew illustrates by the parable of the Unmerciful Servant. It is noticeable that Mark has not got this passage, but still more noticeable that in Luke the saying loses half its force owing to the omission of the statement that it was an answer to a question by St. Peter.

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Now any purely mechanical idea of inspiration is rendered impossible by facts like these. The Evangelists were men and retained their liberty—albeit inspired. It is here that real study of the Gospels is called for. What were these Evangelists as men? We can only learn this from their Gospels—with perhaps some little help from tradition.

But before proceeding further it will be well to clear the ground by setting forth certain principles of Gospel exegesis, principles which are only too often neglected:

a) While the Gospels do present us with a fourfold picture of Our Blessed Lord we must be careful to bear in mind that it is a *picture* and nothing more; the Gospels are in no sense biographies.

b) The Evangelists were *inspired*—consequently what they record most certainly happened.

c) Not one of the authors of the Synoptic Gospels as we now have them, was an *eyewitness* of all that he relates. It is necessary to insist on this for it is often forgotten. St. Matthew's Gospel was written by him in Aramaic according to the consentient testimony of tradition, and he was of course an eye-witness of much that he describes. But we can only profess profound ignorance of the authorship of the Greek translation we now have;⁷ some even go so far as to maintain that it bears signs of being no translation at all, for the Greek—though tinged with Hebraisms—has not the appearance of a translation. It is possible of course that St. Matthew himself was its author, but this is mere conjecture. St. Luke, by his own showing, was not an eye-witness of the events he relates; the same must be said of St. Mark, though he approaches more nearly to the character of an eye-witness since, according to the testimony of Papias, St. Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian, he was the interpreter of St. Peter and composed his Gospel from his reminiscences of the latter's

⁷ "Matthaeus . . . primus in Judaea propter eos qui ex circumcisione crediderant, Evangelium Christi Hebraicis literis verbisque composuit. Quod quis postea in Graecum transtulerit, non satis certum est."—St. Jerome, *Vita S. Matthaei in Libro de Ecclesiasticis Scriptoris*.

preaching. It is this fact which gives such a life-like character to St. Mark's narrative.

d) The *destination* of each Gospel is tolerably clear from tradition and from their contents. Thus St. Matthew's is essentially the 'Gospel of the Hebrews';—his aim is to prove to the Jews the Messianic character of Our Lord. St. Mark is a Hebrew writing for the Gentiles; his is essentially a Greek Gospel even though the writer is a Hebrew. St. Luke, again, is a Greek writing for Greeks and Romans, and, if there is an Aramaic tinge discernible now and again, this is due not to the writer but to the sources at his disposal. Hence each Evangelist has his prepossessions; he has a certain goal in view and the impress of his own character is necessarily stamped upon his Gospel. This feature of the Gospels gave rise to the application to the Evangelists of the cherubim of Ezechiel's vision; the titles of the Man, the Lion, and the Ox—even though not always consistently applied—show us how clearly the Fathers of the Church had grasped the 'unity in variety' of the Gospels.

e) A further study of the several Evangelists will bring out other features. The natural bent of each shaped the Gospel he produced. Thus St. Matthew, while adhering to a historical framework which in the main accords with that followed by St. Mark and St. Luke, yet makes no pretence to keep to the historical order of events in detail. This fact has always been recognized but its import has not always been insisted on sufficiently. There can hardly be question that he groups together the miracles, chs. VIII-IX; the parables, ch. XIII; and the doctrinal teaching, chs. V-VII. But what a tremendous fact this is! It puts St. Matthew out of our calculations when endeavoring to construct a harmony. A comparison between the Sermon on the Mount and St. Luke VI and XII will be sufficient indication of this.

St. Mark, on the other hand, though preserving the same general lines as St. Matthew, has quite a different object in view. It used to be said that in St. Matthew's Gospel we had a species of 'Summa Praedicabilium' which closely approached

the summary of Gospel-preaching drawn up, according to tradition, by the Apostles before they dispersed. This may be partly true, but it is much more true to facts to term St. Mark's Gospel such a 'Summa Praedicabilium'; for he owed his Gospel, as Papias expressly tells us, to St. Peter's preaching. Papias' words are well-known, but they will bear repetition: 'This also the Presbyter said: Mark, having become the interpreter of Peter, wrote down accurately, though not indeed in order, whatsoever he remembered of the things said or done by Christ. For he neither heard the Lord nor followed Him, but afterwards, as I said, he followed Peter who adapted his teaching to the needs of his hearers, but with no intention of giving a connected account of the Lord's discourses, so that Mark committed no error while he thus wrote some things as he remembered them. For he was careful of one thing, not to omit any of the things which he had heard, and not to state any of them falsely.' (*H. E.* III, 39.)

St. Luke's Preface is the best testimony to the style of Gospel-narrative which he wished to produce. He claims to write in orderly and historical fashion, and therefore we are bound to accept his Gospel as a chronological narrative in the main—though reservations may be necessary at times for, be it noted, St. Luke nowhere binds himself down to adhere rigidly to this historical order and there is good ground for thinking that at times he deserts it. But above all St. Luke is the artist. St. Mark may be vivid and picturesque but his are not studied pictures, they owe their vivacity to the fact that St. Peter himself saw what he described. In St. Luke's case it is different. His pictures are thrown on the canvas with consummate skill. We feel that in describing the scenes in his first two chapters he is painting in words.

But again, he, too, has certain prepossessions, that is to say, certain details appeal to him more than others. What pictures of women he has painted for us! How he dwells upon Our Lord's prayers; ⁸ how much, too, of the general teach-

* "Marcus discipulus et interpres Petri, juxta quod Petrum referentem audierat, rogatus Romae a fratribus, breve scripsit Evangelium. Quod

ing regarding prayer we owe to him! And the Divine compassion! It appears, of course, in the other Gospels, but if we want to preach on mercy we somehow instinctively turn to the third Gospel. Then, again, his non-Jewish origin comes out prominently when he tells us of the universality of the Gospel, and it is here that his dislike of the Jews appears so strongly, as also in Acts.⁹

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Now it is clear that in estimating the value of any section of the Gospels,—when attempting a harmony of them—we must bear in mind the above characteristics of each Evangelist.

Thus, for example, if we ask where we are to place the ‘Pater Noster’ in our scheme, we have to face the fact that while St. Matthew definitely assigns it a place in the Sermon on the Mount, vi. 9-13; St. Luke equally definitely assigns it to a much later period, viz., the Perean preaching, xi. 2-4, and—what is more, omits some of the clauses. It is easy to reply that Our Lord repeated His teaching; He probably did so, but are we to apply this easy solution to every individual case? And on the other hand, if it can be shown—as appears more than probable,—that St. Matthew actually does group together details of Our Lord’s teaching, and if at the same time it is conceded that St. Luke is generally careful about the geographical and thus—by implication—of the historical order of events, then it would seem that we have good ground for saying that the ‘Pater Noster’ was only once delivered

cum Petrus audisset, probavit, et Ecclesiae legendum sua auctoritate edidit: sicut Clemens in sexto Hypotyposeon libro scribit.”—St. Jerome, *Vita S. Marci in lib. de Scriptoris Illustribus*.

“Secundus Marcus interpretas Apostoli Petri . . . qui Dominum quidem Salvatorem ipse non vidit, sed ea quae audierat magistrum praedicantem, juxta fidem magis gestorum narravit quam ordinem.”—From St. Jerome’s *Preface to Comment. on the Gospel of St. Matthew*.

“Igitur Evangelium sicut audierat, scripsit; Acta vero Apostolorum, sicut viderat, composuit.”—St. Jerome, *Vita S. Lucae in lib. de Scriptoris Illustribus*.

“Tertius Lucas medicus . . . ut ipse in proemio confitetur, audita magis quam visa describens.—*Ibid.*

and that St. Matthew has put it out of its due place. At the same time we must not be understood as insisting upon the application of this principle in every case; far from it; we have chosen the instance of the 'Pater Noster' simply because it is a striking one. But this 'grouping' tendency on the part of St. Matthew may throw light on his procedure when he tells of *two* demoniacs and *two* blind men outside Jericho. It is at least conceivable that here also he has lumped together miracles. If the fact that he was inspired did not preclude him from grouping together points of teaching in the Sermon on the Mount why should it preclude him from a similar procedure when narrating miracles? When we now turn to St. Mark we are brought face to face with still graver problems. His Gospel is but a reminiscence of St. Peter's preaching. And yet he must have heard St. Peter repeat his sermons again and again! And surely we need not suppose that St. Peter always repeated them in the same way? Thus, to take an example already brought forward, when St. Peter told his hearers the story of the sons of Zebedee and their petition need we believe that he always said it was *they* who made the request rather than their mother? For it is certain that whichever was the spokesman did but voice the sentiments of the other. Hence it is quite conceivable that St. Peter may have sometimes stated the request as emanating from John and James, and at other times have given it as actually voiced by Salome. Or again, on the supposition that St. Peter was always careful to repeat himself in the same words—an incredible supposition—need we suppose that St. Mark always *remembered* the precise order in which St. Peter presented the facts? Papias' words seem to give the lie to such a supposition: 'Mark . . . wrote down accurately, though not indeed in order, whatsoever he remembered of the things said or done by Christ.'

But the case of St. Luke is even more complex. We have seen that he was an artist, that he had certain prepossessions, that he was a Greek with probably small knowledge of Palestine and of Jewish customs. Even more, then, than the others is he dependent on authority and tradition for his details.

Had he ever walked by the Sea of Galilee? Had he ever been in Perea where he laid the scene of so much of Our Lord's ministry? Mark may possibly have been the young man who threw away his garment in the garden; Matthew was certainly the man who 'sat at the receipt of custom'; and John, of course, had reclined on his Master's bosom. But Luke had done none of these things. Probably he had never even set eyes on the 'Word made Flesh.' We are not denying that he had first-rate authorities for all that he says. We get glimpses of these authorities now and again; the Blessed Virgin; St. James, the bishop of Jerusalem; St. Philip the Evangelist; possibly, too, St. Peter himself when St. Paul went to pay him his formal visit at Jerusalem, and again at Rome. But what kind of information did they give him? Much of it may have been in writing; this is almost certainly the case with that furnished by Our Blessed Lady, viz.: the first two chapters. Some of it may have been in Aramaic, traces of this may be discerned in the first two chapters and in other parts, *e. g.*, in the story of Zachæus. But are we precluded from supposing that much of it was fragmentary? Not in the least, for we are not allowed to multiply miracles. And a further question: need St. Luke have remembered it all quite accurately? Dates, places, and occasions—does his inspiration extend to an accurate preservation of all these? And when St. Luke came to edit all his laborious collection—must he not have treated his materials as any ordinary compiler would have done? Would inspiration necessarily supply gaps? If he thought his informant said that a certain event took place in Galilee whereas it really took place in Perea—would inspiration come to his rescue? ¹⁰

¹⁰ St. Augustine's treatment of a similar difficulty is well deserving of study, all the more that it is too much the fashion to sneer at what are termed his 'harmonistic devices.' He remarks that there is a great difference between 'whose shoes I am not worthy to carry' (Matthew, III, 11), and 'the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to stoop down and loose' (Mark, I, 7); "Non enim verbis aut verborum ordine, aut aliquo genere locutionis, sed etiam *re ipsa* videtur aliud esse calceamenta portare, aliud corrigiam calceamenti solvere." He suggests that the Baptist *might*

These are delicate questions and we have no wish to answer them all in the negative. Inspiration would certainly preclude the Evangelist from making positively false assertions. But that is not the same as saying that he often suspended his judgment and left things vague and doubtful where he was not sure. An examination of some passages will make our meaning clear.

St. Luke is often chary of assigning names to persons and places. We are sometimes told that this was because he was writing for Gentiles who were not familiar with Palestinian places and people and for whom such details would have been

have said both and that one Evangelist remembered one, another the other. But he concludes with the enunciation of a principle the breadth and far-reaching consequences of which can hardly be exaggerated:

"If, then, one asks what John the Baptist did really say, whether he said what Matthew assigns to him or what Luke gives him, or only the few words which Mark mentions him as saying while he is silent about the rest: it will be readily answered that such labor is vain when once we rightly grasp the fact that their very phrases (*ipsas sententias*) were necessary for our arriving at the truth—whatever words they may have used to express them. For, that one gives us a different order of the words from another implies no contradiction. Neither is there any contradiction if one gives what another omits. For it is clear that each one gave the facts as he remembered them and according as it came into the mind of each to state his ideas briefly or at length. . . . Hence it is clear that when several are stating their reminiscences of something they heard or seen, none of them are guilty of falsehood merely because they do not state it in the same way or in the same terms—while yet it is the same thing which is stated. And the same principle applies when it is question of changes in the order of words; or when one uses different words from another—though words which mean the same thing; or when something is omitted which either did not occur to his memory or which could easily be gathered from what another had said; or again when, amongst other things which he had decided to relate, a writer thought fit—for the sake of proportion—to merely touch upon and not fully detail certain things; or if, on the contrary, for the purpose of throwing light on and fully stating something, an author added, not facts, but words—authority for which is conceded when it is question of narration; or if, finally, while thoroughly understanding the matter, he does not arrive at a complete statement of what he has heard—for lack of memory.

"But if anyone says that it ought, by the power of the Holy Spirit, to be conceded to the Evangelists never to disagree in the words they use—neither in their order, nor in their number—, such a one fails to see that precisely because the authority of the Evangelists is so pre-

irrelevant. This is in great measure true, but it may be pushed too far. Thus, to take a few instances, we may well ask why—if he were unwilling to weary his Roman readers with Palestinian place-names—he yet mentions Nazareth, II, 39, 51; IV, 16; Capharnaum, IV, 31; VII, 1; Naim, VII, 11; the land of the Gerasenes, VIII, 26; Bethsaida, IX, 10; etc. We can understand that such places as Jerusalem and Jericho should be named even to Romans for they would of course be familiar to them, but what about Naim? Surely the answer is that he found this name in his source? For Luke was not present at this scene; he must then have learnt it from some one who was present, perhaps from the widow, perhaps from her son, perhaps from one of the Apostles; but whoever told him the story also told him that its scene was laid in Naim.

And on the other hand it seems clear that St. Luke was often

eminent we can *a fortiori* claim for them the same certainty as we claim for other men when they speak the truth, so that when perchance several of them relate the same event in no sense can anyone of them be accused of untruthfulness if he does differ, as just said, from another, as can indeed be seen in the preceding example from the Evangelists. For since it is wrong to either think or say that one of the Evangelists had stated an untruth, so also it will appear that neither did he fall into an untruth to whose memory has happened what is shown to have happened to them. And since the higher our character the more we have to beware of untruth, so much the more do we owe it to the King of Supreme Authority not to imagine that we are in the presence of untruths when we find narratives vary amongst themselves so much as do the Gospel narratives. In the same way, too, and this is especially a question of sound doctrine, we must understand that we are to look not so much for truth in words as in things when we declare that they have stood in the same truth who use not the same modes of expression but differ not in facts and ideas.

“What contradiction, then, is there in these narratives from the Gospels which I have compared? Is it that one says: *whose shoes I am not worthy to carry*, while the others say: *the latchet of whose shoe I am not worthy to loose*? For ‘to carry the shoes’ and ‘to loosen the latchet’ is not merely a difference of words, or of order of words, or of mode of speech; they are essentially different *things*. We may well ask what precisely John *did* say that he was unworthy of: ‘carrying the shoes’ or ‘loosening the latchet.’ For if John *did* say one of these things then apparently he has told us the truth who has been enabled to tell us what John *did* actually say; whereas he who tells us the other (what, namely, he *did not* say), must certainly, if he *did not* tell us an untruth, have forgotten and told us one thing instead of the other. But it is unfitting

ignorant of *place-names*; they were either not in the 'source' at his disposal, or if he had heard where the event took place he had forgotten it. Thus he is very fond of the expression 'in a certain place' or 'city,' cf. iv, 42; v, 12; ix, 52; x, 38; xi, 1; xiii, 22; xvii, 12; etc. Is it rash to conclude from this that he often did not know where certain events had happened and that, true historian as he is, he purposely made use of a vague expression in order to show that he had no more precise knowledge?

The same conclusion seems to be forced on us by a study of his indications of *time and order*. Thus in ii, 2; iii, 1;

that there should be any falsehood in the Gospels, and not merely falsehood which consists in telling untruths but also that which is due to forgetfulness. Hence if it is allowable to understand one thing by the words *carry the shoes*, and another by *loosening the latchet*, what else can we rightly think than that John said both, either at different times, or at the same time? For he might have said: 'the latchet of whose shoe I am not worthy to loose, and whose shoes I am not worthy to carry' so that one Evangelist mentioned one part while the other mentioned the other, and yet all of them told the truth. But if when John spoke of the Lord's shoes he meant to indicate no more than his own humility and the Lord's excellence—then whichever of these he actually said—whether it was 'loosening the latchet' or 'carrying the shoes'—conveyed the same meaning and consequently each one of the Evangelists expressed by this reference to the shoes the same indications of humility and consequently, too, did not fail to express John's *intention*." Note particularly what follows:

"We have, therefore, a practical standard and one which we should take pains to remember when treating of the agreement of the Evangelists, namely, that it is no question of untruthfulness when one of them happens to say something which indeed he of whom he narrates it did not—as a matter of fact say—yet he (the writer) nevertheless expresses the speaker's *intention* just as much as he who gives his actual words. And thus we learn in a practical (salubriter) manner that we have nothing else to enquire except what he *intended* who spoke."—*De Consensu*, II, 27-29.

He insists on this doctrine in even stronger terms further on (67): "Rem plane utilissimam discimus, et per necessarium; nihil in cujusque verbis nos debere inspicere, nisi *voluntatem*, cui debent verba servire: nec mentiri quenquam, si aliis verbis dixerit quid ille *voluerit*, cujus verba non dicit: ne miseri aucupes vocum, apicibus quodammodo litterarum putent ligandam esse veritatem; cum utique non in verbis tantum, sed etiam in caeteris omnibus signis animorum, non sit nisi ipse *animus* inquirendus."—Cp. No. 121.

vi, 1; ix, 28 (cp. Matth., xvii, 1, Mark, ix, 1); ix, 37; xiii, 1, 31; he is precise in his indications. But compare with the above notices such passages as vi, 6; viii, 22; xv, 1; xvi, 1; xvii, 20; xviii, 1, 9; xx, 1; etc. It will be seen that the majority of these instances of vagueness occur in the Perean section. This is interesting since it agrees with what we should have expected regarding that period of Our Lord's ministry. Unlike the period of Galilean or Judean preaching the Perean ministry was not exercised in the full light of Pharisean Judea. It was done 'beyond Jordan' and at a period when it was convenient for the Messias to keep out of reach of His enemies, cf. Luke xiii, 31-35.

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But it will be asked: how do the above statements accord with the inspiration of the Evangelist? Is inspiration compatible with ignorance? Remembering that ignorance is not error, we must answer in the affirmative. And the reason is clear: *inspiration is not revelation*. But to say that inspiration is compatible with ignorance is not at all the same thing as to say that it is compatible with error. Not to know something is one thing, to hold something as true which is not so is another. But—it may be objected—if it can be shown that the Evangelists are guilty of ignorance, when can we trust them? To be *guilty* of ignorance, however, and to be *ignorant* are quite different things. A man may be ignorant of a great many things and yet not *guilty* of such ignorance. For guilt only comes in when a man is ignorant of what he ought to know, or when he pretends to knowledge which he has not really got. But St. Luke was under no obligation whatever to know all the details of time and place in the story of Our Lord's ministry; neither does he pretend to know them. And this is precisely what we have tried to point out. When he does know he tells us so in clear fashion and there is no doubt about his meaning; when he does not know he shows this by the use of certain expressions which with him are almost

stereotyped: 'on another Sabbath,' 'on a certain day,' 'into a certain town,' etc.¹¹

And the above remarks will apply to those places where St. Matthew, for example, has grouped together facts which the other Evangelists show us did not take place simultaneously. For we shall be asked: if St. Matthew tells us that there were *two* demoniacs and *two* blind men whereas there were not two but only one on that precise occasion—has he not deceived us? The answer must presumably be that St. Matthew never meant us to gather this from his narrative. This sounds startling. But it is the literary problem over again. Before we can ascertain the precise value which is to be attached to a particular passage or statement we must make up our minds as to the precise character of *the whole book*. What is St. Matthew's Gospel? Is it a history conceived in the modern style? It is cast in an historical mould it is true, but that is no more than to say that a certain order of development is followed. St. Matthew traces Our Lord's ministry from start to finish, *i. e.*, he brings Him from Galilee to Jerusalem just as St. Peter sketches that same ministry, Acts x, 37-42; but there the chronological order stops. This will be evident from the single fact that had we only the first three Gospels we should never have known that the ministry lasted more than one year. In the light of the Fourth Gospel we can see that even the Synoptics leave room for a more extended ministry than we should otherwise have gathered from their narrative—but that is all.

¹¹ Thus once more note St. Augustine's broad treatment of such difficulties:

"Satis apparet . . . non nos debere arbitrari mentiri quenquam, si pluribus rem quam audierunt vel viderunt reminiscantibus, non eodem modo atque easdem verbis, eadem tamen *res* fuerit indicata; aut sive mutetur ordo verborum, sive alia pro aliis quae tamen idem valeant verba proferantur . . . sive ad illuminandam declarandamque sententiam, nihil quidem rerum, verborum tamen aliquid addat, cui auctoritas narrandis concessa est; sive rem bene tenens non assequatur, quamvis id *conetur*, memoriter etiam verba quae audivit ad integrum enuntiare."—*De Consensu*, II, 28.

The truth seems to be that we have become so impressed with the necessity of defending the absolute historicity of the Gospels that we have unconsciously lost sight of the character of each of them individually considered and have thus worked ourselves into an *impasse*. It was not always so. Origen long ago insisted that it was impossible to reconcile the statements of the Evangelists as they stood. So perplexed was he by the apparent inconsistencies displayed that he felt compelled to have recourse to his allegorising methods in order to defend the truth of the story. But Origen was strangely lacking in the historic sense. On the other hand, St. Augustine who was not afraid to have recourse to strange methods of exegesis when statements seemed to conflict¹² took a bolder and freer line as our footnotes show, when attempting a reconciliation of apparent discrepancies in the Gospels.

* * * * * *

We may conclude by applying the principles stated above to two passages which present certain difficulties for the harmonist. St. Matthew, xxv, 14-30, has given us the parable of the Ten Talents; St. Luke, xix, 11-27, has a strikingly similar parable—that of the Ten Pounds. Similarly, St. Matthew, xxii, 1-14, has the parable of the Marriage of the King's son, while St. Luke, xiv, 16-24, has a similar parable, that of The Great Supper. Advanced rationalistic critics attempt to identify these parables in each case. But the principles laid down above show that such a proceeding is contrary to sound exegesis. For in each case, not only do the details vary, not only are the circumstances different, but each Evangelist gives us definite positive statements regarding time and place which we cannot disregard, for to do so would be to accuse them—not of ignorance of something which they do not profess to know, but of positive misstatements—and these are incompatible with inspiration.

¹² See his amazing explanation of the 'three' days and 'forty' days of Jonas in the Septuagint and Hebrew texts respectively (*De Civitate Dei*, xviii, 44).

Here it may be objected that in spite of our disclaimers we are really insisting on a merely partial inspiration; for it might be concluded from what has been said that we hold that the Evangelists were inspired regarding the substance of the facts narrated, not however regarding the accidentals. This is the very last impression we are desirous of conveying. Inspiration is total; the whole statue comes from the sculptor's chisel and the whole statue comes from the sculptor's brain, hand, etc.; the whole comes from each, but from the one as from the instrumental, from the other as from the principal cause. It is the same with an inspired writing. Nothing, no jot or tittle, can escape the influence of the Inspirer, and all is to be attributed to Him as the principal agent; while at the same time no jot or tittle is to be found which did not emanate from him who wielded the pen. But the instrumental agents are free; their nature is not changed by the fact that they are the recipients of inspiration, and—as the old Scholastic axiom has it—*quidquid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur*. And if the inspired agents were ignorant of certain things inspiration does not demand that that ignorance should be removed *unless exact knowledge is requisite for the just presentation of the story*. And who dare say that absolute accuracy in details of time and place were always essentials?

But inspiration demands *inerrancy*? Most emphatically—yes! But we make a mistake when by inerrancy we understand 'unmistakable.' Because a document is inspired—and therefore contains no error,—it in no sense follows that *we* shall never fall into error in our interpretation of it. Because a statement is true its truth is not therefore always on the surface 'so that he who runs may read.' And, finally, truth must always be relative; relative that is to say to the character of the writing in which it is contained. If the first two Gospels are rather summaries of preaching than documents conceived and compiled on historical lines—is their inerrancy exactly the same as that of the third Gospel which sets out to be an historical document?

It is the literary problem over again. We must, from a

careful study of each individual Gospel, ascertain what precisely it sets out to be before we can endeavor to weave a consistent, harmonious narrative out of them all.

We have quoted St. Augustine very often and can hardly do better than conclude with the following striking passage:

Faustus had raised objections to the Gospel-story on the ground that the Evangelists were not consistent with one another. St. Augustine pithily remarks:

“Vellem sane ut aliquis istorum vanorum, qui hujusmodi quaestiunculas quasi magnas calumniose obijciunt Evangelio, narraret aliquid idem ipse bis numero, non falsum nec fallaciter, sed omnino id volens intimare et exponere, et stilo exciperentur verba ejus eique recitarentur; utrum non aliquid plus minusve diceret, aut praepostero ordine, non verborum tantum, sed etiam rerum; aut utrum non aliquid ex sua sententia diceret, tanquam alius dixerit, quod eum *dixisse* non audierit, sed *voluisse* atque sensisse plane cognoverit; aut utrum non alicujus breviter complecteretur sententiis veritatem, cujus rei antea quasi expressius articulos explicasset.”
—*Contra Faustum*, lib. xxxiii, 8.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

La Première Communion, Histoire et Discipline, Textes et Documents, des Origines au XX Siècle, par Louis Andrieux, Vicaire de la Cathédrale de Reims. Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1911. 12mo., 292 pp.

In this volume the author has given to the public an erudite and richly documented commentary on the recent decree, *Quam Singulari*, relating to First Communion. After an extensive and valuable list of sources, he describes in the first six chapters the ancient custom of giving Holy Communion to infants and children of tender years, a custom which obtained down to the twelfth century, when the widespread practise of withholding the chalice from the laity led to its decline and final prohibition. In the next eight chapters, constituting part II, he treats the application of the decree of the Fourth Council of the Lateran to children. This decree, as is well known, declared yearly confession and communion to be binding on all who had reached the years of discretion. The author traces the various interpretations, in theory and in practice, that have been put on that decree as affecting First Communion, from the time of the council down to the present time. There is no reasonable doubt, as the author shows, that the meaning of the decree, as framed by the Lateran Council and renewed by the Council of Trent, was that children should be admitted to confession and communion as soon as they came to the use of reason, and were capable both of discerning what is grievously sinful and of distinguishing the Holy Eucharist from common bread. In this respect, the recent decree, *Quam Singulari*, is but a renewal of the Lateran decree. But when do children, as a rule, attain the age of reason? Here there has been considerable divergence of opinion. The view expressed in the recent decree just mentioned, that the age of reason is about the seventh year, sometimes before, sometimes after, is the one that has prevailed in modern times, due in large measure, it would seem, to the early ripening of the child mind through school training and city life. But in former centuries, when the opportunities of

early mental training were beyond the reach of most children, it may be questioned whether the use of reason was attained by the generality of children at so early an age. A few documents of the thirteenth and following centuries recommend, it is true, First Communion for children as young as seven or eight years. But far the more common view, the view held by most schoolmen and theologians of the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries, was that no one year could be designated as the ordinary age of discretion, and that as a rule children did not acquire the use of reason before the tenth to the twelfth, and sometimes the fourteenth year. This point is not so clearly brought out in the present work as the evidence justifies. There are some interesting pages on the influence of Jansenism during the eighteenth century, in consequence of which the custom prevailed in not a few parishes of France of deferring First Communion to the sixteenth, eighteenth, and even twentieth year. How the attempt to fix the minimum age at twelve years for First Communion was checked by the Holy See, and how the original intention of the fathers of the Lateran Council was once more put in force, is told in the eighth chapter.

The last part of the work gives an interesting survey of the catechetical preparation for First Communion which has been exacted during the last eight centuries. The closing pages of the book contain by way of appendices, the French translation of the recent decree on First Communion, the two instructions of Benedict XIII for First Confession and First Communion, the documents discussing the right of the Bishop of Annecy to fix a minimum age of twelve years for First Communion, and lastly the letter of Pius X to his Vicar General on the preparation of the children of Rome for First Communion.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

The Life and Writings of Right Reverend John B. Delany, D. D., by G. C. D. Lowell, Mass., Lawler Printing Co., 1911. 8vo., 452 pp.

A good biography is always interesting reading. It is doubly valuable when it is at the same time the biography of a good man.

In the present volume both these conditions are verified. Bishop Delany, whom the reviewer had the good fortune to know personally, was one of nature's noblemen, elevated by the grace of God to the perfection of a high-minded and faithful priest. He was a man of many admirable traits of character, with a mind keenly interested in all that makes for true Christian culture, with a heart full of zeal for the best interests of religion, full of love for Church and Country, full of sympathy for God's children and God's poor. The story of his life is methodically told, in which we see his character unfolded like a beautiful flower, through the years of his boyhood, of his seminary and priestly life, and of the all too short period of his activity as bishop of Manchester. The story is given a particular interest by its numerous personal touches, contained in the familiar letters which he wrote from abroad to relatives and friends, and which reveal a happy mingling of seriousness, humor, optimism, a deep sense of religion, and a keen appreciation of current events. It is an inspiration to read the pages that describe his last hours, in which he rose superior to pain and to the disappointment of a promising career so suddenly cut short, dying as he had lived, a hero. The closing pages of the volume present to the reader the choicest of the numerous poems that came from his facile pen.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Was ist uns Christen die Bibel? von Dr. Kapistran Romeis, O. F. M. Freiburg, B. Herder, 1911. 12mo., 242 pp., 95 cents, net.

This book is written for the educated lay reader, and seeks to present in a popular form the Catholic idea of the inspired Scriptures. From the opening chapter on revelation, the author passes on to the exposition of inspiration, its true nature, the grounds for belief in the inspired Scriptures, and the main characteristics resulting from their inspiration, namely, their authenticity, inerrancy, and trustworthiness as sources of religious knowledge. In connexion with this, some twenty pages are given to the demonstration that the Gospels preserve the verbal teaching of Christ, and that St. John's portraiture of the Incarnate Son of God is identical with the concept of Jesus held by the other apostles and

is undoubtedly true. The last chapter shows that the reverent study of the Scriptures has from the earliest times been held in honor by Church authorities, and seeks to encourage the lay reader to turn frequently to the Bible for spiritual refreshment and edification. A list of popular German versions of the Bible, including the best illustrated editions, brings the volume to a close.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

The Divine Trinity: A Dogmatic Treatise by the Reverend Joseph Pohle, Ph. D., D. D. Authorized English version with some abridgment and numerous additional references by Arthur Preuss. B. Herder. St. Louis, 1912. Pp. 297.

This treatise on the Divine Trinity by the Reverend Doctor Pohle, formerly professor of fundamental theology in the Catholic University of America, and now professor of dogma in the University of Breslau, is a welcome companion to the first volume published in 1911 under the title: "God: His knowability, essence, and attributes." The author begins by tracing the obscure references to the dogma in the Old Testament with a view to showing that this great truth of faith was foreshadowed from the very beginning of the Jewish Covenant and not announced suddenly in the New Testament. Then follow in order studies of the dogma in the New Testament, in tradition, in the official liturgy of the Early Church and the private prayers of the faithful—to which are added chapters on the Divine processions, the theological development of the dogma, and the consubstantiality of the Three Divine Persons.

This summary recital of the contents does not give the reader an adequate idea of the interesting questions treated in this volume. It is invidious to single out for special praise one portion of the treatment rather than another. Suffice it to say that the reader will find edification as well as enlightenment in the discussion of the famous text concerning the "three heavenly witnesses," and in the section on the development of dogma. These are timely and important, in view of current misunderstandings, not to say, misrepresentations.

An abundant bibliography accompanies each topic treated. Not-

withstanding the condensation necessary in a work of this nature, the clearness is admirable. The English version does credit to the translator. It is a volume which priests should have in their library, and one which should not be placed on the shelves until it has been read and studied. It is a work to be put in the hands of those who come for advanced instruction, and we recommend it to all as a succinct and learned treatment of the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Un umanista teologo Jacopo Sadoletto. S. Ritter. Rome, Ferrari, 1912. Pp. 184.

This volume contains an appreciation of the pastoral and literary labors of Cardinal Sadoletto, the humanist theologian, and by common consent far more humanist than theologian. It is an interesting account, well and orderly told, its purpose being to show that Sadoletto, although he left no school to perpetuate his memory, bequeathed a method which is still in vogue and a spirit which has entered into modern theology, not, be it said in passing, for the world's good. As a study in origins, therefore, this volume is very valuable. One lays it down with the thought uppermost in mind that coming events cast their shadows before, and that a vast deal may be learned with personal profit from the virtues and defects of this humanistic theologian of the sixteenth century, who meant well in a task for which he was ill equipped. A bibliographical index, copious notes and references, as also a chronological table and a list of personal names enhance the scientific value of the author's investigation and conclusions. At the end of the volume is appended the Cardinal's treatise on original sin, a good specimen of a poor method.

A product of his times in the love of literary flourish and in the disdain of clear-cut thought, Sadoletto undertook to write theology out of his own head, after the pretentious manner of his times which accorded scant courtesy to the wisdom of the ancients. The result may be readily imagined. Ideas as old as the hills, and abandoned time out of mind for their insufficiency were given a new lease of life, under the mistaken impression that they had never been tried before, not to say, found wanting. For instance,

the fundamental thought, running like a central thread through all Cardinal Sadoletto's writings and developed for the first time in his commentary on the epistle to the Romans, is the contrast between the love of God on the one hand and the love of the world on the other. He rings the changes on this one idea incessantly. Original sin is merely the love of the flesh. Justification is the first struggle and victory of the will over the love of things mundane. The redemption is man's liberation from the things of the flesh. Grace is nothing more than the practice of superior virtue by natural powers. Predestination has its causal reason and ground in the beginnings of free will. Not a word about the supernatural. He does not seem to know what the idea meant, as the supersensible is the highest category of which he speaks.

It was the sophism of the humanist then as it is of the modernist now, to look for simple explanations of complex and many-sided facts, like the Christian religion and the meaning of life. The meanest flower that blows lends itself to no such simple analysis as these men pretended and still pretend. But it was the fashion in those days to wipe the slate of history clean and to write things over again to suit one's self. Cardinal Sadoletto fell a victim to this method. A knowledge of the development of thought in the Middle Ages would have saved him from this fate. Unfortunately, his chosen method of ignoring those that went before, and his over-weening desire to think out things for himself, left him a stranger to history. Methods ruin minds as frequently as they train them, and the present instance is a case in point. It all goes to show the truth of the Leonine adage that progress, to be real, must combine and not divorce the old and the new.

This study has many points of interest and instruction for all those engaged in the work of appreciating at its true value the rise of modern theology. In its contempt of the past, in its pretentious simplification of all things, Christianity included, and in its search for novelty as the mark of truth, this theology stands condemned at its very springs. The author has accomplished a difficult task most creditably. His pointing out of the essential and glaring defects of modern theological methods, his criticisms of Cardinal Sadoletto step by step, and his appreciation of whatever good he found in his eminent subject, are all highly instructive. Tolle, lege.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

L'Éternité des peines de l'Enfer dans Saint Augustin. Achille Lehaut. Paris, Beauchesne, 1911. Pp. 205.

This historical study is divided into three parts: the prevailing errors of the time occupy the first, Saint Augustine's refutation of these the second, and his positive exposition of the Catholic doctrine the third. It is a scholarly and thorough piece of research into the history of the doctrine of eternal punishment. Saint Augustine, it is true, does not write as an historian recounting the errors of the day, but rather as a defender of Christian belief. Still, it is possible to read between the lines, and in this indirect way discover whether Saint Augustine himself is proposing the objections to forewarn and forearm the faithful, or reciting the hostile views of others. It is by this careful method of procedure that the author distils history out of his sources. There is nothing arid about the presentation; on the contrary, the liveliness of the style sustains one's interest unflagging to the end.

There was first to be considered the idea—attributed to Origin—of a universal final restoration, based for the most part on philosophical grounds, and refuted by Saint Augustine on these same grounds, supplemented by an appeal to the Scriptures, especially to the text of Isaiah "their worm dieth not," and to the manner in which the Church had always understood and interpreted the meaning of the last judgment.

Then there was the theory of mercy which made light of the Scripture threats of everlasting punishment, and extended salvation finally to all, or withheld it from the merciless and uncharitable only. Saint Augustine demolished the argument based on the divine promises of life to all, by showing that the divine threats of everlasting spiritual death to sinners were equally a part of the Scripture record, and could not be impugned without calling the whole in question.

After the bleatings of the sheep of the fold had been reduced to silence, there remained to be considered the arguments proposed by the unbelievers. The physical objection to the doctrine of endless chastisement was that bodies could not live in fire. It was against nature to suppose that they could. To this the great Doctor made the reply that it was man's theories of nature, and not nature itself, which rendered the doctrine of endless punishment incredible.

And then there was the moral argument that justice forbade a punishment out of all proportion with the fault or offense committed. The parity between human justice and divine was urged in support of this point to clinch it. Saint Augustine denied the parity, and showed that in sin there is an adherence to evil, which lasts until the will itself yields, and that may be never. Not content with this reply, he plunges into a profound analysis of human malice, and finds the reason for questioning eternal punishment in the lack of a proper sense and appreciation of the seriousness of sin. Was Saint Augustine acquainted with the medicinal theory of punishment which holds that the true end of all chastisement is reform? He mentions it in one passage, but pays no further attention to the problem which it suggests—a sure sign that it was not a current objection on the lips of his opponents. It was much later that this objection began to go the rounds, Origin himself, to whom the theory also occurred, not having realized its full drift, whatever Turmel may think to the contrary.

It is impossible to follow the author into the positive side of the exposition, the restricted space at our disposal forbidding our doing so. Suffice it to say that the full thought of the great Doctor loses none of its vivid glow in this admirable scientific re-presentation. In the sentimentalism of our times, when this doctrine of the heinousness of sin and the endlessness of its chastisement is in danger of being depreciated, it is good to have set before us the words of a giant mind in all their bearings. The author has accomplished his task most creditably in this contribution to the history of theology, and we wish him well with his work.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Introductory Philosophy. A text-book for Colleges and High Schools. By Charles A. Dubray, S. M., Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy at the Marist College, Washington, D. C. New York, Longmans, 1912. Pp. xxi + 624. Price \$2.60.

The greatest difficulty which teachers of philosophy encounter is the inability of the average student to realize the problems of philosophy as problems. In other words, the teacher finds that the pupil is already convinced of the truths of philosophy, that

the work of proving them is labor wasted, that he must first develop an interest in the problem before he can engage the attention of his class. One of the many good qualities of Doctor Dubray's book is that it facilitates this task. It justifies the title, *Introductory Philosophy*, by showing the way to the problems of philosophy, by pointing out the paths which lead to philosophy from science, literature, history and human experience in general. The historical presentation of the problems of philosophy has very great advantages from the point of view of interest to be cultivated and attention to be secured. But sound method requires that the historical presentation be supplemented by systematic discussion. Doctor Dubray's book is an excellent aid to the latter and will undoubtedly recommend itself both to teachers and students.

Introductory Philosophy while it is a textbook and, as such, keeps in view the needs of the beginner in philosophy, is more than a mere compilation. In manner and method it is a departure from the time-honored manual, and by reason of its originality of presentation will interest many who, perhaps, have decided to close their textbooks for good, and seek inspiration among the philosophical essayists and the writers of philosophical classics. The book will interest the mature student, as well as the beginner. It will show how, in accordance with the instructions of Leo XIII, the modern exponent of scholasticism brings forward "New things and old," and knows how to combine the principles of Thomistic philosophy with what is true in modern philosophy and established as the result of scientific investigation. While we congratulate the author on the success he has achieved, we cannot but call attention to this additional indication of what the Catholic University is doing to assist our schools and colleges in their laborious task. *Introductory Philosophy* is a credit to the University as well as to the author.

WILLIAM TURNER.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Commencement Exercises, 1912.

Commencement Week at the Catholic University began on Baccalaureate Sunday, June 2, when Solemn Pontifical High Mass was celebrated by the Rt. Rev. Denis J. O'Connell, D. D., Bishop of Richmond, Va., and former Rector of the Catholic University. The Sermon was delivered by the Rev. William J. Fitzgerald, J. U. D., of Milville, N. J., President of the Catholic University Alumni Association. On Wednesday morning, June 5, the Twenty-Third Annual Commencement and Conferring of Degrees took place in the Assembly Room, McMahon Hall, the Rt. Rev. Rector of the University presiding. The Deans of the Schools of Sacred Sciences, Philosophy, Letters, Science, and the Sisters College presented 96 candidates for degrees. The exercises closed with an address by the Rector.

Degrees were conferred as follows:

In the School of Sacred Sciences, for the degree of *Bachelor of Sacred Theology* (S. T. B.): Rev. Leo Thomas Ennis of Brooklyn, N. Y.; Rev. Francis Aloysius Fadden, of New York City; Rev. Joseph Hafford, New York City; Rev. Robert Thomas Riddle, of Philadelphia, Pa.; Rev. Stanislaus Zmijewski, of the Order of Friars Minor; Rev. Joseph Thomas Barron, of St. Paul, Minn.; Rev. Francis James Rakowski, of St. Paul, Minn.; Rev. Vincent Joseph Ryan, of Fargo, So. Dakota; Rev. Theodore Christian Peterson, Rev. Henry Francis Riley, Rev. John Elliot Ross, Rev. Hugh Anthony Swift, of the Paulist Congregation; Rev. Edward Peter McGrath, Rev. Louis Alphonsus Pelletier, and Rev. James Teynac Reilly, of the Society of Mary; Rev. James Joseph Quinlan, and Rev. William Peter Lennartz, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross.

For the Degree of *Licentiate in Sacred Theology* (S. T. L.): Rev. Sigourney Webster Fay, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "The Rise and Development of the Christian Doctrine of the Supernatural."

Rev. John Joseph Finn, of Albany, N. Y., Dissertation: "Christianity and the Theories of Social Progress."

Rev. Michael Ambrose Gilloegly, of Scranton, Pa., Dissertation: "The Present State of the Divorce Controversy."

Rev. Francis Henry Kehlenbrink, of St. Louis, Mo., Dissertation: "The Ordinary Convalidation of Marriage."

Rev. William Peter McNally, of Philadelphia, Pa., Dissertation: "The Ecclesiastical Policy of Otto the Great."

Rev. Philo Laos Mills, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "The Meaning of 'Peithomai' in the Greek Bible."

Rev. Paul John Ritchie, of St. Louis, Mo., Dissertation: "The Diocesan Synod."

Rev. Paul Sandalgi, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "De Orientalibus Vagis."

Rev. Celestine Paul Smith, of the Order of St. Benedict, Dissertation: "The History and Morality of the Oath."

For the Degree of *Bachelor of Canon Law* (J. C. B.): Rev. John Joseph Clifford, of Los Angeles, Cal.; Rev. Thomas Patrick Durkin, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Francis Aloysius Fadden, of New York City; Rev. John Joseph Featherston, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Celestine Anthony Freriks, of the Congregation of the Most Precious Blood; Rev. Michael Ambrose Gilloegly, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Godfrey Francis Kuratko, of San Antonio, Texas; Rev. George Joseph Hafford, of New York City; Rev. Thomas Francis Kelly, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Francis Patrick Lyons, of the Paulist Congregation; Rev. William Michael McGuire, of Rockford, Ill.; Rev. Thomas Joseph McHugh, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. James Joseph Mulholland, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. James Bernard O'Brien, of Providence, R. I.; Rev. George Michael Sauvage, of the Holy Cross Congregation; Rev. Celestine Paul Smith, of the Order of St. Benedict; Rev. Owen Joseph Smith, of Brooklyn, N. Y.; Rev. Hugh Anthony Swift, of the Paulist Congregation; Rev. William Turbiaux, of Duluth, Minn.

For the Degree of *Licentiate in Canon Law* (J. C. L.):

Rev. John Ignatius Barret, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "The Impediment of Sacred Orders."

Rev. Andrew Joseph Carroll, of San Francisco, Cal., Dissertation: "Extrajudicial Methods as Applied to Ecclesiastical Legislation."

Rev. John Joseph Clifford, of Los Angeles, Cal., Dissertation: "Excommunication."

Rev. Edward Patrick Dalton, of Albany, N. Y., Dissertation: "The Impediment of Age."

Rev. Michael Joseph Galvin, of Los Angeles, Cal., Dissertation: "Appeals."

Rev. Leo Ligouri McVay, of Providence, R. I., Dissertation: "The Matrimonial Impediment of Reverential Fear."

Rev. Thomas Joseph Toolen, of Baltimore, Md., Dissertation: "Witnesses."

For the Degree of *Doctor of Philosophy* (Ph. D.):

Rev. William Francis Cunningham, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross, Dissertation: "The Basis of Realism."

Rev. Joseph Francis Rhode, of the College of the Holy Land, Dissertation: "The Arabic Versions in the Church of Egypt."

Rev. John Elliot Ross, of the Paulist Congregation, Dissertation: "Social Obligations of Consumers."

Rev. Daniel Joseph McDonald, of Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Dissertation: "The Radicalism of Shelley and its Sources."

Rev. Ignatius Albert Wagner, of the Congregation of the Most Precious Blood, Dissertation: "The Condensation of Acetone by Means of Calcium Carbide."

For the Degree of *Master of Philosophy* (Ph. M.): Louis Joseph Bour, of the Paulist Congregation, and Julius John Weber, of Wilkes Barre, Pa.

For the Degree of *Master of Arts* (A. M.): Maurice Vincent Cummings, of Olyphant, Pa.; Rev. John Henry Fitzgerald, of Milwaukee, Wis.; Eugene Sinclair Quay, of Washington, D. C.; Rev. Peter Matthew Wilkin, of Rockford, Ill.; Herbert Francis Wright, of Washington, D. C.; Robert Marcellus Wagner, of Sidney, Ohio; Rev. James William O'Keefe, of the Order of St. Benedict.

For the Degree of *Bachelor of Arts* (A. B.): Terry de la Mesa Allen, of Pensacola, Fla.; Charles Callan Tansill, of Washington, D. C.; James Bergen Dempsey, of Albany, N. Y.; Frederick Conrad Dietz, of Oberlin, Ohio; Christian James McWilliams, of Brooklyn, N. Y.; John Joseph Phillips, of New York City; Thomas Noxon Toomey, of St. Louis, Mo.; John Patrick Treacey, of Marlboro, Mass.

For the Degree of *Bachelor of Science* (B. S.): John Edwards, Jr., of Washington, D. C.; John James Greer, of Washington, D. C.; Rev. Stephen Joseph Zmich, M. D. A., of Washington, D. C.; Frank Henry Butt, of Washington, D. C.

In Sisters College, for the Degree of *Bachelor of Arts* (A. B.): Sister Mary Camillus, Sister Mary Irma, of the Sisters of Mercy, Chicago, Ill.; Sister Mary Columbkille, of the Sisters of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, Texas; Sister Mary Germaine and Sister Leo, of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, of Scranton, Pa.; Sister Mary Aquinata, Sister Hilarine, of the Sisters of Divine Providence, Newport, Ky.; Sister Thomas Aquinas and Sister Mariola, of the Order of St. Dominic, Sinsinawa, Wis.; Sister Mary Crescentia, Sister Mary Antonia, Sister Mary Columba, Sister Mary Regina of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa; Sister Agnes Clare, Sister Mary, Sister Ignatia, Sister Mary Ignatia, Sister Genevieve, of the Sisters of Providence of St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Terre Haute, Ind.

Letter of Dr. Max Pam.

Dr. Max Pam, a well-known Jewish-American Lawyer of Chicago, has founded five scholarships in the Catholic University at Washington, for the study of the Social Sciences, and in the following remarkable letter to Cardinal Gibbons he sets forth the reasons for this benefaction:

2001 EMPIRE BUILDING,
NEW YORK, June 1, 1912.

YOUR EMINENCE:

It gives me pleasure to hand you herewith check covering the first of five scholarships each being in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars, established by arrangement with Your Eminence in the Catholic University of America, for the purposes hereinafter indicated. The remaining scholarships shall be remitted for, one each during the next four years.

First. The holders of the scholarships are to take at least one of their studies in the department of sociology, with a view to studying the social and economic conditions in the interest of the well-being of the nation.

Second. The holders of the Scholarships are to be students, whom, during my lifetime, I shall designate, after consultation with the officers of the Catholic Church Extension Society at Chicago, and the Rector of the University, reserving, however, the right to arrange with the Board of Trustees for a change in the method of designation whenever in my judgment it may seem necessary or wise. After my death the designation or nomination of these students shall be made by the Executive Committee of said Catholic Church Extension Society in consultation with the Faculty of the Catholic University of America at Washington, D. C.

Third. Each scholarship shall be limited to three years, subject, however, to extension to a period of four years on the recommendation of the Rector of the University.

The reasons and motives impelling me to found these scholarships are as follows:

The spirit of "live and let live" has been the dominant characteristic of our people up to the present time. From a material standpoint we have been very fortunate. A land of boundless resources and manifold opportunities, the struggle for existence has been deprived of the hard features which characterize it in most other countries. But conditions are rapidly changing. A phenomenal increase in population is straining our resources more and more each year, and opportunities are proportionately decreased. As a result of these changed conditions the spirit of "live and let live" must sooner or later yield to that individual selfishness begotten of a more intense struggle for existence unless another and higher spirit, the spirit of *LIVE AND HELP LIVE*, comes to its aid. We are not and should not be, in any state, individual units, seeking our own selfish ends, and concerned only with what affects our own personal welfare.

LIVE AND HELP LIVE should be the true patriot's motto. Rich and poor have fought side by side to save this country and to give it freedom. They have worked together to upbuild it. The rich of today are the poor of yesterday. There is no dividing line of blood between them and none of the artificial distinctions of caste and class which are to be found in older civilizations. And I do believe there is less class hatred in America today than in any country under the sun. Our men of wealth, as a class, have shown themselves to be unselfish and patriotic and American philanthropy is a world's wonder at the present moment.

Every European country today is face to face with grave economic problems. Our turn is coming; in fact, it is a grave question if it be not already here. We hear advanced, from time to time, new and strange theories of government. There are some who claim, even at the present hour, that the Constitution has outlived its usefulness. In spite of assertions to the contrary, I am strongly convinced that the spirit of our people is sane, conservative and just. There is plenty of respect for law and order, consideration for the rights of others and a general realization that the millennium promised by political visionaries will not arrive in a week or a year. The people at bottom are right, but they need wise and honest leadership.

FALSE LEADERSHIP IS THE NATION'S REAL MENACE.

To avert this latter danger we must have men who are qualified by training and integrity to meet and oppose it whenever and wherever it appears. It is my conviction that it is the people themselves who must supply this leadership. In my humble way I want to help talented young men to fit and qualify themselves for this work and therefore it is with great pleasure that I am, with your consent, establishing these five scholarships with the understanding that the young men who will be chosen for these scholarships will make a special study of social and economic problems. These problems, as I conceive it, will center round man's relation to man, man's relation to government, and man's relation to property.

The Catholic Church holds to the traditions of the past; it is conservative; it stands for authority, for government, for the rights of the individual and for the rights of property, and these to my mind are the chief elements that enter into individual and national happiness; it has the largest number of communicants of any religious institution in the country; it has the opportunity of moulding character, developing the intelligence and creating a proper sense of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, not only amongst those who are citizens at the present moment, but amongst the millions who will come from other lands, seeking better opportunities and more favorable conditions of life.

I do not believe in helpfulness which leads to lack of self-reliance, destroys individual ambition and makes drones instead

of producers. I believe that all right-thinking people are as opposed to predatory poverty as they are to predatory wealth. I believe in religious education which quickens the conscience to a sense of its responsibilities. I believe in the country's future and have faith that the people properly educated and wisely led will solve their problems as they arise; and with the spirit of religion finding permanent place in thought and conduct, both in private and public life, the liberties and happiness of the people are secure.

In conclusion, Your Eminence, permit me to express the hope that the young men who will receive a higher education as a result of this foundation will reflect credit upon their Alma Mater and will, under your care, develop that type of character which makes for all that is best in the Nation's life.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) MAX PAM.

TO HIS EMINENCE,

JAMES CARDINAL GIBBONS,

*Chancellor of the Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.*

University Degrees for Sisters.

This year for the first time the Catholic University of America has awarded to representatives of our Sisterhoods the honors that are attached to academic degrees. At the Commencement exercises on June 5, the Baccalaureate in Arts was conferred on eighteen candidates, members of Sisters College, representatives of seven of our leading teaching communities.

The usual time requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in the representative universities of the country is 2,160 class hours of collegiate work, taken after the completion of a standard high school course of four years. In this University the minimum requirement is 2,176 hours. The candidates from the Sisters College have a record of college work ranging from 2,176 to 3,408 hours and averaging 2,733 hours, or thirteen hours more than five years of work. The candidates are as follows:

Sister Mary Regina, Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa, number of college courses taken 28, number of class hours 2,176, experience in teaching 20 years in the high school.

Sister Mary Columba, Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa, number of college courses taken 24, number of class hours 2,208, experience in teaching 24 years of high school.

Sister Mary Columbkille, Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, Texas, number of college courses taken 32, number of class hours 2,336, experience in teaching 2 years in primary grades, 5 years in grammar grades, 2 years in high school.

Sister Mary Germaine, Congregation of the Sisters-Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Scranton, Pa., number of college courses taken 32, number of class hours 2,368, experience in teaching 18 years high school, 12 years as inspector of the schools conducted by the Congregation in the diocese of Scranton.

Sister Thomas Aquinas, Sisters of the III Order of St. Dominic, Sinsinawa, Wis., number of college courses taken 28, number of class hours 2,464, experience in teaching 2 years grammar grades, 8 years high school, 3 years normal school.

Sister Mary Irma, Sisters of Mercy, Convent of Our Lady of Mercy, Chicago, Ill., number of college courses taken 39, number of class hours 2,562, experience in teaching 20 years in high school.

Sister Mary Crescentia, Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa, number of college courses taken 22, number of class hours 2,592, experience in teaching, 18 years high school and 6 years high school principal, 6 years normal training school.

Sister Mary Genevieve, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 34, number of class hours 2,610, experience in teaching grammar grades 2 years, normal training school 1 year.

Sister Mary Leo, Congregation of the Sisters-Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Scranton, Pa., number of college courses taken 39, number of class hours 2,620, experience in teaching 16 years in high school.

Sister Mary Camillus, Sisters of Mercy, Convent of Our Lady of Mercy, Chicago, Ill., number of college courses taken 38, number of class hours, 2,684, experience in teaching 7½ years in high school.

Sister Mary Antonia, Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Dubuque, Iowa, number of college

courses taken 28, number of class hours 2,720, experience in teaching 18 years high school, 5 years in normal training school.

Sister Mary Ignatia, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 41, number of class hours 2,770, experience in teaching 1½ years grammar grades, 6 years high school.

Sister Ignatia, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 41, number of class hours 2,784, experience in teaching 2 years grammar grades, 2½ years high school.

Sister Agnes Clare, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 48, number of class hours 3,004, experience in teaching 14 years high school and college, 2 years normal school, 6 years high school principal. Author of a Brief Compendium of General Literature and Eleanor C. Donnelly, a school classic.

Sister Mariola, Sisters of the III Order of St. Dominic, Sinsinawa, Wis., number of college courses taken 35, number of class hours 3,168, experience in teaching 8 years high school.

Sister Mary Aquinata, Sisters of Providence of Kentucky, Newport, Ky., number of college courses taken 20, number of class hours 3,296, experience in teaching, 4 years grammar grades, 4 years normal school.

Sister Mary Hilarine, Sisters of Providence of Kentucky, Newport, Ky., number of college courses taken 21, number of class hours 3,392, experience in teaching 2 years grammar grades, 3 months normal school.

Sister Mary, Sisters of Providence, St. Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana, number of college courses taken 36, number of class hours, 3,408, experience in teaching 1½ years high school, 5 years normal school.

These Sisters are qualifying for work as teachers in our colleges, academies and parochial schools. In many instances, however, they will remain in the University to fulfill the conditions prescribed for the obtaining of higher degrees.

Meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Charities.

On September 22, 23, 24 and 25 the Second Biennial Meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Charities was held at the Catholic University of America.

The officers of the Conference are:

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HIS EMINENCE JAMES CARDINAL GIBBONS

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Toomey, Mrs. V. L.

Virnstien, Mrs. Wm.

Weller, M. I.

Woodward, H. E.

The program:



PROGRAM

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1912.

10.00 A. M. Solemn Opening Mass at the Catholic University of America.

Conference Sermon. Rt. Rev. J. F. Regis Canevin, Bishop of Pittsburgh.

3.00 P. M. Meeting of Executive Committee.

8.00 P. M. PUBLIC MEETING.

Address of Welcome, Gen. John A. Johnston, Acting President, Board of Commissioners.

The Church in Charity. Rt. Rev. Monsignor Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the Catholic University, Washington, D. C.

The Government in Charity. Mr. Thomas M. Mulry, President of the Superior Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society, New York City.

Charity and Culture. Mr. F. P. Kenkel, Editor of the Social Justice and the Daily Amerika of St. Louis, and Member of the Board of Directors of the Central Bureau of the Central Verein, St. Louis, Mo.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1912.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON NEEDY FAMILIES.

Chairman's Address. Mr. Robert Biggs, President of Particular Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society; Member Executive Committee, Federated Charities; Secretary Executive Committee of Catholic Immigrants and Sailors Protective Association; Member Committee for Reorganizing Housing Code of Baltimore City; Baltimore, Md.

Desertion and Non-Support. Mr. Patrick Mallon, Probation Officer at Brooklyn Children's Court, Brooklyn, N. Y.

The Pensioning of Widows and Their Families. Miss Mary E. Shinnick, Probation Officer, Cincinnati, Ohio.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DEPENDENT CHILDREN.

Chairman's Address. Mrs. Thos. Hughes Kelly, Chairman of the Committee on Day Nurseries of the Association of Catholic Charities, New York City.

Present Methods in the Care and Training of Defective Children (deaf, mute, blind, and feeble-minded). Rev. Michael McCarthy, S. J., New York City.

Medical Point of View of Mentally and Physically Defective Children. Dr. Mary O'Brien Porter, Chairman of the Protectorate of the Catholic Woman's League, Chicago, Ill.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DELINQUENT CHILDREN.

Chairman's Address. Mr. Edwin Mulready, Executive Officer and Secretary of the Massachusetts Probation Commission; Secretary-Treasurer of the Massachusetts Branch of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology; Trustee of the Massachusetts State Hospital for Dipso-maniacs at Foxborough, Boston, Mass.

Prevention of Delinquency. Mr. J. J. McLoughlin, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, New Orleans, La
Necessary Legislation. Mrs. Thaddeus J. Medder, Member of the Catholic Woman's League, Chicago, Ill.

Discussion. Opened by Hon. Charles A. DeCourcy, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

2.00 P. M. MEETINGS OF ORGANIZATIONS.

St. Vincent de Paul Society.

Christ Child Society.

The Federation of Catholic Women's Organizations.

Organizations engaged in the work of Protection of Young Girls.

8.00 P. M. THE CITY AND ITS POOR.

The Poor as Victims of Their Material Environment. Dr. Lawrence F. Flick, Founder of the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Tuberculosis; Co-Founder of the Henry Phipps Institute for the Study, Treatment, and Prevention

of Tuberculosis; Ex-President of the International Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis; Philadelphia, Pa.

The Poor as Victims of Their Moral and Social Environment. Miss Katherine R. Williams, Member of the State Board of Control of Wisconsin; Former Member of the Milwaukee Tuberculosis Commission; Chairman of the Committee of Civics and Philanthropy of the Marquette Woman's League; Milwaukee, Wis.

The Legal and Social Protection of the Poor. Mr. James F. Kennedy, President of the Particular Council and Secretary of the Superior Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Chicago, Ill.

Discussion.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1912.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON NEEDY FAMILIES.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Mrs. James Hugh Hackett, President of the Marquette Woman's League, Milwaukee, Wis.

After-Care of Families. Mr. Joseph W. Brooks, Member of Executive Board of St. Mary's Industrial School, and of the St. Vincent de Paul Society, Baltimore.

The Relation of the State to the Convict's Family. Dr. Chas. F. McKenna, Vice-President of the Catholic Home Bureau, New York City.

Home Recreation, Play and Playgrounds Among the Poor. Miss Margaret C. Cummings, Director Recreation Centre for Men and Boys (New York City Board of Education); Former Director of Vacation Playgrounds; Secretary Federation of Catholic Sewing Circles; Member Riverside Council, Charity Organization Society, New York City.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DEPENDENT CHILDREN.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Mr. Edward J. Du Mee, Vice-President of the Central Council, and Chairman of the Almshouse Committee, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Philadelphia, Pa.

The Legal Aspect of the Problem of Dependent Children.
Hon. Michael F. Girtten, Former Judge in the Municipal Court of Chicago, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the German Aid Society; Chicago, Ill.

The Federal Children's Bureau. Mr. Richard M. Reilly, President of the Particular Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Harrisburg, Pa.; President of the Society for the Prevention of Tuberculosis in Lancaster City and County; Director of Lancaster Charity Society; Secretary of St. Mary's Orphan Asylum, Lancaster, Pa.

The Immigrant Child.—I. Mrs. Edward Mandel, Secretary of Woman's Auxiliaries to the St. Vincent de Paul Society, Association of Catholic Charities; Secretary of the Local Needs Association of New York City; Member Public Education Association; President of Women's Auxiliary to the Gouverneur Hospital Tuberculosis Clinic, New York City.

II. Rev. Dr. Joseph Corrigan, Superintendent of Catholic Missionary Society of Philadelphia.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DEPENDENT SICK.

Chairman's Address. Dr. John A. Horgan, President of the Central Council of Boston, St. Vincent de Paul Society; Out-Patient Physician of Foxborough State Hospital; Roxbury, Mass.

The Chronic Sick in Their Homes. Robert M. Merrick, M.D., Boston, Mass.

Systematic Visitation of the Sick in Their Homes. Mrs. M. J. McFadden, President of the Guild of Catholic Women, St. Paul, Minn.

Service on Boards Controlling the Disbursement of Funds for the Relief of the Sick. Dr. Helen M. Nolan, Christ Child Society, Toledo, Ohio.

Discussion.

The afternoon is left free in order that Delegates may have opportunity to visit points of interest in Washington.

8.00 P. M. CO-OPERATION IN CHARITY.

Co-operation Among Catholic Charities. Miss Adelaide M. Walsh, Director of the Social Service Department, Children's Memorial Hospital, Chicago; Director Chicago Industrial School for Girls.

Co-operation Among All Charities. Dr. James E. Hagerty, Professor of Economics in the Ohio State University; Columbus, Ohio.

The Parochial School in Relation to Relief Work. Rev. Joseph F. Smith, Superintendent of Catholic Schools in the Archdiocese of New York; President of the Parish School Department of the Catholic Educational Association; New York City.

The Uses of a Catholic Charities Directory. The Secretary of the Conference.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1912.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON NEEDY FAMILIES.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Mr. John Rea, President of the Central and Particular Councils, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Philadelphia, Pa.

Modern Views and Methods of Treatment of Inebriety. Dr. John A. Horgan, Out-Patient Physician of Foxborough State Hospital, Roxbury, Mass.

The Parish Nurse. A Sister of the Institute of Mission Helpers, Baltimore, Md.

Our Catholic Immigrants. Mr. Wm. J. Vavra, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney in the Court of Domestic Relations; Member of the United Bohemian Charities of Chicago; Chicago, Ill.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DEPENDENT CHILDREN.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Miss Stella Hamilton, Board of Managers of the Christ Child Society; Omaha, Nebr.

The Problem of Dependent Catholic Children in Public Institutions. Rev. Francis X. Wastl, Chaplain at the Philadelphia Hospital for the Sick, Indigent and Insane; Philadelphia, Pa.

The Selection of Children for Placing Out. Mr. Wm. J. Doherty, Executive Secretary of the Catholic Home Bureau, New York City.

The Education of the Dependent Child. Brother Henry,

Director of the New York Catholic Protectory; New York City.

Discussion.

9.30 A. M. Section Meeting of the COMMITTEE ON DELINQUENT CHILDREN.

Vice-Chairman's Address. Hon. Patrick A. Whitney, Commissioner of Corrections; New York City.

Causes of Delinquency. Rev. James Donahoe, City Missionary of St. Paul, Minn.; Member Charities Conference Committee.

Treatment of Delinquent Children. Mr. Michael Francis Doyle, Vice-President Particular Council, St. Vincent de Paul Society; Philadelphia, Pa.

Discussion. Opened by Judge William H. De Lacy, Juvenile Court, Washington.

At the close of the Conference the following officers were elected to serve during the years 1913 and 1914.

Honorary President, His Eminence James Cardinal Gibbons; President, Rt. Rev. Monsignor T. J. Shahan, Rector of the University; Secretary, Rev. Dr. Wm. J. Kerby, Washington, D. C.; Assistant Secretaries: B. A. Seymour, Detroit, Mich.; Miss S. G. Gaynor of Chicago; Bernard C. Kelley of Boston, Mass.; Treasurer, Hon. Wm. H. De Lacy of Washington, D. C. Vice-Presidents: Daniel B. Murphy of Rochester, N. Y.; Miss Mary V. Merrick of Washington, D. C.; Richard Crane of Cincinnati, Ohio; Mrs. T. J. Meder of Chicago, Ill.; Rev. Joseph Ruesing of West Point, Nebr.; David F. Tilley of Boston, Mass.

The Conference is now engaged in the work of compiling a complete and authentic directory of the institutional and lay Catholic charities of the United States. It is hoped that the work will be completed in 1913.

The report of the first meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Charities makes a volume of 430 pages. Price \$2.00 in cloth binding; \$1.50 in paper.

Up to the present, the Conference has been financed by the contributions of its friends and by the sale of the Report. Beginning with the 1912 Conference, it has been found necessary to add paying membership, as follows:

PAYING MEMBERSHIP.....\$3.00

Payable every two years.

SUSTAINING MEMBERSHIP.....\$10.00

Payable every two years.

Paying and sustaining members will receive a bound copy of the Proceedings without further charge. Sustaining members may receive a second copy without charge, upon application.

The Conference bespeaks active sympathy and support in its work. It asks its friends to send a subscription in either of the manners above indicated, and to make any suggestions or send any information which will improve its efficiency or encourage its efforts to serve the great interests of Catholic charity in the United States.

Address all communications to the National Conference of Catholic Charities, Catholic University, Washington, D. C.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Visit of the Apostolic Delegate. His Excellency, the Most Rev. Giovanni Bonzano, Apostolic Delegate to the United States, was entertained by the Rt. Rev. Rector of the Catholic University on May 13. This was the first public appearance of the Apostolic Delegate since his arrival in Washington. At the dinner given in his honor by the Rector the Delegate was officially welcomed to the University by the Rector, who spoke on the intimate relations existing between the University and the Holy See. Monsignor Bonzano responded in English, expressing his appreciation of the reception given him in America and especially in Washington, and his deep interest in the University whose career he has watched from the beginning. After the dinner the professors of the University, the heads of the affiliated colleges, and guests were presented to the Delegate.

Andrew Lang Prize Essay. The Prize offered by the late Andrew Lang for the best Essay on a Homeric topic was won by Mr. Charles F. Tansill, of Brookland, D. C. The contest was open to undergraduate students of the University.

The Summer Session opened on Sunday, July 1st, with a Solemn High Mass in the chapel of Divinity Hall, at which the Very Reverend Doctor Dougherty was celebrant. The Sermon was preached by the Right Reverend Rector. The Session closed on Friday, August 9.

Attendance at the Summer Session. The total registration of students at the Summer Session was 314. Of this number 11 were lay students and 303 religious. The religious represented 26 orders or communities and came from 55 dioceses of the United States and Canada.

Public Lectures. During the Summer Session Public Lectures were given at MacMahon Hall at eight o'clock on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. The lecturers were Reverend Doctors Pace, Shields, Turner and McCormick.

Retreat for Sisters. At the close of the Summer Session a retreat for Sisters was begun. The exercises were conducted by the Reverend Paschal Robinson, O. F. M.

Sisters' College. The first academic building for the Sisters' College is being erected on the grounds of the Benedictine Convent, Brookland. It will be completed for the opening of classes, October 4. It is a building of the "portable" type, and will be moved later to the permanent site of the Sisters' College.

Registration. A week before the formal opening of the University the Registrar reports that every room in Gibbons Hall and Albert Hall is taken. The number of new students will be well over one hundred.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVIII.

December, 1912.

No. 8.

"Let there be progress, therefore ; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

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THE IRISH HOME RULE BILL.

A genuine attempt to settle long-standing Irish grievances and to bring about the realisation, in whole or in part, of century-old but never-abandoned and fondly-cherished Irish ideals must naturally be of absorbing interest both on sentimental and practical grounds to Irishmen or their descendants wherever they are found; but as an experiment in constitution making the Irish Home Rule Bill, now before the British Parliament, makes a still wider appeal. As the debates on the Bill have gone forward, the interest in it has increased, and no wonder, for it is a momentous step in legislation.

The Government of Ireland Bill—to give it its official designation—was introduced in the House of Commons on April 11, 1912, by the prime minister in a speech which, though perhaps not quite up to the standard of Gladstone's great oratorical performances on two similar occasions, is yet admitted on all hands to have been a model of lucidity and to have displayed a wonderful mastery of the complicated details of the measure to be expounded. The first trial of strength took place on the 16th of April, when the House divided on the motion for leave to bring in the Bill, and the Government had a majority of 94, the figures being 360 to 266. The Bill was accordingly "brought in" and read a first time. It obtained second reading on the 9th of May by a majority of

101 (372 for, 271 against), and is now in its Committee stage.

The Bill consists in all of 47 clauses and 4 schedules, and is therefore as brief and concise as the magnitude of the issues involved permits.

Its first proposition is to establish in Ireland a parliament consisting of the King and two Houses, namely, the Irish Senate of 40 members, and the Irish House of Commons of 164 members, with the proviso that, notwithstanding the establishment of the Irish parliament or anything contained in the Bill, the supreme power and authority of the parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters, and things within the King's dominions. It is thus made plain at the outset, as it is in many emphatic ways in later clauses, that the Irish parliament is to be subordinate to the parliament of the United Kingdom.

The principle adopted in 1886 and 1893 of bestowing a certain number of powers on the Irish parliament and of reserving the rest, defined and undefined, to the imperial parliament has on this occasion been abandoned in favour of the opposite principle of reserving from it certain named subjects and leaving to it everything else. Hence we find that the Bill now under consideration gives to the Irish parliament the general power of making laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland, but debars it from legislating on any matter affecting any of the following questions, namely:—

- (1) The Crown, or the succession to the Crown, or a regency; or the Lord Lieutenant except as respects the exercise of his executive powers in relation to Irish services;
- (2) The making of peace or war or matters arising from a state of war; or the regulation of the conduct of any portion of the King's subjects during the existence of hostilities between foreign states with which the King is at peace, in relation to those hostilities;
- (3) The navy, the army, the territorial force, or any other naval or military force, or the defense of the realm, or any other naval or military matter;

- (4) Treaties, or any relations with foreign states, or relations with other parts of the King's dominions, or offenses connected with any such treaties or relations, or procedure connected with the extradition of criminals under any treaty, or the return of fugitive offenders from or to any part of the King's dominions;
- (5) Dignities or titles of honour;
- (6) Treason, treason felony, alienage, naturalisation, or aliens as such;
- (7) Trade with any place out of Ireland; quarantine; or navigation, including merchant shipping, except as respects inland waters and local health and harbour regulations;
- (8) Lighthouses, buoys, or beacons, except when constructed or maintained by a local harbour authority;
- (9) Coinage; legal tender; or any change in the standard of weights and measures;
- (10) Trade marks, designs, merchandise marks, copyrights, or patent rights;
- (11) The following reserved services:—
 - (a) The Acts relating to Land Purchase in Ireland, the Old Age Pensions Acts of 1908 and 1911, the National Insurance Act of 1911, and the Labour Exchanges Act of 1909;
 - (b) The collection of taxes;
 - (c) The Royal Irish Constabulary and the management and control of that force;
 - (d) Post Office Savings Banks, Trustee Savings Banks, and Friendly Societies;
 - (e) Public loans made in Ireland before the passing of the Bill into law.

Should the Irish Parliament make any law in contravention of the foregoing limitations, that law will be *ipso facto* void to the extent of the contravention.

With regard to the "reserved services" contained in Section 11, the Irish Constabulary passes automatically at the end of six years to the control of the Irish Parliament, and if both

Houses of the Irish Parliament pass a resolution providing for the transfer to the Irish government of public services in connection with the administration of the Old Age Pensions Acts or of the National Insurance Act, these services shall be accordingly so transferred on a date fixed by the resolution at not less than a year after its adoption. The services in connection with the Post Office Savings Banks, Trustee Savings Banks, and Friendly Societies shall be similarly transferable, but not until ten years shall have elapsed.

A special clause effectually separates church and state. Its language is remotely reminiscent of the language used in the somewhat analogous portion of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Irish clause is so important and so clear that it deserves to be quoted in full:—

“In the exercise of their power to make laws under this Act the Irish Parliament shall not make a law so as either directly or indirectly to establish or endow any religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof, or give a preference, privilege, or advantage, or impose any disability or disadvantage, on account of religious belief or religious or ecclesiastical status, or make any religious belief or religious ceremony a condition of the validity of any marriage.

“Any law made in contravention of the restrictions imposed by this section shall, so far as it contravenes those restrictions, be void.”

The foregoing clause is incorporated in the Bill for the general effect it is bound to have; but the portions of it which refer to ecclesiastical status and to marriage validity, respectively, are introduced specifically, as stated by Premier Asquith in his opening speech expository of the Bill, for the purpose of preventing any attempt at giving legal sanction or effect to two recent papal pronouncements, namely, the *motu proprio*, *Quantavis Diligentia*, and the *Ne Tèmere* decree. So much of a sop had to be thrown to the Cerberus of sectarianism, without, however, effectually stopping the monster's deep-mouthed bayings and hideous howls.

In appointing an executive authority, the time-honoured

British practice of having joint legislative and executive functions united in one individual, which is in such marked contrast to the system prevalent in the federal government of the United States, is adhered to, for the Bill requires that every Irish Minister must be a member of the Privy Council of Ireland and must also be a member of either one of the Houses of the Irish Parliament. The executive authority remains nominally vested in the King, but in reality, in respect of Irish services, in the Lord Lieutenant or other chief executive officer or officers to whom the King may delegate his prerogatives and powers. In practice, of course, this delegation of prerogatives and powers by the King will be a legal fiction, for it is the British cabinet that will be really responsible for the nomination of the Lord Lieutenant or other chief executive officer or officers in his room. The Irish Ministers, who are to be appointed by the Lord Lieutenant with, I take it, no more freedom in their selection than is exercised by the King at present in appointing the various heads of British Departments, will form an Executive Committee of the Privy Council of Ireland—that is, in ordinary parlance, a Cabinet—to aid and advise the Lord Lieutenant in the exercise of his executive power.

As the Bill now stands, it is contemplated that the first Irish Parliament of the new dispensation shall be summoned to meet on the first Tuesday in September, 1913, and shall thereafter hold a session at least once in each year and always so that not more than twelve months shall intervene between the ending of one and the beginning of another session. Each elected Irish House of Commons is to continue to sit for five years from the date of its first meeting, unless sooner dissolved by the Lord Lieutenant. The Senate is not affected by a dissolution, as its members are nominated for a term of eight years. The first Senators are to be nominated by the Lord Lieutenant on instructions from the King, that is, as before, from the British Cabinet; afterwards they are to be nominated by the Lord Lieutenant on the advice of the Executive Committee or Irish Cabinet. One-fourth of the Senators are to retire every second year, the order of retirement in the case of the first

forty to be decided by lot. The vacancies thus caused will be filled by a new nomination. The Bill is not clear on the point, but it seems to me that a Senator may be re-nominated to succeed himself. The 164 members of the Irish House of Commons are to be elected by the constituencies named in the Bill. There will be 2 University members, 34 Borough members, and 128 County members. The university members are assigned to Dublin University just as they are at present in the Imperial parliament, but as there are now two other universities in Ireland, a not unnatural protest has gone forth against the discrimination shown against them in this matter of representation; and it will not surprise me if a fairer adjustment is made in Committee, or if, alternatively, university representation is altogether abandoned. Any peer of any part of the United Kingdom may be a member of either Irish House. No one can be a member of both Houses at the same time, but an Irish Minister who is a member of one House may sit and speak in both, but cannot vote except in the House of which he is a member. Women are not given the parliamentary franchise, but there is apparently nothing in the Bill to prevent them from being members of either Irish House.

Any Bill passed by the Irish Parliament cannot become law until it receives the assent of the King, which is to be given by the Lord Lieutenant, and the Lord Lieutenant is to take from the King instructions in the matter of postponing or altogether withholding the royal assent. This provision gives the King—or, in other words, the British Cabinet—a complete veto on Irish legislation. It may of course be meant to be only a form; but there it is in black and white, and, read in conjunction with Clause I, this Clause VII makes the right of British veto on Irish legislation appear perfectly plain and indefeasible. The defence set up for it is that such a veto right appears in the constitution of every self-governing British dependency. Against the view that the possession of the power of veto on Irish legislation is to be regarded as being a mere formality, it may be urged that in the case of other countries constituting the British Empire the right is not only exercisable

but has been actually exercised. In addition to the veto power, there is also reserved to the Imperial Parliament the right of what is called Concurrent Legislation. This means that the Irish Parliament shall not have power to repeal or alter any provision of any Act extending to Ireland which may in the future be passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, even should such provision deal with a matter with respect to which the Irish Parliament has power to make laws; and, conversely, that any Act passed by the Irish Parliament, dealing with any matter with respect to which it has power to make laws, shall be read subject to any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom dealing with the same matter, and that, so far as it is repugnant to the British Act, the Irish Act shall be void. These are points about which much of what may be described as ultra-national Irish sentiment has been and still is keenly excited and on the alert; but Mr. John Redmond, speaking in the House of Commons on the 11th of April on behalf of himself and his party, made it plain that they at all events will not boggle at accepting the veto and concurrent legislation clauses as they stand. This attitude of the Nationalist party is perfectly intelligible from the point of view of "practical politics" or taking what you can get, and it must be remembered that they are on the spot and are in a position to make the best bargain possible and have every motive of honour and expediency to extract the maximum of concession. At the same time, every student of history will admit that, theoretically at least, there are at stake right here two great constitutional issues, important equally from the British and the Irish standpoint. How these reserved powers, if maintained in the Bill, will work out in practice time alone can tell; but it is no mere doctrinaire quibble to say that the elements of an intolerable friction are present, and that a set of circumstances might conceivably arise hereafter which would strain to the verge of breaking point the relations between the two Parliaments. What is relied on to prevent so undesirable a consummation is the spirit of amity and the feeling of interests in common that the Bill is calculated to promote between the

two countries. Ireland, contented and prosperous under the new régime, will, it is argued, be so conscious of her responsibilities, so proud of her acknowledged position in the congeries of self-governing countries that go to form the British Empire, and therefore so loyal to the British connection, that she will not seek to push her legislative claims to any extreme; and on the other hand, in so happy a posture of affairs, Great Britain will be extremely reluctant and slow to interfere in any way likely to hurt the sensibilities of her friendly neighbour. The argument is a strong one; and, as practically all modern government is the result of give-and-take and compromise, I am of opinion that those who put forward the cheery and optimistic view of the future will probably be proved to be in the right.

Money Bills, properly so called, can originate only in the Irish House of Commons, and can originate there only on the recommendation of the Lord Lieutenant. Such Bills coming up from the Commons must go through the form of passing the Senate so as to be in order for receiving the King's assent, but the Senate may neither reject nor amend them, being in this matter merely a body for registering the will of the other House.

In case a Bill of any other type passes the Commons and is either rejected or for any cause not passed by the Senate, or is so amended by the Senate that the Commons will not accept the amendments, the latter body can bring it up again in the following session, and if the Senate again fails to pass it or amends it in a manner unsatisfactory to the Commons, then the Lord Lieutenant may, during that same second session, convene a joint meeting of both bodies, and a majority of those present at the joint assembly on a vote taken determines the fate of the measure.

Even while having her own Parliament, Ireland is to have the right and the duty to send 42 members to represent her in the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom. Of these, 8 will be selected by Boroughs and 34 by Counties. Besides this constant representation at Westminster, there is

also a provision that, when there is question of a revision of the financial arrangements of the Bill, there shall be summoned, by Order in Council, "to the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom such number of members of the Irish House of Commons as will make the representation of Ireland in the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom equivalent to the representation of Great Britain on the basis of population; and the members of the Irish House of Commons so summoned shall be deemed to be members of the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom for the purpose of any such revision."

The Bill is silent on the point as to whether Irish Peers elected by their fellows are to serve as at present in the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, but the inference is that, as the Act of Union of 1800 is not repealed by the Government of Ireland Bill, and as there is to be no Irish House of Lords, things in that respect remain *in statu quo ante*, and that Irish peers will have the right and the duty to continue their attendance in the British upper chamber.

Ample provision is made for the protection of the interests of existing Irish Judges, civil servants, and police officers and constables, in the matter of salaries, pensions, and nature of duties to be performed. Judges appointed after the passing of the Bill into law will be nominated by the Lord Lieutenant and will hold office by the same tenure as judgeships are now held, that is, practically for life, and will be removable only on the presentation of an address from both Houses of the Irish Parliament instead of from both Houses of the Imperial Parliament as at present.

The right of appeal to the House of Lords from the decisions of the Irish law-courts ceases. In lieu thereof there is substituted the right of appeal to the King in Council, that is, in practice, to the judicial committee of the British Privy Council. Similarly, questions as to whether any Irish Bill or Act, or portion of same, is beyond the powers of the Irish Parliament will, on the recommendation of the Lord Lieutenant or of a Secretary of State, or on petition from any

individual, be referred to, and determined by, the judicial committee of the British Privy Council.

The financial provisions of the Government of Ireland Bill are necessarily of extreme importance, and while they are complicated enough in some of their details, in general principle they are distinguished by simplicity. The Liberal Ministry has acted on the assumption, which they say is borne out by the Treasury figures, that, whereas in 1893, when Gladstone introduced his second Home Rule Bill, there was an estimated contribution by Ireland of over £2,000,000 a year to the Imperial Exchequer, such changes have occurred in the interval that Ireland is now run at an annual loss to Great Britain of between £1,000,000 and £2,000,000. For example, the government estimate of the true Irish revenue for the financial year 1912-1913 is £10,839,000, while the estimate of the expenses for local Irish services for the same period is £12,354,000, showing a deficit of £1,515,000. It has been well established by the findings of Commissions of investigation and other bodies that over-taxation and mal-administration are the causes of this sorry condition of affairs. There is accordingly a feeling that some restitution is due to the nation which under the Union has been systematically robbed. Expediency, too, plays its part, for, if something is not done to check the downward process, things will go from bad to worse, and Ireland will remain an ever-growing burden on British finances. This latter view has been boldly advanced by the promoters of the Government of Ireland Bill, and it is bound to have weight with the British tax-payer, who, like every other tax-payer, is very sensitive where his pocket is concerned. It would never do, of course, to start Ireland on her new career in an insolvent condition; but by helping her out now and bearing for a time her deficit, the British tax-payer will enable her to work out her own salvation and incidentally, it is believed, to save him in the course of a few years from what is now a growing loss, which may with careful and economical management be ultimately turned into a profit. This is the

basic principle underlying the proposed financial relations between the two countries.

The way the case is met is both ingenious and simple. Great Britain will at the outset bear all the expenses of the "reserved services," and will continue to bear them as long as they remain reserved, but the obligation will be upon the Irish government to pay the cost of all other Irish services out of a fund which will be placed at its disposal in the manner now about to be shown. Among the "reserved services" is the collection of taxes. The collection of taxes—other than duties of postage, which fall to the Irish government—will therefore be retained as an imperial service, and the product of all Irish taxes collected by the Imperial government will be paid into the Imperial Treasury. The Imperial Treasury will in turn transfer to the Irish Exchequer—for there is to be a separate Irish Exchequer—a sum representing what it costs the United Kingdom Exchequer to defray Irish services, exclusive of the reserved services, at the time of the passing of the Government of Ireland Bill into law. This sum, known as the Transferred Sum, will be determined by a body to be appointed and called the Joint Exchequer Board, consisting of five persons, of whom two will be named by the Imperial Treasury, two by the Irish Treasury, and the fifth, who will be the chairman, by the King, that is, by the British Cabinet. To the sum so ascertained by the Joint Exchequer Board will be added the Irish Postal Revenue. To these two items will be added, from the Imperial Treasury, by way of surplus, the sum of £500,000, which will continue for three years, when it will be reduced by £50,000, and so each year until it comes down to £200,000, at which figure it will be maintained. From the three items here specified will be derived the revenue which the Irish Parliament will have available to carry on the government of Ireland. Subject to the automatic variation in the surplus during the period between the fourth and the ninth years and to certain minor variations specified in the Bill, and subject also to any changes consequent upon the exercise by the Irish Parliament of its powers to increase or reduce tax-

ation, the Transferred Sum fixed in the first year after the passing of the Bill will remain a constant quantity until the total revenue derived from Ireland exceeds the total expenditure on all Irish purposes. When that stage is reached and has continued for three successive years, steps will be taken by the Joint Exchequer Board to bring about a revision of the financial arrangements. In such revision details will be dealt with as they will in the meantime have arisen; but the two guiding principles of any re-arrangement of finances will be (1) that Ireland shall make an equitable contribution to the common expenses of the United Kingdom; and (2) that the control and collection of such taxes as may be advisable shall be transferred to the Irish Parliament and Government.

For the present, however, the levying of taxes for the whole United Kingdom, including Ireland, will remain vested in the first instance in the Imperial Parliament; but, once it has acted in the matter, extensive powers of varying or abolishing the taxes it has fixed for Ireland, and of imposing new taxes, are conferred on the Irish Parliament. The principal reason for giving the initiative power to the Imperial Parliament appears to be to secure that no articles shall be liable to Customs duties in Ireland which are not also liable to Customs duties in Great Britain. Subject to this right of initiative on the part of the Imperial Parliament, the Irish Parliament shall have the following financial powers:—

1. It may add to the rates of Excise duties, Customs duties on beer and spirits, Stamp duties (with certain exceptions), Land Taxes, or Miscellaneous Taxes, imposed by the Imperial Parliament;

2. It may add—to an extent not exceeding 10 per cent.—to the Income Tax, Death duties, or Customs duties (other than the duties on beer and spirits), imposed by the Imperial Parliament;

3. It may levy any new taxes other than new Customs duties;

4. It may reduce or repeal any tax levied by the Imperial Parliament on Ireland, with the exception of certain Stamp

duties, which for business reasons it is desirable to keep at a uniform rate for all portions of the United Kingdom.

The Transferred Sum will be increased by such an amount as the Joint Exchequer Board may determine to be the produce of increased or new taxation levied by the Irish Parliament. On the other hand, the Transferred Sum will be similarly reduced by an amount corresponding to the loss of revenue due to the reduction or repeal of a tax imposed by the Imperial Parliament. The Irish Exchequer will therefore gain or lose by any increase or decrease in taxation enacted by the Irish Parliament, while the net revenue of the Imperial Exchequer will remain unaffected by such changes.

These, I think, are the principal provisions that seem to call for comment.

I have described the Bill as an experiment in constitution making. Like every other such experiment on a grand scale, it has been extravagantly praised on the one hand and fiercely attacked on the other. No legislation proposed in recent years has more thoroughly fanned party feeling to a white heat glow. It has stirred up primal passions in the breasts of even professional politicians. It has upset the wonted British respect for the decencies and decorum of debate, and insults, hot and bitter, have been freely bandied between the front benches in the House of Commons.

Those who can see nothing good in the Bill and who are opposed to it root and branch are the members of the Unionist party in Great Britain as well as in Ireland. They are traditionally opposed to it, for their very name is derived from their determination to maintain the existing legislative union between the two countries. They condemn the Bill as a whole and in all its parts. They claim that it means the disruption of the empire, and some of them have professed their resolve to take up arms, if necessary, to resist it. The attitude of a certain section of Ulster seems specially threatening; but there is considerable misunderstanding on this point. I find that

there prevails a general, but, as it seems to me, a wholly unwarranted, impression that Ulster is solidly opposed to Home Rule. That impression is due in part to settled convictions which date from olden times, and have never been satisfactorily dislodged; it is due in greater part still to recent announcements in the newspapers. A great demonstration in force was planned against Home Rule; a special day, September 28th last, was set aside and called Ulster Day; and on that day a solemn league and covenant was made and is now being sent around for signatures. The wording of this Ulster Covenant is certainly impressive. It runs thus:—

“Being convinced in our conscience that Home Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as to the whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous to the unity of the Empire, we, whose names are underwritten, men of Ulster, loyal subjects of his Gracious Majesty, King George V., humbly relying on the God whom our fathers in days of strife and trial confidently trusted, do hereby pledge ourselves in solemn covenant throughout this our time of threatened calamity to stand by one another in defending ourselves and our children, and our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom, and in using all the means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland; and in the event of such a Parliament being forced upon us, we further solemnly and mutually pledge ourselves to refuse to recognise its authority, in sure confidence that God will defend the right.

“We hereby subscribe our names, and further we individually declare that we have not already signed the Covenant.”

It is perhaps not surprising that any one reading that document, without being acquainted with the facts, should conclude that all Ulster is irrevocably pledged to resist Home Rule to the last—to resist it, if need be, by resorting to rebellion and the dread arbitrament of war. Now, what are the facts? The men of the nine counties of Ulster send 33 members to represent them in the British Parliament. Of the 33, 16 are Home Rulers, so that Ulster, so far from being solidly one way, would seem to be fairly evenly divided on the question. But, if we come to examine the details, what do we find?

Donegal is represented by four Home Rulers and no Unionist; Monaghan by two Home Rulers and no Unionist; Cavan by two Home Rulers and no Unionist; Tyrone by three Home Rulers and one Unionist; Fermanagh by one Home Ruler and one Unionist. Therefore five Ulster counties are represented in Parliament by twelve Home Rulers out of fourteen members: five out of nine Ulster counties are overwhelmingly for Home Rule. The opposition to it then is mainly confined to the four counties which compose the North-East corner of Ulster, Londonderry, Antrim, Down, and Armagh. Here undoubtedly the Unionist sentiment is strong, but even here it is not entirely unleavened, for of the 19 borough and county members four are Home Rulers. Belfast itself, the headquarters of Irish Unionism, sends to Parliament one Home Rule member out of four representatives. As a matter of fact, there is a powerful Home Rule sentiment in Belfast. On the very morning of "Ulster Day" there appeared in the *Freeman's Journal* of Dublin a list of Belfast subscribers to the Home Rule Fund. The amount was £1,189, more than double the amount contributed in any previous year, and the list of subscribers filled one whole page of eight columns of the *Freeman* and went over into three more columns on the next page. The letter of the Treasurer of the Belfast Home Rule Fund covering the cheque contained the following striking passages:—

"We send you this cheque and a list of subscribers' names representative of every class and rank and creed amongst the Home Rulers of the North at the moment when the forces of bigotry, ascendancy, and reaction are making their last desperate effort to stem the progress of the tide of National Democracy in Ulster. While the Unionists of Belfast are freely expending the subsidies granted from English Tory funds for the promotion of strife, disorder, and verbal treason in the North of Ireland, the Nationalists of your own city are sending to the Home Rule war chest by far the largest amount ever subscribed for National purposes by any community north of the Boyne. The contrast will carry its own lesson to the mind of every man not blinded by bigotry, malice, and self-interest."

I think I have made it sufficiently plain that Ulster is very far indeed from being a unit against Home Rule. The ques-

tion then is: Can one small section of the country set itself successfully against the remainder of Ireland, and, in the last resort, against the armed might of England? No; Ulster will *not* fight, and Ulster will be right.

In addition to the Unionist politicians, certain Church bodies have also gone on record against the Home Rule Bill. Others who, on very different grounds, condemn it, are those extreme Irish nationalists, represented mainly by the Sinn Fein party, who think the Bill does not go far enough in the satisfaction of Irish aspirations. They object in particular to the veto, to the general supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, and to the financial arrangements. Above all they are angered by the reservation—temporary though it is likely to prove—of the collection of Irish taxes to the Imperial parliament, and by the absence of the full control of Irish Customs duties by the Irish parliament.

On the other hand the two sections of the Liberal party in the House of Commons—the labour members as well as the regular liberals—are enthusiastic in support of the measure; Mr. Redmond and his party of 74 are as a unit in its favour; and even the little knot of Nationalist members, some ten in number, who follow the leadership of Mr. William O'Brien, have accepted it, if with some slight demur. Finally, a representative National Convention, of about 8,000 delegates, held in Dublin on April 23rd, gave it an unqualified benediction. The resolution there adopted without one dissentient voice leaves nothing to be desired in wholeheartedness. It was resolved:—

“That we welcome the Government of Ireland Bill as an honest and generous attempt to settle the long and disastrous quarrel between the British and Irish Nations; and this National Convention of the Irish people decides to accept the Bill in the spirit in which it is offered; and we hereby declare our solemn conviction that the passage of this Bill into law will bind the people of Ireland to the people of Great Britain by a union infinitely closer than that which now exists and by so doing add immeasurably to the strength of the Empire.”

The wording of that resolution makes it patent that a new

spirit has come into Ireland. The confidence reposed in the Nationalist party and its leaders is proved by the fact that the Convention gave Mr. Redmond *carte blanche* as to amendments to be moved in Committee.

There is no doubt that the Bill, while not perfect, is an honest and well-meant attempt to right admitted wrongs, and to set at rest the disputes and bickerings that the Union of 1800 has brought in its train. It will confer on Ireland in regard to Irish concerns a real autonomy. I have no other opinion than that, when it gets into full working order, it will prove of inestimable advantage to Ireland and through Ireland to the British Empire. Many things in it appeal to me; but the feature which I like best perhaps is that, for the first time in the history of the English occupation of Ireland, the Irish Ministerial Executive will be responsible to the Irish parliament and be dependent on its confidence. That this responsibility and this dependence did not exist even in Grattan's parliament was one of that body's fatal flaws, as I have elsewhere frequently pointed out. I believe, too, that that section of Ulster which now stands sullenly and petulantly aloof will, when the time comes, take an active, an intelligent, and an honourable part in making the Irish Parliament a success.

To my mind the great practical question is: Will the Bill pass? I believe it will, and that more quickly than most people seem to anticipate.

The Home Rule Bill does not repeal the Act of Union, and does not restore Grattan's Parliament, and is therefore very far from realising our youthful dreams. Neither will it bring the millennium to Ireland; but, as I have already said in *The North American Review*, "there can scarcely be a doubt that, coming in the train of beneficent legislation on the tenure of land, on labour, and on agricultural, scientific, and University education, it will tend to promote the peace, prosperity, and happiness of the Irish people."

P. J. LENNOX.

THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC CHARITIES.

Our Catholic charities in the United States are massive and varied. Their work is done with great devotedness and dislike of publicity. Charity appears, reverent and fruitful, wherever Catholic social consciousness comes to collective expression. The average parish has a sense of responsibility toward its poor. Practically all of the more important cities have general Catholic organizations which look after city problems as they concern us. The great majority of dioceses have a fairly wide range of institutions making provision for those forms of helplessness and need to which the Church as such has always given care. Aside from these local or geographical divisions among our charities, we find religious communities of men and of women under a central government with branches established widely over the United States engaged in relief work. There are few forms of helplessness which are not ministered to in one way or another by these silent champions of the poor. In addition, our fraternal organizations undertake a vast amount of relief work, notably by assisting charity organizations and by ministering directly to their own members or their families who may come to need. We Catholics ourselves possibly underrate the extent, the efficiency, and the consecration of our charities. This is due to no lack of good will, but rather to the fact that our charities as a whole are not symbolized in any way that appeals to our imagination. In addition, occasions are lacking which might bring them together in such numbers as to impress us by their magnitude alone. Moreover, they persist in not making themselves known. Unless they make themselves known, how shall the world understand them?

And yet there is much to be desired in the condition of these charities. Magnificent as they are, they are inadequate to the

work which is to be done. We lack means, we lack lay workers, and our religious communities constantly complain of lack of vocations to the religious life. Out of forty cities which reported to the National Conference of Catholic Charities in 1910, on general conditions, twenty-one intimated that equipment was inadequate from the standpoint of numbers, of means, and of works of particular kinds. Thirteen cities reported that membership in the lay charity organizations was not sufficiently representative of the prosperous classes.

We need literature. There is lack of literature of investigation which will take up, analyze and present the peculiar problems in relief which confront the Catholic Church as distinct from the general relief problems which confront the nation. There is lack of a detailed and objective literature of interpretation which will explain poverty and its processes as these appear to the supernatural point of view. Since no explanation of poverty can depart very far from Christian philosophy, it is a matter of some concern to us that the current interpretations of poverty are sociological rather than Christian. There is need of a more elaborate literature of direction which will take up the complicated and unnumbered tasks of relief and show us the best methods of performing them. Only when the experience and judgment of our best workers are placed at the disposal of all, can we hope to attain to ideal efficiency. A literature alone can accomplish this. We have a fairly adequate literature of inspiration which presents the doctrine of Christian charity and explains the motives under which it operates.¹

We should foster the habit of using the general literature of relief much more widely and earnestly than appears to be the case. The very highest types of mind are turning themselves to the study of poverty. Brilliant investigations, subtle and convincing interpretations of the facts and processes of poverty and an elaborate literature of direction have resulted from the attention that the modern mind is giving to this

¹ See the *Catholic World*, October, 1912, "The Literature of Relief."

field of study. While there is much in it that will not please us, there are splendid results to be expected when we approach this literature in the right spirit and under proper safeguards.

There is need in our Catholic charities of more systematic coördination and coöperation among them. Of the cities reporting to the National Conference of Catholic Charities in 1910, twelve stated that coöperation among Catholic charities was unsatisfactory. We need a clearly defined policy to govern us in our dealings with outside charities whether voluntary or civic. Of the cities reporting on this phase of coöperation two years ago, twenty-one stated that coöperation with outside charities is, to an extent, satisfactory. Six cities reported that there is practically no coöperation. Even where coöperation is said to be satisfactory, it is at times incomplete and possibly ineffective.

Our charities appear to need a wider view of their problems than they seem to take. The tremendous emphasis now placed on preventive work as distinct from relief is on the whole, justified. The causes that add to the ranks of poverty work unceasingly. We must anticipate their action and prevent poverty when and where possible. Now it seems natural that the insistent demand for legislation and for administrative action in favor of the poor should come from those who are working for the poor. Hence, the average charity organization should take an interest in all social measures which bear directly on the lot of the poor, otherwise their work is half in vain or incomplete. Now, while individual Catholics, according to the reports to the Conference in 1910, are fairly active in their interest in improving social conditions, twenty-two cities reported that Catholic charity organizations, as such, had not been taking part in these larger social movements. Can such reports mean that to a great extent, our organizations have not been working as organizations to promote child labor legislation, to combat loan sharks, to improve housing conditions, to eliminate disease, to solve the problem of the liquor traffic, to advance the interests of compensation laws? Isolated cases of coöperation occurred in some cities which gave a general negative

answer, but the inference that one is inclined to draw from the report as a whole, is that our Catholic charity organizations might increase their usefulness in the whole movement against poverty by taking a more active part in this larger social work.

The limitations referred to here are not mentioned in order to find fault. On the contrary, they are mentioned to point the lines along which the best promise of our immediate development seems to lie. We are familiar with the saying of the old philosophers that one must live before one can write philosophy. Similarly, the poor must be fed and clothed and sheltered, their immediate, concrete, particular and individual wants must be satisfied before we can do much in the line of social philosophy and reform. Now, the amount of relief to be given, the extraordinary devotedness of those who administer it and the immediate specific needs of our poor have largely absorbed our resources and have left little time, little leisure and little means to engage in the larger work of social reform. Fortunately, things are brighter in this regard and it is fair to hope that our charities will year by year identify themselves more vigorously than ever before with this larger social preventive work, as in fact, leading individual Catholics now do.

Another need in our charities is related to the foregoing. In taking hold of any problem it is necessary that charity organizations understand the relations of the various associations which are interested. Now, labor unions, city government, states, citizen' associations, churches, nationalities, universities, schools of philanthropy, journalists and social philosophers of all kinds, are working earnestly in the field of relief. It seems necessary, therefore, that everyone of these organizations should understand thoroughly the resources, and attitudes of all others and also the relations into which all must enter reciprocally in order to accomplish the adequate results in the work of relief. It was a discovery for many, for example, to learn at the meeting of the National Conference of Charities and Correction last June, that the Labor Union can coöperate most efficiently in cases of wife-desertion which throws the deserter's family upon our charities.

A review made somewhat in the form of the foregoing, led to the creation of the National Conference of Catholic Charities in February, 1910. The aims adopted at that time and since maintained in the constitution, are as follows:

1. To bring about exchange of views among experienced Catholic men and women who are active in the work of charity.
2. To collect and publish information concerning organization, problems and results in Catholic charity.
3. To bring to expression a general policy toward distinctive modern questions in relief and prevention and towards methods and tendencies in them.
4. To encourage further development of a literature in which the religious and social ideals of charity shall find dignified expression.

A description of the method in which the Conference works, will enable one to see that it has laid out very practical tasks for itself and that it aims to direct its activities toward meeting the most pressing needs of our charities in a very concrete way.

II.

This year's meeting of the National Conference took place at the Catholic University, September 22, 23, 24 and 25. Three hundred and fifty delegates, representing twenty-seven states or fifty-two cities, were present. Physicians, attorneys, judges, bankers, merchants, clergymen, men and women of wide experience in fields of civic as well as of Catholic charity, and representatives of religious communities of men, were found in goodly numbers among those in attendance. Twenty-six Catholic women's organizations and in particular the St. Vincent de Paul Society, embracing over 10,000 men in the United States, were well represented. Many Catholics interested in relief work but not actively identified with any particular organization were present, since the constitution of the Conference appeals to individual Catholics as well as representatives of organizations.

In spite of extremely inclement weather, the sessions were uniformly well attended and the discussions were frank and thorough-going. Approximately fifty papers were presented. A number of them, treating fundamental principles in relief or fundamental aspects of the work were read at general meetings of the Conference without discussion. The majority of papers, however dealing with everyday questions of relief, were presented at Section Meetings. Here, discussion was invited, and the invitation was heeded. The enthusiasm and industry of the delegates continued unabated from beginning to end.

Much of the work of preparation for the Biennial Meeting is done by Committees, varying in membership from fifteen to twenty-five. Each of these is under a Chairman and one or more Vice-Chairmen. We had this year, Committees on Needy Families, Dependent Children, Delinquent Children, and Dependent Sick. The work of the 1914 Conference will be organized under Committees on Needy Families, Children, Sick and Defectives, Social and Civic Activities.

When the work of preparation is entered upon, the Chairman of each committee proceeds to get in touch with all of the members through correspondence. They are asked to describe in some detail, conditions and problems in their neighborhoods. Since membership in the Committees is scattered widely throughout the United States, the Chairman obtains through this correspondence a fairly representative view of that field with which his Committee is concerned. The reports from members are intended to describe local conditions, to make suggestions as to local needs and as to men and women who may be well qualified to prepare papers for the Conference. The suggestions as to writers include not only Catholics actively engaged in the field of charities but as well our representative men and women who may be won over to coöperate in relief work through an invitation of this kind. After all of the members of the Committee have reported to the Chairman, he proceeds to study the situation and he draws up his tentative program. All of the Chairmen send their outline to the office of the Conference where the topics are adjusted in order to bring out

unity and helpfulness in the general program and so to distribute the appointments that all sections of the country may be represented.

The following advantages are to be noted as a result of this arrangement. First, the program is made really representative of actual conditions and needs. Secondly, one hundred men and women active in Catholic charities are set to work studying local conditions, summing up their own experience, formulating a judgment and writing out a report. When this work is done conscientiously, it inevitably increases the efficiency, widens the views and strengthens the impulse to service in everyone of the hundred men and women concerned. This is undoubtedly a very important service to the cause of Catholic charity, particularly since a large majority of those in question have not the habit of working out their views in this form. Third, forty to fifty of our representative Catholics are selected to prepare papers. This means that they are forced to consult others, to enter into correspondence with Catholic leaders in other cities, to visit libraries, to read pertinent literature, to reach conclusions after systematic reading and observation and to express those conclusions with due regard to literary standards. The educational value of this experience for the writers of papers is not to be overlooked. We have here well defined beginnings of a taste for publication and training toward it. This contains the promise of literature of the precise kind of which we have in these days, marked need. One of those who prepared a paper for this year's Conference, remarked that the work of preparation had been worth more than a year in college. Preparation for the Conference, therefore, greatly encourages the use of the literature of relief, encourages the production of it, and knits together in friendly intercourse, our Catholic men and women who are at work in fields far removed from one another.

The program itself has a certain value inasmuch as it presents problems in charity in their relation to one another. The organization which confines itself strictly to its own field tends

gradually to become narrow and to see things in false relations. The habit of comparison, of looking widely around a problem broadens views and strengthens judgment. Hence it is that the program is frequently a revelation because it brings to notice the wider bearings of problems that may have been looked upon by one or another as isolated and relatively easy of solution. Thus, for instance, in this year's program an endeavor was made to emphasize relations between state policies and private charities, between city administration and the environment of the poor, between the parochial school and the relief organization. The whole process of widening views, of strengthening insight and of correcting judgment seems to be assisted directly by the very nature of the program of the Conference as a whole. These advantages endure through the publication of the Reports of the Conference Meetings in printed form.

III.

The service of the Conference in correcting views should not be overlooked. The Conference creates an atmosphere. From beginning to end the spiritual note is dominant, and spiritual values in poverty and relief are asserted with relative unanimity. The Conference is in fact an experience in faith for those who take part in it. They trace their impulse back in unbroken continuity to the command of Christ and they look upon charity itself, let it be said with entire reverence, as the flowering of the Incarnation. Hence, it is that so many of the delegates speak with such enthusiasm of the revelation that the Conference makes them, of the depth and power of inspiration that they derive from the mere fact of being present. One of the delegates to the recent Conference remarked during a discussion of organization: "When our representative Catholics come here and exchange views, and get into intimate association I cannot but feel that I am in touch with the fountainhead of Catholic charity during the time that I am here. I meet leaders about whom I have heard or whose writings I have read, men and women of whom I have known

only the name. I meet them here, I find something about them that is more than the mere reading of what they have written. I see them. I get an insight into their personality. I get in touch with what is going on, with the fervor and zeal of our leaders and then I return home inspired to work with renewed vim and energy until I may come back in two years to find again the inspiration that I need."

Now, there are two tendencies in our charities. On the one hand, there are those Catholics who have no systematic, personal contact with their own charities. They are in contact with philanthropic work, with civic charities or even with schools of philanthropy. They may serve on state boards of charity or in municipal relief work. They may be professional men dominated largely by professional views. At any rate, there are many Catholic men and women who are interested in relief work but who are deprived of a Catholic atmosphere through which to view it. It is not surprising to find sometimes that the subtle understanding of the spiritual character of charity is lost in these circumstances and that one is led unconsciously into false judgments concerning many problems and into a mistaken appreciation of arguments on certain delicate questions. On the other hand, there is another type that is narrow and local. It is represented by the Catholic who works exclusively in a Catholic field and refuses to know or understand or make any form of compromise with situations or movements that are foreign to his own. Now, of course, these extreme types naturally avoid each other or disagree on everything when they meet. It is the beautiful work of the Conference atmosphere to draw these two types nearer to each other in the joy of spiritual unity and in the insinuated assurance that neither is right and that a third position must be found if they would love and serve the poor with unselfish zeal and reasonable efficiency. The atmosphere of the Conference acts gently but with a certain compulsion in this direction. It brings the too progressive who are not in contact with Catholic charity, nearer to the shelter of the distinctive Catholic spirit. It brings the unyielding conservative a little closer in sympathy

and acknowledgment to those who have discovered the middle way and are following it. In this process, impressions take on a different light and certain arguments are discovered to have less force than was imagined. New bearings of questions are viewed in the light of Catholic philosophy, Catholic traditions, and I might say, Catholic wisdom. In this way, much is done to correct extreme views and build up a policy quite in keeping with orthodoxy as well as with progress. In fact, the Conference serves as a sort of a retreat where mental attitudes may come for self-examination and for renewal at the fountain of strength and truth.

In order to make this point a little more clear a number of questions are indicated in the judgment of which the two tendencies referred to, assert themselves, and in the final solution of which the Conference promises to have a helpful part. Shall we keep records or card catalogues and shall we exchange information among our own organizations and with outside charities? Shall we develop professional charity workers and pay them salary? Shall we spend money for administrative purposes or shall we insist that no money be so expended? Shall we coöperate with non-Catholic, secular and civic charities or shall we hold aloof? Shall we give credit for the honest purpose and noble impulse of philanthropy that ignores the supernatural? Shall we resent or shall we encourage state supervision of private charities and such state institutions as the new Federal Children's Bureau? Shall we favor or shall we oppose the granting of public money to private institutions? Shall we write and speak in public concerning our charity, our methods, our efficiency or shall we work silently and refuse to acquaint the world with our results, contenting ourselves with the thought that God knows and judges and that is sufficient? Shall we test the efficacy of our methods and admit bravely our mistakes when we make them, or shall we leave it to our critics to proclaim our mistakes? Shall we more and more insist on testing efficiency by results or shall we be content with purity of motive? Is our full duty toward the poor done when we have fed, clothed,

housed and visited them or does the spirit of charity as we may imagine it in the mind of Christ, require of us that we coöperate to the utmost of our power in the social work which prevents poverty? Shall we say that those who work for the establishment of a Juvenile Court or the passage of factory laws or for laws to protect women and children, are as noble, as high-minded as those who visit the poor and bring them relief?

On questions of this sort we find two general tendencies among our ranks. It will, undoubtedly, be the work of the Conference to lead toward general unanimity in answering these questions. And in our answers to them there is no doubt that while we hold unyieldingly to everything that is strong and permanent and Catholic in our work, we shall at the same time not fail to take account of everything in modern relief, in modern knowledge and in the practice of healthy compromise which will increase our efficiency, promote harmony among our works for the poor and hasten the day of social justice for them. Catholic ideas require a Catholic atmosphere just as American ideas require an American atmosphere. The Conference offers the atmosphere in and through which we may hope to reach the practical conclusions by which all border questions and all new situations will be met.

IV.

One should not overlook the value of the Conference in promoting conversation and discussion. It brings together three or four hundred of our leaders. They are animated by one purpose. They have a varied range of experience and interests in charity. From early morning until late at night, conversation goes on without end. Those interested in like problems manage to discover one another very early and they seize every occasion to exchange views, compare results and propose questions. In this manner, new works are heard of, new methods are described, comparisons are made, illusions are dispelled, incorrect interpretations are modified. There is no way of keeping record of the amount of good that is accomplished

by the Conference simply through the opportunity for conversation offered to these specialists in their own lines. In a similar way, the discussions in the Section Meetings stimulate thought, suggest views and limitations of views and tend to set true valuations forward in views and in work. Here we have leader matched against leader, experience against experience, and view against view. The narrowness of a locality loses some of its self-confidence in the presence of the range of views and experience brought out in an average discussion. Furthermore, the fundamental papers exposing principles or general phases of relief work, convey a vast amount of information which the members of the Conference absorb in varying degrees as they may have capacity or need for it. On the whole, it may be said that through the conversation, the discussion and the exposition which fill out the time of the Conference, there is a general promotion of efficiency with a general uplifting of the whole tone of our leaders which promises the happiest possible result in our Catholic charities as a whole.

The National Conference appears to stimulate new works in different localities. Whether the Conference itself formally acts in that way or whether the Conference simply creates the occasion out of which these good works result, is of no consequence. I may point out, for instance, without for a moment claiming credit for the Conference, the following as some of the evidences of stimulated activity in the Catholic charities since the Conference was created: The establishment of a Diocesan Conference in Pittsburgh and of City Conferences of Catholic Charities in St. Louis and Chicago; the inauguration of courses of lectures on problems in the field of charity in the parish schools to be conducted under the direction of the Pastors; the efficient organization of the work of Protection of Young Girls in four of our larger cities in the United States; the compilation of a National Directory of the Catholic Charities of the United States; the beginning of a Library on Charities by the Catholic Woman's League of Chicago; greatly increased efficiency in a definite number of organizations identified with the Conference; the proposal to hold State Conferences of Catholic Charities in

alternate years between the biennial meetings of the National Conference at Washington: the creation of the National Federation of Catholic Women's Charities.

V.

One word might be said in conclusion as to the representative character of the National Conference. It has received most encouraging approval from the hierarchy in the United States, from two Apostolic Delegates, and from the Holy Father. A goodly number of members of the hierarchy are found in the subscribing membership of the Conference. A large number of religious communities of men and of women have expressed most cordial approval of the aims and methods of the Conference and have formally become members. One of the problems of organization which remains to be worked out, however, is that of devising the most effective manner of coöperation between the National Conference itself and the Sisterhoods which do so much work in the field of relief, but are in the nature of things hindered from actual attendance at the sessions of the Conference. The Conference will, of course, not be thoroughly representative until the experience and judgment found in our religious communities come to expression in some manner in the Conference. The great body of American Catholics engaged in relief work earnestly desire to get into closer touch with the communities which work with such silent self-sacrifice for the poor. Those engaged in building up the Conference and maintaining it, feel encouraged by the sympathy and coöperation already achieved. Not, however, until the National Conference of Catholic Charities becomes entirely representative of the great interests of the Catholic charities of the United States both lay and religious will their reasonable ambition be satisfied or will they count that their labors have been adequately rewarded.

The St. Vincent de Paul Society prepared the field in which the National Conference is working. It has been the single national representative of lay Catholic Charities in the United

States. It developed organization, leadership and literature which have accomplished splendid things. Much of the feeling of assurance and many of the hopes of the National Conference rest on the sympathy and encouragement of the St. Vincent de Paul Society. The National Federation of Catholic Women's Charities is, in fact, the creation of the National Conference itself. In these two directions the Conference is fully representative. When it succeeds in representing satisfactorily, our religious charities, it will be a worthy addition to the organization and activity of the Church in the United States.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

JUSTINIAN AND CHARLEMAGNE.¹

It is not my purpose in speaking of Justinian and Charlemagne to undertake any elaborate comparison of their characters or any extended analysis of their achievements, but rather to view them as instruments by which two different tendencies in mediæval thought and policies found concrete expression.

Mediæval life and civilization may be said to have begun in the year 313 when Constantine and his colleague Licinius published at Milan the "Edict of Toleration" by which the Christians were granted the right to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences. This decree, inasmuch as it admitted a principle diametrically opposed to all previously accepted theories of society and the state, formally and definitely brought to a close the system of civilization which had prevailed in pagan antiquity. Whether we consider the great Oriental theocracies, the city-states of Greece, or the Empire of Rome, all forms of ancient civilization were characterized by two general features and based on two identical principles. In the first place all these states were theocratic in character, the principle of unity in them being the worship of some particular god or gods, patriotism and the worship of the national deities being synonymous. Closely connected with this was the other principle of state absolutism, or the subjection of the citizen to the absolute control of the state. Professor Willoughby, summing up this latter characteristic, says: "The individual was in many respects more completely subordinated to the control of the state in the Hellenic world, than were the subjects of the Asiatic monarchies, but while the Oriental in his subjection to the law and to the state viewed his subordination as an obedience rendered to an alien

¹ A Lecture delivered in the Fall Course of Public Lectures in MacMahon Hall, Catholic University, October 24.

and external power, the Greek saw in it but the yielding to a higher self, a giving up of his will to a will in the formation of which he participated." Stated in other terms the civilizations of antiquity were theocratic and collectivist. In contradistinction to the form of civilization implied in these principles, the action of Constantine introduced a reform by which religion was freed from state control and by which a definite barrier was raised limiting the authority of the state over the individual. In other words liberty and individualism superseded despotism and collectivism.

It is true that the decree of Constantine merely granted to the Christians the right to worship God as they saw fit; but this was a complete abdication of the theocratic and absolutist basis of the older civilization. It was a concession resulting from the struggle of three centuries in support of the Christian contention that each man is responsible to God for his own salvation. This individualist doctrine included as necessary corollaries the other principles which the Christians had already commenced to put into practice, namely the equality of all men before God and the solidarity of the entire race because of the law of Christian charity. Though essentially religious in character, these doctrines in practice necessarily tended towards certain radical social and political reforms. Thus the doctrine that each man is responsible for his own salvation necessarily implied liberty of conscience, equality before God tended naturally to bring about social equality and to remove slavery and its evils, and the mutual duties and obligations arising from the observance of the law of charity would make impossible poverty or evils of an economic character as far as these could be remedied.

The Christian Church had been the champion of these rights, it was because of the courage and devotion with which these ideals had been pursued through three centuries of persecution, that the first step towards their realization had been attained, and very naturally she became their custodian and defender. Thus did the ancient world pass away, and thus did the mediæval world come into existence. Certain rights were de-

clared to be normal and inherent in human nature and independent of all state control or interference. They were not derived from and were superior to social or political grouping and might be exercised without prejudice to racial or political affiliations. A new confederation was established among men which paid no regard to divisions of race or nationality, and which found its basis in the common nature, the common origin, and the common destiny of all men through the Redemptive sacrifice of Christ. This confederation was known as the Church. Its mission had been clearly defined by its Founder, and side by side with the state, it took its place in human affairs to promote human welfare. The mediæval world thus differed from the ancient in having two institutions with clearly defined purposes and independent spheres of action, busying themselves with matters which had previously fallen exclusively to the lot of the state. The purpose of the Church was to promote the spiritual, that of the state the temporal well-being of man, but the doctrines of religion affected conduct so completely, that its activities came into contact with those of the state at all points.

The problem of the Middle Ages, therefore, was to decide what were to be the relations of Church and state, and the history of the Middle Ages is largely a record of the various attempts to settle that problem. The question was, how was the state with its history and limitations, its powers and its fixed position in law, tradition and existing institutions, to be adjusted to a concept of human nature, and human relations which placed so much of human activity beyond its competence and control. It is no exaggeration to say that this question forms the burden of mediæval political thought and discussion, and that with it are intimately bound up mediæval progress and civilization. Few great ecclesiastics and no ruler in Christendom escaped being drawn into the controversies which it aroused. The question is of perennial interest. Its mediæval phase in its political bearing was another form of the ever-recurring problem, shall society be organized on a collectivist basis, and shall it absorb all individual activities and liberties,

or shall social control be limited. To look on mediæval history as a series of squabbles between Popes and Emperors is to miss entirely its true character, and to lose sight of the forces which made it possible for ecclesiastics to prolong the struggle with civil rulers. It was because the Church represented individual rights, and barred the way to the complete control of the state over its citizens, that it could always count on the support of the majority who would not surrender even to their own national leaders, rights which would make life under these rulers intolerable, and by a strange paradox it is precisely in the countries where the spirit of liberty showed itself most strongly that we find the largest measure of subjection to ecclesiastical control.

State and Church, therefore, was the question of paramount importance for the mediæval ruler and statesman. Two main lines of policy were followed, one in the East and one in the West. Two solutions were offered from the difference in which arose, in large measure, the different development and progress in civil and ecclesiastical affairs in the Eastern and Western sections of Christendom. The men to whom these different lines of policy must be mainly attributed are Justinian and Charlemagne.

There is much that is similar in the lives of these two great conquerors and rulers. The problems which they were called on to deal with and the conditions which confronted them were much alike. Both were reorganisers, the work of both was lasting and its influence felt in later times. The reign of Justinian in the East and that of Charlemagne in the West may be considered as definitely terminating in those localities the period of anarchy and disorder inaugurated by the Teutonic invasions. Because of the warlike genius and administrative fitness of these two men the uncertainty as to what form of civilization would arise in the ruins caused by the Germans ceased. At widely different periods Justinian and Charlemagne caught up and restored what was left of organisation, of law and of civilization, and by sound administrative measures imposed them on people whom they had unified by the

sword and thus inaugurated new periods in the civilization of the East and the West.

Though an interval of two centuries separated Justinian and Charlemagne the same causes which gave one power and prestige in the Orient made the other master of the West. Both were called to repair the havoc caused by the successive floods of barbarian invasion which had penetrated the rich and well-organised provinces of the Roman Empire. A thousand years of conquest and triumph had made Rome mistress of the peoples of three continents: but she in turn was made to feel the sorrow and humiliation of pillage and defeat. The Goth, the Vandal, the Frank, the Burgundian, and the Hun had overrun the fertile fields and captured the fair cities of the Roman. Those who had been masters of the world were parcelled out as serfs among their conquerors, and compelled to do the work and obey the will of the uncultivated children of the forests and the fens. The rich hoards of gold and jewels, the treasures of art, the arms, the homes, and the temples which had been the glory of Rome were now the possession of men who could neither understand their use nor appreciate their beauty. The work of a thousand years had been undone in less than a century, and the civilization to which all the nations of antiquity had contributed was on the verge of extinction. The work of destruction is always rapid. The fifth century saw Rome crumble away and new masters install themselves in Gaul, Spain, Italy and Africa. No portion of the Empire had been free from the terrors and the horrors of war and pillage, but even in Rome with all her resources the work of destruction could not last indefinitely. After a century of disorder there came the slow work of reorganisation. This work went on more rapidly in the Orient than in the West. There the imperial administration though shorn of most of its power continued unbroken, and there it was that Justinian found his opportunity.

No better proof of the extent to which society had been moved to its profoundest depths during these years of disorder can be found than in the manner in which Justinian

was forced up from the obscurity of a peasant's hut in Macedonia to the throne of the Cæsars. His advancement was due to the influence of his uncle Justin, a true soldier of fortune, who as a youth exchanged all he possessed for a wallet of dry-bread to enable him to reach a Roman recruiting station. In the army he advanced rapidly and being childless he adopted his sister's son, Justinian, whom he provided with an education and for whom he found a place in the imperial civil service. The stout old soldier was rewarded, for when he became Emperor he found in Justinian just the man whom he stood in need of. For nine years Justinian served him faithfully, and unobtrusively relieved him of many of the details of administration with which he was incapable of dealing. In those years Justinian gained the experience which later on stood him in better stead than high lineage or martial renown.

No one has succeeded in drawing a satisfactory portrait of Justinian. Most writers on his life and reign are content to set aside the strictures of his contemporaries and his critics, and to say the man can best be judged by viewing him in connection with the work he accomplished. This is a fair though an inadequate test. A comparison of the world in 565 when he died, with what it was when he ascended the throne in 527, will show a measure of achievement which offers few, if any equals in history. The achievements of Justinian extend to practically all fields of human activity. The historians of religion, of education, of philosophy, of art, of architecture, of politics, will all find in his reign some act or occurrence which stands as a landmark in all these different fields of effort. Not the least of his deeds was to put new heart and courage into a people still struggling under the blows which had robbed them of more than half their Empire. East and West, North and South there was Roman territory to be recovered and there were victorious enemies to be chastised. Though no soldier himself, Justinian, through the genius and skill of his generals Belisarius and Narses, restored the military glory and prestige of Rome. Persia, the traditional rival and enemy of Rome was shut off from the Mediterranean and safe behind

the old boundaries was made harmless by a truce of fifty years. There could be no Roman Empire if Rome was not able to recover all that had once been hers. Under Justinian the Mediterranean once more became the centre of Roman power and the avenue of Roman conquest. With Belisarius the wave of conquest swept along the southern shore of the Mediterranean and carried before it the Vandal kingdom of Africa. In a campaign of a few months a kingdom that has lasted a century was swept to destruction, leaving not a trace behind. In regular order the same irresistible power swept over the islands of the Mediterranean, and once more Sicily, the granary of Rome, sent her corn-ships to the Roman capital.

Another Teutonic kingdom, that of the Ostrogoths, which, under the guidance of the brave and far-seeing Theodoric, had advanced so far in the arts of peace that it may be said to have justified its conquest of Rome and Italy, unfortunately stood in the way of Justinian's plans, and it too was annihilated. The other branch of the Gothic people, the Visigoths, who had established themselves in Spain, were made to yield up a large portion of the territory they had conquered. "The geographical aspect," says Freeman, "of the map of Europe has seldom been so completely changed within a single generation as it was during the reign of Justinian. At his accession his dominion was bounded to the West by the Adriatic, and he was far from possessing the whole of the Adriatic Coast." Under his reign the power of the Roman arms and the Roman law were again extended to the ocean. Roman power and Roman influence were once more restored in all Roman lands except those where the Franks ruled, and "even those lands were destined to become once more part of a Roman Empire, but a bishop of old Rome, not an Emperor of New Rome was to bring this about two hundred and fifty years later."

The military successes of the reign of Justinian would alone entitle him to a unique place in history. So too would his work as a builder of great and beautiful edifices. Despite the fact that the Roman world had been beaten prostrate and that a century of war and havoc had just passed, Justinian was not

only able to find architects and artists, but even the means to make of his reign one of the most glorious periods in the history of art. Santa Sophia, "the most perfect monument of Christian piety," as it has been called is also a monument to the artistic instincts and spirit which Justinian quickened and encouraged. In the midst of war he knew how to make the arts of peace flourish and here too he has raised to himself a unique and perpetual memorial.

The work, however, with which the name of Justinian is most inseparably connected, is the great *Corpus Juris Civilis*, the codification of Roman Law. At his instance and under his direction a commission was organized, composed of the best jurists in the Empire, to bring order out of the chaos which ruled in the world of Roman Jurisprudence. The various sections of this huge undertaking were carried out with a rapidity and thoroughness that is astounding. All that Rome stood for, with a slight blending of Christianity, was crystallised in this Body of Civil Law and for weal or woe laid at the feet of humanity. "Rightly and justly, therefore, is the name of the peasant's son from the valley of the Vardar mentioned with reverence, wherever from the Mississippi to the Ganges, teachers of law expound the greatest of Rome's legacies to the nations, the *Corpus Juris Civilis*."

These represent but a part of the manifold activities of Justinian. He was a writer, a theologian, a diplomat, an administrator, and in everything that he undertook, he attained a certain eminence where he did not excel. Supreme accomplishment is hardly possible where the interest is divided; but it is no small accomplishment to have been the guiding and directing spirit, unifying and coördinating all the activities with which the reign of Justinian is filled. It might be well if we could dismiss the subject here, and say that in the great works he planned and executed we find the measure of his soul and mind, but that would not give us the true Justinian. There was another side to his character, which had a more potent influence in determining his place in history.

At the beginning of his reign Justinian declared that his

purpose was to restore the ancient glories of Rome and with the execution of this purpose nothing was allowed to interfere. In order to get money to carry on his numerous schemes at home and abroad, cruel and unjust methods of taxation were resorted to. The people, impoverished by the exactions of the tax gatherers, were compelled to forced labor in the government service. The name of Justinian's Praetorian Prefect and tax-gatherer, John of Cappadocia, is as truly symbolic of his reign as those of his generals and his architects. The words of Justinian and the ceremonial of his court show that no man who wore the diadem of the Caesars was more concerned for the prestige and glory of the office than he, yet he took as his consort and crowned as co-regent a woman whose depravity and licentiousness were known in every city of the Empire. He shocked and wounded the sensibilities of his compatriots, but his life was simple, even austere. He never showed excitement nor does he seem to have been capable of enthusiasm. He was the cold, calculating, implacable reincarnation of Roman pagan imperialism. He was just, but he could be cruel; he loved ostentation, but his life was simple; he knew how to curry favor with what Diehl calls the "canaille of the circus," but he could slay them by the thousand without a qualm. He could bend the world to his will, but he himself was bent and warped by the spirit of the institutions which he controlled and directed. He could not escape the spirit of Roman law, the genius of pagan institutions or the tradition of Roman Caesarism. "He represents," says Bury, "the last stage in the evolution of the Roman Imperium: in him was fulfilled its ultimate absolutism. From Augustus to Diocletian there was a dualism, the 'dyarchy,' of the Emperor and the Senate which was abolished in the monarchy of Diocletian; and from Constantine to Justinian there was another dualism between the Church and the imperium, which passed into Justinian's absolutism. . . . The historian Agathias expresses Justinian's absolute government by saying: "of those who reigned at Byzantium, he was the first absolute sovereign in deed as well as in name."

This sums of the character of Justinian's administration and

the main achievement of his life and reign. Bury says of him: "He may be likened to a colossal Janus bestriding the way of passage between the Ancient and Mediæval worlds." He did not bestride, he blocked the way. The mediæval world demanded of him that he give an answer to the problem of how Church and State were to be related. His answer was to ignore the reform of Constantine and to throw the world backward to the political conditions of a Trajan or a Decius. To the mind of Justinian there was no Church *and* State. There was state absolutism with a department of religion, and, following in the footsteps of Constantius, he was willing to aid and encourage the Church, but it was a Church wholly dependent on the head of the State. Cæsar was head of the State, and head of the Church and Cæsarpapism was Justinian's contribution to the civilization which he had aided so nobly in saving.

Though a Christian, a mystic, and a theologian, Justinian failed to seize the true spiritual significance of Christianity. He reverted to the pagan ideal, and not only in word but in deed showed that he considered himself absolute master over the Church as well as the State. He made laws for the Church, he dictated to councils, he drew up doctrinal formulæ, and by imperial edict regulated matters of faith. While Cæsarpapism is infinitely better than the raw heathenism of the earlier times, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that Justinian brought the progress of civilization to a stop, or rather turned it back into the old channels. Edmund Burke said he did not know how to draw up an indictment against a whole civilization. In order to point out the numbing effect of Justinian's action on the civilization and history of the Eastern branch of Christendom, it would be necessary to analyse and describe what Byzantium has represented in the affairs of mankind. It may be said in justification and defence of Justinian that the forces which he used were already in existence and operative before he came to the throne, that he was not more culpable than a Zeno or an Anastasius, but a statesman can hardly be exonerated if he repeats the mistakes of his predecessors, and a man, and especially a ruler, is judged as well by his sins

of omission as by his sins of commission. He had a great opportunity and he failed. Had he been less self-centred, had he lived more for people and less for institutions, had he turned his face to the future instead of the past, he might have seen that Christianity had unlocked the human spirit, that a way had been shown by which it might escape the chafing limits of institutions which it had exhausted and which it had outgrown, and that a new civilization would arise from the effort to satisfy new spiritual longings and aspirations. This task was reserved for other times and other peoples.

To trace the steps by which the people of Western Europe were brought out of the chaos and disorder which prevailed there at the time that Justinian commenced his work of reorganisation would be the surest way to point how deep and widespread this disorder was. What was accomplished in less than one generation in the East, took nearly three centuries in the West. When the Western Empire came to an end, swallowed up in general disintegration, the only fact for many decades which contained any promise of better things was the conversion of Clovis and his Franks to the Christian religion. The only ones among the great Teutonic confederations to become orthodox Christians directly, the Franks alone succeeded in establishing a permanent kingdom within the limits of the old Roman Empire. It was a matter of no small moment when all the forces of disruption were at work, that the head of the most powerful Teutonic Confederation should be brought into the current of orthodox Christian thought in the West. This fact affected all subsequent history. The Franks became the leaders and subsequently the rulers in Western Europe. By slow degrees a counterpart to the Eastern Empire had grown up in the West and in the eighth century all of the territory between the Elbe and the Ebro was under the dominion of one man. All the provinces which had formerly belonged to Rome with the exception of Britain, part of Spain and Italy together with enormous possessions in Germany, were governed by Charlemagne.

There are some few things to be remarked in connection with the condition of the Frankish kingdom at this time. In the

first place it was based on a union of Roman and Teutonic elements. In language, law and manners the two elements subsisted side by side. No general amalgamation had taken place. In the second place, the Franks were devotedly attached to their religion. Thus at the end of the eighth century all these forces seemed to be waiting for the impulse from within or without, which would cause them to coalesce into a new civilization. Two circumstances contributed to this result:—the administrative measures of Charlemagne and his relations with the Holy See.

Charlemagne became joint ruler of the Frankish dominions in 768 and sole ruler in 771. Though no less an authority on imperial standards than Napoleon was satisfied to take Charlemagne as his model, the propriety of incorporating the word "great" in his name has often been questioned: but if his reign is judged by its spirit and results rather than by isolated incidents in his career, it may with all justice be admitted that the verdict of his own nation will be sustained.

When he came to the throne he found the people under his sceptre with neither unity, ideals, nor a spirit of national destiny. They were exposed to constant attacks from the enemies along their borders and they were sunk in ignorance. It is no exaggeration to say that what the historian can discern by contrast with other peoples and other times was clear to the eye of Charlemagne from the beginning. He followed from his coronation a consistent policy, and when he laid down the sceptre, the foundations had been laid on which are built the great nations of Europe. Many causes within his kingdom contributed to retard his work of unification, not the least among them being the spirit of fission which afterwards contributed so powerfully to the growth of feudalism. Another obstacle arose from the slothful methods of his Frankish predecessors who subdued many nations, but ruled none of them.

Charlemagne's merits as a ruler can best be judged from his work of defence, of administration and education, or his work as a soldier, a statesman and a teacher. In a reign lasting 47 years he directed 53 military campaigns. For eight years he waged war with the Avars and for thirty-three with the

Saxons. He never desisted until his enemies admitted defeat or retired beyond his borders. He surrounded his Empire with a line of fortified posts, behind which he carried on his work of education and organisation.

His plans were bounded only by his Empire and by the capacity of his people for advancement, and in the midst of his wars and diplomatic struggles there was no detail of administration too small or insignificant to be neglected. He drew up practically an entire legal code, but he could at the same time decide how children ought to be taught to sing church hymns, and what kind of plants would best suit certain localities. In his scheme of government he aimed at a method of administration by which the good of all the people would be provided for, and by which the laws would be justly and equitably administered. Charlemagne however, does not owe his position in history so much to his merits as a warrior or statesman, as he does to the fact that in his person was revived the Roman Empire of the West. Mr. James Bryce says: "The coronation of Charles is not only the central event of the Middle Ages, it is also one of those very few events of which taking them singly, it may be said that if they had not happened, the history of the world would have been different."

The facts leading to this important event are briefly these. The Lombards gradually forced themselves into Rome and Roman affairs, until the pressure became intolerable, and the Popes seeing no hope either in an appeal to the imperial Exarch in Ravenna or to the imperial ruler in Constantinople, turned for aid to the Franks. Pepin and after him his son Charles made several expeditions to Italy and placed themselves in the position of defenders of the Holy See. It is useless to discuss the question as to whether the Pope had the right to crown Charles Emperor, the fact of importance is, that by crowning him, he performed an act which moulded the course of history for centuries. Charles was the greatest ruler in the West, he was ruler in Italy by virtue of assumption of the iron crown of Lombardy, and by becoming Emperor he became a figure in universal history because his act was an open and formal answer to the problem raised by Con-

stantine nearly 500 years before. For Western Europe the question was answered in regard to the relations of Church and State. It would not, perhaps, be accurate to say that Charlemagne evolved a new theory of these relations, but it is certain that as head of a State he took a position towards the Church which was in accordance with the traditional theory of the Church. The attitude of the Western Church towards the state had been clearly defined centuries before and in entering into close relations with the Church, Charlemagne tacitly, but none the less formally, accepted that attitude and that theory. As early as the fifth century, the Popes in conflict with the Emperors, had expressly formulated this theory, that in Christian society the spiritual and the temporal powers are, in the first place, entrusted to two different orders, each deriving its authority from God, each supreme in its own sphere, and independent within its own sphere of the other. In the second place, while these two authorities are each independent, and supreme in their own spheres, they are also mutually dependent and cannot avoid relations one with the other.

None knew better than Charlemagne the meaning of this relation. Writing to Leo III on the occasion of the latter's election to the Pontificate, he said: "It is our task to defend by arms from without, the Holy Church of Christ from the ravages of the pagan and the infidel, and from within by the profession of the Catholic faith. It is yours, lifting your hands to God, with Moses, to help our warlike endeavors with your prayers." Such was Charlemagne's conception of the relation of Church and State, such his answer to the problem of the Middle Ages.

All the questions as to whether Charlemagne really desired to receive the crown from the hands of the Pope, whether he was convinced that the Pope had the right to crown him, or whether he ever fully realised the significance of this act, are of little importance. What is of importance is that he approved and put into effect a manner of relation between Church and State which formed the basis of Mediæval European civilization. The work of Charlemagne was the continuation and complement of the work of Constantine. Without im-

pairing in the least the monarch's usefulness or authority it imposed on him new obligations to defend the Church and the helpless.

Not only did Charlemagne give Mediæval society the form and impress it retained for centuries, but he may be said to have given that society an impulse that saved it from subsequent destruction. When the unity of Empire which he had established was crumbling away in the reigns of his weak and incompetent successors, the position in which he had placed the Church made it a bond of unity when all other ties failed. The ideals of Charlemagne survived the days of Carolingian failure and decline and were brought to full realisation by Hildebrand, under whose skilful hand the forces were moulded and directed which produced the great nations of Europe, with their spirit of liberty and progress.

Thus from a difference in the manner in which two men conceived and executed a duty imposed on them by the position they occupied, have come the two main currents of civilization as represented in the two sections of Christendom. How far the failure or the achievements of these two branches of civilization are to be attributed to the two men who were so largely responsible for the direction they received it is not easy to say. Byzantium and Western Christendom represent something totally different, one represents dwindling influence, suppression of popular liberties, suffocation of art and aspiration, and the very essence of state absolutism. The other stands for progress, culture, for the growth of popular sovereignty, and the widest measure of popular liberty consistent with good order.

The question of Church and State is ever old and ever new. It is the question of collectivism versus individualism, of State absolutism or popular rights, and for the world of the present seeking in so many quarters an outlet for its difficulties and its problems by enlarging social control and the powers of the State, there may be a valuable lesson in the contrast offered by the civilizations bearing respectively the imprint of Justinian and Charlemagne.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Expositio Regulae Fratrum Minorum, Auctore Fr. Angelo Clareno. Quam nunc primum edidit notisque illustravit P. Livarius Oliger, O. F. M. Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi). Typis Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1912. 16°, pp. lxxviii—250. Price, 6½ francs.

It is well known that even during the lifetime of St. Francis of Assisi a division had shown itself in the ranks of his followers as to the observance of the Rule and that this division resulted in the formation of two parties within the order of Friars Minor designated respectively by later writers the *Zelanti* or "Spirituals" and the *Relaxati*. The former insisted on the literal following of the primitive Rule "without gloss" while the latter favored a relaxation of its rigor especially as regards Poverty. These mystic disputes among the Franciscans, which lasted over a century and which were marked by revolt on the one hand and by repression on the other,—both accompanied by harshness and even cruelty,—gave rise to a very considerable literature. In the mass of controversial writings which thus grew up round the Rule of the Friars Minor the works of Angelo Clareno are of special interest and importance. This remarkable man entered the Franciscan order in or about 1260 and soon became the leader of the "Spiritual" Friars in the Marches of Ancona. Hunted and persecuted by his adversaries during his whole life, Angelo Clareno died in 1337. Among the works of Clareno that have come down to us the best known are undoubtedly his *Chronica Septem Tribulationum Ordinis Minorum*, a complete edition of which is now in course of preparation at Quaracchi, his *Epistola Excusatoria ad Papam* which has been edited by Fr. Ehrle, S. J., in the *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte* and his *Expositio Regulae Ordinis Fratrum Minorum* a work now published for the first time in the volume under review.

Students of Franciscan history have long felt the need of a critical edition of Clareno's Exposition of the Rule of his Order, not indeed that it has any great practical value nowadays but

because of the light it throws upon the complicated early history of the "Spiritual" Franciscans and because it may be regarded in some measure as an apology for the line of conduct followed by Clareno and his disciples. The present edition of Clareno's work was worth waiting for. It would have been difficult, perhaps, to find anyone more fitted for the difficult task of editing such a work than Fr. Livarius Oliger who has long made the history of the Franciscan Rule and of the "Spiritual" Friars a special study. So far as concerns knowledge of his sources—whether this be in the form of inedited mss. or of printed material—he is thoroughly equipped. The sum of his researches is embodied in the critical Introduction to the present volume (pp. i-lxxviii) which opens with a detailed description of the early mss. in which Clareno's exposition may be found and an accurate account of the fragments of the work already published. Next follows a biographical sketch of Clareno covering twelve pages which adds not a little to our knowledge of his life. This is supplemented by a list of Clareno's writings including the works he translated from the Greek. Among these writings the *Expositio Regulae* is, of course, dealt with at greatest length, many interesting questions being touched upon as to the date of its composition, the sources from which it derives its value and authority. After this comes the Exposition itself in twelve chapters (pp. 1-236), the text here published being taken from a XIV century codex now preserved at S. Isidore's College, Rome, which the Editor has carefully collated with several other early mss. The value of the text before us is moreover greatly enhanced by the scholarly notes of reference and explanation which elucidate the standpoint of the author and the more important allusions contained in the Exposition. Only those who know something of the difficulty attending the editing of mediæval documents will be able to appreciate the labor involved in the preparation of the present volume. The patient and careful scholarship is a delight. Indeed Fr. Oliger's edition of Clareno is a really notable work and is in its way beyond all praise.

FR. PASCHAL ROBINSON, O. F. M.

Christ's Teaching concerning Divorce, in the New Testament.

An exegetical study. By Rev. Francis E. Gigot, D. D. New York, Benziger. 1912. Pp. 282.

Most of our so-called Christian nations pretend to follow the maxims of Christ, and yet many of them legalize remarriage after separation of husband and wife. Protestant churches claim not only that Christ allowed divorce in the case of infidelity, but that this was only a model case, and that He was not opposed to divorce and subsequent wedlock for reasons of similar import. For those who believe in the divine mission of Christ, His words ought to be law, and no matter what reasons the human mind can put forward against the permanency of the marriage-tie, they must be set aside if they disagree with the Master's teaching. The teaching of Christ is for the believer, the starting point and it is compliance with it that will render any legislation on divorce Christian or un-Christian. But what is that teaching? It is this fundamental question that Dr. Gigot has undertaken to investigate, on strictly scientific lines; surely, there could not be any study more actual or more welcome to the honest seeker after truth.

The passages of the New Testament in which are recorded the sayings of Jesus on divorce, are the following: Mark, x, 2-12; Luke, xvi, 18; 1 Cor. vii, Matt. v, 31-32; xix, 3-12.

These passages are subjected to a very minute analysis by Dr. Gigot. He deals with them in a manner that reveals not only the severe dialectician but also the true historian: he sets each passage in its context, points out the insidious questions that gave rise to Christ's answers, and interprets it in the light of the historical circumstances in which it was uttered. Such a painstaking and methodical analysis shows that the author is equal to the task that he has set for himself, and reflects great credit upon him. This applies especially to the famous passages of St. Matthew in which is to be found the clause 'except for fornication.' Our Lord was well acquainted with the difference between the two schools of Hillel and Shammai with regard to the interpretation of the 'Eruath Dabhar,' the ground given by Deuter. xxiv, 1, for delivering a bill of divorce. Hillel maintained that the expression meant anything that would displease the husband, provided the bill of divorce be delivered; Shammai restricted it to the case of infidelity. Shammai was right, and his interpretation corresponds to the original purpose of the Mosaic legislation. Yet, as Dr.

Gigot shows, Jesus did not intend to side with Shammai against Hillel, but directly and explicitly gave his teaching as the abrogation of that of Moses. In St. Matthew, therefore, there is question only of separation, but remarriage after separation is branded as adulterous intercourse.

We can hardly do justice to the author in such a short notice, but we recommend his work to the readers of the *Bulletin*. We confidently hope that this little volume will contribute to check the advance of the greatest of modern social evils, divorce.

R. BUTIN.

Faith and Suggestion, including an Account of the Remarkable Experience of Dorothy Kerin, by Edwin L. Ash. Philadelphia, Reilly, 1912. 12mo., 151 pp. \$1.25 net.

The object which the author has had in mind in writing this little book is a laudable one. It is to show how unfounded are the claims of a materialistic pseudo-science to have disproved the existence of Soul and Spirit, and to have explained all psychical and religious experiences by the agency of purely natural causes. "Realising the morbid effect on many of a belief that modern science has finally banished the spiritual sphere and put the Soul out of court, it occurred to me that I might further help some who sought my aid by collecting the opinions of many of these scientists and psychologists who have made it clear that nothing has yet been 'proved' to make the position of the materialists impregnable. These investigations," he adds, "point more and more strongly in the direction of the spiritual."

Making use of the modern teaching of psychologists like the late Professor James in regard to the sub-conscious activity of the mind, he argues that it can be viewed as the 'open door' through which influences from the world of Spirit are made accessible to favored individuals. These influences often take the form of divine, supernatural suggestion, conveying distinct communications from God and also bringing about miraculous cures. In illustration of his point, he describes the remarkable cure of a young woman of London, Dorothy Kerin, who after seven years of illness, variously diagnosed as tuberculosis, and as hysteria simulating tuberculosis,

was reduced to a state of absolute physical exhaustion, in which she was only partly conscious and lost the use of sight and hearing. On February 18, 1912, as her relatives were gathered at her bedside looking for her death at any moment, she had a vision of an angel, radiant with a light of indescribable beauty, who touched her and said in a tone audible only to herself, "Dorothy, your sufferings are over; get up and walk." To the astonishment of all present, she sat up, opened her eyes, called for her dressing-gown, got out of bed, walked and ate food, and has ever since been in excellent health. This remarkable cure is vouched for by evidence beyond cavil. Of its supernatural character Miss Kerin is absolutely convinced, and the author of the book under review shares her conviction. The physicians and nurses who attended her for the last two years of her illness pronounced it at the time advanced tuberculosis. But the fact that in its earlier stages, the ailment was thought by some to be of hysterical nature has led others to doubt whether it was, after all, a genuine organic disease. There are some, therefore, who would hesitate before asserting that the cure, remarkable as it is, was miraculous.

The author has a peculiar habit of defying grammar by writing as sentences what are mere dependent clauses or detached phrases. Instances will be found on pages xi, xii, 18, 67, 125. Apart from this, he tells what he has to say in an interesting manner.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Spiritual Perfection through Charity, by H. R. Buckler, O. P.
New York, Benziger, 1911. 12mo., 346 pp. \$1.50 net.

Father Buckler is a prolific writer on the subject of spiritual improvement and piety. He has won an honorable name in this field of literature by such works as *Spiritual Consideration*, *A Few Aids to Faith*, *A Good Practical Catholic*, *A Spiritual Retreat*, *A Few First Principles of Religious Life*, and *Spiritual Instructions on Religious Life*. The present volume is a worthy continuation of this series. It consists of a chain of instructions originally addressed to the young religious of his order, afterwards adapted to a much wider circle of readers. Both the secular priest and the piously inclined layman will find

the book interesting and profitable. It is made up of two parts, called books. Book I, comprising seven chapters, deals with the end and nature of spiritual perfection. Book II aims at showing how through the manifold exercise of charity progress can be made towards the noble ideal of Christian perfection. The treatment of this elevating theme is characterized by sound judgment and by a sympathetic consideration for the imperfections and failures of aspirants after perfection. The author gives evidence of a wide range of reading in the classic, spiritual and ascetic writings approved by the Church, apt citations from which are to be found on almost every page. He also has command of a pleasing, flowing style, a thing which is not always found in books of this kind. Chapter VII of Book I, on *Religious Perfection*, and Chapters VI and VII of Book II, bearing the titles, *Mortification* and *Riddance of Faults and Fears*, are instructions of exceptional excellence. For spiritual reading it is a work worth while.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Little Sermons on the Catechism, from the Italian of Cosimo Corsi, Cardinal Archbishop of Pisa. Vol. II. New York, Joseph F. Wagner, 1911. 8vo., 207 pp. \$1.00 net.

Books of sermons are always welcome to the busy priest. They are the handy storehouses, from which he can draw at short notice a suitable theme to speak on to his flock. The present volume offers fifty-two short instructions on a variety of subjects suited to young and old. In treatment these instructions are solid and plain, bare of illustration, devoid of anything like literary flavor. To the trained preacher they will furnish material for building up useful sermons. It is a pity that no attempt was made to arrange them in something like an orderly sequence. As the table of contents now stands, it is a jumble of titles thrown together haphazard.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Damoisele a la Mule (La mule sanz frain), conte en vers du cycle arthurien par Paiens de Maisieres, nouvelle édition critique par Boles las Orłowski. Paris, Champion, 1911. xi+224 pp. (Thèse pour le doctorat de l'Université de Paris.)

La mule sans frain, an Arthurian romance by Paiens de Maisieres, edited with introduction, notes and glossary by Raymond Thompson Hill. Baltimore, J. H. Furst Company, 1911. 71 pp. (Dissertation, Yale University.)

The two books were written simultaneously, the one in France, the other in America. The latter is nothing more than a new revised edition of the text, the introduction containing only a brief review of the Old French language. There is wanting in this treatise all comparative study in regard to the sources, origin and development of the poem, to the motifs and character of the work, and to its relation to Chrétien de Troyes, as a new edition in our times demands (although in a footnote the editor promises to do this in some later time). I am very curious as to the nature of this proposed work, as I for myself had planned a new edition and had collected material for it. The other dissertation makes an effort to give what its companion lacks. But I am able to show that the author's views regarding the relation between the Old French romance and the Old German literature are incorrect. Had he taken "une comparaison minutieuse du roman français et du poème allemand" (compare *Romania*, Tome xli, No. 161, 1912), he would have been more successful in his work. Mario Roques is right in calling attention to this fact, in the above-mentioned *Romania*. In the next publication of the *Catholic University Bulletin* I hope to be able to give this comparison with the important connections concerning the source of "La mule sanz frain." I am prepared to say that the German romance "Diu Krône" of Heinrich von dem Türlîn translates almost line for line the French poem and was influenced by the "Ivain" of Hartmann von Aue.—A new edition only of the text of "Païen de Maisières" with its few variations is scarcely of any value.

PAUL GLEIS.

De Curia Romana: Eius Historia ac Hodierna Disciplina iuxta Reformationem a Pio X inductam: auctore Arthur Monin, J. C. L. in Universitate Catholica Lovaniensi Iuris Canonici Professore Extraordinario. Pp. 394. Lovanii, Van Linthout, 1912. 5 frs.

The Roman Court has long offered an inviting subject to the pen of the canonist, as is witnessed by the long list of authors, ancient and modern, who have devoted themselves to its study. Much of what has been written in the past still retains interest and value from an historical point of view, but—in so far as actual practice is concerned—even the most classical treatises that appeared before 1908 have been antiquated by the Constitution *Sapienti Consilio* of Pius X. A signal proof of this is found, *e. g.*, in the fact that the latest edition of one of the most recent and authoritative of canonical text-books declares that any discussion of the Rota pertains only to legal history and archæology, and not to existing discipline.

The need created by the *Sapienti Consilio* has been met by numerous works devoted to an explanation of the important changes wrought by that document in the organization and competency of the congregations, tribunals and offices which constitute the Roman Curia in the stricter sense of that term. And precisely in view of the many laborers in this new field, it is no slight praise of the present work to say that there are few comparable with it in thoroughness, scholarship and adaptation to practical needs. Compendious as it is, it leaves little to be desired, whether one seeks knowledge of the history or wishes to learn the present province of action of the bodies created to assist the Sovereign Pontiff in matters judicial and administrative relating to the universal Church.

No detail of importance or interest is neglected; the bibliography is unusually complete and up-to-date; what is valuable in other commentaries is fully utilized; even the method of having recourse to the various organs of the Curia is indicated so that one who has at hand this manual will—for ordinary purposes—rarely find reason to look further for information or guidance.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Letter of His Eminence the Chancellor.

CARDINAL'S RESIDENCE,
408 NORTH CHARLES STREET.

BALTIMORE, MD., *November 3, 1912.*

Reverend dear Sir:

On the approach of the First Sunday in Advent, the day set aside for the annual collection in favor of the Catholic University of America, it becomes my pleasing duty to appeal with great earnestness to our hierarchy, clergy, and people for a continuance of the support they have so generously given us in the past, and the splendid results of which are now manifesting themselves in large and unexpected benefits to the Catholic Church in our beloved nation.

The growth of the lay departments of the University in the last three years has been truly phenomenal. From a modest figure the number of students in all departments receiving instruction from its professors has reached one thousand, and the indications are that in the next decade this figure will be doubled or trebled, so that even in point of numbers the Catholic University will, in our own generation, rank among the most successful schools of the nation.

Two large and useful edifices have been added to the noble group of buildings that ornament the grounds; a central plant for power, heat and light, and the beautiful Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall, now completed, and accommodating one hundred and thirty young men from all parts of the Union.

The library has increased to 80,000 volumes and will soon be one of our country's most important collections of up-to-date books. The laboratories of Chemistry, Physics and Biology have notably increased their equipment, and in general solid growth and varied activity characterize the daily life of this great central school of the Catholic Church.

Especially gratifying is the increase in the body of lay students; their rapid growth is at once a cause for rejoicing and a source of much concern as to the capacity of our residence halls, now filled to overflowing.

The professors have increased in numbers from twenty-eight to fifty-six and, not only by their teaching but by their writings and their public discourses, they illustrate honorably our Catholic life and compel an increasing admiration for Catholic learning and culture. While the Schools of Law and the Sciences show in particular a gratifying increase, the Schools of Philosophy and Letters are also developing rapidly. The University Summer School for our Teaching Sisters welcomed over three hundred of them from twenty-six religious orders and most of the States, while the recently established Sisters College has already, in its infancy, fifty students. In this way the benefits of the University are soon brought home to the remotest parish in our country, and not only the sons of our Catholic people but their consecrated daughters can drink at the fountain of knowledge which the popular generosity has opened and sustains.

Such a large growth, however, creates an urgent demand for more professors and immediate equipment, particularly for new buildings. Besides a new residence hall and an ample dining hall for at least six hundred students, the University needs a new chemical laboratory, a gymnasium, a library, and other edifices, if it is to conduct its work with the dignity and efficiency befitting an institution that represents the attitude of the Catholic Church towards learning.

It is the duty, and should be the pleasure, of all our Catholics to uphold and develop a religious work of this magnitude and promise. Already the Catholic University illustrates in several ways our immemorial devotion to human progress along its highest lines, and contributes abundantly to the defence and spread of our holy faith. Even now all visitors to the National Capital are filled with admiration at the size and number and character of its buildings, though yet in its infancy. It is becoming the recognized center for all our larger religious interests, both educational and charitable, and cannot fail to render incalculable service to the generations that follow, and for whose welfare we ought now to plan.

Every diocese has a living interest in the great work, for it is

now drawing students from the remotest quarters whose enlightened faith and noble zeal will in years to come justify all our sacrifices. I am well aware that the local works of religion make heavy demands upon our people, but we ought not to forget the larger and more general interests of our holy religion, and foremost among these is the Catholic University, if only for the high quality of scholarly leadership that it is destined to create and to keep up in the eventful period on which we are now entering. Were it only as a public and efficient protest against the highly secularized teaching of non-Catholic universities our own would be necessary, and would call for our most earnest support.

Our wealthier Catholic people who are often generous in the support of religion, ought to consider more seriously their duty towards this great central school of the Church and by endowments, scholarships, and special gifts encourage and develop it in each generation, until this new Oxford shall be filled with the honored names and the grateful memories of countless benefactors, whose services to Catholic education will perhaps be all that men will one day recall of their careers on earth.

Our Holy Father Pius X is most deeply concerned for the growth of the University, and last winter heard with delight the excellent report which the Rector of the University was able to present him. He gave him the noble pontifical letter that all know in favor of the University, and with it his paternal blessing on all who would in any way help the bishops of our country in their great task of upbuilding a central school of the higher studies that should be worthy of the name and an honor to religion. Let us all co-operate earnestly in developing this holy work that is making such rapid progress, is already our consolation and our pride, and will be eventually not only the intellectual fortress of our holy faith, but also a glorious site of all the arts, a home of letters, and an inspirational center for all that the Catholic religion can accomplish in the cause of humanity.

Yours faithfully in Christ,

JAMES CARDINAL GIBBONS,
Chancellor of the Catholic University.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Opening of the Academic Year. The academic year 1912-1913 was solemnly opened on Sunday, October 6. Solemn High Mass was celebrated in the Assembly Room of MacMahon Hall, after which the Right Reverend Rector addressed the students.

Public Lectures. The Fall Course of Public Lectures at the University began on Thursday, October 17. The following are the dates and subjects:

October 17.—“The Political Economy of Alcohol,” Dr. Frank O’Hara.

October 24.—“Justinian and Charlemagne,” the Very Rev. Dr. Patrick J. Healy.

October 31.—“Catholic Charities,” the Rev. Dr. William J. Kerby.

November 7.—“Archbishop Ketteler: a Great Catholic Social Reformer,” the Rev. Dr. James J. Fox.

November 14.—“Saint Francis of Assisi,” the Rt. Rev. Monsignor Shahan.

November 21.—“Juan Luis Vives, Educator (1540),” the Rev. Dr. Patrick J. McCormick.

December 5.—“Literature and Politics,” Dr. Charles H. McCarthy.

December 12.—“Medieval Welsh Romances: the Mabinogion,” Dr. Joseph Dunn.

Typical Christian Hymns. The attention of Mr. Maurice Francis Egan, our Minister to Denmark, has been drawn by Mr. Angul Hammerich, of Copenhagen, to some unpublished and hitherto unknown sequences by Scandinavian monks of the Middle Ages in the Northern countries. In order to examine these, to complete his lectures on “Typical Christian Hymns,” he has asked permission of President Lowell of Harvard University to postpone his eight lectures at that University until the winter of 1914. President Lowell has very kindly granted this request.

Meeting of the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees held its semi-annual meeting, Wednesday, November 20th, 1912.


Matters of routine were first taken up and disposed of.


The Trustees expressed themselves as very much pleased with the large growth in the student body of the University and measures were taken to provide in due time the buildings that the increase of the University has made absolutely necessary.

The Trustees agreed to take over the publication of the great Paris collection of the Oriental Christian writers (*Corpus Scriptorum Orientalium*), of which seventy-five volumes have already appeared. This large enterprise will be henceforth conducted in coöperation with the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium. Eventually it will contain all the Christian writers in Syriac, Coptic, Ethiopic and Arabic. Distinguished scholars from many universities of Europe will coöperate in this work and several volumes will be published annually.


The Trustees visited Gibbons Memorial Hall and congratulated the venerable Cardinal and Chancellor of the University on the splendid edifice that will henceforth perpetuate his memory at the University, and of which he has been from the beginning the principal support and benefactor.

Dr. Thomas C. Carrigan, Associate Professor of Law and Acting-Dean of the Law School, was elected James Whiteford Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School. Peter J. McLaughlin was appointed Associate Professor of Law and Vice-Dean of the Law School.











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